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ABSTRACT 

IS Security (ISS) has become a key element of business risk management and can itself 
create competitive advantage. Thus, organisations seek practical approaches to protect 
the operation of the business. Protecting the functionality of an organisation is a 
difficult task but it is the responsibility of both senior management and ISS functions to 
do so. An analysis of the ISS literature reveals a paucity of research of ISS 
management, and a need for research to develop a holistic model for managing ISS 
knowledge to overcome the ever-increasing number of negative security incidents. The 
ISS research community is restrained by small-scale technical questions as the social 
aspects of ISS are ignored resulting in fragmented research across the IS field. While 
several possible methods are scattered throughout the literature – they focus on the 
development of information systems. ISS professionals require a range of skills 
encompassing business knowledge, legal awareness, and organisational processes as 
well as technical security knowledge. Research to date has failed to provide an 
integrated approach to managing ISS knowledge. 
This study investigates how ISS could leverage the concept of knowledge management. 
It proposes a theoretical model derived from the ISS and KM literatures. Thus to 
address this gap in research, this study adopts an exploratory interpretive holistic case 
study approach using interviews and document analysis as data gathering methods. The 
study will focus on the relationship between ISS and KM and the proposed benefits that 
an ISS KM initiative would produce. An analysis of the approaches used by these 
specialised structures in managing knowledge within and across the two case studies 
facilitated the development of an integrated model. The interplay between the functions 
provided rich description of the approaches used to manage knowledge. This research 
builds on previous studies documented in the ISS literature, by providing a much needed 
model against which practitioners may diagnose problems, plan action and implement 
solutions. ISS models and standards today do not exhibit much flexibility, therefore 
managers make ISS decisions in a vacuum. ISS problems can be managed or reduced 
when the ISS functions and management are aware of the full range of controls 
available and implement the most effective. Unfortunately, they often lack this 
knowledge and their subsequent actions to cope with threats are less effective. 
The focus of ISS research to date has been technical and grounded in positivism and 
few, if any, studies utilise a qualitative approach, therefore eliminating holistic, in-
depth rich descriptions of core issues within the field. Comparatively little work has 
taken a managerial point of view, covering broad organisational and social issues. This 
study acknowledges these issues and provides a solid conceptual foundation for future 
studies on ISS by answering calls for a theoretical model to guide research in the area. 
The study also identifies the positive and negative impacts of compliance and describes 
how organisations can apply the model to overcome these negative effects. 
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CHAPTER ONE

THE IS SECURITY CHALLENGE 

1.0 Introduction 
This Chapter highlights the scarcity of, and need for, research to develop a holistic 
model for managing IS Security knowledge to overcome the ever-increasing number of 
negative security incidents. Section 1.1 highlights the negative consequences of 
deficiencies in IS Security and the importance of knowledge of risks and threats. 
Section 1.2 defines IS Security, knowledge management and organisations as the 
Chapters of this thesis are implicitly rooted in these definitions. Section 1.3 presents the 
research objective and the research questions. The section also provides an overview of 
the relevance and rigour of the study. The section explains how this study extends the 
body of empirical evidence by developing a model consisting of people, processes and 
technology. Section 1.4 describes and illustrates the organisation of the thesis.  Finally 
Section 1.5 concludes the Chapter. 
1.1 Studying IS Security in Organisations 
In just a few decades, the use of IT/IS has formalised information management and 
streamlined the administration of organisations (Galliers & Newell, 2001; Dhillon, 
2006). The significance of IS Security for an organisation is proportional to the 
organisation’s dependence on information. Therefore adequate IS Security is an enabler 
for inter-organisational relationships (Keen et al., 2000) and information management. 
An organisation’s IS Security affects not only the organisation itself, but also its 
external parties (Von Solms, 1999). The more sensitive information an organisation 
handles the more important are confidentiality, integrity and availability. Deficiencies in 
IS Security can cause direct negative consequences for business processes due to errors, 
delays and information leakage. Organisations encounter numerous IS Security 
challenges, such as (Booz et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006): a rapid expansion of the 
enterprise ecosystem through external partnerships and new global markets, a value 
migration from the physical to information-based and intangible assets, continuing 
pressure to reduce costs, and new security technologies such as biometrics are blurring 
functional boundaries and compliance regimes. To make effective decisions regarding 
IS Security, management must know about the various threats facing the organisation, 
its employees, data, information, knowledge and systems. Thus, knowledge of threats 
and attacks are crucial to management when allocating resources, formulating security 
policies and performing risk assessments (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). Failures in IS 
Security can temporarily deny network resources to employees and hackers can then use 
one organisation’s resources as a stepping-stone in attacking another organisation.   
1.2 IS Security and KM Definitions 
Three families of definitions are required to map out the conceptual territory of this 
investigation: organisations, IS Security and knowledge management. The arguments in 
the following Chapters are implicitly rooted in these definitions. 
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The study of organisations is complex, as their processes are made up of many activities 
(Stamper, 1973; Nutt, 1984; Baskerville, 2004). Traditionally organisations have been 
viewed as formal systems concerned with inter-organisational (between the 
organisations and its environment) and intra-organisational (internal departments) 
information. Since computer-based systems have been used to automate the activities of 
these formal systems this view has evolved. The emergent belief of a number of studies 
is to view the organisation as an evolving or emerging social form (Baskerville, 2004; 
Dhillon, 2006). Consequently, the organisation allows different groups to interact with 
each other and the environment (Walsham, 1993). 
Organisations and the functional areas within them evolve and the result is rarely a neat 
arrangement of employees and procedures (Strassman, 1995). Galliers and Baker (1994) 
observed that organisations often adopt mixtures of arrangements that can be difficult to 
study, creating problems for researchers of organisations. Organisational environments 
can be viewed as being composed of the informal, formal and technical interconnecting 
parts (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990) or systems (Dhillon, 2006). Emergent 
organisations endure continuous change which is beyond simple environmental 
adaptiveness, allowing them to operate effectively in highly competitive markets by 
maintaining continual agility (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Vulnerabilities and threats 
emerge as these organisations and their information systems are remade (Baskerville, 
2004). As a result the context of IS Security is changing. Consequently, IS Security 
managers will need to manage the increasingly complex infrastructure - necessary to 
support and protect an emergent organisation. In order to provide the groundwork for 
such management IS Security researchers “...need to develop organisational approaches 
and methodologies that respond to this new context by providing techniques for 
supporting emergent security” (Baskerville, 2004, p.156). Emergent IS Security must 
cope with rapid changes in the organisation, shifting information systems and changing 
vulnerabilities and threats through the development of an integrated and agile approach 
to managing IS Security. Agile IS Security management is required to anticipate threats 
and rapid responses. Traditional IS Security management principles and approaches will 
endure in organisations which are static and non-competitive, protecting traditional 
systems from traditional threats.  
IS Security is a complicated concept and field. The terms computer security, IT security, 
information security and information systems security (and their extensions) are often 
used interchangeably. The nature of security makes it difficult to measure and assess as 
it concerns phenomena that may not happen now but could happen in the future or 
which are occurring on an ongoing basis. Additionally, in contrast to other 
organisational processes and functions, such as productivity and sales, security is 
difficult to measure or even to judge objectively (Jonsson, 1995). It is only in isolated 
environments, where only technical aspects are considered, that measurements are 
applicable (ibid.). However IS Security deals with aspects other than technology, such 
as organisational processes and people. Frameworks for assessments and measurements 
of IS Security, both by practitioners (Veriscan, 2006) and academics, have been 
developed (Johansson, 2005; Randere, 2006). These were limited to technical aspects of 
IS Security such as incidents within corporate networks, and neglecting other factors 
that affect IS Security, such as the value of information assets and threats. The indirect 
consequences of security incidents also contribute to abstractness because they are so 
difficult to survey. An incident can lead to specific damage but its further spreading is 
difficult to foresee due to the fuzzy interfaces between information systems and 
organisations. As a result, it is difficult for organisations to estimate the level of IS 
Security for information systems, infrastructures and business partners. Encryption 
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technologies, firewalls, intrusion detection software (IDS) and virtual private networks 
(VPN) are all examples of complex technologies and applications that are difficult for 
non-experts to understand (Stewart, 2005). These technologies can be used to fragment 
organisational information systems into security compartments (Baskerville, 2004; 
Dhillon, 2006) within dynamic environments.  
IS Security is an important issue for organisations. However it is an area that is difficult 
to grasp and estimate. The significance of IS Security motivates research and practical 
developments from a number of perspectives; technological, organisational and 
behavioural. The management of IS Security goes beyond allocating controls to objects 
but involves the people, processes and technologies of the organisation as a whole. It 
encapsulates every aspect from decision-making and environmental considerations to 
the overall objectives of the organisation. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the 
following are put forward as working definitions of IS Security and knowledge 
management as a lens through which IS Security is investigated: IS Security is a process 
that ensures the protection of information resources encompassing the people, 
processes and technologies used. 
Knowledge management (KM) is concerned with ensuring that the knowledge is 
available in the right form to the right processors [systems, people and processes] 
whenever required. It is a holistic attempt to manage organisational assets which are 
composed of people, technology and processes. KM consists of such processes as: 
knowledge acquisition (Alvi & Leider, 2001), capture (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004), 
creation (Oppong et al., 2005), sharing (Grant, 1996), application/use (Holsapple & 
Joshi, 2004) and control (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Technology, while a key enabler 
for both IS Security and KM, is not the primary driver in either initiative (Blacker, 
1995; Siponen, 2005). As explained by existing theory IS Security plays a significant 
role regarding KM when technology is a factor (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004) or in 
controlling knowledge (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Randeree, 2006). Access controls 
determine who has access to the different knowledge repositories and this has 
significant repercussions in KM as it can determine the value of the knowledge 
(Jamieson, 1991; Holsapple & Joshi, 2000; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). The conviction 
within the KM community is that eighty percent of KM is composed of people and 
culture, and twenty percent is technology (Liebowitz & Chen, 2004).  
Therefore IS Security plays a significant role in every tenet of KM to assure its validity 
and utility. It should be mapped to KM roles, culture, processes and technology and 
warrants additional research to investigate the relationship between both fields and to 
build on existing KM and IS Security theory. Gaps exist in the knowledge management 
and the IS Security literatures where a relationship between the fields has not been 
investigated (Belsis, et al., 2005; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Holsapple & Singh, 2004; 
Randeree, 2006). Although security is put forward as a necessary consideration in the 
design and implementation of knowledge management systems (KMS) (Eppler, 2004; 
Butler & Murphy, 2007), it is not identified as a consideration or aid in the management 
of knowledge, as in simply providing the right knowledge to the right people (logical 
access control). The IS Security literature advocates access controls, security policies, 
the integrity of information and environmental threats yet KM is ignored as an issue 
when it could be a solution. 
The next section describes the research objective, questions and the contributions of this 
study. 
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1.3 Research Objective and Contribution 
Lucas (1991) recommended that IS researchers should investigate interesting problems 
and underlying issues instead of focusing on the latest IS fashion. Therefore the primary 
objective of this study is: 
To explore how Information Systems Security (ISS) could leverage the concept 
of Knowledge Management (KM) through qualitative research. 
To accomplish the research objective the following questions are proposed: 
RQ.1: How can the organisational infrastructure support the management of IS Security 
(ISS) knowledge? 
RQ.2: How do the two functional areas IS Security (ISS) and Customer Support (CS) 
manage knowledge? 
RQ.3: How can firms align Information Systems Security (ISS) to a Knowledge 
Management (KM) environment? 
1.3.1 The Relevance of this Study 
Quality in IS research is measured through the relevance and rigour of the study (Keen, 
1991). Knowledge development in the IS discipline should be useful for industry and 
not follow the latest fads and fashions (Galliers & Newell, 2001: 2003; Lucas 1991) or 
as Keen contends “...until relevance is established, rigour is irrelevant” (Keen, 1991 
p.27). If a research result is useless, the rigour of the research is meaningless. The 
majority of research results must be applicable for practitioners otherwise IS research 
will degenerate into an introvert activity (Goldkuhl, 1996). The quality of this study, 
with regard to academia and practice, is discussed in the following section. 
To make effective decisions regarding IS Security, management must know about the 
various threats facing the organisation, its employees, data, information, knowledge and 
systems (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). The effective management of IS Security is a 
knowledge-intensive activity that depends on the experience of IS Security experts. The 
effectiveness of current approaches to managing IS Security knowledge has been 
questioned given the volume of security breaches and well published security lapses 
such as: ChoicePoint, Bank of America, T-Mobile and LexisNexis. Management must 
not only minimise risks through the operationalisation of security activities but also 
effectively communicate vision, rules and guidelines to employees. Large volumes of 
data must be processed from a plethora of security technologies to provide information 
regarding the security landscape of the organisation (Stewart, 2005). As a result, 
management requires the development of an integrated approach to the management of 
security knowledge. Combining security activities, experts and tools could resolve these 
problems. This could be achieved through the utilisation of an effective KM approach. 
The application of the approach to the management of IS Security knowledge would 
enable a more holistic approach to the management of IS Security across the enterprise. 
Managerial environmental challenges are justification for the phenomenon under 
investigation. The adoption of adequate KM for IS Security knowledge will assure the 
convergence of IS Security across the enterprise. Chapter 2 addresses these issues in an 
attempt to clear up the conceptual confusion that persists in IS Security research, and in 
order to provide the study with a firm theoretical foundation.  
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The practical relevance of research findings differs from how the research has been 
conducted. Theoretical research can be enormously beneficial to practitioners while 
research conducted close to practice can be of little use for practitioners. If practitioners 
are involved in the research process, through for example open interviews and 
conversations, the researcher can be sensitive to their demands and needs. However, if a 
researcher undertakes studies close to practice; a greater understanding is developed of 
what problems are relevant and what research results are demanded by the practice. 
Research must of course be relevant for academics as well. This research examines the 
importance of IS Security in protecting the business and the development of an 
integrated approach to its management. The research contribution must have scientific 
readership and backing, in this case, from the IS Security research community. 
The IS research community has embraced many technologies as the “silver bullet 
solution” to corporate information needs. This tendency could have serious implications 
and is leading to a disintegration of research and a lack of theoretical progression 
(Webster & Watson, 2002). This predisposition has had significant effects on IS 
Security research. IS Security is interlinked with every aspect of information systems, 
people and processes and therefore has consistently increased in importance in practice. 
The protection of corporate assets is a priority for organisations and investment in 
security has dramatically increased in the last ten years (Dhillon, 2006; Behara et al., 
2007) due to new legislative requirements and the realisation that IS Security is a key 
enabler of business (CSI/FBI, 2007; Dhillon, 2006; Behara et al., 2007). However, the 
academic response to IS Security has resulted in a field that is theoretically 
underdeveloped. Previous IS Security research has been technical and conducted 
primarily by computer scientists, mathematicians, and computer engineers as criticised 
by leading IS researchers (Straub et al., 2008; Siponen & Willison, 2007; Dhillon, 
2006). Similarly methods for the development of secure systems have been investigated 
(Baskerville, 1992; Siponen, 2005; Villarroel et al., 2005) while an integrated approach 
to managing IS Security has been ignored.  
A recent survey argued that the number of IS Security research papers published in the 
leading IS journals such as MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, and the 
Journal of Management Information Systems has diminished (Siponen & Willison, 
2007; Siponen et al., 2008). The researchers examined IS Security papers for the period 
1990-2004; approximately one thousand and eighty were analysed in terms of theories, 
research methods and topics. One thousand and forty-three of the papers contained no 
theory. A large number of categories pertaining to IS Security were identified despite 
this large number; fourteen categories comprise seventy-two percent of all of the papers 
used in the study. The categories are summarised in Table 1.1. The focus of research has 
been technical even though it has long been recognised that it is as important to 
understand the social elements. Comparatively little work has taken a managerial point 
of view, covering broad organisational and social issues (Dhillon & Backhouse 2001; 
Straub et al., 2008). This study acknowledges these issues and provides a solid 
conceptual foundation for future studies on IS Security by answering calls for a 
theoretical model to guide research in the area. 
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S SECURITY CATEGORIES 
CATEGORIES % CATEGORIES % 
Legal aspects of IS Security 3.35 % Computer crime 2.50 % 
General IS Security 6.64 % Database security 6.25 % 
Business continuity planning 3.20 % Intrusion detection systems  2.96 % 
IS Security management and planning 8.83 % Network and communication security 10.85 % 
Operating System security 2.50 % Secure systems design  2.57 % 
Risk management 2.96 % Identification and authentication 3.59 % 
Viruses and malware 4.76 % Cryptography 10.93 % 
Security and privacy 2.18 % Security behaviour  1.17 % 
Copyright and piracy issues  1.32 % Hackers and hacking 1.64 % 
Security policies 1.25 % Public key infrastructures 1.32 % 
Computer forensics 2.26 % 
Table 1.1: IS Security Categories. 
1.3.2 The Rigour of this Study 
The criteria for conducting positivist assessments of research are objectivity, reliability, 
internal validity and external validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). However this criterion is 
not suitable, when judging the quality of qualitative research. An overview of the 
research design is illustrated in Table 1.2. In order to realise this exploratory study’s 
research objective, an integrative conceptual model and a related research analysis 
framework are employed to investigate the relationship between IS Security and KM 
within two multinational organisations: CME-Co and TELE-Co. Two of the key 
strategic units within the cases are the IS Security and Customer Support (CS) functions 
which operate as silos servicing (in/external) customers. These case studies were 
selected from a population of large multinationals in two market sectors (storage and 
telecommunications) to facilitate (Drake et al., 1998) the study of the phenomenon in a 
diverse setting. The theoretical model (Section 2.7.1, p.59) draws on the KM and IS 
Security literatures from which three research questions are formulated (Section 1.3). 
These research questions are posited to guide the conduct of the study. In addressing 
these questions, the findings of the two case studies present a cross-case analysis of the 
different approaches to managing (IS Security) knowledge; these are then synthesised to 
determine comparisons, differences and impacts across the cases.  
RESEARCH LEVEL DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Type of Research Q To explore how ISS could leverage the concept of KM through qualitative research 
Strategy Qualitative: Two case studies and  a Pilot Case Study 
Paradigm Interpretivist 
Data Collection Method Semi-structured Interviews 
Other Data Sources Document Analysis, Observation 
Major References DeLone & McLean ‘03; Becerra-Fernandez et al., ’04; Siponen, ’05; Dhillon, ‘06 
Informants IT Professionals: ISS Experts, CS Engineers and Senior IS Managers 
Type of Results In-depth reflective descriptions and patterns of behaviour 
Table 1.2: The Research Design. 

The next section presents the organisation of this thesis. 
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis first examines the literature on IS Security (Figure 1.1). Chapter 2 presents 
a critical analysis of the different strands of IS Security. The current security landscape 
is explored as is the importance of controlling IS Security to protect (knowledge) assets 
from known threats. The various controls and models necessary to protect an 
organisation and their implementation are also described. KM is then discussed as a 
possible approach to managing IS Security knowledge and as a conceptual model and 
research lens to this research is discussed. 
Chapter 3 describes the research philosophy, epistemology, methodology and design. 
The appropriate methods of qualitative data collection, analysis and displays are 
outlined. The Chapter concludes with a description and illustration of the research 
protocol used in a series of six steps to explain how the study has been conducted.  
Chapter 4 applies the research protocol developed and described in Chapter 3 to a pilot 
case study. 
Chapters 5 and  6 provide the context to the study, to understand the environment in 
which the IS Security and CS functions under analysis operate. While the focus of the 
research is primarily the IS Security and Customer Support functions within each case, 
the rich description used allowed the researcher to describe the case studies 
systematically and identify the different research categories due to the use of the 
research lens identified in Chapter 2. An analysis of the contrasting goals, strategies and 
approaches to the management of knowledge between Customer Support and IS 
Security functions explained how the methods applied in one context can be transferred 
to the context of other functions with tangible benefits.  
Chapter 7 conducts an integrative cross-case analysis of the findings. The analysis is 
structured by the conceptual model and associated research questions. The cross-case 
analysis provides a generic understanding of the relationship between IS Security and 
KM across the two case studies. This Chapter concludes with a summation of the 
overall findings which includes a refined theoretical model of an integrated approach to 
managing IS Security knowledge and an analysis of the interplay between KM and IS 
Security. Chapter 7 therefore provides an understanding of the phenomenon and allows 
explanation to give rise to understanding.  
In Chapter 8 existing literature and existing theories are discussed with the purpose of 
building internal validity and increasing the theoretical basis of the study’s research 
findings. An integrated model for IS Security knowledge is presented as a practical 
approach for practitioners to manage IS Security for organisations and IS Security 
knowledge. This Chapter presents a critical review of the strengths and weakness of the 
interpretivist approach adopted and presents recommendations for future research.  
The concluding section outlines the contribution of the empirical findings. It is clear 
from the analysis presented in Chapter 8 that this study provides a timely answer to calls 
in the IS field for in-depth exploratory research of a qualitative nature on the 
phenomenon of IS Security. Additionally, the overall goal of this research is to ensure 
that the findings are of value to practitioners and to do rigorous research in addressing 
the research questions and objective. 
Page 21 
Pilot Study:
Specialised Functions
Case Study1:
Specialised Functions
Case Study2:
Specialised Functions
Cross-Case Analysis:
Recommendations &
Conclusions
Theory, Research,
Questions & Model
Research Philosophy 
& Methodology
Research Method&
Design
Research Method
IS Security
Theoretical Background
IS Security Challenges
KM Solution
Chapter 2
Chapter 3 Chapters:4, 5 & 6
Chapters: 7& 8
1.5 Conclusion 
In this study qualitative research is used to explore how IS Security can leverage the 
concept of KM. The unit of analysis is the (ISS and CS) support function or specialised 
unit. This research adopts a case study approach, interviewing participants in two 
multinationals. Data was gathered in the form of interview transcripts and documents. A 
number of people in each organisation were interviewed (Table 3.3), providing a range 
of opinions and reports of practice. The use of semi-structured interviews provided a 
framework for identification of approaches to managing IS Security and CS knowledge, 
while allowing sufficient freedom for interviewees to report important data. This 
research extends current understanding of IS Security and of managing IS Security 
knowledge. Its findings provide a basis for an integrated model for managing IS 
Security knowledge. The following Chapters of this thesis are presented in 
diagrammatic form in Figure 1.1. The diagram depicts the flow through the Chapters, 
with the research objective arising from the relationship between IS Security and 
knowledge management, testing the conventional view of managing IS Security 
knowledge in a compliant environment. 
Pilot Study: 
Specialised Functions 
Case Study1: 
Specialised Functions 
Case Study2: 
Specialised Functions 
Cross-Case Analysis: 
Recommendations & 
Conclusions 
Theory,Research, 
Questions& Model 
Research Philosophy 
&Methodology 
Research Method & 
Design 
Research Method 
ISSecurity
TheoreticalBackground 
ISSecurity Challenges 
KM Solution 
Chapter2 
Chapters: 7&8 
Chapter3 Chapters:4, 5 &6 
Figure 1.1: Plan of Research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 

FRAMING THE IS SECURITY LITERATURE 

2.0 Introduction 
This Chapter first reviews the IS Security (ISS) literature examining the nature of ISS, 
and defining it for the purpose of this study. Section 2.1 describes the importance of 
using a framework to structure the literature and outlines the framework used in this 
Chapter. Section 2.2 examines the evolution of IS Security to become a strategic 
function within organisations. The section also defines IS Security and highlights its 
importance in the IS field. Section 2.3 establishes how IS Security is institutionalised 
and the different roles and responsibilities necessary to manage IS Security. Section 2.4 
classifies the formal controls and models utilised in IS Security. Section 2.5 highlights 
the IS Security challenges encountered in organisations, and Section 2.6 discusses IS 
Security from a knowledge management perspective, describing the knowledge types, 
knowledge reservoirs and approaches used in KM. Section 2.7 explains that 
organisations need to apply an integrated approach to managing IS Security and a 
research lens is derived from this literature to investigate the objective of this study. 
Finally, Section 2.8 concludes the Chapter (Figure 1.1). 
2.1 Framework for Analysis 
One of the fundamental steps in reviewing literature is the selection of an appropriate 
framework to organise and analyse the (IS Security) literature (Webster & Watson, 
2002; Siponen, 2005; Siponen & Willison, 2007). The purpose of this section is to 
identify existing frameworks in the IS Security literature and their effectiveness. This 
section also outlines the framework used in this Chapter to understand and summarise 
relevant IS Security and KM literature.  
There are several frameworks which have been used to analyse Secure Information 
Systems (SIS) methods and approaches (Baskerville, 2004). Dhillon and Backhouse 
(2001) analysed IS Security methods in the context of the four sociological paradigms 
proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Siponen (2005) selected research methods, the 
organisational role of IS, research objectives and applicability to ISD as his conceptual 
framework to analyse IS Security methods. While these approaches produced 
interesting findings, there were deficiencies (Siponen & Willison, 2007; Siponen et al., 
2008). Each study investigated methods for secure IS, not the people, processes and 
technologies which embody IS Security functions. IS Security is a knowledge-intensive 
activity (Sundt, 2006) therefore the effectiveness of current approaches (originally 
created for developing information systems) to managing IS Security have been 
seriously questioned (Siponen, 2005). Technical approaches to IS Security have limited 
effectiveness as security is primarily a people issue. IS Security requires the 
development of an integrated approach to the management of IS Security knowledge. 
For the purpose of this study a framework was created. A number of different 
viewpoints were selected such as the: IS Security challenges facing practitioners, 
organisational role of IS Security, traditional IS Security methods, IS Security activities, 
technical counter-measures, IS Security knowledge, reservoirs of IS Security knowledge 
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and the use and impact of KM for this study. Table 2.1 outlines the framework for 
analysing the literature. It is theoretically important to adopt a framework to understand 
and summarise relevant IS Security research. However, to begin with, the evolution of 
IS Security is discussed (Section 2.2). 
VIEWPOINTS SOURCE REFERENCES 
How did IS Security evolve? Borodzicz, ‘05, Baskerville, 05; Siponen, 05 
How is IS Security defined? Baskerville & Siponen, 02; Anderson, 03 
How is IS Security institutionalised? Dhillon, 01; Dutta & McGowan, 02; Baskerville & Siponen, 02 
What are the different activities? Andress, 04; Whitman & Mattord, 05;Sundt, 06 
What are the technical solutions? Stewart, 05; Mishra & Dhillon, 08 
What are the diff. methods & models? Baskerville, 94; Dhillon & Backhouse, 01; Baskerville, 04 
What is the IS Security challenge? Baskerville, 04; Dhillon, 06; CSI/FBI, 06; Randeree, 06 
What is IS Security knowledge? Jamieson & Handzic, 04;  Belsis et al., 05 
Where is ISS knowledge located? Drucker, 93; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 04; Randeree, 06 
What are the different KM processes? Holsapple & Singh, 04; Avital, 04; Holsapple & Joshi, 04 
Table 2.1: Framework of the Literature Analysis. 
2.2 Evolution of Information Systems Security 
The purpose of this section is to examine how IS Security evolved to become a strategic 
function within organisations. IS Security is beset with reports of negative incidents in 
practice and calls for qualitative studies and integrated approaches to managing IS 
Security within organisations are numerous in the IS field. This section concludes with 
a working definition of IS Security. 
Theoretically the IS Security field is in its infancy (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; 
Borodzicz, 2005; Belsis et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006; Siponen & Willison, 2007) and it 
draws from an assortment of informing disciplines (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; 
Stewart, 2005; Dhillon, 2006) from computer science which provide the technological 
aspect, law the regulatory restraints and behavioural science and anthropology provide 
the human and cultural implications for effective IS Security. The IS Security research 
community itself arose from the mathematical and natural sciences (Gerber & Von 
Solms, 2005; Botha & Gaadingwe, 2006). As a result, attempts to produce a cohesive, 
all-encompassing and regulated profession are ill-founded (Borodzicz, 2005, p.67). 
Additionally the fundamental issue in defining and categorising IS Security is that it is 
intrinsically fuzzy and under-researched (Manunta, 2000; Anderson, 2003; Borodzicz, 
2005, Baskerville, 2005; Dhillon, 2006). Some theorists hypothesise that IS Security is, 
in fact, risk management in practice (Borodzicz, 2005). However Lievesly (1995) posits 
that even the term is incorrect and that researchers and practitioners should be 
discussing and implementing a “risk engineering” strategy as opposed to a IS Security 
policy or strategy. Therefore the: 
“…Socratic problem “What is Security?” is under-estimated and under-
researched. Different answers are given, which are of value at the tactical and 
specific level. There is general agreement and a surfeit of information on the 
physical and formal aspects of security. Standards, technical details and codes of 
practice are available… None of them appears to address the concept of security. 
We need to understand what do we mean by “security” before addressing the 
problem: How can we attain it?” 
(Manunta, 2000, p.7) 
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Manunta (2000) contends that security is the function of three components: an asset (A), 
a protector (P) and a threat (T). Security can therefore be expressed in any situation (Si) 
mathematically as: S = f (A, P, T) Si. This approach eliminates the complexity of 
understanding the concept of IS Security but the problem is compounded when applied 
in different environments (Baskerville, 1993; Wood, 1999; Baskerville & Siponen, 
2002). The most complex conception of IS Security is provided by Post & Kingsbury 
(1991). They suggest that the term should not be defined, as the definition will fail to 
include the other areas of study that support it, but rather understood within a theoretical 
discourse, in terms of eight categories. Table 2.2 outlines the themes or categories 
which Post & Kingsbury (1991) use as a lens for understanding the field (Stewart, 
2005). However Anderson (2003) challenges Post and Kingsbury’s (1991) contention 
that IS Security should not be defined. Anderson (2003) calls for an exact definition as 
if you cannot define IS Security you cannot measure it and “…you cannot manage what 
you cannot measure” (Baskerville, 2008, p.2). As explained by Wiseman (1988) the 
advancement of a field of enquiry depends on giving priority to measurement as well as 
in defining it. 
CATEGORIES OF IS SECURITY 
1. 
Historically security knowledge is composed of facts generated through the growth and 
development of society. The best examples are the changes in legislation and the development of 
codes of practice.  
2. 
The psychological focus would be in the study and interpretations of individuals and groups 
regarding the definition of security. In addition to trying to catch a hacker an organisation should 
also try and understand why and how to prevent future breaches. 
3. 
Sociologically security is viewed as an aspect of human social behaviour, society and cultural 
groupings and through human organisations and institutions. As corporate security is viewed as 
primarily an organisation or institution issue, it is difficult to view these in isolation from the 
others. 
4. 
The functionalist category is used in terms of the application of security by security personnel who 
have clearly defined roles. 
5. 
Management is divided into five major functions: planning (the management function of setting 
security goals), organising (the structure through which the tasks or goals are carried out), 
command (essentially leadership and motivating employees to achieve the optimum return on 
investment), coordination of activities to facilitate collaborative efforts and controlling the process 
of regulating organisational activities to achieve set standards and goals. 
6. 
The normative category or theme defines security in relation to defining norms and standards and 
then protecting and enforcing them. 
7. 
However the structural category views security in terms of the organisation’s components and the 
control of these units to ensure the interoperation of the entity.  
8. 
Descriptive allows multiple definitions of security. The definitions can be based on context, 
environment and utility. 
Table 2.2: The Eight Categories (Source: Post & Kingsbury, 1991). 
This study focuses on the development of an integrated approach to managing IS 
Security knowledge. However, given the significance of the evolution of ISS, it is 
imperative that the researcher next defines what is meant by IS Security in the context 
of this study. 
IS Security definitions focus on specific uses. In “...an information society, security 
emphasizes the protection of information and not only the infrastructure” (Gerber et al., 
2001, p.32). There are ISS goals: confidentiality, integrity and availability (Parker, 
1981, 1998; ITSEC, 1991) which are cited regularly in the literature (Dhillon, 2006). To 
further complicate matters Holsapple & Joshi, (2000) add knowledge validity (accuracy, 
consistency and certainty) and knowledge utility (clarity, meaning, relevance and 
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importance) as additional characteristics or IS Security goals when securing knowledge. 
If an organisation can not ensure and assure these goals, then the value of the 
data/information / knowledge will be reduced or lost (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). The 
ultimate objective of IS Security is the alignment of security to the requirements of the 
business (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002) and the environment in which it operates 
(Baskerville, 2004). Hong et al., (2003) contend that IS Security is open to many 
definitions. Table 2.3 highlights some of the most common definitions and it is apparent 
that while many definitions with varying viewpoints of ISS have been provided since its 
inception, none capture all of the characteristics of ISS. This is because ISS is evolving 
and for the purpose of this study the following is a working definition: 
IS Security is a process that ensures the protection of information resources 
encompassing the people, processes and technologies used. 
Additionally it is important to note that IS Security is not absolute (Neuman, 1995; 
Anderson, 2003; Behara et al., 2005) as “a [system] which aims to be one hundred 
percent risk free will have a productivity of zero percent” (Jones & Ashenden, 2005, 
p.188) making the issue of determining the optimal level of IS Security vital (Manunta, 
2000). This section has detailed how IS Security has evolved to become a mission-
critical function and the issue of determining the optimal level and management of IS 
Security is vital. Prior to addressing this issue, it is imperative that the researcher 
identifies how IS Security is institutionalised and the roles and responsibilities 
necessary to control IS Security. Section 2.3 describes its institutionalisation and 2.3.1 
its governance. 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY DEFINITIONS 
Definition Viewpoint Authors 
“The process of controlling and securing information from inadvertent 
or malicious changes and deletions or unauthorized disclosure is IS 
Security”. 
Processes URN 96/702, 
1996, p.3 
“…as all aspects related to achieving and maintaining confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, audit ability (accountability), authenticity and 
reliability”. 
Goals ISO, IEC TR 
13335-1, 
1996, p.1 
“…is not just about protecting the technology, it is about protecting 
business or personal information wherever it resides”. 
Technology Willis, 1999, 
p.1 
“Information systems security is not a contradiction in terms…security 
without risk management is”. 
Risk 
management 
Bisson, 2003 
in BS7799, p.3 
“… the protection of information systems against unauthorized access 
to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or 
transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users or the 
provision of service to unauthorized users, including those measures 
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats”. 
Access to 
objects 
U.S. National 
Information 
Systems 
Security 
Glossary 
“…as to apply any technical methods and managerial processes on the 
information resources (hardware, software, and data) in order to keep 
organisational assets and personal privacy protected”. 
Protection Hong et al., 
2003, p.243 
Table 2.3: Definitions of IS Security (ISS). 
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2.3 Institutionalising Information Systems Security 
The purpose of this section is to describe the complexity of securing organisations and 
to discuss the roles and responsibilities necessary to protect them. Responsibility is the 
foundation of IS Security governance in defining the control structure for the 
organisation. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 provide an overview of the roles of senior 
management and ISS functions in managing ISS. This section concludes with a 
description of the culture and informal controls necessary to create the correct control 
environment necessary to preserve and govern the security of the organisation. 
Societies and organisations increasingly rely on computers and global networks such as 
the Internet to carry out their business communications, transactions, and supervision of 
employees. Emergent organisational forms endure continual change and are difficult to 
secure (Baskerville, 2004; Dhillon, 2006). As organisations grow in size and complexity 
information handling becomes increasingly difficult and important. Information 
communication technologies (ICT) have enabled large, complex and global 
organisations to be competitive and adapt to changes in their environment (Truex & 
Baskerville, 1998; Baskerville, 2004). Emergent organisations are then unstable and 
often unresponsive to centralised control which can be problematic from an IS Security 
perspective. Due to the sheer complexity of modern organisations, security failures and 
the implementation of continuity plans are common (Reason, 1997; Borodzicz, 2005). 
IS Security convergence, a trend affecting global enterprise is the identification of 
security risks and interdependencies between business functions and processes (Booz et 
al., 2005). Security convergence is pushing companies to focus beyond functional 
dimensions to include all parts of the security and the business life-cycle in creating a 
need for a unified security environment.  
A further layer of complexity is added when organisations establish relationships with 
other enterprises (Gal-or & Ghose, 2005; Dhillon, 2006). IS Security managers will 
need to manage increasingly complex security architectures in support of emergent 
organisations. These are composed of a series of information handling activities 
(Stamper, 1973) coordinated through the establishment of rules, policies and procedures 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon, 2006). As organisations grow, controlling 
information by assuring its integrity and availability can be extremely difficult. 
Organisations must design and create a safe environment in which business processes, 
procedures, employees and units can function. This environment must maintain the 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of the organisation’s information/knowledge 
(Doyle, 1997; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004).These goals are met through the application 
of an IS Security strategy or policy. Information and knowledge are undoubtedly critical 
resources of the enterprise (Escamilla, 1998). However these are becoming increasingly 
endangered by security threats (Whitman, 2004; Eschelbeck, 2005; Im & Baskerville, 
2005; CSI/FBI, 2006). In order to implement a successful security management 
strategy, management needs to develop an underlying IS Security model to protect 
knowledge assets, operationalise risk assessment and create an effective control 
environment (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002). This environment enables organisations to 
keep to their overall plans, as they move from their IS Security objectives to their IS 
Security outcomes. 
Methods, strategies and procedures ensure the protection of an organisation’s resources 
and adherence to IS Security standards (such as ISO17799). Therefore an enterprise-
wide IS Security policy can function as a guide in determining the corporation’s 
weakest links (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002). These will then be the basis for 
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formulating policies or strategies and procedures for risk and IS Security management 
(Booz et al., 2005; Jones & Ashenden, 2005). Matrix structures can cause more 
complicated process flows compared to hierarchical structures (Borchgrave et al., 
2001). Therefore the role of senior management is to guarantee that its structure is 
supportive of the exploitation of IS Security-related initiatives, without necessarily 
impeding business processes. Borchgrave et al., (2001) warn that separating particularly 
sensitive processes into peculiar structural entities will require the development of 
additional IS Security measures specifically for the new entities (such as geographically 
dispersed subsidiaries). Another implication is the modification of communication lines, 
reporting relationships or accountability to attain IS Security strategies and objectives. 
Dhillon (2006) further stresses the importance of the culture and structure of the 
organisation as he extrapolates that IS Security of information at a structural level is 
largely related to linking access rights to the hierarchical structure of the organisation. 
2.3.1 Responsibility and Corporate Governance 
It is the responsibility of senior and IT management to protect the organisation’s ability 
to function (Cresson Wood, 2001; Dhillon, 2005; 2006). Structures strongly influence 
primary corporate activities engagement. Dutta and McCrohan (2002) suggest that if 
there is an absence of a group or unit responsible for IS Security activities then IS 
Security may become a futile function. Therefore structure adds capability to match 
corporate objectives by supplying a complete framework for planning and developing 
an organisation. The assignment of authority and responsibility is an extension of the 
development of structure.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates a generic responsibility model for the average organisation and 
demonstrates how challenges or issues related to IS Security management affect 
different responsibilities (Dhillon, 2005). The relationship between (corporate) 
governance and IS Security exists in a number of different forms (Dhillon, 2006). The 
corporation is responsible to its creditors, stakeholders and for legal requirements. 
However corporate officers are responsible for IS Security through the application of 
formal (policies, procedures and audits), technical (compliance, access lists and audits) 
and informal (ethics and behaviours) controls. Corporate officers can demonstrate 
responsible behaviour and meet compliant requirements (Kaen, 2003) through corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is concerned with who has legal control (Kaen, 
2003; Borodzicz, 2005) which creates challenges for management. The scandals of 
Enron and Barings Bank were significant drivers for more regulations. IT and IS 
Security were impacted by the Sarbanes-and-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) which grounds 
the call for better business and IT controls in legislation. The primary goal of the Act is 
to produce more complete and accurate financial reports and over eighty billion dollars 
has been reportedly spent between 2005 and 2006 on regulatory and compliance-based 
work (Chou, 2005). 
Barings Bank and Enron are cases of mismanagement of IS Security (Dhillon, 2006). 
Barings Bank was brought down by weak IS Security which allowed an employee to 
hide losses accumulated in a secret account he created with his “access rights to the 
bank’s accounting systems” (Dhillon, 2001; Haworth & Pietron, 2006). Enron has had 
ramifications for American overseas subsidiaries. Regulators alleged that this type of 
fraud and corruption was possible because of loopholes in U.S. securities laws and poor 
auditing controls, resulting in inflated profit margins. It is through IS Security that 
tighter access controls for the environment are assigned. Additionally, the allocation of 
senior responsibility through corporate governance has increased corporate security 
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Executive Officers
Formal, Informal & Technical Controls
Employees
Information Security Controls
Policies/Procedures
Behaviors/
Culture
Compliance/
Audit
Law/Society
Standards/ 
Codes of Practice
awareness (Kaarst-Brown & Kelly, 2005; CSI/FBI, 2006). Corporate governance 
defines the control structure and control of tangible and intangible information assets 
and corporate knowledge. Corporate governance emphasises accountability, fiduciary 
duty and methods of auditing and control (Sundt, 2006).  
BOD/Shareholders/Stakeholders 
Customer 
Creditors 
Government 
Responsibility 
Accountability 
Feedback 
Figure 2.1: Model of Responsibility & Corporate Governance for IS Security (Source: 
Dhillon, 2005, p.214). 
Trompeter and Eloff (2001) argue that organisations should use confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (C.I.A) standards and security services to govern IS Security. To 
achieve C.I.A internally organisations should adopt ethical principles. The organisation 
would engender IS Security and ethical awareness in adhering to regulatory 
requirements and protect information assets. Smith and Hasnas (1999) contend that the 
adoption of a code of ethics can have significant consequences (Reynolds, 2003; 
Whitman, 2004). Customers and society are often affected by the decisions of corporate 
decision-makers (Dhillon, 2006). That is IS Security managers must choose between 
competing ethical stances (Smith & Hasnas, 1999). Failures in governance have been 
due to a lack of awareness and conflicts of interest. There is a documented failure of 
management in recognising the extent to which IS Security is critical (Dhillon, 2006) 
and ethical issues regarding security and privacy can have far reaching consequences. 
As a result there is a fundamental requirement for the governance of IS Security. 
Moulton and Coles (2003) refer to security governance in terms of: IS Security 
responsibility and practices, strategies and objectives for security, risk assessment and 
management, resource management for security, compliance with legislation, 
regulations, security policies and rules, investor relations and communication activities 
in relation to security. Ultimately it is the responsibility of management to align security 
activities with the goals of the organisation (IT Governance Institute, 2001). Therefore 
IS Security must be mapped to every business function and process (Patterson, 2005).  
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2.3.2 Information Systems Security Management 
Comparatively little research covers organisational and social issues regarding IS 
Security (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Straub et al., 2008). Senior management and the 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) must set policies and ensure that the organisation is 
compliant with the complex and often shifting legislation that controls Finance and the 
use of IT. Management often digress from decisions regarding IS Security as they 
regard it as a technological issue and the responsibility of IT (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; 
Hinde, 2002). However as Wood (2001, p.1) stated “…IS Security is a management 
issue in addition to a technical issue, it is a people issue in addition to the technical 
issue”. As described by Andress (2004) the role of management within IS Security is to 
identify crucial (knowledge) assets, initiate a process of risk management and maintain 
a general operational balance within the organisation to assure productivity (Jamieson & 
Handzic, 2004). 
Organisational structures strongly influence the implementation of IS Security activities 
and the consistency with which they facilitate the enterprise’s goals. For example if 
there is an absence of an individual or section that is solely accountable for IS Security 
issues (such as a IS Security function) then the deployment of activities related to 
security may be slow, hampered or futile (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002). The role of senior 
management is to guarantee that its structure is supportive of the deployment of 
security-related initiatives, without necessarily impeding business processes. This may 
indicate separating particularly sensitive processes into different structural entities and 
establishing more security measures specifically for them. Another implication is the 
modification of communication lines, reporting relationships or accountability to attain 
security strategies and objectives (Borchgrave et al., 2001). Von Solms and Von Solms 
(2004) highlighted a number of mistakes commonly made by management regarding IS 
Security (Table 2.4). The role of management is vital in assuring conformity to 
environmental drivers such as compliance regulations and the development of effective 
IS Security policies (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002). However these requirements are 
often enforced by an IS Security function. 
TEN DEADLY SINS OF IS SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
1. Not realising that IS Security is a corporate governance responsibility 
2. Not realising that IS Security is a business issue not a technical issue 
3. Not realising the fact that IS Security governance is a multidimensional discipline 
4. Not realising that an IS Security plan must be based on identified risks 
5. Not realising the importance of the role of international best practices 
6. Not realising that IS Security policy is absolutely essential 
7. Not realising that IS Security compliance enforcement and monitoring is absolutely essential 
8. Not realising that a proper IS Security governance structure is absolutely essential 
9. Not realising the core importance of IS Security awareness among users 
10 Not empowering IS Security managers with the infrastructure, tools and supporting mechanisms 
to perform their responsibilities properly 
Table 2.4: Ten Deadly Sins of IS Security Management (Source: Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2004, p.372).  
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2.3.3 The Information Systems Security Function 
Dutta and McCrohan (2002, p.84) contend “…that only senior management can initiate 
the plans and policies that address the different aspects of security in a balanced and 
integrated manner”. They further state that leaving the aspect of IS Security in the hands 
of the IT department “…will strengthen …technology and will not yield intended 
results. IS Security lapses are management failures more than technical failures”. The 
study of people and groups/units can be traced back to as early as the 19th century. For 
example, Gustave LeBon (1896) investigated the absorption of individuals into a crowd, 
losing their personality and adopting the collective mind of the group, such as a 
departmental group. The role that groups come to play in their organisation cannot 
easily be tied down to simple models (McGrath, 1984). Organisations and functional 
areas evolve and the result is rarely a neat arrangement of groups and procedures 
(Brown & Magill, 1994; Strassman, 1995). A wide range of employees is required to 
support a diverse IS Security plan. The individuals responsible for IS Security are vital 
in ensuring the success of any plan to prevent known threats and respond to unplanned 
incidents (Im & Baskerville, 2005). IS Security also depends on the utilisation of 
external professionals such as communities of practice (CoP). These communities are 
composed of a group of individuals united by similar interest/values (Wenger & Snyder, 
2000). People are the missing link to improving IS Security. Therefore, a specialised IS 
Security function is fundamental in assuring corporate assets. 
The management of IS Security is a significant challenge due primarily to the increase 
in value of information (Behara et al., 2007) and knowledge (Jamieson & Handzic, 
2004; Randeree, 2006). Due to the nature of IS Security issues organisations utilise a 
number of analytical tools to aid decision-makers to enact the functions of IS Security 
with their allotted resources. Given the high cost of IS Security it is necessary to 
determine the most effective approach and level of investment. The most practical or 
common approaches include: Cost based analysis (CBA), Net Present Value (NPV), 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Gorden et al.,  2006) and risk management, all of which 
focus on the financial or managerial evaluation of IS Security investments (Behara et 
al., 2007). As explained by the CSI/FBI 2006/07 surveys the majority of the 
respondents conduct some form of economic evaluation of their IS Security 
expenditures, with forty-two percent using ROI, twenty-one percent using IRR and 
nineteen percent NPV. The survey also identified economic and management issues (for 
example risk management) as among the most critical issues. However the overall 
objective for any organisation is to identify and strive toward the optimal level between 
IS Security and insecurity. The level is reached when the cost of additional IS Security 
countermeasures exactly equals the resulting reduction in damages arising from security 
breaches (Marin, 1992). Organisations must therefore determine the affect of too little 
or too much IS Security. Insufficient IS Security might leave the organisation 
vulnerable to attacks and ultimately reduce the corporate profit margin, and too much IS 
Security would mean that the high costs of IS Security countermeasures would consume 
profits (Bjorck, 1996) and reduce productivity (Jones & Anderson, 2004).  
Security countermeasures have other consequences; there are social, legal and ethical 
issues. To further complicate the issue of determining the optimal level of IS Security, 
the most valuable asset an organisation has is often intangible, such as information and 
knowledge assets which are difficult to assess (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004, Booz et al., 
2005; Holsapple & Singh, 2005). The technical control solutions, properly 
implemented, can improve an organisation’s ability to balance the objectives of making 
information more readily and widely available against increasing the information levels 
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of confidentiality and integrity (Whitman & Mattord, 2005; Dhillon, 2006). Therefore 
while the need for, and management of, IS Security is justified, to succeed within the 
environment, people, processes and technology involved must be understood and 
implemented into the organisation. The next section describes the importance of 
organisational culture for IS Security. 
2.3.4 Organisational Culture 
Culture is an elusive concept with numerous researchers linking culture to enhanced 
coordination and control, improved goal alignment and increased employee effort 
(Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992; Dojkovski et al., 2007). De Long and Fahey (2000) 
contend that culture includes more explicit artefacts such as norms and practices, 
symbols, as well as language, ideology, rituals and myths (Pettigrew, 1979). Jermier et 
al., (1991) distinguished between tacit and explicit components of culture, describing 
the tacit aspect (assumptions) as ideational while the more explicit artefacts of culture 
(norms and practices) are referred to as material. Schein’s (1985a, 1985b) three leveled 
model of culture describes both the more observable aspects of culture and the less 
observable aspects. As described by Schein (1985a) basic assumptions are at the core of 
culture and represent the belief systems that individuals have toward human behaviour, 
relationships and truth. These basic assumptions are formed over time as members of a 
group or function develop strategies to cope with solving problems and share these 
techniques and solutions with new members (or other practitioners). At the next level, 
corporate values form the foundation of corporate culture and provide a basis for 
appropriate behaviour (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Schein (1985a, 1985b) makes it clear 
that values are merely a reflection of the underlying cultural assumptions. At the third 
level, culture is manifested through visible artefacts (for example heroes, language and 
rituals). 
However, artefacts, such as information technology, are not culturally neutral and may 
come to symbolize a number of different values driven by underlying assumptions and 
their meaning, use, and consequences (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). Schein (1985b) 
argues that values are more easily studied than basic assumptions, which are invisible 
and therefore not easily studied, as well as cultural artefacts (technology) that, while 
visible, are not easily decipherable. Therefore it is understandable that the vast majority 
of theories that conceptualize culture do so in terms of reference group value 
orientations (Jackson 1995) such as value dimensions at the organisational and 
functional levels. These have an impact on subsequent behaviours of firm members 
through acting as a means of social control that sets the expectations and boundaries of 
appropriate behaviours for members. Thus, the study of organisational values may be 
particularly useful in explaining certain behaviours with respect to how social groups 
interact with, for example, applying IT in organisational contexts (Leidner & Kayworth, 
2006). 
2.3.4.1 Cultural Topologies 
Cultural theory argues that one’s social position can be defined by two basic dimensions 
grid and group, subsequently producing four ways of life, each with a corresponding 
bias. Group refers to the extent to which an individual’s freedom is controlled by the 
group in which they live or work (Jackson & Philip, 2010). Douglas (1970) recognises 
that belonging to group can place constraints on how people behave. In a high group 
environment, workers will be compelled to act in accordance with the collective 
interests of the group. In low group environments, members will be less compelled to 
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act in the interests of the group, and are free to associate and interact with other groups 
and individuals. In the group dimension, individuals have a choice as to whether they 
want to belong to a group. The application of these two dimensions: grid and group 
result in four approaches to life with contrasting cultural cosmologies (values and 
beliefs of a way of life) (Douglas, 1970). These include and are summarised by Jackson 
and Philip (2010): 
(1) Fatalism is characterised by strong grid and weak group. Individuals 
exemplifying this way of life display values of apathy and fear. This creates a 
hampering environment to transcend throughout the organisation in times of 
change (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999). It possesses no enabling characteristics.  
(2) Hierarchism is characterised by strong grid and strong group. There will be a 
strong emphasis on order, discipline and coordination of tasks. It provides 
visionary leadership and coordination. However, too much control and power 
can smother vision, foster dissatisfaction and lead to an impassive cultural 
orientation (Tolsby, 1998). 
(3) Individualism/Market is characterised by both weak grid and weak group. There 
will be opportunities for creativity and innovation. In its constraining form it can 
create a culture where individuals seize opportunities to their own advantage, 
leading to non-collaborative behaviour (Tsohou et al., 2006).  
(4) Egalitarianism is characterised by weak grid and strong group. Group concerns 
take priority over individual interests. Members will stress the importance of 
group-ethos, teamwork and trust. In its enabling form, egalitarianism fosters 
knowledge sharing, teamwork and trust to exist between organisational members 
(Adler, 1991). Change can only be effective if individuals are willing to work as 
part of a team or a function/group. In its constraining form, egalitarianism due to 
its lack of leadership and authoritative values, can lead to breach of trust and 
unsettled disagreement and internal rivalry.   
Therefore, according to Jackson and Philip (2010), managers should strive to reduce the 
constraining cultural characteristics and create a facilitative socio-technical environment 
by promoting the enabling cultural values. Organisations and functions, such as support, 
require the drive and innovation of individualism/market for enhancement and 
improvisation; the visionary leadership, resources and coordination of hierarchism, and 
the teamwork, trust and knowledge sharing of egalitarianism. This view is supported by 
a number of researchers (Ruppel & Harrington, 2001; Hendriks, 1999; Adler, 1991). 
However, membership of a cosmology is not fixed or permanent. It is dynamic as an 
individual could be a member of multiple cosmologies at the same time and drift 
between them forming, for example, technical communities of practice (CoP) in fields 
such as IS Security. 
2.3.4.2 IS Security Culture 
IS Security culture is composed of more than the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of messages (Dhillon, 2006). Policies and procedures which are clearly 
articulated and supported by management are a good mechanism for setting the cultural 
tone regarding risks (Greenstein & Feinman, 2000). Beliefs and best practices influence 
the behaviour of employees regarding IS Security (Thomson & Von Solms, 1998; Hu et 
al., 2008) and as a result staff should be aware of procedures aimed at preserving IS 
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Security of corporate assets. It is vital that IS Security awareness is instilled in the 
culture of an organisation (Ettinger, 1993) by the IS Security function and management 
(Borodzicz, 2005). Cultural differences can, however, create difficulty in determining 
what is and is not ethical. Difficulties arise when one nationality’s ethical behaviour 
conflicts with the ethics of another national group, which is an issue for multinationals. 
Dojkovski et al., (2007) contend that the local organisation/subsidiary culture will affect 
the IS Security culture, as an open culture promotes a relaxed attitude in the ISS 
approach adopted. The key to leveling ethical perceptions within a small population is 
education and awareness (SETA). Therefore employees must be trained in expected 
behaviours of an ethical employee, especially in areas of IS Security, to ensure proper 
use of information systems. Deterrence is the best method for preventing illegal or 
unethical activity. Laws, policies, and technical controls are all examples of deterrents. 
Additionally tools such as E-learning, training and education are valuable in developing 
IS Security cultures (Siponen, 2000). Knowledge sharing and collaboration have also 
been found to increase learning at individual and organisational levels in order to 
develop an awareness and culture of IS Security (Dojkovski et al., 2007). 
Pabrai (2005) contends that organisations, which lack security education and training 
awareness (SETA) procedures, are more vulnerable to accidental or intentional 
compromise of sensitive information. He further states that appropriate training and 
regular updates on business policies and procedures should be given to all employees 
and third-party users who manage sensitive information. Cheswick et al., (2003) argue 
that organisations should implement these procedures regularly as the organisation’s IS 
Security needs change. An efficient SETA strategy will educate employees about 
vulnerabilities, security measures and the importance of sensitive information. 
Businesses must communicate information regarding IS Security policies, legal 
responsibilities and business controls to the workforce. Finally, education amalgamates 
the IS Security capabilities of the organisation into a collective body of information and 
aims to equip IS Security professionals with the ability for vision and positive response. 
A corporate code of ethics and culture can be introduced and developed during training, 
which will aid organisational security (Stevens & Brownell, 2000). The development of 
a secure organisation requires a collaborative organisational endeavour (Dutta & 
McCrohan, 2002). Further awareness measures should be persuasive (Siponen, 2000) 
and assessed regularly (Dojkovski et al., 2007). It is through the provision of an 
effective organisational ISS culture and awareness programme that employees will 
intuitively protect corporate assets (Dojkovski et al., 2007) despite threat from the 
environment. 
Organisations are constantly reinventing themselves to cope with the challenges of their 
business environments (Baskerville, 2004) and threats (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). 
Essentially, the organisational context can offer criminal opportunities due to a 
complacency towards IS Security, erroneous perception of risks, a technical perspective 
of IS Security risks, funding of IS Security, implementation of inappropriate controls 
and an inability to learn from, and utilise, compliance reviews (Willison & Backhouse, 
2006). The correct control environment utilises documentation and guidelines such as 
IS Security policies which are crucial to an IS Security function’s ability to sustain, 
preserve and govern the IS Security of the organisation (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Thus, 
Section 2.4 examines the underlying threats to an organisation and the importance of 
allocating the necessary controls to combat their negative effects.  
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2.4 Formal Aspects of Information Systems Security  
The purpose of this section is to present the formal aspects of IS Security. Issues related 
to managing risks (Section 2.4.1), knowledge regarding the threats and challenges 
(Section 2.4.2) facing organisations and technical countermeasures (Section 2.4.3) are 
also outlined. Section 2.4.4 describes the regulations and standards affecting the 
management of IS Security. This section concludes with an overview of the formal 
models presented in the literature and highlights the inappropriate use of these models 
in managing IS Security (Section 2.4.5).  
2.4.1 Managing Risk 
This section highlights the importance of risk management as a vital activity in IS 
Security. It involves identifying, assessing and evaluating the level of risk facing the 
organisation in question (Borodzicz, 2006). Risk management involves the 
identification of known threats (Williams et al., 1995) and the process of risk 
engineering (Lievesly, 1995). The IS Security function must understand its internal and 
external environment and the company’s relationship with IS Security before an 
effective IS Security solution can be coined. The process involves implementing 
effective control measures (formal, informal and technical) to maintain the optimum 
level of IS Security (Dhillon, 2006). This acceptable level is achieved through the 
introduction of a number of processes from risk and feasibility analyses to the 
evaluation of IS Security controls. Enterprises face enormous challenges in exposures to 
risks – be they IS Security or otherwise. However senior management and many IT 
executives lack sufficient knowledge and data about their own vulnerabilities (Im & 
Baskerville, 2005) and the potential cost of failure due to an inability to manage 
knowledge pertaining to IS Security (Belsis et al., 2005; Wiant, 2005; Willison & 
Backhouse, 2006). 
IS Security function’s and practitioner’s knowledge of local threats, which form part of 
such risks, is often fragmented. Researchers have addressed the extent to which IS 
Security managers are cognisant of the nature of systems risk (Willison & Backhouse, 
2006). This risk can be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the different 
threats and implement the most effective controls (Straub & Welke, 1998). Aken (1978) 
posits that a control is the use of interventions by a controller (Security 
Officer/Coordinator) to promote a preferred behaviour for the organisation in preventing 
threats. The following sections will examine the threats and challenges facing IS 
Security functions in order to identify their negative effects and the controls necessary 
to limit the cost incurred. 
2.4.2 Threats and Challenges 
A threat is the possibility of an action, or event which could infringe IS Security causing 
harm by exploiting the vulnerabilities of an organisation. The weakest point in IS 
Security is considered to be the organisation’s greatest vulnerability. In the IS Security 
field this is referred to as the “principle of easiest penetration” (Parker, 1991; Dhillon, 
2006). Knowledge of threats and attacks are crucial to management when allocating 
resources, formulating IS Security policies and performing risk assessments (Straub & 
Welke, 1998; Jones & Ashenden, 2005). Attacks can temporarily deny network 
resources and use them as a stepping-stone in attacking another organisation a strategy 
frequently used in critical infrastructure attacks (Gal-or & Ghose, 2005).  
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Table 2.5 outlines twelve categories of threats that an organisation’s people, information 
and systems face (Whitman, 2003). The majority of threats can be prevented with 
controls or IS Security measures such as verification of commands through 
authentication techniques. Deliberate acts of espionage represent a broad category of 
electronic and human activities that breach the confidentiality of information. Controls 
such as firewalls (Section 2.4.3) are sometimes implemented to mark the boundaries of 
an organisation’s virtual territory. These boundaries give notice to trespassers that they 
are encroaching on the organisation’s cyberspace.  
CATEGORIES OF THREAT EXAMPLES 
1. Acts of human error or failure Employee mistakes 
2. Compromises to intellectual property  Piracy, copyright infringement  
3. Deliberate acts of espionage or trespass Unauthorised access/data collection 
4. Deliberate acts of information extortion Blackmail or information disclosure 
5. Deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism Destruction of systems or information 
6. Deliberate acts of theft Illegal confiscation of equipment 
7. Deliberate software attacks Viruses, denial of service (DoS)  
8. Forces of nature Flood, fire 
9. Deviations in quality of service Power and network connections 
10. Technical hardware failures or errors Equipment failure 
11. Technical software failures or errors Bugs, code problems, loopholes 
12. Technical obsolescence Outdated technologies 
Table 2.5: Threats to IS Security (Source: Whitman & Mattord, 2005, p.39, Adapted 
from ACM, Inc.). 
To tackle the threat of worms and viruses IS Security functions need to keep their skills 
and knowledge current (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Additionally organisations and IS 
Security practitioners are required to understand any and all legal and ethical 
responsibilities to minimise financial penalties and reduce risks from the threats 
discussed (Sundt, 2006). Section 2.4.3 presents an overview of the different technical 
controls available and Section 2.4.4 examines the regulatory aspects of IS Security. 
Various standards and best practices are also discussed. 
2.4.3 Technical Information Systems Security Countermeasures 
The technical side of IS Security is a part of, but not the answer to, the different IS 
Security challenges. This section explores IS Security technologies, methods and 
models. Knowledge and expertise of the technologies necessary to alleviate IS Security 
risks are seen as valuable (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Belsis et al., 2005; Stewart, 2005). 
Technology is used by organisations to gather and share information while 
simultaneously protecting it. Therefore “…senior managers must be familiar with some 
of the critical components of security technology” (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002, p.74). 
Technological changes, in both secure hardware and software, are as constant as the 
increase in the number of threats to corporate IS Security. Secure protocols, standards 
and encryption are used to protect business environments (Stallings, 2001; Dhillon, 
2006) and IS Security technologies such as firewalls, scanning tools and intrusion 
detection systems are used to filter out possible threats (Jamieson, 1991). Theoretically 
the data derived from these tools should, if utilised correctly, provide an integrated view 
or knowledge pertaining to the IS Security landscape of the organisation (Belsis et al., 
2005; Booz et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2.2 illustrates a combination of the sphere of IS Security (Whitman & Mattord, 
2005) and ISS controls aligned to corporate assets such as: data, information and 
knowledge. Each asset is mutually interdependent and of value requiring appropriate 
countermeasures. They are always at risk from attacks through the people and computer 
systems that have direct access to them. The sphere illustrates that between each layer 
there must exist a layer of protection in the form of countermeasures to prevent access 
to the inner layer from the outer layer. Technical controls are implemented between 
systems and the three assets, between networks and the systems, and between the 
Internet and internal networks. As illustrated, a variety of controls can be used to protect 
the data, information and knowledge stored by an organisation.  
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Figure 2.2: Proposed Countermeasures for data, information and knowledge (Adapted 
by the Researcher from Whitman & Mattord, 2005, p.198, Appendix A). 
However, as people can directly access each ring as well as the knowledge at the core of 
the model, people require unique approaches to IS Security. Members of the 
organisation must become a safeguard, which is effectively trained, implemented, and 
maintained, or else they, too, become a threat to the information and knowledge stored. 
The most common counter measure is the firewall. Firewalls are often regarded as the 
first line of defence of an IS Security strategy (Andress, 2004). The most effective 
firewalls are able to optimise functionality, decreasing risk and cost efficiency. Intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) monitor both inbound and outbound activities of the network 
and computer systems for signs of IS Security violations (Escamilla, 1998). Having 
detected such signs, the IDSs trigger alerts to categorise and report them. The report is 
downloaded by an analyst who evaluates and initiates an adequate response (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2005). In practice IDSs can trigger thousands of reports per day of which 
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the majority are false positives (benign events) making it extremely difficult for the 
analyst to filter and identify true positives (attacks).  
Access controls permit or deny the use of an object (a passive entity, such as a system 
or file) by a subject (an active entity, such as an individual or process). Access control 
systems provide the essential services of identification and authentication, authorisation, 
and accountability where identification and authentication determine who can logon to a 
system, authorisation determines what an authenticated user can do, and accountability 
identifies what a user did (Andress, 2003; Cheswick, 2003; Dhillon, 2006). Strong 
(layered) authentication is often coupled with high investments in the security 
infrastructure (Cheswick et al., 2003; Andress, 2004).  Cryptography is the use of 
mathematic formulas to encrypt and decrypt data allowing individuals to store sensitive 
information or transmit it across insecure networks (Stallings, 2001; Sundt, 2006). It is 
extremely important for data security and e-commerce in addressing confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation (Whitman & Mattord, 2004). Virtual 
private networks (VPNs) utilise encryption when establishing connections over an 
existing shared infrastructure using encryption or authentication technologies to secure 
its information. Virus scanners function by constantly screening all inbound network 
traffic. This technology is used by nearly ninety-six percent of organisations (CSI/FBI, 
2005). 
The same technologies which have empowered global commerce are also empowering 
hackers and hacking organisations to subjugate different types of information systems 
(Baskerville, 2004; Stewart, 2005). Advanced firewalls and virtual private networks 
(VPN) can be used (unintentionally) to fragment organisational information systems 
into IS Security compartments (Baskerville, 2004; Dhillon, 2006) making them difficult 
to monitor and control. There has been a consolidation of larger vendors but the market 
does remain fragmented with specialised vendors in for example IDS. The IS Security 
market is essentially vendor driven in which IS Security capabilities (products) are 
widely available for any business to purchase. Gartner estimates that worldwide IS 
Security software revenue totalled seven and a half billion dollars in 2005 (CSI/FBI, 
2007). It is common practice (for vendors) to manipulate internal taxonomies of 
vulnerabilities to make vendor figures look more impressive, creating a false perception 
of value (Stewart, 2005). Vendors in the IS Security space have a vested interest in 
playing up the perception that organisations face rapidly increasing threats/risks, and 
management should approach their claims with appropriate scepticism (CSI/FBI, 2007). 
As IS Security breaks out of its technical citadel to become a ubiquitous reality for all 
users of information, there is a pressing need for a theoretical framework against which 
practitioners may diagnose problems, plan action and implement solutions (Willison & 
Backhouse, 2006). 
The next section describes IS Security regulatory drivers. 
2.4.4 Information Systems Security Regulations 
An elementary part of the IS Security function’s responsibility is a careful examination 
of current regulations and common ethical expectations of national and international 
entities. Laws and regulations increasingly affect how IS Security is implemented. This 
analysis provides insight into regulatory constraints that govern business (Sundt, 2006). 
Therefore this section examines key laws that shape the field of IS Security.  
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The Financial Services Modernization Act or Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 requires 
all financial institutions to disclose their privacy policies on the sharing of non-public 
personal information. The act ensures that the privacy policies in effect in an 
organisation are fully disclosed when a customer initiates a business relationship. 
However it is the compliance to the Sarbanes-and-Oxley Act of 2002 that has had a 
profound effect on IS Security and IT as well as Finance and legal departments (Kaarst-
Brown & Kelly, 2005; Dhillon, 2006). Therefore IS Security practitioners require a 
wide range of skills far beyond technical computer security but which encompasses 
business, legal awareness and organisational process knowledge (Sundt, 2006). The 
SOX Act primarily addresses financial reporting and accounting controls; however it 
has inadvertently had a significant operational impact on IS Security management. 
Dhillon (2006) contends that IT and IS Security can be leveraged by an organisation in 
order to comply with the requirements of the law (Kaarst-Brown & Kelly, 2005).  
Figure 2.3 illustrates and outlines the impact of SOX on IS Security. The initial and 
most obvious impact has been the creation of a new reporting structure which must be 
implemented by IT/IS Security functions. IS Security will have to assure authentication 
of data through the use of technical controls. Specialised IS Security structures or 
functions must document in detail the logging of data access and/or modifications, 
control structures and processes. Adequate storage and back-ups of relevant corporate 
data assets (emails, audits, and financial reports) must be provided and implemented. 
Legal liability may arise from the use of, for example, a knowledgebase (Zeide & 
Liebowitz, 1987; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004) therefore it is the responsibility of the IS 
Security function to assure compliance to relevant laws. The Sarbanes-and-Oxley 
legislation has created a greater need for businesses to implement IS Security controls to 
enforce “separation of duties1” and therefore controlled access to information. The 
greatest challenge, especially in organisations with complex structures and incongruent 
financial processes, is to construct testable, consistent, transparent, and complete 
auditing processes to determine the level of compliance (Sundt, 2006).  
Figure 2.3: Impact of SOX (Source: Kaarst-Brown & Kelly, 2005, p.2). 
1Separation of duties is a cornerstone in the protection of information assets and in preventing loss. The completion of 
a significant task that involves sensitive information should require two people. The check and balance method 
requires two or more people to conspire to commit an incident, which is known as collusion. 
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Feltham & Mbagwu (2006) argue that the legislation was necessary, relevant and 
effective. They observed that prior to the implementation of SOX over ten percent of 
five hundred companies examined were disclosing earnings in a potentially deceptive 
way. However in 2003 less than one percent of disclosed earnings were potentially 
misleading. SOX has, as a result, augmented investor confidence, corporate 
accountability and improved financial statements’ transparency (Nazareth, 2006). IS 
expenditures are no longer justified due to their technical value but in clear business 
terms (View, 2003) adding to the value of the IS Security function.  
SOX reforms require a broad, digital paper trail to authenticate corporate financial 
reports (View, 2003). Adherence to industrial IT best practices and standards can 
potentially minimise the controls and systems devoted to SOX compliance, reduce costs 
and free resources for the development and advancement of the business (Hackett, 
2006). Companies have adopted best practice models or practices (Katz, 2006), such as 
capabilities maturity models (CMM), industrial standards such as COBIT (Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology), ITIL2 and ISO17799 to assess 
internal practices (Poole, 2001; Mishra & Dhillon, 2008).The most effective approaches 
appear to be those that have been developed as an extension of the overall control 
structure of the specific organisation (Rittenberg & Senn, 1993). However Backhouse et 
al., (2006) contends that a clear mapping of IS Security requirements to policies can be 
found in ISO17799. As explained by Belsis et al., (2005) the standard has greatly 
influenced the perception of IS Security.  
Conversely, Baskerville & Siponen (2002) contend that the use of standards in the 
development of best practices is disadvantageous. General IS Security management 
standards and guidelines fail to take into account that organisations differ and, as a 
result, managerial IS Security requirements are different (Baskerville, 1993). Standards 
additionally do not acknowledge the social nature of problems (Dhillon & Backhouse, 
2001). Generic standards omit business requirements as they are broadly written to 
necessitate ad hoc managerial decision-making. Standards are fundamental 
compatibility specifications that shape the configuration, use and management of 
information systems (Backhouse et al., 2006). Standards are instruments of power as 
they contain inscribed actions and processes that influence organisational activities and 
work tasks. Standards have been the subject of several studies in the IS field 
(Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Siponen, 2005; Backhouse et al., 2006) 
and are of enormous importance in providing structure and guidance for specifying IS 
Security policies, controls and processes. They are however generic and rarely aligned 
to the needs of the organisation (Baskerville et al., 2005). IS Security functions and 
managers do depend on this guidance in applying suitable IS Security measures to 
comply with regulatory requirements (Baskerville et al., 2005; Sundt, 2006; Backhouse 
et al., 2006). 
The following section explores the nature and scope of the formal models used for the 
technical specification of IS Security. Formal models are used to build security into 
computer-based systems and hence have limited utility in specifying technical controls 
alone. Thus, it is imperative to present the models available in literature and highlight 
such negative aspects prior to discussing the challenges facing IS Security and using 
knowledge management approaches to incorporate behavioural aspects of IS Security.  
2The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a customisable framework of best practices that 
promote quality computing. 
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2.4.5 Information Systems Security Methods and Models 
This section highlights the fact that “…serious research into the nature of the 
management of information systems security is scarce” (Baskerville, 1994, p. 385). 
However from the technical view point there are a number of solutions available. One 
of the key issues in managing IS Security is secure information systems. However, 
despite the recognised relevance of IS Security (Baskerville, 1992; Straub & Welke, 
1998; Anderson, 1999; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001) the IS Security research 
community has become bogged down in small-scale technical questions (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2001; Siponen et al., 2008). To alleviate this issue several methods for the 
development of secure information systems have been proposed, ranging from 
checklists (Von Solms, 1999; Eloff & Von Solms, 2000a; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001) 
to risk management (Siponen, 2005). Studies suggest that the alternative methods for 
developing and managing secure IS are influenced by the IS software development 
methods of previous generations (Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). 
Interestingly the oldest approach, namely checklist-standard-based securing of IS 
(Baskerville, 1993) is still used. However even though checklists are not a hot topic in 
the IS Security literature; IS Security management standards (Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon 
& Backhouse, 2001) have received increasing attention from IS Security researchers 
and practitioners (Baskerville et al., 2005; Siponen, 2005; Dhillon, 2006).  
Following ideas and developments in the field of software engineering new IS Security 
management-oriented maturity standards have been put forward, including the System 
Security Engineering Capability Maturity model (SSE-CMM, 1998). Greenstein and 
Vasarhelyi (2001) contend that risk management is a methodology for evaluating the 
prospects of future events that can exert grave outcomes. It involves the deployment of 
effective mechanisms for addressing these repercussions. The authors assert that it is not 
possible to eradicate risk completely. Ettinger (1993) argues that if risk management is 
properly carried out and combined with education and awareness initiatives, it might be 
the most cost-effective IS Security-enhancing measure available. Stoneburner et al., 
(2002) contend that the process enables IT managers to leverage both the cost efficiency 
of operations and economic costs of protective mechanisms. Each of these approaches is 
used in the systematic secure development of systems processing data, information or 
knowledge. 
Organisations utilise IS Security models to secure their assets (Baskerville, 2004; 
Siponen & Willison, 2007). The IS Security market is glutted with an array of 
traditional approaches so much so that practitioners find it difficult to understand the 
differences between them (Siponen, 2005; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). The first model 
is the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) model. This examines 
issues pertaining to trust and the confidentiality of the data stored and is largely 
concerned with securing classified data when purchasing systems from vendors but it 
underplays the importance of contextual issues (Dhillon & Hossein, 2001; Whitman & 
Mattord, 2005; Dhillon, 2006). The criteria used lists different levels of a trusted 
system, from level D with no security to level A1 with high security. This strategy was 
also used in the Bell La Padula model (Sundt, 2006). This model deals with controlling 
access to objects. These are akin to applying read/write permissions to word documents. 
However the Denning information flow model is used to apply security to information 
flows. As explained by Dhillon (2006) the model is based on the assumption that 
information constantly flows, is compared and is merged. The model examines a set of 
objects (files) that contain information and identifies active agents who are responsible 
for information flows, allocates each a security class (confidential) and the security of 
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the objects responsible for merging information is decided. The Chinese wall model was 
designed to provide controls that mitigate conflict of interest in commercial 
organisations, and is built upon an information flow model. A Chinese wall or firewall 
is an information barrier implemented within a firm to separate and isolate persons who 
make investment decisions from persons who are privy to undisclosed material 
information which may influence those decisions. This is a way of avoiding conflict of 
interest problems.  
The Observe-Orient-Decide and Act (OODA) model is regarded as a basic measure of 
the responsiveness of any security unit or function (Baskerville, 2004). The OODA loop 
has become an important concept in both business and military strategy. Essentially 
decision-making occurs in a cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. An effective function 
will sense (observe) a change in its setting, analyse the meaning and importance of the 
change (orient), identify the best strategy to take advantage of the change (decide) and 
then implement the change (act). An entity (either an individual or an organisation) that 
can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly 
than an opponent, can thereby “get inside" the opponent’s decision cycle and gain an 
advantage (Baskerville, 2004). One of the most widely referenced and often discussed 
security models is the ISO17799 as a model for IS Security. This is viewed as a 
standard which fails to incorporate the human factor into IS Security (Baskerville, 
2005). This exclusion of the circumstance of IS Security limits an organisations ability 
to protect all of its components.  
Finally the security infrastructure in place must support the size and scope of the 
enterprise. The IS Security methodology adopted must allow for the growth/expansion 
of the organisation. In order to secure growing and emerging organisations IS Security 
researchers and IS Security managers need to develop emergent IS Security approaches 
(Baskerville, 2004). Like its organisational counterpart, emergent IS Security endures 
continual change while seeking stability but never achieving it. Therefore IS Security 
managers and functions must adapt to and respond to an emergent IS Security 
landscape. IS Security activities, aimed at protecting information/knowledge assets must 
be both defensive and offensive. Researchers have argued that IS Security can be treated 
like a game (Wang, 2007) between the IS Security group and hackers (Baskerville, 
2004; Borodicz, 2005; Behara et al., 2005). The approaches to managing IS Security 
seem to dwell on the organisation as a machine metaphor (Walsham, 1991) and fail to 
consider stakeholder interests (Dhillon, 2006) and function activities such as KM.  
2.4.5.1 IS Security Strategic Decision-making 
At a corporate level the IS Security strategy determines key decisions regarding 
investment, diversification, and integration of resources in line with other business 
objectives. At a business level, the IS Security strategy analyses the threats and 
weaknesses of the IT and security infrastructure. In the IS Security literature, many of 
these issues have been investigated under the umbrella of risk analysis (section 2.4.1). 
The business IS Security strategy defines the overall approach to gain advantage from 
the environment, the detailed deployment of the procedures, at the operational level, is 
an issue of concern for functional strategies such as the IS Security policy. Current IS 
Security research considers policies as a vital component for the protection of the 
organisation. However, Wrapp (1991, p.32) contends that “good managers don’t make 
policy decisions”. Therefore the emphasis is on avoiding the danger of managers being 
trapped in disputes arising out of stated policies rather than binding IS Security to the 
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organisational objectives. The main IS Security objective is to create an environment 
where there is no scope for abusing organisational systems and processes.  
One of the fundamental problems regarding IS Security is for an organisation to choose 
the right kind of environment to function in. Strategic IS Security issues relate to where 
the firm chooses to operate and the scope of the organisation’s relationship with other 
organisations. For example if an organisation chooses to work with a U.S. based firm, 
the organisation will have to ensure compliance with corporate governance as mandated 
by the Sarbanes-and-Oxley Act of 2002 (section 2.3.1). Moreover, any change to an 
existing business process will have implications for business partners. In addition to 
corporate governance and environmental issues, IS Security return on investment (ROI) 
has become important (section 2.3.3). Addressing this issue would have a range of 
implications in ensuring IS Security. Investment in IS Security has increased, but so 
have the number and range of security breaches (CSI, 2009; 2010). This could mean 
that security mechanisms are ineffective (Figure 2.2), investments are being made in the 
wrong places or that the benefit of an ISS investment is intangible (Dhillon, 2006). 
Regardless of the reasons for a lack of security investment payoff, it is important that 
key decisions about security objectives are identified. While many organisations have 
engaged in identifying security issues and as a result developed appropriate IS Security 
policies, there is a clear mismatch between what the policy mandates and what is done 
in practice. Researchers have termed this as a gap: in espoused theory (actions that 
people write) and theory-in-use (what people actually do). Therefore theories-in-use 
have degrees of effectiveness which are learned (Mattia & Dhillon, 2003). Espoused 
theory and theory-in-use, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, are a part of the double-loop 
learning concept which creates a mindset that consciously seeks out security problems 
in order to resolve them. This results in changing the underlying governing variables, 
policies and assumptions of either the individual practitioner, function or the 
organisation. 
Context Assumptions Actions Results 
Single-Loop Learning Double-Loop Learning Triple-Loop Learning 
Are we doing things right? 
Are we doing theright things? 
How do we decide what is right? 
Figure 2.4: Levels of Learning 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) categorise higher-level organisational learning as a double-loop 
process yielding organisational characteristics such as acceptance of non routine 
managerial and heuristic behaviour. In contrast, single-loop processes ignore any 
security contradictions as we tend to be blind to the counterproductive features of 
security actions. Therefore organisations exhibiting single-loop security; display 
minimal, if any, security contradictions in their underlying governing values, variables, 
policies and assumptions. Single-loop is categorised as lower level organisational 
learning yielding characteristics such as rules and routines. When using the double-loop 
learning security framework, assumptions underlying current espoused theories and 
theories-in-use are questioned and hypotheses about their behaviour are tested. The 
double-loop inquiry is very different from single-loop learning. The organisation and 
therefore the IS Security function must become aware of the security conflict regarding 
the actions that have produced unexpected outcomes. The IS Security function must 
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reflect on the conflict and become aware that they cannot correct the error using existing 
IS Security controls more efficiently under the existing conditions (Dhillon, 2006). It is 
vital to discover what conflict is causing an error and then to undertake the inquiry that 
resolves the security conflict. Therefore the restructured governing variables become 
inscribed in the espoused theories. This allows the espoused theories and theories-in-use 
to become similar and thus more susceptible to effective ISS realisation.   
Thus, the following section presents the growing IS Security challenge of managing IS 
Security knowledge in the context of protecting an ever increasingly changing and 
complex organisations to strategically adapt their business environments. 
2.5 The Information Systems Security (ISS) Challenge 
The preceding sections focussed on a review of the IS Security literature examining its 
nature and importance, and the evolution of ISS to become a strategic function within 
organisations. The purpose of this section is to discuss IS Security from a knowledge 
management perspective (KM), describing the types, reservoirs and approaches used. 
IS Security is threatened with ongoing managerial challenges internal and external to 
the organisation. The sheer complexity of modern organisations means that the 
management of IS Security failures and the implementation of IS Security controls 
(formal, informal and technical) are far from rare (Baskerville, 2004; Borodzicz, 2005; 
Randeree, 2006). IS Security functions (attempt to) ensure the protection of information 
resources or assets (Dhillon, 2006). As a result IS Security has become a priority for 
modern enterprises and organisations, as the majority of organisational processes and 
activities depend heavily on IS. The IS Security industry has responded by developing a 
plethora of tools and mechanisms covering almost every aspect of IS Security. 
However, the effectiveness of current IS Security solutions and best practice standards 
have been seriously questioned (Baskerville, 2005). IS Security challenges increase the 
importance of managing IS Security knowledge in the context of protecting the 
organisation. The goal in managing IS Security is to minimise information systems 
operational risks. This involves several activities, such as planning, designing, 
implementing, monitoring, reviewing, and improving (BSI, 2002). These activities 
require specialised IS Security knowledge and one of the challenges faced by modern 
organisations is to acquire and manage expert knowledge in the area of IS Security 
(Belsis et al., 2005). 
Combining IS Security knowledge, activities, experts and tools could resolve the 
different IS Security challenges encountered by organisations (Sundt, 2006; Randeree, 
2006; Huo et al., 2008). This could be achieved through the utilisation of an effective 
KM approach, a solution which has been ignored by academia and industry. The 
application of the strategy to the management of IS Security knowledge would enable a 
more holistic approach to the management of IS Security across the enterprise. The 
researcher proposes that the application of a KM approach to the management of IS 
Security knowledge could alleviate the challenges facing IS Security managers and 
functions. KMS have been proposed as possible solutions in capturing and storing IS 
Security knowledge (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Belsis et 
al., 2005; Randeree, 2006). However approaches incorporating people and processes as 
well as technologies have never been contextually investigated.  
The administration and management of IS Security is a knowledge-intensive activity 
and to be effective must be managed. Research to date has focussed on incorporating IS 
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Security into IS development and ignores the social context of the phenomenon. The 
next section explores ISS from a KM perspective. 
2.6 Information Systems Security from a KM Perspective 
This section will define and differentiate between the different types of knowledge 
before discussing its various reservoirs and processes. The section will also discuss the 
mechanisms used to promote KM, the organisational infrastructure necessary to support 
it and the impact of managing knowledge for individuals, functions and finally the 
organisation. 
Knowledge is distinct from data and information (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Alavi 
and Leidner (2001), contend that some authors, mainly in IT literature, address defining 
knowledge by distinguishing between knowledge, information and data and also by 
setting out the perceived hierarchy or continuum of the three. Fundamentally data is 
“…a set of discrete, objective facts about events” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998, p.5). 
Knowledge is regarded as volumes of relevant information endowed with experience 
(Avison & Fitzgerald, 1997). An ISS expert, to be effective, must use extensively both 
formal (quantitative) and informal (qualitative) information (Earl & Hopwood, 1980; 
Land & Kennedy-McGregor, 1987) in decision-making. Finally, knowledge could be 
considered as “actionable information” (Jashapara, 2004, p. 16). Tiwana, (2000) 
contends that actionable information aids decision-making through the provision of 
information at the right place and time and in the format required by the decision-
maker. However this view does not fully explain the characteristics of knowledge and 
theorists such as Wiig (1999, p. 32) oppose this view and posit that knowledge is 
fundamentally different from both data and information: 
“[Knowledge]…is consistent of truths and beliefs, perspectives and concepts, 
judgments and expectations, methodologies and know-how and is possessed by 
humans, agents or other active entities and is used to receive information and to 
recognize and identify; analyze, interpret and evaluate; synthesize and decide; 
plan, implement, monitor, and adapt – i.e. to act more or less intelligently. In 
other words, knowledge is used to determine what a specific situation means and 
how to handle it”. 
Therefore knowledge is used to convert data into information and information into 
knowledge. Some experts view knowledge as an object which can be easily managed 
and controlled (secured through access rights and partitioning) while others view it as a 
product of a complex interaction between human beings and information. There are, 
however, alternative views of knowledge. Knowledge can be viewed from an objective 
or subjective stance (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). The objective view presents (IS 
Security) knowledge as an object with access to information or as a capability (Dhillon 
& Backhouse, 2001). The subjective view presents (IS Security) knowledge as a state of 
mind or as a practice. There is, however, a general consensus among theorists (Polanyi, 
1966; Nonaka, 1994; Dieng et al., 1998; Coakes, 2004) that knowledge can be split into 
two different facets: (1) explicit and (2) tacit. Coakes (2004) posits that tacit knowledge 
is more difficult than explicit to codify as it is retained in people’s minds and is not 
easily shared. The author advises that it is important to define the concept and different 
types of ISS knowledge before identifying its locations and discussing its application 
and management.  
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2.6.1 Types of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge has been classified and characterised in a number of different ways. Alavi 
and Leidner (2001) categorise it as individual, social, casual, conditional, relational and 
pragmatic. In this section some of the more important classifications of (ISS) 
knowledge are discussed. 
The first distinction is between tacit and explicit knowledge. Literature examining the 
application of tacit knowledge outlines how it can be identified and shared within 
organisations (Polanyi, 1966). Saint-Onge (1996) argues that the largest amount of 
knowledge within an organisation is tacit and is unarticulated. However, to be 
competitive an organisation must generate or create new knowledge. Knowledge is 
either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge (Svieby & Simons 2002). Therefore, knowledge 
is not private but social (Polanyi, 1975). This “personal coefficient” shapes all factual 
knowledge and thereby bridges the gap between subjectivity and objectivity. Explicit 
knowledge is viewed as knowledge that is codified, documented, archived and 
communicated. Explicit knowledge can be easily transferred from one place to another 
in a systematic and structured format (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Coakes, 2004). Bohn 
(1994) posits that explicit knowledge is more valuable than tacit knowledge and 
disseminated through more technologically enabled processes. The opposing view as 
advocated by Alavi and Leidner (2001) is that this is problematic, and derived from an 
inability to measure the true value of knowledge. Polanyi (1975) asserts that tacit 
knowledge forms the foundation that is necessary to understanding and structuring 
explicit knowledge. Therefore both present benefits and challenges to organisations 
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Holsapple & Singh, 2006). Stake (1978, p.6) provides one of 
the most succinct elaborations of this type of knowledge:  
Tacit knowledge is all that is remembered somehow, minus that which is 
remembered in the form of words, symbols, or other rhetorical forms. It is that 
which permits us to recognize faces, to comprehend metaphors, and to “know 
ourselves”. Tacit knowledge includes a multitude of inexpressible associations 
which give rise to new meanings, new ideas, and new applications of the old.  
The effects of globalisation and the accelerated rate of progress in technology have led 
to changes in the practices of the knowledge worker (Jashapara, 2004) or ISS 
practitioner. Changes such as advancements in ISS technologies have implications for 
the way IS Security practitioners work. When individuals work in groups or functions to 
perform tasks, those members create and apply tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966). 
Therefore explicit and tacit forms of knowledge are quite distinct. However, it is 
possible to convert explicit into tacit and vice versa.  
The second classification of knowledge is between declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Declarative knowledge is factual information that is static and easily 
described. It is an explicit form of knowledge which actors are able to verbalise and is 
usually factual in nature. In direct contrast procedural knowledge is regarded as 
dynamic requiring skilled actions. This type of knowledge is not easily explained or 
verbalised. Essentially declarative knowledge is described as “knowing that” and 
procedural knowledge as “knowing what”. 
The third classification of knowledge focuses on whether the knowledge is possessed 
widely or narrowly (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). General knowledge is possessed 
by a large number of individuals and can be transferred easily. Specific knowledge (or 
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idiosyncratic knowledge) is possessed by a limited number of people and is both 
difficult and expensive to transfer (Hayek, 1945; Jensen & Meckling, 1996). Specific 
knowledge can be further broken down into technically and contextually specific 
knowledge. Technically specific is deep knowledge about a specific field through both 
training and applied experience, and contextual refers to the knowledge of particular 
circumstances, such as an ISS audit, of time and place in which tasks must be performed 
(Hayek, 1945). It cannot be acquired through training. The objective of most 
organisations, attempting to manage knowledge regardless of the type, is to capture, 
share, acquire, control and create explicit and tacit knowledge (Standards Australia, 
2001). 
However, the difficulty is in locating the different reservoirs of (declarative, procedural, 
general, specific, explicit and tacit) knowledge. Davenport and Prusak (1998) identified 
knowledge mapping as a crucial step in the codification of corporate classified 
knowledge. Sources of knowledge should be identified and evaluated to determine their 
use. Knowledge maps are therefore useful as an inventory of knowledge within the 
organisation. The maps are graphic directories of knowledge sources such as assets, 
structures, applications or development stages (Eppler, 2004). Knowledge can also be 
classified according to its role within organisations (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). 
Knowledge is divided into support knowledge, which relates to the organisational 
infrastructure and facilitates day-to-day operations; tactical knowledge, which relates to 
the short-term positioning relative to its business environment, competitors and 
suppliers; and finally strategic knowledge, which pertains to the long-term positions of 
the enterprise regarding its corporate vision and strategies in achieving that position. 
Table 2.6 outlines and categorises examples of sources of IS Security knowledge and 
their roles within an organisation as identified by Belsis et al., (2005). 
Level of 
Abstraction 
Security Practice Potential Sources of Related 
Knowledge 
Target  
(Proactive/Reactive) 
Strategic  Design & dissemination 
of security policies 
Policy document Proactive security 
Tactical Risk analysis 
IS audit 
Risk analysis documentation  
Documented countermeasures 
Audit trail reports, automatic logs 
Audit documentation & reports 
Proactive security 
Reactive security 
Proactive security 
Reactive security 
Operations Security management 
tools 
NW security & Firewalls 
Reports 
Alerts | Logs 
Proactive security 
Reactive security 
Table 2.6: IS Security Practices & Relative Sources of Security Knowledge (Source: 
Belsis et al., 2005, p.194). 
2.6.1.1 Knowledge as Practice  
Gherardi (2000, p.218) argues that “practice connects knowing with doing”. Therefore 
knowledge practice is based on the assumption that activity includes inseparable 
physical and cognitive elements. As a result knowledge use and development is 
therefore regarded as a fundamental aspect of activity (Hislop, 2005), making 
knowledge inseparable from human activity (Orlikowski, 2002). Equally, all knowledge 
work, whether using knowledge, sharing knowledge, developing knowledge or creating 
knowledge will involve an element of activity. Blacker (1995, p.1023) explained it as 
“something that people have, it is suggested that knowing is better regarded as 
something [IS Security practitioners] do.” 
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Schon argued that the skilful practice exhibited by professionals does not consist of 
applying some prior knowledge to a specific decision or action, but rather of a kind of 
knowing that was inherent in their action. The essential role of a human agency is 
knowledgeable performance. Maturana and Varela (1998, p. 27) similarly define 
knowing as: "effective action," and write that "all doing is knowing and all knowing is 
doing." When we focus primarily on knowledge, we lose the centrality of action in 
knowledge-ability. Schon (1983) suggests that the tendency to slip from a focus on 
knowing to that of knowledge is deeply rooted in our theoretical enterprise as we 
attempt to develop (and test) theories that make sense of (or predict) effective action. 
Employee ongoing engagement in social practices, and thus their reproduction of the 
knowing generated in those practices, is how they reconstitute knowledge ability over 
time and across contexts. Continuity of competence, of skilful practice, is thus achieved 
not given (Orlikowski, 2002). Existing approaches to studying distributed organising 
tend to focus on the importance of knowledge transfer across boundaries, and the value 
of generating a set of "best practices" that can be propagated through the dispersed 
operations. A view of knowing as enacted in practice does not view competence as 
something to be "transferred," and suggests that the very notion of "best practices" is 
problematic. When practices are defined as the situated recurrent activities of human 
agents, they cannot simply be spread around as if they were fixed and static objects. 
Rather, competence generation may be seen to be a process of developing employee's 
capacity to enact what we may term "useful practices"-with usefulness seen to be a 
necessarily contextual and provisional aspect of situated organisational activity. 
The next section discusses the different reservoirs of (ISS) knowledge (or stores) before 
discussing the approaches used to manage knowledge.  
2.6.2 Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge resides in several different locations or reservoirs of knowledge (Becerra-
Fernandez, et al., 2004).They encompass people (individuals and groups), artefacts 
(practices, technologies and repositories) and organisational entities (organisations, 
functions, and inter-organisational networks).  
Drucker (1993) contends that knowledge is always embodied in a practitioner, created, 
augmented or improved, applied, taught and shared by a person. A considerable amount 
of knowledge resides in individual members of the firm (Argote & Ingram, 2000). As 
a result the majority of organisations seek methods to retain knowledge which might be 
lost, through, for example staff turnover (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Knowledge work 
is the ability to create an understanding of the nature of organisations and processes and 
in the application of this understanding as a means of generating wealth (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995). Managers are needed to govern initiatives (Davenport & Prusak, 1998) 
in managing knowledge. These managers should be skilled in the management of 
projects, change and technology. Leadership (governance) is responsible for appointing 
and identifying individuals, such as a Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO), to identify 
knowledge assets and artefacts within the organisation (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; 
Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). However, IT auditors and IS Security Officers should also 
be involved in the process (Standards Australia, 2001) to assure that the processes are 
controlled. 
A significant amount of organisational memory is stored in organisational artefacts. 
Some knowledge is stored in practices, organisational rules, routines and procedures 
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which are developed through experience over time, such as disaster recovery procedures 
(Levitt & March, 1988). Considerable knowledge is also stored in technologies and 
systems. In addition to storing data, IT and computer based information systems can 
store knowledge and facilitate relationships such as communities of practice (CoP). 
Knowledge stored in repositories represents another method of storing knowledge in 
artefacts. Knowledge repositories can be paper-based, embodied in books, white papers, 
and procedures or electronic such as web-based frequently asked questions (FAQ) and 
forums (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). 
IS Security knowledge is also stored within entities such as organisational units, the 
organisation itself and inter-organisational networks. The firm stores specific 
knowledge regarding: the norms, values, practices and culture which embody the 
organisation. To effectively understand the culture of an organisation (Section 2.3.4) it 
is necessary to examine the business environment; the organisation’s mission, vision 
and values; technology; IS Security knowledge structures; management style and 
organisational structure; individuals; collectives or groups and organisational memory 
(Lemon & Sahota, 2004). The knowledge stored in units, such as a department represent 
the formal functions of individual stores of knowledge specific to a unit or function. 
Customer Support (CS) functions are regarded as knowledge-intensive units focussing 
on supporting the problem-solving needs of an organisation’s customer base. The CS 
function of a multinational organisation is formed to capture and transfer the knowledge 
of their support experts, trouble-shooting and case-based reasoning (CBR) systems 
(Huang et al., 2007). Support functions predominately apply a form of a KM approach 
in supporting an organisations customer base (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004).   
ISSUE SOURCES 
Expertise Development 
Categories of ISS knowledge 
Organisational knowledge 
Seminars 
Scientific journals, international conferences and specialised websites 
International standards and guidelines from international 
organisations 
On-the-job training 
ISO17799 categorisation 
Culture 
Organisation structure 
Organisational needs addressed by the IS perception of risk 
IS configuration and functionality 
Table 2.7: IS Security Knowledge (Source: Belsis et al., 2005, p.195). 
Knowledge transfer has extended from passing information from individual to 
individual (Cantoni et al., 2001) to moving knowledge around the organisation 
(Rutkowski, 1999). As a result the collective knowledge of a function is synergistic 
(Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). Knowledge is also stored in inter-organisational 
relationships such as collaborative partnerships. Table 2.7 outlines some of the sources 
of IS Security knowledge exploited in order to protect corporate boundaries. 
Additionally regardless of type or classification, knowledge provides substantial value 
to the organisation and it must learn to manage (Stewart, 1997) and to retain its value 
through control (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Randeree, 
2006). 
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2.6.3 IS Security Knowledge Management Approaches 
Knowledge Management (KM) is a holistic attempt to manage organisational assets 
through the effective utilisation of experts, technologies and processes in the business 
environment in which the company operates to achieve competitive advantage. 
Definitions of knowledge management abound. Table 2.8 provides an overview of some 
of the more well known definitions. However KM lacks an agreed upon definition (Ives 
et al., 1998) but is viewed as an important discipline which promotes the creation, 
sharing and leveraging of the organisations memory. This problem is mirrored in the IS 
Security literature (Section 2.2). IS Security lacks an agreed definition even though it is 
viewed as a vital discipline in protecting valuable corporate assets. For the purpose of 
this research, KM is concerned with ensuring that knowledge is available in the right 
form to the right processors (systems, people and processes) at the right time for the 
right cost (Holsapple & Singh, p.220). 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
DEFINITIONS 
VIEWPOINT AUTHORS 
“[Knowledge management]... draws from existing resources 
that your organisation may already have in place - good 
information systems management, organisational change 
management, and human resources management practices”. 
Integration of 
resources 
Davenport & 
Prusk,1998 
“…improving the ways in which firms facing highly 
turbulent environments can mobilise their knowledge base 
(or leverage their knowledge “assets”) in order to ensure 
continuous innovation”. 
Strategy Newell et al., 
2002 
[knowledge management] “is an array of process that deal 
with the creation, dissemination and utilisation of 
knowledge 
Array of 
processes 
Avital, 2004, p.2 
“[knowledge management is]…the systematic organisation, 
planning, scheduling, monitoring and deployment of people, 
processes, technology and environment to facilitate the 
creation, retention, sharing identification, acquisition, 
utilisation and measurement of information and new idea, in 
order to achieve strategic aims” 
Knowledge is a 
condition of 
access to 
information. 
Lehaney et al., 
2004, p.3 
knowledge management is “in its broadest application refers 
to how a firm acquires stores and applies its own intellectual 
capital”. 
Intellectual capital Wickramasinghe, 
2003, p. 296 
knowledge management is the most recent in a long line of 
fads and fashions embraced by the Information Systems 
community that have little to offer. Rather, we argue for a 
refocusing of our attention back on the management of data, 
since IT processes data – not information and certainly not 
knowledge. 
A fad Galliers & 
Newell, 2001, p. 
609 
Table 2.8: Definitions of Knowledge Management (KM). 
Alavi and Leidner (2001) contend that the growing realisation of the value of 
organisational knowledge has driven organisations to transform themselves into 
knowledge-orientated enterprises (Wong & Aspinwall, 2005). Organisational 
knowledge is viewed as a strategic asset, because it meets the following criteria: it is 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Holsapple & Singh, 2004). Prusak (2001) 
states the sceptics of KM argue that it was invented by consultants in response to 
declining revenues, a belief compounded by Galliers and Newell (2001) who view KM 
as the most recent in a long line of fads and argue for a refocus back to the management 
of data. This argument is mirrored in studies such as Butler (2000) as KM has resulted 
in as many successes as failures (Randeree, 2006). The benefits include leveraging core 
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business competencies, accelerating innovation and time to market, improving cycle 
times and decision-making, strengthening organisational commitment and building 
sustained competitive advantage (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Avital (2004, p.2) posits 
that KM is composed of “an array of processes that deal with the creation, 
dissemination and utilisation of knowledge”. There are many different ways in which 
KM can be practised and that certain KM approaches are more suited to particular 
organisations than to others. Holsapple and Joshi (2004) have identified various KM 
activities or processes. An examination of these activities revealed a great deal of 
variation, as a result many researchers use different terms for the same processes.  
Therefore the following sub-sections describe the IS Security processes discussed in this 
study: IS Security knowledge acquisition, capture, creation, sharing, application/use and 
control. 
2.6.3.1 IS Security Knowledge Acquisition and Capture 
Alavi and Leidner (2001), and Davenport and Prusak (1998) agree that acquired or 
procured knowledge does not need to be created within the firm, just new to the firm. 
Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained (Huber, 1991, 
p.90). Once it is identified it is transformed into a representation that can be internalised 
(Holsapple & Singh, 2004). The most effective acquisition method is simply to buy or 
lease knowledge. This has resulted in many companies encouraging employees to copy 
or develop ideas from other organisations through, for example, reverse engineering 
(Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). A takeover is an approach to acquiring knowledge 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Knowledge can be acquired by “grafting” or employing 
new members with the skills and knowledge lacking instead of developing it in-house 
(Jashapara, 2004). Examples of knowledge acquisition include: conducting an external 
survey, training, purchasing data sets, monitoring the external IS Security landscape, 
network (NW) perimeter penetration testing, gathering knowledge via competitive 
intelligence (Holsapple & Singh, 2004) or information warfare (Baskerville, 2004).  
Knowledge capture is “the process of retrieving either explicit or tacit knowledge that 
resides within people, artefacts, or organisational entities” (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 
2004, p.33). The knowledge captured may reside inside or external to the organisation 
in the form of vendors, consultants, competitors, partners and past employees. It also 
utilises Nonaka’s (1994) externalisation and internalisation to capture tacit and explicit 
knowledge. 
2.6.3.2 IS Security Knowledge Creation 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) regard knowledge creation as a sign of a healthy 
organisation becoming a learning organisation (Coakes, 2004), arguing that knowledge 
does not remain static. The knowledge that organisations collect must be maintained 
with a “focus on continually renewing existing knowledge, creating new knowledge, 
and effectively using that knowledge in … practices” (Oppong et al., 2005, p.431). A 
common method of generating knowledge is to establish dedicated resources for doing 
so, such as research and development (R&D) groups (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). 
Leveraging tacit knowledge is a difficult process and central to its attainment is the 
collaboration of the actors. To facilitate these processes the structure, management and 
the necessary ICT must support them. One of the primary factors for knowledge 
creation is a culture of learning. There are four modes of knowledge conversion 
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required for knowledge creation: (1) socialisation, (2) externalisation, (3) conversion 
and (4) internalisation (Nonaka et al., 1996). 
1.	 Socialisation is the process by which tacit knowledge from one individual is 
converted into the tacit knowledge of another though observation and practice. 
Examples include: trial and error learning, on the job training, mentoring, direct 
or indirect communication.  
2.	 Externalisation is the process of changing tacit knowledge into explicit through 
dialogue and group reflection. 
3.	 Combination is a process of combining components of explicit knowledge to 
create and store in knowledge systems such as: KMS, databases and 
documentation, enabling additional members of the unit or organisation to 
access knowledge.  
4.	 Internalisation is the process through which experts can personalise explicit 
knowledge and convert it into tacit knowledge.  
Knowledge creation occurs when there is continuous interaction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge, producing a spiral effect, starting with one process and moving onto 
the new mode continuously. Knowledge creation examples include: making a decision, 
recognising or solving a problem, inventing a process, brainstorming, constructing a 
software routine and discovering a pattern.  
2.6.3.3 IS Security Knowledge Sharing 
Knowledge sharing is the process through which explicit or tacit knowledge is 
communicated between individuals, groups, units or organisations. In contrast, 
knowledge exchange or trading focuses on sharing explicit knowledge between groups 
and organisations (Grant, 1996). The goal of many organisations is to create 
communities where knowledge is shared and used by developing CoP (Pan & Leidner, 
2003). Davenport and Prusak (1998) contend that when such networks share knowledge 
through a variety of communication tools such as: email, telephone or groupware, new 
knowledge is created. Davenport and Prusak (1998) recognise that knowledge is 
transferred within organisations whether or not the process is managed. Dieng et al., 
(1998) add that organisational memory must be distributed to the correct people either 
passively or actively. Davenport and Prusak (1998) posit that organisations should 
introduce knowledge sharing methods, adding that companies must expand on their idea 
of productivity in the workplace to include continuous learning, social interaction, and 
reflection by providing the time and recognition for employees.  
2.6.3.3.1 Communities of Practice (CoP) 
IS Security depends on professionals internal and external to the organisation such as 
‘Communities of Practices’. These communities are composed of a group of individuals 
united by similar interest/values (Wenger, 2000). Communities of practice (CoP) 
develop as individuals interact frequently to discuss topics of mutual interest and 
demonstrate the productive value of knowledge in groups. Wenger and Snyder (2000, p. 
139) define communities of practice as “groups of people informally bound together by 
shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise”. Additionally they explain that 
“managers cannot mandate communities of practice.  Instead, successful managers 
bring the right people together, provide an infrastructure in which communities can 
thrive, and measure the communities’ value in non-traditional ways”. Communities 
appoint their own leaders but they require a significant amount of support both from 
senior management and in terms of infrastructure and funding.  
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One of the strengths of the communities of practice approach is that it can be applied in 
a wide range of organisational settings. However, this can also be viewed as a 
weakness, since it may encourage its inappropriate application (Roberts, 2006). In 
contrast, Kimble and Hildreth (2004, p. 5) question whether communities of practice are 
always suitable for the business setting, arguing that their interests may not be aligned 
with those of the organisation and ‘because they are self-managed and self directed, 
their contribution to the organisation will always be uncertain’. Workers increasingly 
operate in an individualistic world of weak ties where resources are frequently obtained 
through personal networks rather than through organisation based communities. 
Individuals belong to a variety of communities of practice some internal to their work 
organisation while others will be external arising from their personal and professional 
networks. Therefore for businesses and organisations to fully leverage their knowledge 
capacities they must harness communities of practice within and external to their 
organisations. Given that knowledge is transferred through social interaction, then 
businesses need to pay particular attention to their recruitment and training policies to 
ensure that they maintain an appropriately skilled workforce to maximise the 
advantages of these communities. Another limitation to the approach is; its relevance 
for small and medium sized organisations. Communities of practice require cultivation 
if business organisations are to fully exploit their positive attributes (Wenger et al., 
2002); they will not ﬂourish in inhospitable organisational environments.  
As explained by Pan and Leidner (2003) the goal of KM initiatives in many 
organisations is to develop networks where knowledge is shared and used by 
developing these communities of practice (CoP). Davenport and Prusak (1998) argue 
that when networks such as these share enough knowledge over time, new knowledge is 
generated within the organisation and that these networks are usually brought together 
through a knowledge champion or by a variety of communications tools such as 
groupware. Buchel and Raub (2002) identified the importance of building trust within 
these communities of practice in order for tacit knowledge to be passed from one 
member of the network to another. Buchel and Raub (2002) add that in this context, 
trust can be considered the foundation on which knowledge is generated within these 
networks. It is through the manipulation of an organisation’s culture and politics, that 
employees can be easily influenced as the most important influence on staff attitude is a 
demonstration of the commitment to IS Security by key opinion formers in each 
functions (Gaunt, 2000).  Therefore it is the role of managers to support the goals and 
objectives of the organisation not the (information/knowledge) society which forms the 
organisational context (Borodzicz, 2005). However, due to the political nature of 
knowledge, this can be problematic. 
2.6.3.3.2 The Political Nature of Knowledge 
Malhorta (2003, p.3) contends that “…knowledge has no definitive value but can 
potentially be of use indefinitely.” Therefore even though knowledge is difficult to 
quantify it is a significant component of the decision making process as “…it does have 
a clear impact on business outcomes” (Soo et al., 2002, p.129). Intangible assets, such 
as knowledge, are difficult to appraise but researchers argue that they should not be 
ignored (Conway, 2004; Ulrich & Smallwood, 2004).  Brelade and Harman (2003) 
contend that the drivers for KM are much the same as drivers for change in any 
organisation; to obtain a competitive advantage. As the majority of organisations regard 
the knowledge possessed by the firm as an asset. It is therefore the management, 
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 creation and application of this knowledge that is a direct contributor in achieving and 
maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage (Stewart, 1997). Additionally Coakes 
(2004) argues that knowledge workers, aided through the implementation of a 
knowledge management initiative, can make more effective decisions and improve their 
efficiency and therefore in turn improve the profitability of the organisation through the 
effective management of knowledge. Brelade and Harman (2003, p. 31) states that “an 
emphasis on knowledge, skills and creativity and on the capturing and sharing of 
information, are all issues that impact upon how people are managed”. However 
knowledge is power and some individuals see more benefit from hoarding their 
knowledge than sharing it, unless knowledge sharing is rewarded more than knowledge 
hoarding (Davenport & Prusak 1998; Walsham 2001). The decision knowledge workers 
face regarding whether or not to participate in knowledge related activities has been 
compared to a classical public good dilemma.  
In summary knowledge workers would have access to a shared organisational resource 
(a public good) whether they contributed to it or not and its value would not diminish 
from its use. The dilemma for knowledge workers is that there are potentially positive 
and negative consequences to both sharing and hoarding knowledge. The advantages of 
sharing knowledge is intrinsically rewarding at both group (increased performance) and 
organisational levels. The monetary rewards (bonus) and an individual’s status can be 
enhanced. Consequently, the negative implications vary from loss of power and time. 
Moreover, knowledge sharing is dependent on the motivational elements of the 
knowledge sharing process and the culture in which the process operates. Raghu and 
Vinze (2005) added that knowledge sharing can be successful even without a set 
structure for knowledge sharing, as long as there is a context for the knowledge 
initiative. However the benefit of hoarding knowledge is that the practitioner avoids the 
risk of giving away knowledge, power and status that are aligned to the knowledge.  
A general weakness of KM initiatives is that the issues of conflict, power and politics 
are generally neglected (Hislop, 2005). The potential for conflict between workers and 
management can shape individuals willingness to participate in organisational 
knowledge processes. Therefore inter-personal and inter-group conflict in organisations 
can also affect KM processes. Hislop (2003) identified a number of instances where 
organisational change was hindered by a lack of willingness to share across functions. 
This can often be explained due to a history of inter-functional conflict and competition. 
Furthermore Hislop et al., (2000) found that knowledge and personal networks are used 
by many practitioners as political tools in support of particular objectives. This is 
compounded by the work of Buchanan and Gibb (2008) where political behaviour has 
been found to be a common feature of organisational life. However the importance of 
conflict, power and politics in impacting workers willingness to share is profound. They 
are a common feature of organisational life and due to the inter-relationship between 
power and knowledge, knowledge is a resource workers make use of in dealing with 
situations of conflict.  
2.6.3.4 IS Security Knowledge Application and Use 
The process of knowledge application relies on available knowledge. The better the 
other processes of knowledge (acquisition, capture, creation, sharing and control) the 
better the application of knowledge. Knowledge application involves the use of 
knowledge to guide decisions and actions. The use of knowledge benefits from two 
processes: routines and directions (Grant, 1996). Routines involve the use of knowledge 
embedded in procedures, rules and norms that guide the user. Direction refers to the 
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approach through which the individual possessing knowledge directs the action of 
another employee without transferring the knowledge. If knowledge is used or applied 
the possibility exists that organisational learning is innovative and as a result adds value 
to the organisation (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004). 
2.6.3.5 IS Security Knowledge Control 
Knowledge control processes ensure that needed knowledge resources and activities are 
available in sufficient quantity and quality. These are also subject to, as identified by 
senior management, the required protection and constraints (Holsapple & Singh, 2004). 
The goal of knowledge control is the “[protection from] ...loss, obsolescence, 
unauthorised exposure, unauthorised modification, and erroneous assimilation [which] 
is crucial for the effective management of knowledge” (Holsapple & Joshi, 2000, 
p.240). To protect information or knowledge assets, management must allocate 
appropriate IS Security and control measures to counter known threats (Jamieson & 
Handzic, 2004; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004; CSI, 2009). The risks to KM are 
numerous. Intellectual property (IP) is regarded as the results of a human intellectual 
(KM) process which has inherent value to the organisation that sponsored the process 
(Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). Organisations create and support the development of 
IP as part of a knowledge creating process and have control of the tangible 
representation of those ideas. The more codifiable, documented and distributed the 
knowledge the greater the risk or compromise. Therefore intellectual property losses for 
an organisation can occur in a variety of ways (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004; CSI/FBI, 
2006), such as: employee turnover, physical theft of sensitive propriety documents, 
inadvertent disclosure to third parties and reverse engineering..  
Companies can use nondisclosure agreements (NDA), patents and copyrights to reduce 
KM risks (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Deliberate “acts of espionage” represent a broad 
category of electronic and human activities that breach the confidentiality of 
information (Jamieson, 1991; Whitman, 2003; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). An 
unauthorised individual gaining access to corporate knowledge reservoirs is categorised 
as a deliberate act of espionage or trespass. The modification, deletion or insertion of 
KM information when passing through a network poses serious risks to KM (Jamieson 
& Handzic, 2004). Jamieson (1991) identified additional KM exposures such as an 
inability of KM software and hardware to recover or start, a lack of knowledge-use 
histories (audit trails) in hard or soft copy, inadequate trace facilities in KM software for 
debugging and testing, KMS knowledge not based on the best expert’s knowledge, 
reasoning and explanations, inadequate control of and access to KM repositories, poor 
management of KM applications and inadequate training and supervision of KM 
personnel. IS Security controls are vital in assuring the quality and quantity of 
knowledge resources. Control is a managerial influence on KM to assure knowledge 
validity (accuracy and consistency) and knowledge utility (relevance and importance), 
(Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Holsapple & Singh, 2004). Knowledge control should be a 
priority as the value of knowledge and the returns achieved depends on its effectiveness 
(IT Governance Institute, 2001; Randeree, 2006). Controls are therefore used as IS 
Security countermeasures to perceived threats to the operations of an organisation, be it 
the management of knowledge, information or data (Section 2.4.3). 
The next section discusses the mechanisms used to promote KM before discussing the 
organisational infrastructure (Section 2.6.5) necessary to support, for example, the 
management of IS Security knowledge.  
Page 55 
2.6.4 KM Mechanisms for IS Security 
KM mechanisms are structural methods used to promote the use of KM tools. 
Mechanisms can be technological and non-technological. They are supported by the 
KM infrastructure and facilitate KM systems (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). KM 
mechanisms range from on-the-job training, learning by training, face-to-face meetings, 
mentoring, employee shadowing, employee rotation, brainstorming and analogies. The 
processes discussed in Section 2.6.3 are facilitated by a number of KM mechanisms. 
Mechanisms which facilitate socialisation includes: cooperative projects across 
departments, repositories of best practices, lessons-learned and apprenticeships. 
Combination is facilitated through the collaboration of documentation, databases, 
problem-solving and web-based access to data. Knowledge capture is facilitated by 
case-based reasoning (CBR) tools and expert systems. Knowledge sharing utilises 
repositories, lessons-learned systems and expertise locators. Knowledge application 
systems such as expert and decision support systems and hierarchical relationships in 
organisations, Help desks and support centres are used to facilitate direction, and 
policies and standards are used to support routines.  
Davenport and Prusak (1998) argue that KM is about much more than just technology, 
but concede that technology is an important enabler. At the heart of the systems 
dimension of KM is the shift from a technology focus to people and their contribution 
when knowledge is made accessible through technology. Tyndale (2002) states that; the 
goal of KM tools or systems is to facilitate the process. Additionally Croasdell (2001) 
contends that there are advantages in using IT to support corporate memory, as the 
contents stored are explicit and can be shared and modified if required. However 
Tyndale (2002) argues that organisations are not reaping the full benefits of KM-
enabling tools. Many of the KM systems utilised in firms seem to provide elaborate 
document management more than effective KM. As explained by Davenport and Prusak 
(1998) the term “KM technologies” encompasses a number of technologies including 
web-based systems, Lotus notes and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, such as expert 
systems, case-based reasoning (CBR) and neural networks. The typical goal of a KM 
initiative is to capture knowledge in a documented form and store it into a repository 
where it can be easily stored and retrieved by knowledge seekers. Davenport and Prusak 
(1998) identified three basic types of knowledge repositories: external knowledge 
(competitive intelligence), structured internal knowledge (for example: research reports, 
product-orientated marketing materials and methods) and informal internal knowledge 
(discussion databases full of “lessons-learned”). Davenport and Prusak (1998) did not 
identify expert systems in their research even though these can also be classed as 
repositories of narrow knowledge domains.  
The combination or integration, along with the capability to combine an expert’s 
experience in the form of a system is regarded as a strategic tool (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001). Systems capable of combining explicit and tacit knowledge of workers are 
referred to as KM Systems (Butler & Murphy, 2007). These systems are used to acquire 
and manage knowledge and distribute it among functional units as well as with any 
external collaborating functions. KMSs are used to disseminate and reuse knowledge 
creating new knowledge through the use of the system (Alavi & Leidner, 2001) 
improving the effectiveness of decisions (Peterson, 1996).  
The next section describes the organisational infrastructure necessary to support KM.  
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2.6.5 Organisational Infrastructure 
Organisational infrastructure is the foundation on which KM resides. It is composed of 
organisational: structure (Section 2.3.1), culture (Section 2.3.4), IT infrastructures, 
common knowledge and the physical environment (Standards Australia, 2001; Jamieson 
& Handzic, 2004). Common or general knowledge refers to cumulative experiences 
which support communication and coordination through common language, vocabulary, 
recognition of individual knowledge domains and shared norms (Grant, 1996). The 
physical environment is important as it allows employees to meet and share ideas and 
knowledge. A supporting organisational culture helps motivate employees to understand 
the benefits of KM. Knowledge sharing and use varies from one culture to the next 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Traditional reporting relationships can influence the flow 
of data, information, knowledge and the nature of functions in making decisions and in 
sharing knowledge (DeSanctis, 1987; Dhillon, 2006). A CoP is a self-organised group 
of individuals dispersed geographically or organisationally but who communicate for 
problem-solving. Specialised structures and functions such as the IS Security and 
Customer Support functions specifically support organisational operations. IT and IS 
Security infrastructures also facilitate KM. IT infrastructures include data processing, 
storage, systems and ICT. It is the IS Security infrastructure which secures the 
organisation and assures the role, value and utility of its knowledge. It secures and 
supports the processes, people and technology involved to prevent uncontrolled 
organisational knowledge (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Belsis 
et al., 2005; Randeree, 2006). Knowledge assurance refers to a review of KMS and IT 
infrastructure to determine if the systems are secured. KM governance committees and 
IS Security functions are responsible for auditing KM (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004) for 
assurance. 
2.6.6 KM Impact 
Brelade and Harman (2003) contend that the drivers for KM are much the same as 
drivers for any organisational change striving for competitive advantage. Therefore IS 
Security knowledge “…has no definitive value but can potentially be of use 
indefinitely” (Malhorta, 2003, p.3). Even though knowledge is difficult to quantify it is 
a significant component of the decision-making process as “…it does have a clear 
impact on business outcomes” (Soo et al., 2002, p.129). Alavi and Leider (2001) 
highlight the fact that the greatest approach to sustainable competitive advantage is not 
the amount of corporate knowledge stored but the firm’s ability to retain and ultimately 
disseminate the corporate knowledge-base and enhance existing knowledge resources. 
KM can impact organisations and organisational performance on the following levels: 
individuals, functions, processes, products and the overall performance of the 
organisation (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004).  
Employee performance can be greatly impacted through KM. It can facilitate employee 
learning and enhance their exposure to the latest knowledge in their fields of expertise 
through for example access to experts and lessons-learned from a project. Employees 
are also encouraged to learn from one another to adapt to changes in their environment. 
These improvements also enhance job satisfaction as skills are improved, as is the 
employee’s market value (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Additionally KM facilitates 
improvement in organisational processes such as manufacturing and engineering by 
improving the effectiveness, efficiency and innovativeness of the different processes. 
Specifically KM enables organisations and their functions to adapt quickly to changes 
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in their environments, such as the IS Security landscape and technological 
advancements. 
Choi and Lee (2002) argue that the relationship between KM processes and strategies is 
critical to improving corporate performance. KM impacts the organisation’s products by 
adding value or creating knowledge-based products and services. Essentially existing 
products are improved to add value to the organisation, and knowledge-intensive 
services such as support functions (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). By overlooking the 
need to formulate a clear business case, many KM implementations have resulted in 
failure (Coakes, 2004). KM can impact the organisation either directly, through for 
example, increased revenue or indirectly in exploiting intangible assets which are 
difficult to measure (Smith & McKeen, 2004). Hansen et al., (1999) warn against 
companies isolating KM in functional departments such as Human Resources, IS 
Security or CS. The co-ordination of KM requires the leadership of senior management 
if the organisation and its customers are to benefit from its utilisation. Even though 
many researchers highlight the importance of an overall KM strategy (Hansen et al., 
1999; Choi & Lee, 2002; Malhotra, 2000; Coakes, 2004) few are implemented. The 
majority of organisations focus on the operational side of KM as opposed to an 
integrated approach. However if knowledge positively impacts an organisation and is 
therefore valuable then it should be secured (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Jamieson & 
Handzic, 2004; Belsis et al., 2005; Randeree, 2006; Guo, 2008). To do so IS Security 
functions need to be effective and proactive in responding to IS Security issues. 
Therefore managing IS Security knowledge is vital in meeting IS Security challenges 
(Belsis et al., 2005; Guo, 2008). 
The next section discusses the importance of managing IS Security knowledge and the 
research lens identified from the literature discussed in this Chapter.  
2.7 Managing Information Systems Security Knowledge 
Trends such as continued IT evolution and new business models coupled with 
strategies, such as KM, have resulted in complex business environments (Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002; Patterson, 2005). Researchers, investigating knowledge and its 
management, have to include the protection and security of knowledge (Randeree, 
2006). IT governance is advocated by Ramos (2001) as a key enabler in aligning the 
environment to the objectives of the organisation. Jamieson & Handzic (2004) posit that 
IT and IS Security governance should involve the governance of KM to ensure that it is 
aligned to the strategy of the organisation. The IS Security function should be consulted 
when considering IS Security controls for KM technologies, people and processes. 
These personnel are responsible for identifying vulnerabilities and abuses associated 
with KM systems (Whitman & Mattord, 2005) and the implementation of appropriate 
controls to alleviate identified threats. Considerable risk is posed in establishing a KM 
initiative within the organisation (Section 2.4.1). KM processes, technologies and 
knowledge workers should also be framed to identify the risks, if any, in generating, 
capturing, acquiring, sharing and applying knowledge.  
To effectively secure tangible and intangible assets such as knowledge, IS Security 
knowledge must be successfully managed to ensure that IS Security practitioners and 
senior management are equipped to meet any IS Security risk and challenge.  However 
the IS Security literature focuses on technical subfields with the majority on automatic 
mechanisms on such as IS Security technologies, access controls (Castano et al., 1995; 
Booz et al., 2005; Borodzicz, 2005; Balta & Gaadingue, 2006; Siponen & Willison, 
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2007), cryptography (Kahn, 1996; Menezes et al., 1999; Dhillon, 2006), and 
development methodologies for secure information systems (SIS) (Baskerville, 1988; 
1993; 2005; Dhillon, 1997; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). A detailed analysis of all of 
the different themes of IS Security is lacking (Siponen, 2005). Andress (2004) contends 
that IS Security involves people (Adams et al., 1992; Siponen, 2000; Hinde, 2003; 
Belsis & Kokolakis, 2005), processes and technologies. Von Solms (2001) warns that if 
IS Security is not addressed in a holistic and comprehensive way significant risks to the 
organisation will continue to emerge. Understanding IS Security is still at a theory-
building stage (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Siponen et al., 2008), especially when 
incorporating KM (Belsis et al., 2005; Randeree, 2006; Guo, 2008). In order to gain an 
understanding of where further research is required, it is necessary to examine and 
synthesis previous research findings which was the purpose of this Chapter. The next 
section discusses the research lens identified from the synthesised IS Security and KM 
literatures. 
2.7.1 Research Lens 
The objective of this research is to determine how IS Security could leverage the 
concept of KM. The research lens (Figure 2.5), derived from the IS Security and KM 
literatures discussed, is used for conceptualising and operationalising the factors of this 
study. Figure 2.5 illustrates the variables identified and used as a guide to explore the 
objective of this research. Each variable is tagged with its corresponding subsection to 
illustrate the flow of the research lens. The research focuses on the relationship between 
IS Security and KM and the proposed benefits that an IS Security KM initiative would 
produce. In conceptualising the research lens, the researcher followed DeLone and 
McLean’s (1992; 2003) advice in identifying an outcome to determine the propositions 
to be explored and the (inter-dependent) relationships which exist between them. The 
DeLone and McLean IS success model is based on a review and integration of a 
hundred and eighty research studies that used some form of system success as a 
dependent variable. The outcome of this investigation is ultimately to apply a KM 
approach to IS Security. An analysis of contrasting (IS Security and CS functions) 
approaches to the management of knowledge - through the operationalisation of the 
model will explain how the methods applied in one context can be transferred to the 
context of other functions with predicable tangible benefits. 
KM assessment approaches usually combine several measures. One such approach 
involves the application of benchmarking or comparing knowledge management at an 
organisational or subunit level with other organisations or subunits. Benchmarking can 
be adopted as a systematic technique for evaluating a company’s or function’s 
performance towards its strategic goals. Benchmarking is based on the recognition that 
best practices are often the same within the same company and within the same 
industry. Benchmarking within the same company, the same industry or competing 
firms. High performing units and companies can be studied and their practices 
replicated within another unit or company. Therefore, in benchmarking KM at the 
Customer Support (CS) subunit level with another of the organisations subunits IS 
Security in order to replicate the success of KM in other unit. Additionally, an analysis 
of the approaches used by these specialised structures in managing knowledge within 
and across the two case studies will facilitate benchmarking at organisational level to 
determine how ISS can leverage the concept of KM within and across the case 
organisations. 
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The systematic evaluation of the CS and ISS functions approaches, used to manage 
knowledge, will enable an assessment and replication of the approaches used to 
ultimately improve how IS Security knowledge is managed. The replication of the case 
study protocol (CSP) illustrated in Figure 3.2 and discussed in Chapter 3 presents a 
cross-case analysis of the different approaches to managing knowledge, these can then 
be synthesised to determine any comparisons, differences and impacts across the two 
organisations investigated. Additionally through the exploration of the interplay 
between the functions (ISS and CS) at a local level and across the two case studies, a 
possible correlation between KM and IS Security could be identified, presenting a 
possible competing outcome to this study.  
The remaining sub-sections outline the different components of the research lens 
(Figure 2.5). The first three describe the types (Section 2.7.1.1), reservoirs (Section 
2.7.1.2) and approaches (Section 2.7.1.3) used to manage knowledge, each of which is 
inter-dependent on the other. Section 2.7.1.4 describes the KM mechanisms needed to 
promote KM in organisations. Section 2.7.1.5 describes the levelled (individual, 
functional and organisational) impact of the approaches used. Finally, section 2.7.1.6 
describes the infrastructure needed to support the management of knowledge in a 
competitive business environment. 
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Figure 2.5: Conceptual Model – KM Approach to IS Security  
2.7.1.1 Types of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge has been classified and characterised in a number of different ways. Figure 
2.5 illustrates the types of ISS knowledge as an inter-dependent variable in the 
conceptual model created. Literature examining the application of tacit knowledge 
outlines how it can be identified and shared within organisations (Polanyi, 1966). 
Explicit knowledge can be easily transferred in a systematic and structured format 
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Coakes, 2004). The practices of the ISS practitioner have 
changed due to technological advancements (Jashapara, 2004) and when individuals 
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work in functions to perform tasks, those practitioners create and apply tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1966). Tacit and explicit can therefore be further classified as declarative and 
procedural. ISS Knowledge can be either possessed widely (general) or narrowly 
(specific) (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). Specific knowledge (technically or 
contextually) is possessed by a limited number of people and is both difficult and 
expensive to transfer (Hayek, 1945; Jensen & Meckling, 1996). Knowledge can also be 
classified according to its role within organisations (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). 
As a result knowledge is divided into operational (facilitating the day-to-day 
operations); tactical knowledge (which relates to short-term positioning relative to its 
business environment); and finally strategic knowledge (which pertains to the long-term 
position of the enterprise). The next section describes the different reservoirs of ISS 
knowledge as illustrated in Figure 2.5.  
2.7.1.2 Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge 
IS Security knowledge resides in people, artefacts and organisational entities 
(organisations, units, inter-organisational networks). A considerable amount of 
knowledge resides in individual practitioner (Argote & Ingram, 2000) and extensive 
knowledge resides within functions. Regardless of type or classification, knowledge 
provides substantial value to the organisation and it must learn to manage (Stewart, 
1997) and to retain its value through control (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Jamieson & 
Handzic, 2004; Randeree, 2006). Knowledge is pulled from its various stores and 
processed through: acquisition, creation, sharing, application, use and control. Therefore 
knowledge is always changing and should never be static. As a result the better the 
approach used to manage knowledge the better its creation and use.  
2.7.1.3 IS Security KM Approaches 
The objective of most organisations is to acquire, capture, create, share, apply and 
control explicit and tacit knowledge (Standards Australia, 2001). Alavi and Leidner 
(2001), and Davenport and Prusak (1998) agree that acquired knowledge does not need 
to be created within the firm, just new to the firm. Knowledge capture is “the process of 
retrieving either explicit or tacit knowledge that resides within people, artefacts, or 
organisational entities” (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004, p.33). Davenport and Prusak 
(1998) regard knowledge creation as a sign of a healthy organisation becoming a 
learning organisation (Coakes, 2004). Knowledge creation occurs when there is 
continuous interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge, producing a spiral effect, 
starting with one process and moving onto the new mode continuously. Knowledge 
sharing is the process through which explicit or tacit knowledge is communicated 
between individuals, groups, units or organisations. The goal of many organisations is 
to create communities where knowledge is shared and used by developing CoP (Pan & 
Leidner, 2003). The process of knowledge application relies on available knowledge. If 
knowledge is used or applied the possibility exists that organisational learning is 
innovative and as a result adds value to the organisation (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004). 
Knowledge control processes ensure that needed knowledge resources and activities are 
available in sufficient quantity and quality. These are also subject to, as identified by 
senior management, the required protection and constraints (Holsapple & Singh, 2004). 
To protect information or knowledge assets, management must allocate appropriate IS 
Security and control measures to counter known threats (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; 
Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004; CSI, 2009). The risks to KM are numerous. Controls are 
therefore used as ISS countermeasures to perceived threats to the operations of an 
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organisation, be it the management of knowledge, information or data. The next section 
discusses the mechanisms used to promote KM as illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
2.7.1.4 IS Security KM Mechanisms 
Use of KM mechanisms, in the context of this research, is measured in terms of the 
change which occurred as a result of managing knowledge either unintentionally or 
purposefully (O’Dell et al., 2004). The use of KM in either a general or specific context 
will affect its success. A causal relationship between KM and use exists (Gartner, 
2000). If the level of use increases then the approach used will have a greater impact on 
the users (individuals and functions) and therefore the organisation (DeLone & McLean, 
1992). The combination or integration, along with the capability to combine an expert’s 
experience in the form of a system is regarded as a strategic tool (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001). The next section describes the levelled impact of KM as illustrated in Figure 2.5.  
2.7.1.5 IS Security KM Impact 
KM can impact organisations and organisational performance on the following levels: 
(1) individual, (2) function processes, products and ultimately the overall performance 
of the organisation (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). Employee performance can be 
greatly impacted through KM. It can facilitate employee learning and enhance their 
exposure to the latest knowledge in their fields of expertise. KM enables organisations 
and their functions to adapt quickly to changes in their environments, such as the IS 
Security landscape and technological advancements. KM can impact the organisation 
either directly, through for example, increased revenue or indirectly in exploiting 
intangible assets which are difficult to measure (Smith & McKeen, 2004).  
2.7.1.6 IS Security Organisational Infrastructure 
Organisational infrastructure is the foundation on which KM resides. As a result it is 
composed of organisational: structure (Section 2.3.1), culture (Section 2.3.4), IT 
infrastructures, common knowledge and the physical environment. However if 
knowledge positively impacts an organisation and is therefore valuable then it should be 
secured. To do so IS Security functions need to be effective and proactive in responding 
to ISS issues. Therefore managing IS Security knowledge is vital in meeting ISS 
challenges. 
This research lens is a representation of the ISS and KM literature discussed in this 
chapter. Figure 2.5 illustrates the flow between the different variables identified. The 
different types of ISS knowledge are retrieved from the corporate knowledge reservoirs 
and manipulated /altered by the processes outlined. The application and use of 
knowledge enables the creation, sharing and reuse of every type of knowledge stored in 
the different reservoirs. These are then promoted through non-technological and 
technological mechanisms which in turn impact individuals, their groups and ultimately 
the organisation itself. Additionally, as this step-by-step cycle continues learning occurs 
is enhanced and alters the cycle of managing knowledge facilitated or hindered by the 
organisation infrastructure within a competitive business environment. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 identifies and describes the calls from academia and industry for an integrated 
approach to managing IS Security in order to provide the present study with a firm 
theoretical foundation. IS Security is a challenging research area in the context of IS yet 
it is under-researched. As the business and IS Security landscape changes, management 
must have the ability to make decisions based on judgement, understanding and 
knowledge. Traditionally there have been technocratic approaches to IS Security. Due 
to the continued increase in incidents and challenges to IS Security, the solution to 
better IS Security may not be found through technical measures. There is a pressing 
need for a theoretical framework against which practitioners may diagnose problems, 
plan action, adapt to a changing IS Security landscape and implement solutions. 
Existing IS Security models and procedures do not exhibit a high degree of flexibility, 
and as a result managers and IS Security practitioners make IS Security decisions in a 
knowledge vacuum. Risk can be managed or reduced when IS Security managers, 
practitioners and functions are aware of the full range of controls 
(formal/informal/technical), environmental threats, regulations, standards, technologies 
and practices available and implement the most effective solution. Threats should be 
met when organisations avoid reactive solutions and instead adopt proactive practices. 
To tackle threats or risks IS Security functions need to keep their skills and knowledge 
current. Therefore this thesis endeavors to explore the possibility of applying a KM 
approach to the management of IS Security knowledge. Table 2.9 outlines the family of 
definitions required for this investigation. 
DEFINITIONS 
Organisations can be viewed as being composed of the informal, formal and technical 
interconnecting parts or systems. 
IS Security is a process that ensures the protection of information resources encompassing the 
people, processes and technologies used. 
KM is concerned with ensuring that the knowledge is available in the right form to the 
right processors [systems, people and processes] whenever required 
Culture is enhanced coordination and control, improved goal alignment and increased 
employee effort 
Explicit K is codified, documented, archived and communicated 
Tacit  K cognitive (beliefs, viewpoints and mental maps) and technical (know how) 
Procedural K is dynamic requiring skilled actions – knowing what 
Declarative  K is factual information that is static and easily described – “knowing that” 
Tech Spec  K deep knowledge about a specific field through training and applied experience 
General K possessed by a large number and can be transferred easily 
Operational K day-to-day operations 
Tactical K the short-term positioning relative to its business environment 
Strategic K to the long-term positions of the enterprise regarding its corporate vision 
Reservoirs of K encompass people, artefacts  and organisational entities (organisations, functions, 
and inter-organisational networks 
K Processes is based on the assumption that activity includes inseparable elements 
Acquisition  process by which new knowledge is obtained 
Capture process of retrieving knowledge that resides within people, artefacts /org entities 
Creation Generating knowledge 
Sharing explicit or tacit knowledge is transferred 
Application the use of knowledge to guide decisions and actions 
Control protection of knowledge resources 
Mechanisms are structural methods used to promote the use of KM tools 
Impact change striving for competitive advantage 
Table 2.9: Root Definitions 
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CHAPTER THREE 

THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 

3.0 Introduction 
Chapter three is about the theory, research question and model underlying this research 
(Figure 1.1). It sets out the research lens (Figure 2.5) informed by a review of the 
literature and defines the research objective and the research questions (Section 3.1). 
The philosophical perspectives of epistemology and the different methodologies are 
discussed in Section 3.2. After reviewing the different perspectives and considering the 
current state of research in the IS Security field, an interpretivist approach using 
qualitative methods was considered the most appropriate for exploring the management 
of IS Security knowledge. Section 3.3 describes the research strategy utilised. Section 
3.4outlines the method by which the data was analysed from within and across the cases 
selected. The Chapter concludes with a summary of the research protocol, steps and 
time line (Section 3.5).  
3.1 Framing the Research 
The purpose of this section is to outline the research framework which is informed by 
evidence sourced from the literature and acts as a lens for this research study. Section 
3.1.1 describes the framework used. Section 3.1.2 states the research objective. Section 
3.1.3 concludes the section by formalising three research questions and explaining the 
purpose of each research question in the context of this study. 
3.1.1 The Research Framework 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the variables identified from the IS Security and KM literatures 
and was used as a guide to explore the objective of this research. Section 2.7.1 described 
the propositions, their measurements and the inter-dependent relationships which exist 
between them. In the context of this study, the literature provides a lens whereby 
operational factors and outcomes can be differentiated based on their applications 
within the two case studies. The factors and outcomes identified in the literature act as a 
basis for grounding the investigation of the approaches used to manage knowledge in 
two specialised IS Security and CS functions within the two organisations participating 
in this study. This equipped the researcher with a fitting lens, based on prior research, 
from which to initiate the investigation while allowing enough scope to enable 
additional factors, outcomes and implications to emerge from the contextual settings of 
the organisational environments participating in this study.  
3.1.2 Research Objective 
IS research seeks to describe, explore or explain a phenomenon expected to add value to 
the existing body of theory (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Fundamental to this process is 
the identification of the research topic or objective (Jenkins, 1985; Mumford, 1985; 
Fitzgerald, 1991; Adam & Healy, 2000; Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2002; Saunders et al., 
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2003) that will add to existing or create a new body of knowledge. The objective must 
be a clear and unambiguous statement to enable the researcher to select an appropriate 
research strategy (Jenkins, 1985). The accuracy of the research objective enables 
focused decisions to be made at critical stages of the research process. The primary 
objective of this study is: 
To explore how Information Systems Security (ISS) could leverage the concept 
of Knowledge Management (KM) through qualitative research. 
3.1.3 Research Questions 
Defining the research questions is one of the most important steps to be taken in any 
research (Benbasat et al., 1987; Miles & Huberman, 1994). A clear research question 
expresses the nature of an inquiry, allowing the researcher to link easily a study to its 
practical and theoretical contributions, and thus forming the backbone of relevant 
research design (Goldkuhl, 1996). However the research questions must also be 
questions that can be answered in a useful way (Drake et al., 1998). Therefore it is 
important to ensure that research questions are appropriate in terms of their interest, 
significance and value to the practitioner, the IS Security, and information systems 
research communities. The literature review facilitates the definition of the research 
questions as well as the research objective. To accomplish the research objective the 
following three research questions were formulated: 
RQ.1: How can the organisational infrastructure support the management of IS Security 
(ISS) knowledge? 
A review of the literature reveals the importance of the organisational infrastructure in 
providing the foundation on which the functional units within reside and operate. The 
review reveals five main components (culture, structure, common knowledge, IT 
infrastructure and physical environment) that are traditionally depicted as 
interconnecting parts of an organisational infrastructure. The researcher also identified 
the importance of the infrastructure in supporting the management of knowledge. 
However, research has yet to explore their application in supporting the management of 
IS Security knowledge. The purpose of this research question is to use this theory as a 
lens to examine how the organisational infrastructure supports the management of ISS 
knowledge in each organisation participating in this study.  
RQ.2: How do the two functional areas IS Security (ISS) and Customer Support (CS) 
manage knowledge? 
The literature suggests that the management of knowledge can directly impact the 
organisation at several levels: (ISS) individuals, the functions within, and the overall 
organisational performance. Impacts can come about directly from KM approaches or 
from the knowledge created, shared and applied through the approach. Therefore it is 
important to investigate how an organisation manages knowledge to determine the 
contribution of KM efforts. It is impossible to properly investigate this at an 
organisational level given size, uncertain business environments, and structural 
complexity.  However examining how one function using a KM approach, producing 
quality knowledge solutions, within an organisation can help establish a baseline for 
implementing the KM approach, including the infrastructure and the mechanisms that 
can help support the management of knowledge, in another function. As Customer 
Support (CS) functions have been identified as knowledge intensive environments in the 
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literature they were selected as units or functions of analysis for this study. A similar 
review of literature revealed that research has yet to explore how IS Security functions 
manage IS Security knowledge. Therefore in comparing the KM approach used in a CS 
function with the IS Security function operating within the same organisation allowed 
the researcher to additionally determine how IS Security functions manage knowledge. 
The purpose of the second research question is to determine how KM can be used to 
manage IS Security knowledge within and across the two organisations participating in 
this study. 
RQ.3: How can firms align Information Systems Security (ISS) to a Knowledge 
Management (KM) environment? 
This question will be answered from within and across the two cases. A review of the 
literature revealed that there is little if any accord regarding the relationship between IS 
Security and the management of knowledge other than the application of ISS controls in 
the technological application of KM and vice versa. It is however agreed that both KM 
and IS Security involve people and processes as opposed to just technology. Therefore 
an organisation, through its ISS function, must align ISS to every facet of a KM 
environment to ensure that needed knowledge resources and processors are available in 
sufficient quantity and quality subject to the corporate ISS measures and constraints. An 
organisation that intends to stay in business must have the necessary IS Security 
controls in place to prevent and certainly to decrease the frequency of loss. The purpose 
of the third research question is to determine how firms align IS Security to a KM 
environment.  
The three research questions described required the researcher to investigate the 
phenomena within their real contexts. Thus, an in-depth study of the context in which 
Customer Support and ISS functions manage knowledge is required (Section 3.5).  
3.2 Research Philosophy and Methodology 
Research philosophy and methodology guide the research strategy and prior to 
undertaking a research study a researcher must be familiar with the various assumptions 
that exist relating to ontology, epistemology and methodology as they define a 
researcher’s belief about reality. This section establishes the philosophical perspectives 
of ontology (Section 3.2.1) and the epistemological positions of the interpretivist and 
positivist paradigms (Section 3.2.2). The methodological debate of quantitative versus 
qualitative approaches is then discussed (Section 3.2.3). Finally, this section justifies the 
research approach selected in the context of the current IS Security literature and 
concludes that due to the exploratory nature of this research, an interpretivist approach 
combined with qualitative data is the most suitable approach for exploring how IS 
Security could leverage the concept of KM. 
3.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is the study of the essence of a phenomena “...and the nature of their 
existence” (Gill & Johnson, 1997). It is important for researchers to establish their 
ontological position as it will influence their research approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991). The ontology debate is divided between nominalism and realism. The nominalist 
perspective centres on the assumption that “...the social world external to individual 
cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to 
structure reality” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The realist position assumes that the 
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“...social world external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible 
and relatively immutable structures” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). There is a range of 
possible ontological assumptions that underpin social enquiry and as a result the 
majority of researchers do not take an extreme position. Thus, the majority of research 
studies are conducted from a perspective somewhere between the two positions. 
3.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is the basis for this search for reality and it refers to the assumptions 
about knowledge and how it can be obtained (Hirscheim, 1992). Gill and Johnson 
(1997) define it as “…the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the criteria 
by which we determine what does and does not constitute warranted or valid 
knowledge”. There are two major research philosophies which have dominated the 
discussion on research methodologies in the IS field including: positivist (sometimes 
called scientific) and interpretivist (also known as anti-positivist) (Galliers, 1992). 
When deciding between the two approaches, researchers must question their own beliefs 
about what knowledge is and how to validly acquire it (Hirschheim, 1985). The two 
research paradigms are discussed in detail in the following sections as failure to 
consider IS philosophical issues will negatively impact the quality of an investigation 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
3.2.2.1 Positivist Paradigm 
Positivism is traditionally the dominant information systems research approach used 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Burrell & Morgan (1979) posit that positivism seeks to 
explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and 
casual relationships between its elements. It is founded on the belief that the study of 
social systems should be carried out in the same way as the natural sciences (Walsham, 
1993) and has evolved from a scientific tradition, where scientific approaches assume 
that observations of the phenomena under investigation can be made in an objective and 
rigorous manner (Galliers, 1991). Positivists believe that reality is stable and can be 
observed and described from an objective viewpoint (Levin, 1988). Human innovation 
and reasoning are excluded and research is carried out independently of the researcher 
(Klein & Lyytinen, 1985) and is therefore unaffected by irrationality, emotionalism and 
human fallibility (Checkland, 1981). The positivist paradigm asserts that there is a 
reality to be studied, captured and understood and this is an apprehensible reality which 
is assumed to exist, driven by unchallengeable natural laws and mechanisms (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). Positivist theory is generally quantitative in nature when testing theories 
to try and increase the predictive understanding of phenomena. It studies 
empirical/quantitative data by testing theories and hypotheses and quantifying variables 
and propositions (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). It is characterised by reductionism, 
repeatability and refutation, and emphasises rigour and objectivity of method 
(Checkland, 1981; Hirschheim, 1985). This approach may not be suited to all research 
and its applicability and validity has come into question (Klein & Lyytinen, 1985). 
Despite the enthusiasm for scientific methods, there has not been a lot of success when 
they have been applied to social sciences (Hirschheim, 1992) such as the IS field where 
the relevant knowledge required cannot be acquired by applying traditional scientific 
methods so this approach is of little relevance to a qualitative study.  
Due to the rich context of this study, the difference in research subjects and the 
fundamental differences in the study of people and other research are important factors 
(Nissen, 1985; Hirschheim, 1985; Klein & Lyytinen, 1985). The positivist approach 
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results in objectivity and testability by stripping the subject of context from meaning in 
the process of developing quantified measures of phenomena resulting in a lack of a 
deeper understanding of the phenomena (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). If the objective is to 
explore a phenomenon and investigate how IS Security could leverage the concept of 
KM through a comparative analysis of IS Security and CS functions then a method that 
will allow the collection and analysis of rich in-depth data is required. Thus, interpretive 
research has emerged as an important perspective from which to conduct information 
systems security research.  
3.2.2.2 The Interpretivist Paradigm 
The interpretivist approach to research is qualitative rather than quantitative; the 
approach analyses every aspect of human behaviour rather than on the collection of raw 
data. An increasing number of researchers have expanded their research beyond 
mathematical analysis to the studying of the environment of the problem at hand 
(Galliers, 1992). Research conclusions, using the interpretivist method, can be 
subjective and the researcher may be biased in the interpretation of participant’s 
information, distorting the information so as to point it in a certain direction 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Another criticism is that it abandons testability of results 
so as to gain greater meaning from the research (Lee, 1989). The participants involved 
in a study may be misleading or deceptive when relaying their experiences and accounts 
of events and if a study is relying on these findings, it will be inaccurate (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991). Bharadwaj (1996) argues that the interpretivist approach is suitable for 
IS research because: (1) it reflects the link between the “human element and the 
technological aspect of IS research”, (2) it contests the positivist view that IS 
development is purely technical, and (3) it encourages the use of a number of research 
methodologies for IS research. Remenyi et al., (1998) contend that researchers must be 
mindful of the weaknesses of their preferred approach to adequately build on the 
existing body of knowledge. 
Table 3.1 outlines the fundamental differences between the two main IS paradigms 
regarding the patterned set of assumptions concerning reality (ontology), knowledge of 
that reality (epistemology), and the approach to knowing about the reality 
(methodology) in question. Walsham (1993) further differentiates between the two 
paradigms by stating that the interpretative approach describes a need to understand the 
phenomenon while positivism is purely technical. Positivism is also characterised by the 
scientific principles of repeatability, reductionism and refutability (Checkland, 1981). 
The scientific nature of positivism serves to test theory through controlled methods in 
order to prove both replicability and predictability with the researcher in the role of an 
observer as if a laboratory experiment was under scrutiny.  
Klein & Lyytinen (1985, p. 137) highlight this meticulous approach when they state 
that: 
“To achieve both it teaches respect for facts, i.e. to refrain from armchair 
speculation when relevant facts can be brought to bear on issues. In using facts 
to support inferences, it puts the emphasis on rigor that is on intersubjectivity, 
reliability and reproducibility. These criteria are closely related and are to ensure 
that all trained observers at all times should be able to reach the same 
conclusions”. 
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The authors do criticise the paradigm for applying scientific methods (as in the physical 
sciences) to a social science which eliminates the context of the research as well as rich 
descriptions eliminating the relevance of the research to invested parties. Galliers (1991) 
identified the following reasons for the inapplicability of the positivist approach for IS 
research concerning a social phenomena as: (1) the possibility of a number of different 
interpretations of the phenomenon; (2) the impact of the researcher on the social system 
under investigation and (3) the problems linked to forecasting future events where 
human behaviour is concerned.  
QUESTION POSITIVISM INTERPRETIVIST 
Ontological 
Epistemological 
Methodological 
Naive realism, “real” but 
apprehendable. 
Dualist / objectivist; findings true. 
Experimental / manipulative 
verification of hypotheses, chiefly 
quantitative methods. 
Relativism, local and specific 
constructed realities. 
Transactional / subjectivist; created 
findings. 
Hermeneutical / dialectical, mainly 
qualitative with support from 
quantitative methods. 
Table 3.1: Basic beliefs of the two main paradigms (Source: Adapted from Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994) 
Researchers are obliged to produce “… an understanding of the context of information 
systems and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced 
by its context” (Walsham, 1993, p. 4). Galliers & Land (1987) posit that the 
interpretative approach can eliminate most if not all of the limitations associated with 
positivism to aid researchers in exploring the social nature of IS research. It too has 
critics, with the limitation of bias and incorrect interpretations (Kaplan & Duchon, 
1988) among the most noted. Both paradigms (and every research method) possess 
limitations but it is the incorporation of appropriate research methods that can ensure 
not only the rich descriptions provided through the interpretative approach but the rigor 
and relevance of a more scientific approach (Drake et al., 1998).  
In aiding the researcher it is Galliers (1991) who proposes a useful framework that 
compares and contrasts the positivist and interpretivist approaches and enables the 
researcher to assess the suitability of each in the context of the research topic being 
studied. The framework conceptualises the different stages of theory development and 
sees the progression of the IS field as being dependent on the development and 
advancement of theories relating to the underlying phenomena. Galliers (1991) also 
divides IS theory development into three stages: (1) theory building, (2) theory testing, 
and (3) theory extension. Theory building sees the use of qualitative techniques as the 
most appropriate to explore the different phenomena occurring. As more knowledge 
about the field is acquired and theory development becomes more advanced, 
quantitative techniques are used to test relevant hypotheses and to extend the existing 
hypotheses. As theory development moves from theory building to theory extension the 
type of research approach required shifts from exploratory and descriptive to 
confirmatory and predictive. Galliers (1991) argues that both the positivistic and the 
interpretivistic paradigms are applicable to IS research but are dependent on the stage of 
theory development in the area that is being studied.  
The study of human behaviour and the complexities of the environment are also 
necessary in this research and cannot be understood with the use of quantitative 
methods alone. Lee (1997) argues that human and organisational instantiations of IT do 
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not have counterparts in the physical subject matters of the natural sciences and are 
therefore elusive in quantitative studies. As IS Security and KM are relatively new areas 
in IS, as such they should not be constrained by the limitations of quantitative analysis 
as opposed to the value added interpretive or qualitative approach which will enabled 
the researcher to explore both in the context of an organisational setting. 
3.2.3 Methodological Debate: Quantitative Vs. Qualitative Studies 
Qualitative techniques can provide the researcher with contextual information. 
Researchers advocate the use of case-based exploratory research (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994) in providing rich descriptions of the phenomena under study. Through the use of 
interviews and document analysis the researcher is equipped to understand the problem 
situation and possess greater insight into the actor’s perspectives (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). Van Maanen et al., (1982) conclude that qualitative methods guarantee the 
researcher greater quality in the research findings as the methods put more emphasis on 
the areas under study. The research method employed by the researcher depends largely 
on the research objective (Jenkins, 1985). Marshall and Rossman (1989) regard 
qualitative research as the most appropriate approach for exploring a phenomenon and for 
providing rich holistic descriptions. Despite the risk of data overload and researcher bias 
qualitative data is the source of grounded, rich data which has meaning to researchers 
and practitioners alike rather than pages of summarised numbers (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Denzin and Lincoln (1998, p. 3) define qualitative research as a “…multi method 
in focus, involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to its subject matter”. Due to 
the context of this study, the human and organisational aspects of the process must be 
analysed through the use of qualitative exploratory research. Thus, Section 3.2.4 further 
justifies the chosen research methodology by examining it in the context of current 
research in the IS Security field. 
3.2.4 Justifying the Research Approach 
The selection of the most appropriate research strategy is vital to the success of any 
study (Jenkins, 1985). This study is centred on how IS Security could leverage the 
concept of KM, therefore the researcher sought to use qualitative research to study the 
targeted functions in their natural settings where it can be interpreted to give meaning to 
the social context of the research (Gable, 1994; Lee, 1991). Quantitative approaches 
focus on a narrow set of variables ignoring important information regarding the social 
context of the research (Checkland, 1981; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The exploratory 
nature of this study seeks to understand the potential use of KM approaches to manage 
IS Security knowledge. Social factors must be taken into consideration in IS research. 
Galegher et al., (1990) highlight the need to pay attention to the underlying fact that IS 
is not solely a technical discipline (Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Galliers, 1993), and that 
the end-users must be involved in the process. The purpose of a research strategy is the 
attainment of the research objective and the selection of an appropriate research strategy 
is of critical importance to the quality and value of the research (Jenkins, 1985). If 
sufficient exploratory studies have been carried out to identify meaningful relationships 
among variables to suggest testing hypotheses, the purpose of the research is testing, 
and, if insufficient exploratory research has been carried out for meaningful hypothesis 
generation, then the purpose of research is discovery.  
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3.3 Research Strategy: Case Study 
There is no universally applicable methodology to answer any research question and 
enable the results to be beneficial to the field (Galliers, 1991). There are numerous 
methodologies for researchers to choose from (Jenkins, 1985). Consideration must be 
given to finding the research methodology to match the research objective (Jenkins, 
1985; Davis, 1992). This section explains the research strategy adopted for this 
investigation which is, as previously stated, qualitative by nature. Section 3.3.1 
discusses in detail the most appropriate methods for such a study. Case studies are 
discussed. The weaknesses of the approach are outlined and a two case organisations 
and a pilot case study approach is argued as a solution which possesses all of the 
benefits while eliminating the limitations of the single case approach (such as bias). 
This case approach facilitates replication and extension of the phenomenon among the 
two case studies while additionally allowing for cross-case analysis. The selection of the 
different sites is discussed in Section 3.3.2, to emphasise the importance of both IS 
Security and KM as are the diversities of each site. The section concludes by discussing 
the limitations of the chosen research strategy and how the researcher alleviated these 
through the application of rigorous data analysis (Section 3.3.3).  
An explanation of the chosen strategy begins by providing an overview of the different 
research methods as depicted, particularly by Marshall and Rossman (1989), before 
discussing in detail the methods deemed appropriate for exploratory research. Oliasen 
(1991, p. 253) contends that: 
“The purpose of exploratory investigation is to move toward a clearer 
understanding of how one’s problem is to be posed, to learn what are 
appropriate data, to develop ideas of what are significant lines of relation, and to 
evolve one’s conceptual tools in the light of what one is learning about the area 
of life concerned with, for instance information systems”.  
Marshall and Rossman (1989), provide a framework to help researchers find the most 
appropriate match to the research objective. The framework, outlined in Table 3.2, is an 
effective aid to evaluate the different research approaches. The framework illustrates 
that the purpose of the research can range from the exploratory to the predictive. The 
investigation of how IS Security could leverage the concept of KM is a new 
phenomenon. The framework provided by Marshall and Rossman (1989), indicates that 
the research is exploratory. Benbasat et al., (1987) argue that IS researchers should 
study systems in practice because a substantial amount of IS research lags behind the 
knowledge practitioners have in the field which is certainly the case in the IS Security 
community. The case study approach stresses the importance of understanding 
empirical data in natural settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The approach is a suitable choice 
in the study of IS issues and practice in general. The research strategy or plan adopted to 
operationalise the research is often a mesh of methods to alleviate the weaknesses 
identified in literature such as bias and the reliability of research findings. Easterby-
Smith et al., (1991) argue that knowledge of the different research traditions enables 
researchers to adapt the chosen design to cater for constraints such as limited access to 
the data or a lack of prior knowledge of the topic. 
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Purpose of the Research Research Question Research 
Strategy 
Examples of Data 
Collection Techniques 
Exploratory 
To investigate little 
understood phenomena. 
To identify / discover 
important variables. To 
generate hypotheses for 
further research 
What is happening in this social 
program? 
What are the salient themes, 
patterns and categories in 
participants” meaning structures? 
How are these patterns linked 
with one another? 
Case Study 
Field Study 
Participant Observation 
In-depth Interviewing 
Elite Interviewing 
Explanatory 
To explain the forces 
causing the phenomena in 
question 
To identify plausible 
causal networks shaping 
the phenomena. 
What events, beliefs, attitudes and 
policies are shaping this 
phenomenon? 
How do these forces interact to 
result in the phenomena? 
Multi-site Case 
Study 
History 
Field Study 
Ethnography 
Participant Observation 
In-depth Interviewing 
Survey 
Questionnaire 
Document Analysis 
Descriptive 
To document the 
phenomena in question 
What are the salient behaviours, 
events, beliefs, attitudes, 
structures and processes occurring 
in these phenomena? 
Case Study 
Field Study 
Ethnography 
Participant Observation 
In-depth Interviewing 
Document Analysis 
Unobtrusive Measures 
Survey Questionnaire 
Predictive 
To predict the outcomes 
of the phenomena 
To forecast the events and 
behaviours resulting from 
the phenomena 
What will occur as a result of 
these phenomena? 
Who will be affected? 
In what way? 
Experiment 
Quasi Experiment 
Survey Questionnaire 
(Large samples) 
Kinesics/Proxemics 
Content Analysis 
Table 3.2: Matching Research Questions with Strategy (Source: Marshall & Rossman, 
1989, p. 78). 
3.3.1 Single Case Vs. Two Case Design 
Robson (2002, p. 178) defines a case study as: 
“…a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence”. 
A case study is an in-depth examination of a single organisation, function or individual 
(Davis, 1992) which examines the relationships between variables in their natural 
setting (Benbasat et al., 1987) with no control exercised over the variables involved and 
which utilises a number of different methods of data collection (Benbasat et al., 1987). 
The number of case studies used is dependent on the research objective and contextual 
IS Security research is rare and required (Siponen et al., 2008). A number of authors 
argue that it is important to re-examine the nature and scope of the IS Security problem 
(Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Baskerville, 2005; Gerber & Von Solms, 2005). They 
suggest that the issue with current approaches for managing and investigating IS 
Security relates to the technical orientation of the solutions which focus on security 
mechanisms such as passwords and firewalls without examining the social elements 
involved in IS Security. The approach is an appropriate research method when the 
theoretical base of a particular research area is in its early stages (Benbasat et al., 1987), 
and is also appropriate in answering “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 1984; Benbasat 
et al., 1987). One of the primary benefits of the case study approach is that it facilitates 
the study of IS in a natural setting (Benbasat et al., 1987; Gable, 1994) thereby enabling 
theories to be generated from practice. The approach allows the researcher to gain an 
insight and understanding of the nature and complexity of social phenomena while 
maintaining a holistic and meaningful focus (Stake, 1994).  
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The case study approach is believed to be one of the “weaker” social science methods as 
it can lose rigour in its quest to gain relevance and context (Yin, 1989) but to increase 
the rigour of the case study approach a number of “logical tests” can be applied by 
which its research design quality can be judged (Benbasat et al., 1987; Lee, 1989; Yin, 
1989; Walsham, 1993). These tests are “construct validity”, “internal validity”, 
“reliability”, and “external validity or generalization”. “Construct validity”, which 
involves establishing correct operational measures for the concepts, ideas, and 
relationships being studied (Yin, 1989) and mapping clearly defined theoretical 
concepts and relations into empirical operations (McGrath, 1984), can be achieved 
through the use of multiple sources of evidence, the use of a chain of evidence, or by 
utilising a key informant to review a draft case study report (Yin, 1989). “Internal 
validity”, which involves the explanation of causal relationships where certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, can be tested using such methods as 
pattern-matching, explanation building, and time series analysis (Yin, 1989). 
“Reliability” involves demonstrating that the procedures involved in carrying out a 
study (for example data collection procedures) can be repeated with the same results.  
Errors and biases should be minimised by conducting research as if you are being 
observed (Yin, 1989). “External validity” refers to the applicability of the results of the 
study to another environment and population (Jenkins, 1985; Yin, 1989), while Lee 
(1989) explains “generalization” as a quality which describes a theory that has been 
tested and confirmed in another setting. Case studies rely on analytical generalisation 
(as opposed to statistical generalisation) where the researcher is endeavouring to 
generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 1989). In addition, a 
simply constructed case study can enable the researcher to challenge an existing theory 
and provide a source for new hypotheses (Saunders et al., 2003) which is one of the 
objectives of this research. 
The case study method is a rich and valuable source of data, and is well suited to 
explaining the relationships between variables in their given context as required by 
descriptive research (Leedy, 1997). A single case study was considered, but the 
weakness of this is that it is restricted to a single organisation (Galliers, 1991). The use 
of more than one case study is more suitable when the research objective is more 
descriptive and is concerned with theory building (Yin, 1984). Two case studies allow 
for increased insight into the variables being researched. Benbesat et al., (1987) argue 
that more than one case is more appropriate than a single case when the objective of the 
study is to build and generate theory. The ability to cross-compare cases, obtain data 
from another source and integrate these “patterns” with literature provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to generate theory or knowledge with a reduced level of 
researcher bias. Although most, if not all, of the research gathered on IS Security has 
been quantitative by nature (Siponen, et al., 2008), KM studies have been for the most 
part qualitative but few, if any, have examined how IS Security could leverage the 
concept of KM. A two case design, incorporating a pilot case study, could aid in 
ensuring the research findings to strengthen the research (Benbesat et al., 1987). 
Literature does not provide any guidelines but rather recommendations regarding the 
number of cases (Patton, 1990).  
Even though the research argument has a fairly strong theoretical basis, the choice of 
the cases is expected to advance the knowledge of the phenomenon and the theory. This 
assertion is especially true of case studies where the case itself provides a supportive 
role and facilitates understanding. As explained by Stake (1994) “the case is often 
looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinised, its ordinary activities detailed...because this 
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helps us pursue the external interest”. As discussed by Walsham (1993), Yin (1994) and 
Lillis and Mundy (2005), the choice of a research method is based on the ontological 
and epistemological stance adopted. Hence, the strategy adopted in this research is 
purely qualitative and case based. Walsham (1993, p.15) argues in favour of case 
research as follows: 
“...from an interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an 
individual case or cases depends not on the representativeness of such cases in a 
statistical sense, but on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used 
in describing the results from the cases, and in drawing conclusions from them”. 
Therefore a two case organisational design using a pilot case study to test the case study 
protocol (section 3.5) was chosen to investigate how IS Security could leverage the 
concept of KM. This strategy reduces the restrictions of a single case while 
incorporating the benefits. It complements the qualitative nature of this research, as does 
the selection of appropriate sites. Section 3.3.2 describes the selection of the case 
organisations. 
3.3.2 Sampling of the Cases 
Miles and Huberman (1994) contend that qualitative research typically involves 
purposive selection and not random sampling. The selection of a suitable research case 
study is critical to the research. Once the researcher identifies the research problem, 
Erlandson et al., (1993, p. 53) state that “the researcher is compelled to identify a site 
that maximises the opportunity to engage in that problem”. The sampling of cases is an 
important aspect of any type of research approach, especially when building theory 
from case organisations. Patton (1990) contends that the logic underlying the sampling 
approach constitutes a fundamental difference between qualitative and quantitative 
research. Therefore, a purposeful sampling plan should be followed (Patton, 1990) 
where case studies are chosen (Eisenhardt, 1989), where a small number of cases are 
selected on the basis of the information richness, from the narratives collected, will 
provide. Patton (1990) purposed a number of purposeful sampling strategies all based 
on variations of the same assumption of purposiveness. One plan must be selected, on 
the basis of the objective of the research, as all of the different strategies cannot be 
pursued simultaneously. In the case of this investigation, three dimensions concern the 
selection of sampling must be isolated. The dimensions are as follows: 
The first dimension concerns the structure of the organisations selected. The IS Security 
function must be separate from the IT department to ensure that the case selected 
prioritises the process and follows basic guidelines from industry and academia (Dutta 
& McCrohan, 2002) at a corporate level (Section 3.5.1, Step 3 of the CSP).  
The second dimension of sampling applies to the utilisation of a KM strategy in a CS 
function within the selected organisations. Support functions are identified in the 
literature as knowledge-intensive environments which effectively operate as silos 
(Huang et al., 2007) within organisations. Support functions predominately apply a 
form of a KM initiative in supporting an organisations customer base (Becerra-
Fernandez, et al., 2004). Therefore this dimension would provide a KM initiative from 
which to learn from and benchmark against the approaches used in the ISS functions. 
Due to the silo nature of CS functions, the impact of IS Security on the technologies, 
people and processes used to manage the technical knowledge required within these 
closed support environments can be easily identified to answer research question three. 
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CS and IS Security functions should collaborate in identifying risks to KM and should 
be cognisant of the IS Security and control applications available in the KM 
environment (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Therefore CS functions operate closely with 
IS Security functions for support and engineering for product expertise (Section 3.5.1, 
Step 2 of the CSP). 
The third dimension of sampling applies to the selection of the different cases or the 
different organisational settings in which the three research questions are going to be 
researched. The sampling method utilised relied on the intensity and criterion sampling 
strategies (Patton, 1990). Intensity sampling required the selection of only organisations 
of a certain size, and complexity were considered to ensure that they would feature 
separate ISS and CS functions, operate on a global scale and in a knowledge-intensive, 
competitive business environment. This also ensured that the ISS functions had to be 
also developed to a certain degree so that informants could be identified in these 
functional areas. Criterion sampling meant that the organisations had to operate in 
different industries so that the findings would have a wider domain of applicability. 
However opportunistic sampling was also necessary as the researcher tried to secure 
access that would allow for proper data collection by selecting organisations where a 
friendly sponsor could be found and used as an informant.  
In addition to the issue of purposive sampling the issue of sample size was considered. 
Sample size does not have to follow the rules of probabilistic sampling as no claim is 
made that the cases selected are statistically representative of a population (Patton, 
1990). Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued for a more specific criterion to determine when 
a suitable sample size has been reached. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested that the 
termination of a study is determined by its informational needs.  Essentially this is 
achieved when no new information is uncovered in additional case organisations and 
the additional data collected becomes redundant, then the sample size can be considered 
to be sufficient. This is therefore negotiated between the researcher and the relevant 
stakeholders of the research as the project unfolds and the findings emerge. However an 
overall control mechanism must also be put in place in order to monitor the progress of 
the research as such a loose criterion for the termination of the field work could 
potentially lead to an on-going study covering many years of investigation.  
The researcher visited a number of organisations to verify their suitability, and if 
suitable, gained official confirmation of management’s commitment to the study. The 
criterion presented led the researcher to exclude the following five case organisations.  
1.	 University College Cork is one of the colleges which make up the National 
University of Ireland (NUI), the largest university in Ireland. This case was 
initially approached due to its size and the insistence of key informants that ISS 
was a separate entity in the structure of the university. However, ISS was fully 
immersed in the IS department and some individual academic departments 
utilised their own IT group which was separate from the university’s 
department. 
2.	 FMC Corporation is a U.S. chemical manufacturing company with over five 
thousand employees. Preliminary interviews determined that ISS was not 
separated from the IT department and that interviewees (eight in total) did not 
manage knowledge but data.  
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3.	 ESB Group is a multinational with its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland. The 
company was of sufficient size and separated ISS from IT five years before this 
research began. However, despite assurances to the contrary, a CS function 
utilising KM initiative was not evident. The ESB group was just beginning to 
investigate the possibility of using KM to improve internal CS processes and 
expected the researcher to guide the implementation of a KM strategy. While a 
KM audit report was supplied to the organisation, the case was not suitable to 
investigate how ISS could leverage the concept of KM as it was not yet 
developed internally. 
4.	 Musgraves is Ireland’s leading Cash and Carry company. This case was initially 
interesting as it had experienced enormous growth in the years prior to the study. 
However the case did not, despite assurances by the primary informant, manage 
knowledge. 
5.	 SERV-Co provides outsourcing capabilities to some of the world’s leading 
technology companies such as Dell.  It was initially targeted as it utilised a KM 
initiative as part of its strategy in supporting customer needs. It also had a large 
IS department spread across its subsidiaries. While the case was not suitable for 
the research objective it was suitable as a pilot case study to help the researcher 
clarify the dimensions of variables (Davila, 2000) and refine the different 
research approach methods.  
The factors presented above led the researcher to select the following two case 
organisations: 
1.	 CME-Co is a technology company and a world leader in products, services, and 
solutions for information storage and management. CME-Co has subsidiaries 
located throughout the world with its headquarters based in Hopkinton, MA and 
its main European manufacturing centre in Cork, Ireland. The organisation has 
separate ISS and CS functions. The CS function also has an established KM 
initiative. 
2.	 TELE-Co is an American multinational, Fortune 100, Telecommunications 
Company. It is a manufacturer of wireless network infrastructure equipment 
with fifty-three thousand employees. The organisation has separate ISS and CS 
functions. The CS function also has an established KM initiative. 
The two multinational organisations were chosen to investigate how IS Security could 
leverage the concept of KM. The two cases were categorised as engineering and 
technological organisations. CME-Co operates in the storage sector and TELE-Co in the 
telecommunications sector. The portfolios of the two case organisations are wide and 
complex requiring significant expertise in supporting customer needs. This strategy 
facilitated Darke et al., (1998) belief in studying a phenomenon in diverse settings. 
Additionally due to the nature of the environment that the organisations operate in they 
are subject to rapid technological advances, regulatory constraints and environmental 
threats such as reverse-engineering and negative security incidents which impact the 
operations of the organisations. After these visits, the researcher was satisfied that a 
viable research relationship had been established with the two organisations. The 
selection process was dependent on getting access to the organisations. Given the topic 
the researcher initially found it extremely difficult to gain access to appropriate cases 
despite the assurances of confidentiality and of the benefits of participating in such a 
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study. The two organisations which did participate saw the benefits from both an IS 
Security and KM perspective. The following section discusses the justification of 
investigating the objective of the study within the IS Security and Customer Support 
functions of the multinationals identified.  
3.3.2.1 Units of Analysis: the Customer Support and IS Security Functions 
The Customer Support and IS Security functions which service (internal and external) 
customers are strategic functions within Engineering organisations. The firms selected 
provided rich context to the study (Step 1 of the case study protocol). In the context of 
this investigation, the embedded units of analysis (Yin, 1989) chosen for inclusion in 
each case were the organisational Customer Support and IS Security functions (Steps 2 
and 3 of the CSP). 
In exploring what each CS function did in adopting a KM approach the researcher will 
be able to determine if the approach was successful in deriving functional and 
organisational benefits. Support functions are structured to operate as separate business 
functions in order to support customers of the organisation. The functions were 
identified to investigate the implications of IS Security on the technologies, people and 
processes used to manage the knowledge required within closed support environments. 
CS and IS Security functions should collaborate in identifying risks to KM and should 
be cognisant of the IS Security and control applications available in the KM 
environments (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Each study organisation has invested 
heavily in a Customer Support function/unit to support the corporate business units or 
organisation’s customers as it is seen as a value added task of the umbrella organisation. 
The focus of the study is the IS Security functions within each case. These functions 
perform a myriad of tasks such as securing the validity of information/knowledge 
through to alignment of technical controls (access controls, identity management) to 
resources. The function facilitates control structures and processes. Additionally, the 
function must support business strategies and align the necessary controls (technical, 
formal and informal) to business activities.  
Each of the factors identified in Figure 2.5 required attention in systematically mapping 
the practitioners, processes and technology used in the management of function specific 
knowledge. In exploring what each Customer Support function did in managing 
knowledge the researcher can determine if the approach was successful in deriving 
functional and organisational benefits. Figure 3.1 illustrates and Section 3.5 explains in 
detail the research protocol used in this study to explore the embedded units of analysis.  
3.3.3 Data Collection Techniques 
The data gathering techniques used for case studies are numerous. They range from 
personal interviews and questionnaires to document analysis (Galliers & Land, 1987). 
The first step in research is to choose the research approach; the next is to select the 
technique used to gather the information on the phenomenon under investigation. 
Literature dictates that the technique chosen should reflect the objective of the study 
(Robson, 1993). The two primary techniques for case study are interviews and 
document analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Table 3.5 outlines the various 
strengths and weaknesses associated with the different data gathering techniques (Yin, 
1994); to offset any limitations multiple methods were employed. For the purpose of 
this research the researcher selected the following data gathering techniques: structured 
and personal interviews, document analysis, and coding (open, axial, and selective). The 
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primary source of qualitative research data collected was from interviews. In fact 
Walsham (1995, p.78) contends that interpretive studies rely on interviews, as “…it is 
through this method that the researcher can best access the interpretations that 
participants have regarding the actions and events which have or are taking place, and 
the views and aspirations of themselves and other participants”. Numerous researchers 
in the IS field report the employment of semi-structured interviews as the primary 
source and method of choice (Orlikowski, 1993; Butler & Fitzgerald, 2001) with 
document analysis and web pages as secondary sources (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).  
3.3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Interviews are frequently used as a data collection technique for qualitative research in 
the IS field (Marshall and Rossman, 1989) and as “an essential source of case study 
information” (Yin, 1984). An interview can be described simply as a conversation, the 
purpose of which is to acquire valid and reliable information (Marshall & Rossman, 
1989; Robson, 1993). There are a number of different types of interviews that are based 
on the degree of structure of the interview, and which can be represented on a 
continuum from structured to unstructured (Fontana & Frey, 1994). A structured 
interview utilises a predetermined set of questions and records the responses using a 
standard set of response categories (Fontana & Frey, 1994), while an unstructured 
interview allows the researcher to probe more deeply to obtain information that may not 
have been immediately obvious. The semi-structured interview, on the other hand, 
utilises a set of loosely structured, flexible questions which can be adapted to facilitate 
the context and flow of the interview (Stone, 1978). This enables the researcher to 
explore more deeply issues that are considered important and enables the respondent to 
highlight important issues that the researcher may have excluded in error (Remenyi & 
Williams, 1995). The adoption of interviews as a data collection technique provides a 
number of advantages to the research approach. They enable large amounts of 
comprehensive and contextual data to be collected quickly (Marshall & Rossman, 
1989). They are flexible and adaptable facilitating the use of immediate follow-up 
questions for data clarification and omissions (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). They also 
facilitate data collection in a natural setting and as a result maintain the complexity of 
the phenomenon being studied (Benbasat et al., 1987; Galliers, 1993; Robson, 1993). 
The interview methodology is based on the belief that it is possible to investigate a 
phenomenon by merely asking people to talk. This ability to digress from the standard 
interview protocol allowed the researcher to explore issues which arose during the 
conversation irrespective of the case or function.  
Erlandson et al., (1993, p. 86) state that “…the semi-structured interview is guided by a 
set of basic questions and issues to be explored, but neither the exact wording nor order 
of questions is predetermined”. The interview guide is basically a checklist to ensure 
that all of the relevant topics are discussed (Patton, 1990). The interview guide 
(Appendix B) used a combination of focused and open-ended questions. In each 
organisation an informant from each function was identified who helped in validating 
the findings and the emergent concepts. This was a particularly useful approach in 
assessing the matrices created to categorise the different roles of IS Security and 
Customer Support knowledge in the two functions.  Additionally informants were 
identified who helped to assess data relevant to the organisational infrastructure of each 
case. Identifying and selecting an informant was guided by Gibson’s (1960) “...it does 
not mean that the man with inside knowledge has evidence for his conclusions ...but 
[that] he is in a...favourable position to accumulate evidence”.  
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3.3.3.2 Roles and Responsibilities 
Within this research study the interviews were conducted on site varying from one to a 
three hour time frame (Table 3.3). Each interviewee gave permission for the 
conversations to be recorded and when requested, the Dictaphone was switched off and 
field notes were made (Walsham, 1995). Each interviewee was identified according to 
their “expertise” in either field in addition to their role as, for example, the Customer 
Support manager might be the knowledge champion within one case or the strategy 
might be championed by the human resource manager in another. The IT manager and 
function can also play a significant part in IS Security. These factors enabled the 
researcher to focus on the appropriate issues applicable to each function within the 
subsidiary and members who are geographically dispersed but still a part of either 
function (section 3.5.1). Following the first round of interviews, transcripts were sent to 
the informants for review and verification of the content. ISS and CS informants were 
also selected to review the display matrices created.  Table 3.3 outlines the roles and 
responsibilities of each interviewee in the two case organisations as well as the pilot 
case study. Details regarding the interviewees years in service, allocated function and 
the duration of each interview are also provided. Furthermore, the personnel 
interviewed were the key decision-makers and most knowledgeable practitioners, in 
relation to the ISS and CS functions. Supplemental informants such as HR managers 
and former employees were interviewed to explain the organisational infrastructures and 
verify the data collected from the primary informants. 
3.3.3.3 Document Analysis 
Document analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 1989) is a useful data gathering technique. 
This technique is vital for collecting in-depth information regarding processes, which 
may not be recalled in interviews and postal questionnaires. The researcher reviewed 
information about the existing IS Security policies, departmental information and 
corporate policies regarding KM. The value of the findings gathered through semi-
structured interviews can also be increased through the use of this technique as the 
researcher’s understanding of the business processes would be greater. Documentation 
review provides the researcher with more insight into the background of the case 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1989). The researcher deemed it appropriate to use this 
technique to gather information  
However, retrievability and access to documentation can be slow and can reflect the 
reporting biases of the authors. Within this research study, this source of data was 
exploited as much as possible. The documentation collected in each case organisation 
provided specific details to corroborate, and in some instances clarify, factual evidence 
collected through interviews. Table 3.4 presents a list of the documentation collected 
and examined for each case organisation. Tables 4.1 (SERV-Co), 5.1 (CME-Co) and 6.1 
(TELE-Co) provide summarised profiles of the pilot case study and the two case 
organisations. Tables 5.2 and 6.2 were derived from analysing the documentation 
collected from CME-Co and TELE-Co and combining it with the roles and 
responsibilities of the interviewees to provide an overview of the data gathered from 
multiple sources within the two case organisations. These tables were created from 
examining the documentation presented in Table 3.4. The documentation collected was 
also used to collaborate and verify the types, reservoirs and knowledge processes 
identified from the data collected (Tables 5.3: 5.12 and 6.3: 6.12). 
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Table 3.3: Roles and Responsibilities of the Interviewees 
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Case DOCUMENTATION ANALYSED 
C
M
E-
C
o 
Annual Reports: 2001/2005/2006/2007 | Corporate Newsletters: CME-Co Profits Soar by 20% 
on Storage Demand Presentations: CME-Co Review 2007 and  Compliant ILM Strategy 
Security Documentation: 
• CME-Co Customised – ISO17799 
Documentation 
• Security Policies Re: email/ Internet/ 
Remote  
• Data Centre - Disaster Recovery 
Procedures3 
• Business Continuity Procedures 
• Intranet: OISRM Website / IS Department 
• CME-Co Website – www.CME-Co.com 
Customer Support Documentation: 
• Primus (CBR Tool) White paper 
• ILM4 White paper 
• Power-Link &  Knowledge link White 
paper 
• KCS5 White paper 
• Viewed: Primus CS View| Power-Link: 
Extranet  
• Intranet: Customer Services Website 
TE
LE
-C
o 
TELE-Co Website – www.TELE-Co.com 
Security Documentation: 
• TELE-Co ISO17799 
• TELE-Co Standard Operating Procedures 
http://cfr.corp.TELE-Co.com/sops/SOP/ 
• Standards of Internal Control (SIC)  
• Electronic Information Security Standards 
(EISS) 
http://internalcontrols.TELE-
Co.com/ic/ca/SIC/ 
Customer Support Documentation: 
• KM Courses @ TELE-Co University 
• Six Sigma6: A Necessary Change 
• M-Gates7 White Papers / K-Gates 
• Intranet: Customer Services Website 
• University – Online Courses: Six Sigma, 
M-Gates 
SE
R
V
-C
o:
 *
Pi
lo
t 
• SERV-Co Website – www.SERV-Co.com /Annual Report 2006/07, SERV-Co PR Pack / 
Organisation Chart 
Security Documentation: 
• Customised: ISO17799, ITIL & Sec­
SDLC8 Guidelines, SDLC9 Template  
• Security Policies: Re: Segregation of 
Duties, email, Internet, Remote Access, 
Corporate Policy 
Business Continuity10 Procedures 
• Viewed: iViewXT ISS View/ Help Desk 
System 
Customer Support Documentation: 
• Presentations: 
iViewXT Customer Presentation 
• iViewXT White Paper 
• Viewed: iViewXT CS View/ Customer 
View 
• Intranet: Customer Services (GIS) Website 
• JD Edwards (ERP)11 User Manual 
Table 3.4: Case Documentation Analysed. 
3 Disaster Recovery Procedures (DRP) is most common mitigation procedure used to recover from a disaster such as 
a power outage and forced shutdown of corporate systems.
4 ILM (Information lifecycle management) is an IT strategy. It’s based on the fact that the value of information 
changes for an organisation. That is information requires different levels of accessibility and protection.
5 Knowledge-Centred Support (KCS) is a KM strategy developed by the Primus vendors. KCS practices involve 
collaborating, sharing, using and improving knowledge. KCS incorporates the process of creating a solution in 
Primus to the evolution of that solution when used by other engineers. 
6 Six Sigma was developed to systematically improve processes by eliminating defects. 
7 M-Gates framework is a high-level process based on the Stage-Gate Process. It represents a comprehensive set of 
Marketing, Engineering, Project Management and Manufacturing activities to ensure proper business planning and 
execution. 
8 SecSDLC implementation is accomplished through changing the configuration and operation of the SDLC to 
incorporate security into the traditional SDLC.
9 SDLC is a development methodology which incorporates the following phases: (1) Feasibility Study, (2) Systems 
Investigation, (3) Systems Analysis, (4) Systems Design, (5) Implementation, (6) Review and Maintenance.  
10 Business Continuity Procedures (BCP) encompasses continuation of business activities if catastrophic event 
occurs. 
11 JD Edwards (JDE) is a software company which sells Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solutions. 
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3.3.4 Limitations Associated with the Methods 
The literature provided a lens to identify gaps which existed in both the IS Security and 
KM domains. The researcher wanted to avoid repeated or expected investigations, for 
example the impact of technologies on IS Security and KM, to facilitate theory creation 
and contribute to both the IS field and relevant communities of practice. Therefore 
“…choosing the right literature in tandem with doing analysis one can learn much about 
the broader and narrower conditions that influence a phenomenon. However, any 
categories, hypotheses and so forth, generated by the literature have to be checked out 
against real (primary) data”, (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.55). This interplay advocated 
by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is beneficial in producing rich theory and is adopted for 
this research study. The conclusion drawn by the researcher upon reviewing literature in 
both domains was that it has not evolved to identify how IS Security can leverage the 
concept of KM. The researcher investigated the phenomenon with no prior hypothesis 
and explored it to deepen the IS fields and practitioner understanding of the role that it 
plays within organisations and the impact of one on the other. The limitations of the 
selected research strategy for this study are the problems associated with the use of 
interviews, and document analysis.   
EVIDENCE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Documentation 
Stable :repeated review 
Unobtrusive: exists prior to case study 
Exact: names etc. 
Broad coverage: extended time span 
Retrievability: difficult 
Biased selectivity 
Reporting bias :reflects author bias 
Access: may be blocked 
Archival Records Precise and quantitative Privacy might inhibit access 
Interviews 
Targeted: focuses on case study topic 
Insightful: provides perceived causal 
inferences 
Bias due to poor questions 
Response bias 
Incomplete recollection 
Reflexivity: interviewee expresses what 
interviewer wants to hear 
Direct Observation Reality: covers events in real time Contextual: covers event context 
Time-consuming 
Selectivity: might miss facts 
Reflexivity: observer might cause change 
Cost: observers need time 
Observation Insightful into interpersonal behaviour Bias due to investigator’s actions 
Physical Artefacts Insightful into cultural features 
Insightful into technical operations 
Selectivity 
Availability 
Table 3.5: Strengths and Weaknesses of Data Collection Techniques (Source: Yin, 
1994). 
Table 3.5 illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of each component of the research 
strategy. While there are strong arguments against the use of qualitative research 
(Walsham, 1993) it provides the researcher with in-depth rich data. Corporate 
documentation is created for a specific audience and for a specific reason, for example 
shareholders are provided with a different perspective on the organisation they have 
invested in from that given to the employees. CME-Co used their Intranet to promote 
the company internally and instil in the employees a sense of team and corporate 
competition. The greatest weakness of this data gathering technique is reliability (Yin, 
1984; Remenyi, 1998). Document analysis is important in analysing the problem 
situation; the pluralistic approach was adopted to reduce the impact of the weaknesses 
of this technique. Section 3.4 discusses the data analysis approach used. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
This section discusses the approach used for the data analysis stage of this research. The 
data analysis phase enables theories and themes to emerge from the study (Erlandson et 
al., 1993). Marshall and Rossman (1989, p.12) describe the practice as: 
“…the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to the mass of collected 
data. It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating 
process. It does not proceed in a linear fashion; it is not neat. Qualitative data 
analysis is a search for general statements about relationships among categories 
of data; it builds on grounded theory”. 
The result of this process is the collection of rich data that will generate a rich 
hypothesis. The literature enabled the researcher to identify the topic and this section 
begins by discussing how the literatures informed the theory building phase.   
The activity of data reduction refers to the method of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appears in transcriptions (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that “anticipatory” data reduction 
can occur before data is even collected. In relation to this research study anticipatory 
data reduction began with the development of research questions and then choosing 
which data collection technique to use. By carefully selecting only a specific number of 
interviewees the amount of data that is collected is reduced (Table 3.3). Data reduction 
also serves to “condense” (Tesch, 1990) the data that is collected and as a result can 
organise, sharpen, and focus the conclusions that are drawn from the research study 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Next the task of listening to and transcribing the taped interviews, which was a long 
process, was undertaken. NVivo, a database for storing, parsing, categorising, and 
querying text files was recommended as a possible software package. Transcripts are 
copied into NVivo, as the transcripts are read passages are marked as ‘nodes’, a term 
used by the software, where they are identified as describing themes recognised from 
the literature review. Other passages are identified and marked up as describing other 
themes that a researcher interprets as being raised by the interviewees as important. This 
process is supposed to enable easy access to the data that is attributed to any particular 
theme. However after approaching four colleagues who had used NVivo, and other 
similar packages, the researcher decided not to use a software package for analyses. 
None of users would recommend the software packages used and stated that there was 
little added value from the use of software.   
Manual transcribing enabled the researcher to analyse the data before coding and 
comparatively analysing it. Coding was used as a method to organise and condense the 
data collected from interviews and facilitate the drawing of conclusions (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Additionally the Miles and Huberman (1994) matrix displays were 
ideally suited to the organisation and analysis of patterns in the data collected across 
two case organisations (Lillis & Mundy, 2005). The matrix displays offered a means of 
identifying themes in the data, categorising them, quantifying their regularity and 
representing this analysis in diagrams or additional display matrices. The displays 
enabled the researcher to produce an audit trail for the evaluation of rigor and extend the 
process by which conclusions are drawn. 
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Finally, while the framework illustrated in Figure 2.5 and discussed in section 3.1 of 
this Chapter grounded this study, it allowed for sufficient scope to enable additional 
variables to emerge from the contextual settings of the two organisational environments 
and pilot study participating in this study. Prior theory informed the use of the data 
collection and analysis techniques used. However the researcher deemed the use of a 
pilot study as an integral part of testing the research protocol and interview guide in 
order to refine the data collection and analysis techniques as well as to familiarise the 
researcher with the phenomenon itself (Yin, 1994).   
3.4.1 Pilot Case Study 
The literature has always recognised the value of refining methods for case study 
research, for example, pilot case studies which clarify the dimensions of variables or 
potential inter-relationships (Davila, 2000) or validate, for example literature, findings 
(Widener & Selto, 1999) are recognised approaches in refining methods. Researchers 
can learn a great deal from conducting a pilot case study. Pilots are extremely useful 
steps in investigating a phenomenon (Lillis & Mundy, 2005) they can result in changes 
to the different data collection and analysis tools used as well as the research protocol 
applied. However it is important to remember that a pilot case study is only the first step 
in the theory-building process of case study research. Chapter 4 applied the research 
protocol developed and described in this Chapter to the pilot case study. 
3.4.2 With-in Case Analysis 
Within case analysis involves detailed write-ups of case descriptions to generate insight 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). These rich descriptions provide 
researchers with the ability to understand the context of the phenomena under study. As 
explained by Eisenhardt (1989), there is no standard format for this type of analysis and 
a variety of approaches can be utilised and manipulated by researchers. Cases have been 
developed by academics as introductions to theoretical work through the compilation of 
organisation case histories, descriptions which are compiled through the use of taped 
transcripts and tabular displays (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As described by Brown 
(2000, p.46), case narratives are “…the most useful way to understand sense-making”. 
The narrative, in the context of this study provides a frame of reference to fully 
understand and report the accounts of the different informants within and across the 
different IS Security and CS functions and their approaches to managing knowledge. 
Additionally, these (informant) accounts are triangulated with available documentation 
(Table 3.4) to ensure that the case is reported accurately. Some researchers regard 
narratives as messy and uncodeable data, yet the insights they provide are invaluable. 
The research lens described in sections 2.7.1 and 3.1 was used in this study to provide 
structure to the investigation. The lens enabled the researcher to make sense of the 
phenomenon under analysis.  
For example, in Chapters four, five and six each case and pilot study has been analysed 
and structured according to the case study protocol (CSP) described in section 3.5. The 
backgrounds and organisational infrastructures of the two cases were presented. The 
investigation of the two case studies has provided rich contextual descriptions of the IS 
Security and CS functions. The types and reservoirs of Knowledge used by the two 
functions operating within the cases were described. The approaches used in managing 
this knowledge are also discussed in detail. Finally the two functions KM approaches, 
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mechanism used and impacts were compared and contrasted. Therefore the within case 
analysis provides insight into the phenomenon under investigation. 
3.4.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
Research shows that knowledge is communicated effectively through a convincing 
narrative that is delivered with formal elegance and passion. As with the case narratives 
used in Chapters five and six, there are various strategies available in searching for 
cross–case patterns, for example: select categories, within–function similarities, 
differences (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Gersick, 1988) and display matrices to 
compare several categories simultaneously (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each of these 
tactics can be combined to draw out more concrete theoretical insight.  Chapter seven of 
this study presents the cross-case analysis. It was used to progress from the within case 
analyses conducted in Chapters five and six and analyse the findings from the two case 
organisations to address the research questions. The Chapter consists of three sections, 
each addressing one of the three research questions outlined in section 3.1.3. The 
purpose of this Chapter is to combine the findings from the three questions and address 
the objective of this study. 
3.4.4 Data Collection, Analysis and Time Line 
The timeline for this investigation is outlined in this subsection and the steps taken are 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The diagram illustrates the six steps completed in order to 
answer the research objective and questions (section 3.1), for this study. This study was 
initially focussed on IS Security and a change requiring the incorporation of knowledge 
management was made in October 2006.  As a result the current literature review and 
research strategy design which were originally completed in September 2005 and were 
subsequently updated in July 2009. Additionally, the data collected, analysed and write-
ups for four case studies were deemed irrelevant for the current objectives and 
additional cases were sourced and investigated. The current research objective and 
propositions were investigated in a pilot case study in June 2007, which ultimately did 
not meet the case selection criteria, as outlined, in section 3.3.2. However the pilot case 
study did allow the researcher to test the research lens (Figure 2.5) and case study 
protocol (Figure 3.1). The data was collected through semi structured interviews and 
documentation in the two case study organisations over a six month period from July to 
October 2007. Transcribing, coding and analysis for the within case write-ups took 
between six and eight months for CME-Co and TELE-Co respectively. The cross-case 
analysis took three months and was completed by June 2009.  
Section 3.5 summarises Chapter three and describes the case study protocol (CSP) used 
for this study. Finally section 3.6 concludes this Chapter. 
3.5 Summary and Case Study Protocol (CSP) for this Research Study 
The objective of this study is to explore how Information Systems Security (ISS) could 
leverage the concept of Knowledge Management (KM) in the context of two 
multinationals. The selection of the most appropriate approach is a key enabler of any 
investigation. The selection must be based on the research objective and the nature of 
the study. Due to the exploratory nature of the study an interpretative strategy was 
adopted utilising a combination of research methods and techniques such as two-case 
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studies and pilot case study, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. In terms 
of expected findings, given the gaps which exist in both the KM and IS Security 
literatures where a relationship between both fields has rarely if ever been identified, the 
IS field has been neglectful of this strategic and vital phenomenon. Previous studies 
have been insufficient in investigating IS Security as few if any studies utilise a 
qualitative approach and therefore eliminating holistic, in-depth rich descriptions of 
core issues within the field. IS Security approaches have been grounded in positivism. 
An investigation exploring how IS Security could leverage the concept of KM should 
provide rich data and aid the researcher in exploring the phenomenon. Section 3.5.1 
describes the operationalisation of the research strategy outlined and discussed in this 
Chapter. 
3.5.1 Research Protocol and Steps 
The researcher used a specific research protocol which was followed throughout the 
investigation to build an integrated map of the research objective from a pilot study and 
two case studies and across the two case organisations. The protocol followed is 
outlined in a series of six steps (Figure 3.1) four of which are replicated in each case 
organisation and as far as step three in the pilot case study: 
Step 1: Study the Organisational Infrastructure 
This step provides the context to the study, to understand the environment in which the 
functions under analysis operate. An organisation and its subsidiaries are composed of a 
series of information/knowledge handling activities coordinated through the 
establishment of rules, policies and procedures all of which must be understood. 
Additionally, the culture, structure and (threats from) the environment in which the 
organisation operates contributes to its overall IS Security and KM profile. The 
structure of the organisation strongly influences core activities and the level of 
engagement with which these are consistent with the enterprise’s goals (business 
drivers). It is composed of organisation charts, ethical codes and job descriptions. 
Therefore, appreciating the role of senior management (Corporate, KM and IS Security 
governance) helps to ascertain if the organisational structure is supportive of the 
exploitation of IS Security-related and KM initiatives. It is through answering RQ1 that 
the researcher can fully appreciate the context in which the objects under investigation 
operate and the influence of the structure, culture, management and business 
environment (for example regulations) of the organisation. Additionally while the focus 
of the research is primarily focused on a single type of informant – the IT professional – 
the bias identified by Lee et al., (1991) is removed by the use of multiple types of 
informants (Table 3.3) relevant to the research objective.  
Step 2: Study Customer Support Function 
Step 2 establishes the justification for undertaking a function specific analysis to 
identify the context of the support function. In exploring what each Customer Support 
(CS) function did in adopting a KM approach the researcher can determine if the 
approach was successful in deriving functional and organisational benefits, the 
conclusion of which is derived in the context of this research. Customer Support 
functions are structured to operate as separate business functions in order to support 
customers of the organisation. The functions were identified to investigate the 
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implications of IS Security on the technologies, people and processes used to manage 
the technical knowledge required within closed support environments. CS and IS 
Security functions should collaborate in identifying risks to KM and should be 
cognisant of the IS Security and control applications available in the KM environment 
(Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Therefore CS functions operate closely with IS Security 
functions for support and engineering for product expertise. Each study organisation has 
invested heavily in a Customer Support function/unit to support the corporate business 
units or customers as it is seen as a value added task of the umbrella organisation.  
Multiple-case Analysis 
Within-case Analysis:

CME 
ISS 
CS 
TELE 
ISS
CS 
Similarities & Differences 
Replication Ends 
Rich descriptions

Display Matrices

RQ1 Step 1 Organisational Infrastructure 
Customer Support Function:

RQ2 Step 2 Types, Reservoirs, Processes of Knowledge

IT/IS Security Function:

Step 3 Types, Reservoirs, Processes of Knowledge

Step 4	 Pilot Case Study: 
Test: research protocol 
Step 5	 Function Comparisons &

Display matrixes

Cross-case Analysis: Step 6 
Emerging patterns 
Comparisons / Differences 
RQ1 
Display Matrices

Comparative mechanism

RQ3 Aligning IS security to a KM

RQ2 
RQ1: How can the organisational infrastructure support the management of IS Security 
(ISS) knowledge? 
RQ2: How do the two functional areas IS Security (ISS) and Customer Support (CS) 
manage knowledge? 
RQ3: How can firms align Information Systems Security (ISS) to a Knowledge 
Management (KM) environment? 
To explore how Information Systems Security (ISS) could leverage the concept of Knowledge 
Management (KM) through qualitative research 
Figure 3.1: Research Protocol and Research Steps. 
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Step 3: Study Information Systems Security Function 
The focus of the study is the IS Security functions within each case. These functions 
perform a myriad of tasks such as securing the validity of information/knowledge 
through to alignment of technical controls (access controls, identity management) to 
resources. The function facilitates control structures and processes. Additionally, the 
function must support business strategies and align the necessary controls (technical, 
formal and informal) to business activities. If there is an absence of “…an individual or 
section that is solely accountable for security issues, then the deployment of activities 
related to security may be slow, hampered or futile” (Dutta & McCrohan 2002, p. 76). It 
is through answering RQ2 that the researcher has identified the people, processes and 
technologies used in the function’s attempt to manage information and IS Security 
knowledge pertaining to the case’s IS Security landscape. Evidence from the within 
case analysis illustrates how IS/Security personnel interoperate. Therefore, it is vital to 
understand the function’s role within the cases and identify the people, processes and 
technology used to protect the corporate boundaries. As already stated, the rich 
description (collected through Steps 2 and 3) used to answer RQ2 enables the researcher 
to compare the cases systematically and identify the different research categories. The 
research model developed from an analysis of the literature review (Figure 2.5) has 
informed the mapping of the different types and reservoirs of knowledge within the 
cases while additionally systematically mapping the people, processes and technology 
used in its management. 
Step 4: The Pilot Case Study 
The pilot case study establishes the validity of the different data collection and analysis 
techniques as well as testing the case study protocol (CSP). Therefore the pilot case 
study was used to refine the different methods used and to clarify the potential 
relationships between the variables identified in the literature review (Chapter 2). Steps 
1, 2 and 3 were undertaken to determine if they were of value in addressing research 
questions one and two. The pilot was also used to allow the researcher to become 
familiar with the phenomenon. 
Step 5: Approaches Used to Manage Knowledge 
Within-case analysis requires detailed case study write-ups for pure descriptions and the 
generation of insight of the objects under investigation (Gersick, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
1989). A constructive description will provide a common frame of reference in order to 
better recognise, understand and ultimately structure the rich accounts provided by the 
informants. Chapters five and six have a description of the organisation’s background, 
the IS Security and CS functions, and employ supplemental informants such as HR 
managers to explain the organisational infrastructures. Additionally, the accounts were 
triangulated with available documentation to further the findings. 
In the context of a case study, descriptions are tools which can provide a suitable 
structure to answer the research questions and act as a blueprint to predict future 
organisational behaviour. Matrices are used by the researcher to display the different 
types and locations of knowledge used by the two functions and the approaches used to 
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manage function specific knowledge. This step also involved explaining the 
relationships between CS and the IS Security functions. An analysis of the contrasting 
approaches to the management of knowledge explained how the methods applied in one 
context can be transferred to the context of other functions with tangible benefits. In 
other words, this step allowed the researcher to understand why specific approaches are 
used (RQ2) and if they are transferred between functions. This concludes the case study 
protocol (CSP) in terms of its replication in each case. 
Step 6: Leveraging IS Security 
Step 6 utilises the cross-case analysis to identify themes emerging from across the two 
cases. There are various strategies to identify cross-case patterns, such as: selecting 
categories, searching for within case differences and similarities, the development of a 
matrix to compare several categories, and determine the differences. Additionally, it is 
through the adoption of a combination of these strategies that stronger theoretical 
insight is elicited. RQ3, by contrast, presents a cross-case analysis; a generic 
understanding of the relationship between IS Security and CS (or the KM environment) 
across the two case studies was built. The relationship between the functions at both a 
local level (within case analysis) and across the two cases was determined (Chapter 
seven). Additionally the different approaches to managing knowledge were synthesised 
to determine any comparisons and differences across the two case studies. 
The collective purpose of RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 was to understand the context of the CS 
and IS Security activities of the organisations and to determine how IS Security could 
leverage the concept of KM through qualitative research. Additionally, it was to 
highlight the issues which have emerged through the integration of the people (roles and 
responsibilities), the processes (classification of resources) and the technologies used. 
The findings from the lessons-learned within and across the cases theorise a possible 
approach to the management of IS Security knowledge. The research methods and 
protocol described enabled the researcher to achieve reliable and meaningful 
conclusions for this investigation and for the IS field in general.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The main contribution of this Chapter is to present and justify an interpretive approach 
as a means of inquiry for this investigation. The research methodology was selected due 
to the nature of the research topic and the various theoretical considerations. Research in 
information systems security has rarely been addressed methodically by using beliefs 
rooted in the interpretive paradigm. This Chapter stresses that theory building in IS 
Security can be accomplished through empirical investigation.  The objective of this 
investigation is to interpret the complexities of a social phenomenon. Chapters five and 
six present findings of such investigations. However, to begin with, Chapter four 
presents the pilot study conducted to verify the data collection, analysis techniques, 
research lens and CSP used. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 

TESTING THE CASE STUDY PROTOCOL

4.0 Introduction 
The preceding Chapter discussed the research method selected to investigate the 
objective of this study. The purpose of this Chapter is to report on the pilot case study 
(Figure 1.1). The pilot case is used to allow the researcher to learn about the 
phenomenon before beginning work in the case studies selected for this investigation. 
Essentially the pilot case is used to test the data collection and analysis techniques, 
interview guide and the case study protocol. In the context of this pilot case study, the 
literature provided a lens (Figure 2.5) whereby the rich contextual description of the 
pilot case study was structured to present the findings systematically. The following 
section provides information on SERV-Co, the organisational infrastructure, the 
specialised units under analysis, their approaches to managing knowledge, and a 
comparison between the approaches used. Finally, the Chapter concludes with a 
summary of the findings and lessons-learned from this pilot case study.  
4.1. SERV-Co: The Pilot Case Study 
4.1.1 Organisational Background 
SERV-Co (pseudonym) operates in three business divisions: (1) printing, (2) healthcare 
products and (3) supply-chain management. The company’s printing division provides a 
comprehensive combination of printing and digital solutions to its consumers from 
digital content management to e-Business services. The corporation’s global supply-
chain management services division of operation provides outsourcing capabilities to 
some of the world’s leading technology companies such as Dell. As explained by the 
GIS Manager “outsourcing has become very common in IT and other industries; it is 
regarded as intrinsic to their management”. Services include: materials sourcing, 
product configuration and customised kitting, order fulfilment and global distribution. 
“Global companies want to improve their supply-chain due to the estimated eighty 
percent costs and industrial experts report that aggressive supply-chain management 
targets and achieves [a] thirty percent reduction in costs”, as stated by the Project 
Leader. However, due to the complexity of end-to-end customer delivery, organisations 
utilise the competencies of companies such as SERV-Co to provide supply-chain 
integration. SERV-Co regards themselves as pioneers in supply-chain integration and 
offer capabilities amassed after twenty years of experience. Additionally its worldwide 
facilities provide consumers with a cohesive globally integrated service in three regions: 
(1) North America, (2) Europe and (3) Asia. SERV-Co is a global partner for leaders in 
the technology, medical, pharmaceutical and retail sectors. SERV-Co sells its services 
through the utilisation of its resource capabilities and information technology with those 
of complementary providers (such as logistics providers, technology service providers 
and business process managers) to give greater cross-functional capabilities and broader 
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autonomy across the supply chain from the planning to the distribution stage. “The 
planning process can be complex and SERV-Co analyses a company’s product flow to 
create a customised plan for vertical and horizontal supply-chain optimisation”, as 
explained by the Business Analyst. SERV-Co’s goal for the planning phase is to 
condense a corporation’s product entry points and therefore simplify its supply chain. 
SERV-Co operates in a business environment that is influenced by rapid technological 
advancement, high demand and short product lifecycles and therefore a high level of 
uncertainty. Threats such as viruses and regulatory constraints are considered 
significant.  Challenges enforced by the company’s competitors – such as rapid growth, 
compliance and entry into new markets – has resulted in an organic growth of internal 
information systems and silos of individual and firm specific knowledge. This, coupled 
with IS Security challenges such as compliance and securing customer and internal 
systems, has put enormous pressure on the organisation’s Global Information Systems 
(GIS) function. Relatively new regulations are having unexpected effects on the 
organisation, such as heightened IS Security awareness, increased documentation and 
business process reengineering. As explained by the SDLC Coordinator, “[the] 
Sarbanes-and-Oxley [Act] is forcing the documentation of internal processes, the 
assignment of responsibilities and [the] segregation of duties to ensure that [financial] 
scandals such as Enron will be avoided in the future”. The Act is placing significant 
strain on multinationals in general, specifically on their resources and time. SERV-Co 
“is separating core systems [due to regulatory requirements] and attempting to utilise [a] 
KM [strategy] to become more efficient”, as explained by the Project Leader. “SERV-
Co for the time being is focusing on the implementation of a knowledge management 
system [called] iViewXT”, as stated by the DB Administrator. 
With respect to this investigation, Table 4.1 provides an overview of the data gathered 
from multiple sources within SERV-Co. 
4.1.2 Organisational Infrastructure 
The organisational infrastructure is the foundation on which KM resides and is 
composed of: organisation culture, structure, communities of practice (CoP), common 
knowledge and IT infrastructure (section 2.6.5). These components for SERV-Co are 
discussed in the next five sub-sections. 
4.1.1.1 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture reflects the beliefs which guide the behaviour of SERV-Co's 
employees. As explained by the GIS Manager “the majority of employees in SERV-Co 
have spent their careers with the company and have [therefore] acquired an infinite 
amount of knowledge”, that pertains to SERV-Co. Currently the culture of the 
organisation and its functions operate from the fact that “the company has been one 
which supports long-term employment supporting informal networks of information and 
knowledge sharing”, as stated by the Business Analyst. The regulative nature of the 
environment and customer requirements, have forced a culture of compliance as 
opposed to security awareness and knowledge sharing. The [Cork] Security Officer 
would disagree as “management at senior level do not understand the importance of 
security, when [or] if it affects them [slows down PC processing speeds] they want it 
[virus scanning software] removed”. Additionally, “employees are not penalised for 
breaking security policies”, as stated by the Help Desk Manager. Non-adherence to 
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security policies and lack of managerial support severely impacts the strength of the 
security controls implemented in any organisation.  
4.1.1.2 Organisational Structure 
Organisational structure is complex in a multinational organisation. SERV-Co is based 
in the U.S. with “the international arm of the organisation in Cork, Ireland. A vice-
president who heads up each function is responsible for developing and implementing 
functional policies across all [of] the manufacturing sites worldwide”, as stated by the 
GIS Manager. Additionally, a General Manager who is supported by a management 
team manages each of the manufacturing sites. SERV-Co operates a centralised IT and 
IS Security function called Group Information Services (GIS). As stated by the ITIL 
Coordinator “GIS reports directly to the U.S. and there is a VP [Vice President] for 
Europe but his focus is primarily on JD Edwards [ERP System] and sourcing new 
customers”. “The VP is becoming more and more interested in our ability to comply 
with whatever regulations our customers are forcing us to comply with”, as stated by the 
Compliance Coordinator. As stated by the CS Manager, “the ultimate goal of SERV-Co 
is to deliver whatever the customer wants and we [CS] along with IS [are] determined to 
meet those needs”. 
4.1.1.3 Common Knowledge 
Common knowledge helps integrate employee knowledge through the provision of a 
common language. SERV-Co “employees are supply chain experts and depending on 
the market we are targeting, like for example healthcare. We will become experts on 
healthcare and the names for surgical instruments or hard drives for storage companies 
will be embedded in our minds”, as explained by the Business Analyst.  According to 
the Senior QA Engineer, “SDLC is fixed onto everything we do now because of 
compliance. It is SERV-Co’s answer to complying with rules and regulations regarding 
access to the information needed”. The systems development life-cycle is “a 
methodology to help manage and assign resources to existing and new projects”, as 
explained by the SDLC Coordinator.  Procedures for assessing quality, and “specialised 
business information [procedures and workflows], after a while becomes pretty 
common but still valuable”, as explained by the QA Engineer.  
4.1.1.4 Physical Environment 
Physical environment is an important consideration in supporting KM. As explained by 
the ERP Analyst “the [physical] layout of our offices isn’t the greatest for collaborating 
with the other groups. It used to be open plan but a couple of years ago we were 
separated from GIS which is on the floor above us now and we are at the other side of 
the building”. CS supports the different SERV-Co subsidiaries throughout Europe and 
“we travel to those sites, for a few weeks, to oversee the implementation of the ERP 
system to make sure everything meets our standards. [However], when we return 
usually something has changed and because things are fairly closed now it’s difficult to 
get up to speed”. As described by the GIS Manager, “the States [corporate headquarters] 
determine our goals and we have no choice but to target them, we do collaborate but 
only over the phone or by email”. 
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OVERVIEW OF SERV-Co 
SERV-Co 
-Multinational, 
-Engineering 
- 22k Employees 
-€1.5 Billion 
Industry Sector Customers Products Competitors Partners/ Vendors 
Supply Chain Management – serves as a global 
outsourcing partner to technology and medical 
products companies. 
HP, Dell, Sun 
Microsystems, 
Abbott Medical 
Devices 
Sell an entire Supply Chain Any Supply Chain 
Management Company 
Dell 
Corporate Strategy Mission Subsidiaries ISS Function CS Function 
Outsourcing company of choice – sell expertise To be the first SCM 
company of choice  
Cork, Ireland, Full function is displaced 
throughout the Org 
Support different facilities as 
well as Customers 
Interviews 
IS Security Function Customer Support Function Other 
Role Years Subsidiary Role Years Subsidiary Role Years 
• GIS Manager 
• Security Officer /Analyst 
• Security Officer /Analyst 
• Infrastructure Manager 
• Security Officer 2 
• Compliance Coordinator 
• Access Mgt/ITIL Coordinator 
• Help Desk Manager 
• DB Administrator 
12 
4 
7 
2 
2 
4 
3 
6 
8 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
• CS Manager 
• CS Engineer 
• ERP Analyst 
• Senior QA Engineer 
Quality Assurance 
• Project Leader 
• Business Analyst 
• SDLC Coordinator 
9 
12 
5 
4 
6 
8 
2 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Cork 
Cork 
• Director of HR 
• Manufacturing 
Trainer 
10 
4 
Documentation 
Analysed 
Security Documentation Customer Support Documentation Corporate / Public 
• SERV-Co Customised – ISO17799, ITIL &  SecSDLC Guidelines 
• SDLC Template 
• Security Policies: Re: Segregation of Duties – by CFO, email, 
Internet, Remote Access, Corporate Policy 
• Business Continuity Procedures: Power Outage 
• Viewed: iViewXT ISS View 
• Viewed: Helpdesk Tracking System 
• Intranet: ISS Website 
• Presentations: 
iViewXT Customer Presentation 
• iViewXT White Paper 
• Viewed: iViewXT CS View/ Customer View 
• Intranet: Customer Services (GIS) Website 
• JD Edwards (ERP) User Manual 
• SDLC GIS Documentation 
• SERV-Co Website – www.SERV-Co.com 
• Annual Reports: 
• 2006/2007 
• SERV-Co PR Pack / 
Organisation Chart 
Table 4.1: SERV-Co Data (Adapted from Tables: 3.3 (Roles & Responsibilities of the Interviewees) & 3.4 (Case Documentation 
Analysed)). 
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4.1.1.5 IT Infrastructure 
IT infrastructure facilitates an organisation’s KM infrastructure. As described by the 
Infrastructure Manager, “SERV-Co utilises enterprise resource planning. [ERP] enables 
the integration process that is used [by the company] to shorten customer supply chain 
to reduce inventories and costs”. Throughout the planning phase SERV-Co will analyse 
customer processes and determine “how to apply IT, global management and tracking 
of product quality, inventory, distribution status and product life cycles”, as stated by 
the Business Analyst. The sourcing phase increases a company’s efficiencies by 
leveraging its purchasing volume and therefore reducing costs. “SERV-Co’s IT 
infrastructure must allow us to integrate with our customers [for example] 
communication network and meet whatever requirements they have, which could be to 
connect with a VPN or provide them with an encrypted channel when accessing our 
support system  iViewXT”, as explained by the IT Infrastructure Manager. 
This concludes the description of SERV-Co’s organisational infrastructure as outlined 
in Step 1 of the Case Study protocol (CSP) discussed in section 3.5.  
4.1.3 Customer Support Function 
KM is a group specific initiative within Customer Support. Ultimately “SOX has 
brought unforeseen benefits such as [the incorporation of methodologies like the] SDLC 
to force the documentation of processes and lessons-learned”, as stated by the SDLC 
Coordinator. SOX has also forced management and employees “to document every 
process and adhere to security procedures and standards as failure to do so could result 
in financial loss”, as explained by the SDLC Coordinator. It is interesting to note that 
prior to the introduction of the SOX auditing process “very little was documented and 
lessons-learned from projects were not formally requested or required”, as explained by 
the CS Manager. Methodologies were not utilised and duplication of information (as a 
central repository did not exist) was common.  However, the allocation of resources and 
time taken in documenting everything, testing controls, formalising processes, essentially 
complying to auditing requirements has put an enormous strain on resources and some 
customer contracts have been lost or neglected as a result. “While SOX has had 
advantages, it is regarded as overkill and could be less demanding in terms of reporting 
demands”, as stated by the [U.S] Security Officer. SOX has placed significant pressure 
on the CS and ISS functions in ensuring that employees have access/authorisation to the 
systems that they need to do their jobs. Compliance auditors request a significant 
amount of information regarding the segregation of duties within the organisation and it 
is the responsibility of both ISS and CS to ensure that this is achieved.  
The following section identifies the different types of knowledge utilised by the CS 
function. 
4.1.3.1 Types of Customer Support (CS) Knowledge 
The different types of CS knowledge are described in the next three sub-sections. The 
first section describes the general knowledge necessary for the members to conduct their 
day-to-day operations. This knowledge is categorised as general as it is available to the 
CS function working throughout the organisation. 
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General knowledge common to the CS function is specific to supply chain 
management processes. As stated by the CS Manager, “documentation, procedures, 
guidelines are all stored on iViewXT so that everyone can access anything that they 
need”. “Software and hardware specifications are stored, shared and accessed through 
the [iViewXT] repository”, as stated by the Project Leader. As explained by the ERP 
Analyst, “guides for JD Edwards and SDLC are stored on iViewXT”. 
Technically specific knowledge is specific to the CS function. According to the CS 
Manager, “the SDLC is applied to all of the projects within SERV-Co to implement 
major projects, change requests and emergency changes to IT systems”. The SDLC is a 
process of implementing enhancements or modifications, roles and responsibilities, 
steps in the process and deliverables from each step. As explained by the SDLC 
Coordinator “the model addresses changes to business systems, particularly the ERP 
system which includes modelling, configuration and testing”. The SDLC is an evolving 
process and “will be continually updated as business needs change or process 
improvements are implemented. It is planned that every three months the Senior Quality 
Assurance Engineer will review the SDLC process and [the Quality Engineer will] 
update the document if required”, as explained by the Business Analyst.  
Contextually specific knowledge within the CS function of SERV-Co is used to solve 
customer problems. As stated by the CS Manager, “queries from customers are either 
phoned in or through iViewXT. They can login and contact us through the system”. 
“Customers can access documentation or track the progress of their job”, as stated by 
the Project Leader. “Reports regarding product configurations or trouble-shooting 
guides are available through what is essentially a self-service platform”, as explained by 
the DB Administrator. Contextually specific knowledge pertains to the supply chain 
provided to a specific customer. 
4.1.3.2 Reservoirs of Knowledge 
Knowledge pertaining to the SERV-Co CS function resides in several different 
locations within the organisation. They encompass people and groups, including 
Engineers, Technicians, HR, management (CS and Engineering) and groups/teams (CS, 
Design and Product Engineers); artefacts, including procedures, repositories; and 
organisational entities, including organisational units, and inter-organisational networks. 
The reservoirs of knowledge are discussed in the rest of this section.  
Customer Support as a function views the people working within the function as its 
greatest knowledge source. “Business Process Analysts are essentially internal ERP 
consultants. They are highly knowledgeable in the configuration of the ERP system, 
business models and best practices”, as stated by the CS Manager. “The different 
[operational] sites worldwide maintain a small on-site IT staff including a Business 
Analyst and Technical Support technicians”, as explained by the Manufacturing Trainer. 
As stated by the CS Manager, “Project Leaders are responsible for guiding a new 
project for a customer and selecting the appropriate resources”.  
Groups are created to support particular customers and their requirements. The 
following are the roles and responsibilities of a typical Customer Support team: the 
client is the consumer of the service provided by CS. The site Business Analysts are 
responsible for submitting a project request and gathering requirements from the client 
when the project is initiated at the site. As described by the CS Manager, “the Analysts 
gather all requirements from the client and document these in the business requirements 
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specification document stored in iViewXT, create a business process model, configure 
the ERP system and system test the application”. Implementation support includes 
liaison with client and rollout, training, documentation, and handover of support to the 
Enterprise Service Centre. The nominated Project Leader is responsible for 
programmers, software development activities and deliverables of specific projects. 
“Project Leaders work closely with Analysts in delivering business solutions”, as 
further explained by the CS Manager. The Group Programmer/Analysts are responsible 
for technical design, coding, as well as unit and integration testing. 
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as best practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. “The SDLC is used as a 
template to document every process from the development of the different systems to an 
audit”, as stated by the SDLC Coordinator. The documents are created from a template. 
The templates are used so that they can be stored and searched through iViewXT. A 
considerable amount of knowledge is stored in SERV-Co technologies and systems.  
As explained by the DB Administrator, “the KMS [iViewXT] and the recent adoption 
of the systems development life cycle are attempts to formalise knowledge processes 
but it is just documentation and it is primarily based on the current project employees 
are working on. It does not explain to employees how solutions were obtained, who in 
the company is an expert in a particular field or the different customer models under 
development or in use. In fact there is no formal mentoring in place or an up-to-date 
skills database”. 
SERV-Co’s customer base is significant and to facilitate its relationships with both 
customers and suppliers it required large volumes of information to ensure the operation 
of the different processes (depending on the requirements of the customer) run 
correctly. “Until the introduction of the company’s web-based system (iView) all of this 
data/information was collected, transferred and archived through SERV-Co’s ERP 
system with reports generated manually and distributed through email to its network of 
customers and suppliers and due to this manual approach the system was prone to errors 
and subject to considerable delays”, as stated by the DB Administrator.  
In order for clients to track their jobs or for suppliers to verify stocking levels, prior to 
the introduction of the web-based system, they had to wait until a report was distributed 
by a SERV-Co Analyst. This resulted in two main problems: (1) it took forty-eight 
hours to generate reports, which dramatically affected decision-making (2) and ad hoc 
reporting was not an option. Customers could not query the data to produce reports that 
were relevant to their individual needs. To alleviate these issues the company decided to 
develop a web-based integration tool to monitor products at any point in the supply 
chain as well as allow customers and suppliers alike to track their products/jobs. When 
the system was first implemented it was used by six organisations with twelve users 
using from seven to ten reports which increased to seven hundred users in seventy-five 
organisations using up to fifty reports. The primary drivers behind the adoption of a 
web-based integration tool were as follows: 
•	 Shareability – utilising a web platform enabled the organisations with web-
browsers to access the system and view their data in HTML.  
•	 Low cost of entry – distributing the reports through the web dramatically cut 
costs in disseminating the information. 
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•	 Ease of implementation – utilising a web platform simplified the development 
and resulted in a more efficient method of communicating with both customers 
and suppliers. 
SERV-Co’s primary objective for the development project was to make information 
from its ERP system and other internal systems accessible to everyone in the supply 
chain. To do this, “the system was designed to provide [secure] ERP reports in real-time 
to give customers a complete view of the business processes to facilitate decision-
making”, as explained by the SDLC Coordinator. This therefore provided them with 
access to relevant information and generated ad hoc reports in real time to reduce both 
costs and cycle times.  
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. As explained by the CS 
Manager, “the function operates closely with GIS and Finance. Access to our different 
systems and connections are determined by Finance and implemented by the Help 
Desk”. The organisation does collaborate with partners and customers to form mutually 
beneficial inter-relationships through iViewXT “to allow customers to solve their 
problems themselves”, as stated by the Senior QA Engineer. “SERV-Co has an 
established a network of global manufacturing and distribution facilities located in key 
markets of the Americas, EMEA and Asia Pacific. They execute critical elements of the 
supply chain including materials management, customised complex kitting, and 
fulfilment services”, as explained by the CS Engineer. SERV-Co creates value by 
helping customers to increase their supply chain efficiencies and deliver products more 
cost-effectively on a global basis. SERV-Co applies information technologies 
throughout the supply chain to achieve process control thereby increasing capacity 
while reducing costs, cycle times and inventory requirements. The integration of SERV-
Co’s IT systems with those of their customers enables SERV-Co to become an integral 
part of its client’s critical supply-chain functions. 
4.1.3.3 KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in the SERV-Co CS function.  
The acquisition of knowledge within CS function is not common. As described by the 
CS Manager, “information regarding a potential customer is sourced to prepare for a 
possible contract”. “SDLC is an external method but it has been customised by CS to 
meet the function’s and compliance requirements”, as explained by the Project Leader.  
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous knowledge stores. As stated by 
the SDLC Coordinator, “we use the SDLC [methodology] to pull knowledge from 
different employees or roles such as the different Analysts and force them to document 
every aspect of their job on a project”. This process is enforced by a specific role in the 
CS function. “It is my job to make sure that everyone documents all of the different 
processes, workflows and even the access rights required for viewing the document or 
for JD Edwards [the ERP system]”, as further explained  by the SDLC Coordinator.  
Knowledge is continuously created and shared through problem-solving. As described 
by the Project Leader “a new [customer] project is a new problem and we are allocated 
by our managers to solve the problem. The team uses iViewXT and SDLC to create the 
requirements documentation, and everything else we need so that we can all collaborate 
and solve the problem”. As explained by the CS Manager “iViewXT allows us all to 
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share the documentation and answer questions so that we can save time and therefore 
money but also so that we are compliant”.   
Knowledge is applied throughout the different phases of the SDLC methodology. 
According to the SDLC Coordinator “the SDLC allows us to apply everything stored on 
one project to another. The lessons-learned are documented at the end of a project and 
they are supposed to be written up and then stored in the SDLC template and uploaded 
to iViewXT. If it isn’t I have to track down the person responsible and make sure he 
enters the required information”. 
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. 
According to the DB Administrator, “one of the key issues when developing the system 
was that of security. It was vital that the system was secure both from the external 
environment and between suppliers and customers”. “In order to prevent user intrusions 
into segments they shouldn’t access, SERV-Co introduced a ten character password to 
access the system”, as stated by the CS Manager. Additionally, a firewall was 
positioned between the web server and SERV-Co’s internal systems to reduce the risk 
of outside interference. “When a customer or supplier makes a request, it is routed 
through the web server to the application server where the request is processed. To 
generate the reports data is pulled from the iViewXT data warehouse”, as explained by 
the DB Administrator. The data warehouse contains a sub-set of the enterprise 
applications database which is propagated with data from all of the internal systems to 
eliminate the need for a direct-link to the systems for both performance and security.  
The system was developed using the J2EE and JSP open-source industry standards. 
XML was also included to allow users to export data. Microsoft SQL was used to 
construct the data warehouse. Finally, “data mirroring was used for replicating data, to 
achieve all of the requirements of the system, a technology that could pull data from a 
number of different internal systems [JD Edwards and the shop floor control and quality 
control systems] before exporting it to the iView data-warehouse”, as further explained 
by the DB Administrator. The benefits that the system provided to the company are 
regarded as substantial as “it has strengthened our relationships with our customers and 
enabled them to have twenty-four support, access to information about their products 
and self-service, saving us time and therefore money”, according to the CS Manager.  
This concludes the description of Customer Support function operating within SERV-
Co as outlined in Step 2 of the Case Study protocol (CSP) discussed in section 3.5.  
4.1.4 IT/IS Security Function 
GIS steers the IS direction, policies, security and technology standards used by SERV-
Co. IS Security “is very much a part of the GIS group”, as explained by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. As described by the GIS Manager, the function “is responsible for 
developing and implementing the IT strategy for managing major enterprise hardware 
and software and for implementing new customer solutions [in conjunction] with the IT 
personnel based at the [different] manufacturing sites”. SERV-Co does not have a 
security group. A single security officer drives the different security activities affecting 
ISS. Therefore “information security is implemented through a community of practice 
operating within GIS with [specific] individuals assigned roles in assuring the 
protection of the organisation”, as stated by the Compliance Officer. However, the 
structure of GIS is centralised and complex in nature; it consists of dedicated IS project 
managers who support the IT infrastructure of SERV-Co. The group is critical in 
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supporting new external projects and in supporting internal business units. The security 
analyst is responsible for security within the company and has a dual role as an internal 
auditor.  
4.1.4.1 Types of IS Security Knowledge 
This section identifies the types of knowledge utilised by the organisation’s ISS group. 
The different types of ISS knowledge are discussed in the next three sub-sections. The 
first section describes the general knowledge necessary for the ISS function members to 
conduct their day-to-day operations. This knowledge is categorised as general as it is 
available to all of the IT professionals working throughout the organisation. Section 
4.1.1 described the culture, structure and common knowledge used, all of which is 
regarded as general knowledge by the interviewees. Section 4.1.4 described the 
reporting structure of the ISS function itself which is fundamental to the group’s 
knowledge of roles and responsibilities at a corporate and local level.  
General knowledge common to the ISS functions is varied.  “SERV-Co’s current 
security model is driven largely by [the] ISO17799 standard, and risk analysis 
methodologies”, as stated by the ITIL Coordinator.  As explained by the Help Desk 
Manager, “SERV-Co uses operational and project risk combined with risk analysis 
methodologies, when assessing the level of security required by an application or 
system”.  The security policies utilised in GIS “are a corporate policy on IT risk and 
Security, business continuity policy, anti-virus policy, remote access policy and Internet 
usage policy”, as stated by the GIS Manager. “[GIS] staff must know how to customise 
the different standards and best practices that we use so that they are effectively used 
and ultimately meet SOX”, as explained by the Compliance Coordinator.  
Technically specific knowledge is specific to the ISS function. External knowledge 
regarding environmental threats from vendors and online resources is vital. As stated by 
the ITIL Coordinator, “the group supports the security requirements of the different 
sites which are governed by Security Officers and [all of the] Security Officers 
collaborate”. Ultimately new procedures are signed off by the VP and become company 
policy. According to the ITIL Coordinator, “new standards and frameworks are either 
recommended by the external auditor or we select something that will meet our needs”. 
ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) is a customisable framework of 
best practices that promote quality computing. “The framework is under review and we 
have a few members of staff on training courses so that we get the best out of it and can 
prove to the VP that it will make audits easier”, as stated by the Director of HR. “Audits 
are difficult and time consuming at the moment but they are getting easier with each 
one; we use SDLC to manage all of the documentation”, as explained by the SDLC 
Coordinator. 
Contextually specific knowledge within the GIS function of SERV-Co is primarily 
used to adhere to regulatory issues or for an incident such as a security breach. As 
described by the Compliance Coordinator, “knowledge about the different regulations 
that affect us and our customers is vital. [SERV-Co is] not a medical organisation but 
we still have to be compliant with HIPAA12 as one of our customers operates in [the] 
health sector. SOX is an issue, a very expensive and time-consuming issue. SERV-Co 
has to adhere to SOX requirements and undergo regular audits”. As explained by the 
12 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Of 1996, impacts all healthcare organisations. The risks 
for providers due to inadequate IS Security range from risks to patient care if records are doctored, liability of leaked 
information, loss of reputation and market share. 
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DB Administrator, “due to SOX we have to implement segregation of duties, access to 
systems has been completely redefined [as determined] by the Finance department”. 
“Security must identify everyone’s access [access control rights] requirements to the 
information or knowledge that they need to do their jobs”, as stated by the Help Desk 
Manager. “Security professionals must not only stay ahead of all the threats but also 
know how to comply with the different regulations and prepare for audits”, as stated by 
the GIS Manager. 
4.1.4.2 Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge, pertaining to the SERV-Co IT/ISS or GIS function, resides in several 
different locations within the organisation. They encompass people and groups, 
including IT and Security professionals, Engineers, management and groups/teams 
within IT/ISS; artefacts, including best practices, security technologies, and 
repositories; and organisational entities, including organisational units, organisations, 
and inter-organisational networks. The organisation reservoir is the SERV-Co 
organisation in its entirety. This reservoir of knowledge is described as part of the 
organisational infrastructure in section 4.1.1. The remaining reservoirs of knowledge are 
discussed in the rest of this section.  
A considerable amount of knowledge resides in people. As explained by the GIS 
Manager, “the Security Officer or Analyst tracks employee access to the different 
systems. He is also responsible for implementing a change management process 
[utilised] to monitor changes to the different systems. Each subsidiary is allocated a 
Security Officer and they collaborate to share information regarding audits and different 
internal processes”. 
The structure of the groups/teams working within the IT/ISS function is described in 
section 4.1.2. According to the Compliance Coordinator, “each [Security] Analyst is 
responsible for the regulatory requirements for their site”. A Group Internal Audit 
(GIA) “will act as corporate coordinators of the risk management process.  GIA will, on 
a half-yearly basis, produce a consolidated Corporate Risk report for submission to the 
VP”, as stated by the ITIL Coordinator. “GIA, with the assistance of management will 
monitor and report on compliance with this policy to [the] external Auditor” as 
explained by the GIS Manager. According to Security Officer 2, “[GIA] will also 
review the continuing adequacy and completeness of policies and support reporting 
procedures and mechanisms used in SERV-Co”. 
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. According to the SDLC 
Coordinator, “information or knowledge pertaining to the different projects is stored, 
procedures are documented, and standards, emails / minutes regarding projects are 
typically stored in an access share”. “Project status information is stored in iViewXT 
and if the project requires the application of security standards and procedures such as 
customer applications it is listed and then allocated”, as stated by the DB Administrator. 
“General information is stored in iViewXT, typically emergency procedures are 
documented regarding the steps to follow in the event of a virus alert [which could 
result in loss of productivity]”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. According to 
the SDLC Coordinator “mechanisms are in place to review and update security 
procedures so that security personnel can document lessons-learned from incidents”. 
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A considerable amount of knowledge is stored in SERV-Co technologies and systems. 
Information and knowledge are stored in one of the two main repositories by the 
members of GIS function.  NT Shares are the main repositories used by the group with 
both aspects of the group (architecture and security) utilising separate shares.  “Outlook 
is [also] used to store incoming documentation and messages.  The Intranet is used as a 
repository for some documentation and iViewXT is becoming the central document 
repository”, as stated by the ITIL Coordinator.  Additionally, “monitoring tools are 
ineffective in providing an integrated view of the entire network”, as stated by the 
[Cork] Security Officer. Therefore ISS technologies are not used to capture knowledge 
pertaining to corporate security network. 
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. These range from the entire 
organisation, units within the organisation to inter-organisational relationships. The 
organisation as a whole is described in section 4.1.1. As explained by the [Cork] 
Security Officer “we collaborate with one another [other subsidiaries] and externally 
with the auditors; CS collaborates with SERV-Co customers through iViewXT”. 
4.1.4.3 IS Security KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in the IT/ISS function.  
The acquisition of knowledge within IT/ISS is common. As stated by the [U.S.] 
Security Officer, “best practices, standards and frameworks like ITIL were researched, 
bought and customised”. “The SDLC methodology was sourced externally and 
customised to act as a document management system (DMS) to ensure quality and 
responsibility as authors and Project Leaders are assigned to different stages of the 
methodology”, as stated by the SDLC Coordinator.   
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous reservoirs distributed 
throughout SERV-Co. As described by the [Cork] Security Officer, “collaboration is 
[primarily] by phone and we are implementing a change management process to make 
sure everyone participates in IS Security projects and for that communication between 
the site Officers and all of the SERV-Co employees is required”. “Check lists from 
previous projects, [audit] reviews are pulled out and updated for the next project”, as 
explained by the ITIL Coordinator. According to the [U.S] Security Officer, “we don’t 
know yet which framework or standard is right but we are improving through the 
different security projects”. 
Knowledge is continuously created through the problem-solving process used within 
IT/ISS. 
SOX have had a dramatic affect on the management of security knowledge as it is 
forcing the formalisation of policies and procedures. As stated by the [Cork] Security 
Officer “[the] auditing [process] for SOX is a learning process”. The function is 
provided with feedback from the external auditor - Ernst and Young as a result of the 
audits conducted. “A significant amount of effort and processes have been put in place 
to reduce the amount of resources needed in auditing”, as stated by the Compliance 
Coordinator. Additionally, the function utilises standards such as ISO17799 and ITIL 
for problem management.  
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The different Security Officers share knowledge during weekly meetings and actions 
are recorded in Excel spreadsheets. According to the [Cork] Security Officer “[the use 
of spreadsheets] is not viewed as very professional but it is regarded as an attempt to 
record project progression”. Conference calls are “widely used to share knowledge 
across the organisation but the calls are not recorded”, as stated by the [U.S] Security 
Officer. Action lists are uploaded to iViewXT for ratification by the global SERV-Co IS 
group. It is regarded as “very time consuming but the organisation needs to be 
compliant and SOX is a significant security activity”, as explained by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. 
The process of knowledge application or use is extensive in the IT/ISS function. As 
described by the GIS Manager “auditing has forced the application of knowledge gained 
from previous reviews. The lessons gained are reused for the next audit”. Regulatory 
requirements have also forced the allocation of quality controls such as “security 
frameworks, and documents and project management methodologies like SDLC”, as 
stated by the Help Desk Administrator.  
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. GIS 
aligns security measures (controls) to individual knowledge stocks. KM projects are 
implemented on an “ad hoc” basis resulting in the organic allocation of controls to 
numerous repositories which are not integrated. The size of the network and a false 
prioritisation of the assets have intensified the resources needed to “backup” and search 
through the individual and unit knowledge shares. The allocation of technical (access 
rights), formal (security policy) and informal (SETA) controls is creating sharing 
restrictions among and between the different business units. “The network is also 
audited to track communication to assure compliance with the SERV-Co security 
policy”, as stated by the [U.S.] Security Officer. As explained by the GIS Manager, 
“SERV-Co employees have been affected by compliance as access rights to financial 
systems such as the corporate ERP system, [the] online web resources and internal 
knowledge or information repositories are controlled”. “GIS group have applied 
security measures to implement segregation of duties”, as explained by the Compliance 
Coordinator. 
This concludes the description of IS Security function operating within SERV-Co  as 
outlined in Step 3 of the Case Study Protocol (CSP) discussed in section 3.5.  
4.1.5 Findings 
SERV-Co has adopted a technological approach to its KM requirements. KM was not 
incorporated into the strategic planning of the company but as a core GIS and CS 
strategy to meet environmental drivers such as compliance and customer demand for 
support. Security measures, such as access controls, are applied to the “KMS”. Access 
controls are used to partition the organisations systems and to enforce segregation of 
duties in accordance with the Sarbanes-and-Oxley Act of 2002. Fundamentally, it is the 
security activity compliance which has had profound implications on the management 
of knowledge within SERV-Co. It is forcing the organisation to develop, use and 
document processes. Prior to the enforced restructuring of internal processes and the 
partitioning of systems, the organisation did not utilise a secure methodology for the 
development of systems or document learning outcomes from customer related 
development projects.  
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The enforced utilisation of the SDLC methodology has resulted in the methodical 
documentation of project processes to increase learning and comply with regulatory 
requirements. However employees have stipulated that the level of documentation due 
to compliance has reduced the amount of time which they can allocate to knowledge 
sharing and even to projects. In fact projects have been lost or dramatically affected due 
to the amount of resources allocated to meeting regulations. Even though systems are 
audited the CS function is not privy to the review report as it is purely to adhere to 
environmental regulations. This report could ultimately track attempts to access the 
different knowledge reservoirs thus both protecting the security of the corporate 
knowledgebase but also allowing knowledge advocates to determine if the right users 
have access to the right knowledge. The adoption of standards such as ISO17799 and 
ITIL are forcing the organisation to apply a stepped approach to protect corporate 
tangible and intangible assets. Compliance to regulatory requirements has placed 
significant strain on the resources of GIS and particularly for security and Finance 
personnel. Compliance has had surprising benefits for the management of knowledge 
within the organisation. This is primarily due to the documentation and formalisation of 
processes in the GIS and CS functions. The utilisation of resources such as personnel 
and time have been considerable. The most significant KM activity within SERV-Co 
was the development and utilisation of the KMS – iViewXT. The development of which 
required the application of numerous ISS controls to limit access to users (segregation 
of duties). 
The adoption of SDLC did define and identify roles and responsibilities for the different 
phases of the development process which forced the required documentation of lessons-
learned and assured a level of quality in protecting the validity of the knowledge stored. 
However the researcher also identified an omission of a fundamental step in the 
development process when interviewing the KM advocates (the CS function). The users 
/employees were not consulted during the development of the system suggesting that 
the SDLC methodology was not employed prior to the commencement of SOX audits. 
Therefore the changes made, due to compliance, were purely environmentally driven 
and not used as an opportunity to gain a competitive advantage. Table 4.2 summarises 
and outlines the different ISS and CS activities identified in this pilot case study. The 
ISS activities are aligned with the identified implications for the CS function using a 
KM solution. Each ISS activity has an implication for KM. The impact of a KM 
strategy on the ISS function is also outlined. Finally the impact of management is 
provided. Governance directly impacts ISS and KM as it determines the resources 
allocated to the two functions and the political support necessary for success. 
4.1.6 Conclusions and Lessons-learned 
The use of the SERV-Co pilot case provided the researcher with useful insights into 
conducting case study research. In addition to the practical lessons-learned such as the 
effective use of a Dictaphone, transcribing and display matrices, the pilot case study 
allowed the researcher to fine tune the interview guide. The researcher used display 
matrices to illustrate examples of general, technical and contextual knowledge through a 
common setting such as a college. This proved successful in the two case studies 
investigated. Key informants were identified from the ISS and CS functions to review 
and verify the display matrices created.  
The pilot case study illustrated the fact that KM was adopted purely as a silver bullet 
solution for selling the SERV-Co service to potential customers as interviewees used 
the words: data, information and knowledge interchangeably and the strategy was 
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predominately a technological implementation of a central repository (iViewXT). 
Additionally the pilot case study did not have a separate ISS function. ISS was 
structured as a part of IT or GIS. This contradicts the advice in academia and industry 
that the ISS function must be separate from IT in order for it to operate effectively.  
IS
S 
&
 K
M
 A
ct
iv
iti
es
 
IS SECURITY ACTIVITIES IMPLICATIONS FOR CS 
Strategic planning lacks KM Mismatch of KM strategy to IT 
SOX enforces segregation of duties Access to reservoirs based on domain rights 
Access controls  Partitioning of knowledge 
Auditing of Systems carried out Purely for SOX requirement and not used by CS 
Forced documentation of processes Less time for sharing Knowledge 
Network controls (Firewalls, VPNs) Dedicated connection/ Encryption of Knowledge 
Standards: ISO17799 Enforced control of access 
Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Step-by-step approach to documentation 
ITIL Stepped approach to problem-solving 
SETA Security aware employees 
General auditing Reduces time for knowledge sharing 
System histories are stored Useful if shared with KM developers 
Quality assurance Time spent on reviews instead of sharing K 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IMPLICATIONS FOR IS SECURITY 
SOX: processes are documented & 
assessed 
Time and the allocation of significant resources 
Development of KMS Allocation of ISS resources to secure the KMS 
SDLC – documentation Application of controls & documentation  
KM Network controls Time spent securing the connections 
Additional controls for dedicated connections 
Minimum exchanges of Knowledge between sites 
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IS SECURITY KM ACTIVITIES IMPLICATIONS FOR ISS FUNCTION 
Lessons-learned are documented Processes are improved 
No Security KMS Filtering knowledge is difficult & time intensive 
Communities of Practice Across function responsibility 
Conference calls, meetings Site collaboration 
Action plans Steeped approach to problem-solving 
Development methodologies  Security is considered during the IS development. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT 
Financial controller has  IT governance role Segregation of duties based on roles 
Full support for compliance Allocation of resources 
Pushing standards Incorporation of methods and  new processes 
Certification Increased skills 
No KM strategy Ad hoc implementations of knowledge tools 
Limited budget Insufficient monitoring systems 
Table 4.2: The Interplay between the Functions. 
Step four of the CSP allowed the researcher to test the CSP itself, the research lens and 
the interview guide in a practical setting. Even though the pilot did not meet the 
requirements (a separate ISS and CS function using a KM strategy) of this study the 
lessons-learned as a result helped to refine the research strategy. In the context of this 
study, the literature provided a lens for the investigation. The factors and outcomes 
identified in section 2.7.1 of the literature (Figure 2.5 and replicated in Table 4.3) acted 
as a basis for grounding the investigation of the approaches used to manage knowledge 
in two specialised functions. This equipped the researcher with a fitting framework 
based on prior research from which to initiate the investigation while allowing enough 
scope to enable additional factors, outcomes and implications to emerge from the 
contextual settings of the organisational environments participating in this study. The 
analysis of the data collected from the pilot case study did identify additional variables 
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(Table 4.4) which were incorporated into the research model for investigation in the two 
case studies described in Chapters five and six. Therefore this pilot case study 
established the validity of the different data collection, analysis and verification (key 
informants) techniques used by the researcher. Steps 1, 2, and 3 of the CSP were tested 
(Figure 3.1) to determine if they were of value in addressing research questions one and 
two. Additionally SERV-Co was used to allow the researcher to become familiar with 
the phenomenon. 
VARIABLES CODES EXPLANATIONS 
Types 
Explicit Exp: is codified, documented, archived and communicated 
Tacit Tac: cognitive (beliefs, viewpoints and mental maps) and technical (know how) 
Procedural Pro: is dynamic requiring skilled actions – knowing what 
Declarative Dec: is factual information that is static and easily described – “knowing that” 
Tech Spec TSpec: deep knowledge about a specific field through training and applied 
experience 
General Gen: possessed by a large number and can be transferred easily 
Reservoirs 
People Pep: individuals and functions CoP 
Artefacts Art: repositories represents another method of storing knowledge 
Procedures Proc: stored in practices, organisational rules, routines and procedures 
Technologies Tech: stored in technologies and systems 
Org Units OrgU: organisational units / Org / inter-organisational networks 
Processes 
Acquisition  Acq: process by which new knowledge is obtained 
Capture Cap: process of retrieving knowledge that resides within people, artefacts /org 
entities 
Creation Cre: Generating knowledge 
Sharing Shar: explicit or tacit knowledge is transferred 
Application App: the use of knowledge to guide decisions and actions 
Control Cnt: protection of knowledge resources 
Mechanisms 
Use Mech: organisational or structural methods used to promote KM 
Technologies Tech: knowledge Tools 
Infrastructure Infra: culture, structure, CoP, IT infrastructures, common k & physical 
environment 
Impact 
People ImP: employee performance can be greatly impacted through KM 
Functions ImG: functions performance can be greatly impacted through KM 
Processes ImPr: to quickly adapt to changes in their environments 
Org IOrg: improving corporate performance 
Table 4.3: Operational Factors and Outcomes for this Study (derived from Figure 2.5). 
Interplay Inter: cross over between functions 
Emerged from the 
analysis 
Control Cnt: informal / formal/ technical controls 
Access Acc: segregation of duties 
Compliance Sox: Regulatory impacts 
Table 4.4: Operational Factors and Outcomes for this Study (identified from the Pilot 
case study). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 

EXPLORING THE CME-CO CASE STUDY 
5.0 Introduction 
In this Chapter the data gathered from the first case organisation is presented and 
discussed (Figure 1.1). As described in Chapter three, this study adopts an exploratory 
qualitative method and utilises a holistic case design approach consisting of two 
multinational case studies. This study uses a multiple method data gathering approach 
which triangulates the data gathered during the data collection phase of this 
investigation. The method consisted of a combination of  semi-structured interviews 
with management, Customer Support Engineers, IT and IS Security technical experts in 
two specialised functions, and documentation in the form of corporate reports, archival 
material, newspaper reports, staff guidelines, security policies (regarding email, 
Internet, IP and non-disclosure agreements), ethical codes, and disciplinary codes, 
internal communications regarding IS Security, KM and email management 
notifications (Table 3.4).  
The purpose of this Chapter is to address the first and the second research questions 
through steps 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the research protocol described and illustrated in Chapter 
three (section 3.5 and Figure 3.1) and tested in Chapter four. The analysis of the IS 
Security and Customer Support functions, within CME-Co, revealed that the approaches 
utilised in managing knowledge varies. By comparing and contrasting data gathered 
from these multiple sources, a more complete and balanced study was possible (section 
2.7.1). Given the sensitive nature of the study with respect to the management of IS 
Security knowledge, the identification of key intangible assets, corporate environmental 
threats and particularly legislative requirements, the case organisation has been assigned 
a pseudonym, which is a condition of the researcher’s authorisation to access the case 
and conduct and publish the study as it pertains to the organisation.  
Boring (1963) stated that “the best fact is one that is set in context, that is, in relation to 
the other facts”. The purpose of putting research into context is to add validity to the 
research and to situate it for the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and the reader. 
This Chapter consists of eight primary sections (5.1.1 to 5.1.8) to structure the case as 
required by the research lens (Figure 2.5 and described in section 2.7.1). Sections 5.1.1 
and 5.1.2 describe the organisational background and infrastructure. Sections 5.1.3 and 
5.1.4 describe the management of knowledge within the CS and ISS functions. Section 
5.1.5 compares the approaches used by the two functions so that one function can learn 
from another. Sections 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 describe the mechanisms used to promote KM 
and the impacts at functional and organisational levels. Sections 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 
conclude by highlighting the impact of compliance on the management of knowledge 
within the organisation (Table 5.12). 
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5.1 CME-Co 
5.1.1 Organisational Background 
CME-Co (pseudonym) is a technology company and a world leader in products, 
services, and solutions for information storage and management. The corporate mission 
is to help customers get the maximum value from their information. To achieve this 
objective CME-Co produces leading edge products and facilitates the integration of 
these products (hardware, software, services) into solutions which are delivered with or 
through partners. CME-Co has subsidiaries located throughout the world with its 
headquarters based in Hopkinton, MA and its main European manufacturing centre in 
Cork, Ireland. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the company’s profile since it was 
formed in 1979.  
PROFILE OF CME-Co 
1979 CME-Co began in 1979. 
1986 CME-Co entered the computer industry in 1981 and in 1986 went public on the NASDAQ. 
1988 In order to advance at an international level CME-Co opened a European facility in Cork, 
Ireland. 
1990 
‘s 
The growth of the Internet in the 1990s rapidly increased the demand for information storage 
and as CME-Co had the right product to meet the demand of this expanding industry saw its 
revenue increasing to $385 million in 1992 and sustained growth through to 2000. 
1993 In 1993 the company released its first software product, the SRDF, which enabled the company 
to expand its products in information storage and retrieval. 
1995 The company overtook its primary competitor, IBM, as the mainframe storage market leader 
1999 In 1999 Data General was purchased by CME-Co providing the organisation with an entry level 
product CLARiiON in the competitive mid-range storage market. 
2000 CME-Co continued to grow rapidly and by the end of 2000 had reached $8 billion in annual 
revenue with a worldwide employee head count of 27,000. This accelerated period of growth 
also had an enormous impact on the CME-Co Cork facility as Cork continued to manufacture 
all of the CME-Co products and the following functions were added: international Finance, IT 
telecommunications, technical support, support centers, R&D and the executive briefing centre. 
By the end of 2000 there were 1,750 employees based in the Cork facility with 600 employees 
in non-manufacturing areas. 
2001 The computer industry in general found 2001 to be difficult as it faced the first worldwide 
recession since 1975. CME-Co endured a 20 percent reduction in total revenue from the 
previous year with $700 million reported losses. However the company had built a strong 
balance sheet during the growth period with capital balances at $2.7 billion and assets worth 
$10 billion. 
2002 In 2002, CME-Co acquired Prisa Networks for its storage area network (SAN) management 
VisualSAN product. 
2003 CME-Co switched its diversification into software and services into high gear, begun under a 
new CEO in 2001, by first acquiring Legato Inc. for $1.3 billion in July, followed by its 
purchases of Documentum and VMware in October and December of 2003 respectively. 
2005 The acquisition of Rainfinity in August 2005 added a storage virtualisation product targeting 
Global File Virtualisation. Through an acquisition of a Belgian software company called 
FilePool, CME-Co developed a data-archiving product called Centera. This content platform 
addressed archiving-specific needs of ILM in a rapidly changing technical environment. 
2006 CME-Co bought RSA Security, Inc. and opened an R&D office in Shanghai, China. 
2007 CME-Co announced that it would invest $160 million in Singapore to setup a new 15000 
square feet development laboratory. 
2008 CME-Co announced the purchase of Iomega Corporation. 
Table 5.1: History of CME-Co (Corporate Documentation: Table 3.4). 
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In 1990 the company introduced the Symmetrix 4200 integrated cache disk array which 
enabled the company to compete as an independent storage provider in the storage 
market. Corporate development in the computer industry was extremely difficult in 
2002 as the company saw a reduction or contraction in its growth. As described by the 
KM Champion, prior to the contraction in growth, “if there was problem money was 
thrown at it”. Due to this decline, senior management had to identify resources within 
the company itself and utilise them more effectively. The company analysed internal 
processes as, in the case of dramatic growth, operations were, to a degree, sidelined to 
meet consumer demands and increase operational efficiency. With a recent series of 
acquisitions and partnerships, the company has grown and diversified its product 
offerings. It has over thirty-three thousand employees with a turnover of approximately 
twelve billion dollars (2007).  
The organisation operates in a business environment that is influenced by rapid 
technological advancement, high demand and short product lifecycles and therefore a 
high level of uncertainty. Threats such as reverse-engineering, viruses and regulatory 
constraints are considered significant. The organisation treats competition as a means of 
learning and comparing its performance with its competitors. Knowledge management 
within the organisation incorporates developments in the external environment as a 
source of knowledge. According to the Knowledge Champion competition is constant, 
“even though we overtook IBM and took a huge market share from them we have 
continued to maintain an established customer base”. Competitors also push the 
organisation to share more and more knowledge with their customers by making a 
“…wealth of knowledge available to them forcing us to do the same”. This is explained 
further by the Compliance Officer, “you have to evolve with the market place and as our 
products become more impacted by additional technologies which are typically being 
enhanced with the use of security”. 
As described by the IT Manager, “companies are being, effectively bombarded by 
regulations so that if you are a U.S. multinational and you have got overseas 
subsidiaries you could be required to comply with local, State and Federal laws in the 
U.S. and you can then be impacted by broad EU regulations. This is complicated further 
by a hugely fragmented [security] market sector with over three hundred security 
companies supplying hundreds of different security products to comply with security 
requirements”. So according to the [U.S.] Security Coordinator, “that type of 
fragmentation makes it very difficult for companies to understand that if they have 
different technologies from different vendors – are they compliant”. The organisation 
has identified this issue as an opportunity to offer customers a full service in meeting 
their storage and regulatory needs. As a result the CME-Co product portfolio is wide 
and complex requiring significant expertise in supporting customer needs. 
With respect to this investigation, Table 5.2 provides an overview of the data gathered 
from multiple sources within CME-Co. 
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OVERVIEW OF CME-Co 
CME-Co 
-Multinational, 
-Engineering 
-33k Employees 
-$13.2 Billion ‘07 
Industry Sector Customers Products Competitors Partners/ Vendors 
Storage and Technology Industry Fortune 500 Companies Symmetrix, Celerra, Centera, Network 
Attached Storage Servers and Clariion 
IBM, HP Dell, McAfee, Microsoft, 
Fujitsu Services 
Corporate Strategy Mission Subsidiaries IS Security Function CS Function 
The Customer always comes first. “Guilty until proven 
innocent” 
Worldwide – Cork Ireland, UK, EMEA 
and Australia 
Displaced throughout 
Organisation 
5000 Staff worldwide 
(Engineering in the U.S.) 
Interviews 
IS Security Function Customer Support Function Other 
Role Years Subsidiary Role Years Subsidiary Role Years 
• IT Manager 
• Security Officer 
• Remote Access Manager 
• Security Officer 
• Security Coordinator 
• Infrastructure Manager 
• OISRM/Compliance Coordinator 
• Remote Access Coordinator 
• Corporate Security Officer 
(Compliance Expert) 
• GIS Director – by email 
8 
4 
10 
5 
10 
11 
2 
10 
7 
12 
Cork 
Cork 
Cork 
Australia 
U.S. 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
• CS Customer Mgr 
• KMS Engineering Trainer 
• KDG Officer 
• Engineering Trainer 
• KMS & DB Administrator 
• Technician Eng Level 1 
• Technician Eng Level 2 
• Knowledge Consultant 
• Engineer Manager 
• E-Services  
13 
10 
2 
4 
8 
2 
5 
14 
13 
8 
Cork 
Cork 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Cork 
Cork 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Cork 
• Purchasing Mgr 
•  Project 
Manager 
-Six Sigma 
•  Operations 
Mgr. 
Exe Brief Centre 
• Learning 
Officer 
• Former IT 
Manager 
13 
7 
11 
6 
5 
Documentation 
Analysed 
Security Documentation Customer Support Documentation Corporate/Public 
• CME-Co Customised – ISO17799 Documentation 
• Security Policies Re: email/ Internet/ Remote Access 
• Data Centre - Disaster Recovery Procedures 
• Business Continuity Procedures 
• ILM Guidelines and White Papers 
• Business Continuity Planning Paper 
• Intranet: OISRM Website/IS Department Website 
• CME-Co Website – www.CME-Co.com 
• Primus White Paper 
• ILM White Paper 
• Power-Link White Paper 
• Knowledge link White Paper 
• KCS Double loop process White Paper 
• Views: Primus CS View/Power-Link - Customer • Presentations: Global Primus Status - 2008 
• Intranet: Customer Services Website 
• Annual Reports: 
2001/2005/2006/2007 
• Profits Soar by 20% on 
Storage Demand 
• Channel CME-Co 
• Presentations: 
  CME-Co Review 2007
  Compliant ILM Strategy 
Table 5.2: CME-Co Data (Adapted from Tables: 3.3 (Roles and Responsibilities of the Interviewees) & 3.4 (Case Documentation 
Analysed)). 
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5.1.2 Organisational Infrastructure Supporting KM 
The organisational infrastructure is the foundation on which KM resides and is 
composed of: organisation culture, structure, communities of practice (CoP), physical 
environment common knowledge and IT infrastructure. These CME-Co components are 
discussed in the next five sub-sections. 
5.1.2.1 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture reflects the norms and beliefs which guide the behaviour of 
CME-Co’s employees. It is an important enabler of KM. As described by the 
Knowledge Consultant the organisation is: “trying to change [employee] mindsets 
because culturally knowledge is power and that’s something that we are trying to 
change; changing mindsets is one of the hardest things ever”. The Purchasing Manager 
added that, “mentoring is part of the corporate wide culture in enhancing knowledge 
sharing. Employees who have been perceived as gurus – mentor”. Historically the 
culture of the organisation is very much founded on legend and some very dynamic 
Engineers have achieved the status of legends and even heroes. The company is rich in 
legendary tales of business daring and a culture of doing - whatever it takes to create 
customers for life. Many interviewees have explained two widely accepted CME-Co 
values which capture the essence of this customer driven organisation: guilty until 
proven innocent – “CME-Co will take responsibility for any customer issue irrespective 
of it being a [competitor] hardware or software problem”, as stated by the Operations 
Manager. Additionally minutes equals millions - this concept underlines the fact that 
CME-Co understands that as their products are mission critical systems and any down­
time could cost a customer millions of dollars. CME-Co as an organisation takes huge 
pride in its successes publishing them in the corporate newsletter. Pride in the 
organisation is intense and the entire organisation including its business 
units/subsidiaries share a very competitive ethos. According to a Level 2 Technician, 
“there’s a culture here of getting things done and if you can cut to the person that’s 
responsible for something and if that’s the quickest way to get something done, 
especially in a crisis, that’s how you do it”.  However, in the opinion of the CS 
Manager, “knowledge sharing is very much grouped specific, CS as a group has a 
knowledge sharing culture”. 
The business environment, and therefore customer requirements, has forced a culture of 
security awareness. According to the Corporate Security Officer, “changes in the 
regulatory environment and customer security enhancement requirements – storage 
[market] is now changing in terms of a culture of awareness...as opposed to a security 
culture”. At a senior level, management are committed to enhancing security both 
internally and externally “to be an inherent part of every department’s considerations”, 
as written on the CME-Co website. As described by the IT Manager, “[the organisation] 
has a proactive stance on security”. Traditionally, according to the Corporate Security 
Officer, “even for a storage company, pre 9/11, security wasn’t on people’s radar as 
much. Most of the change in security considerations such as product design, IS Security 
and all the rest of it internally began to increase afterwards”. The IT Manager stated 
that, “some functions are better than others, generally speaking there is a very high 
sense of security and people will be mindful of things that we can’t afford to have go-
wrong, that could take our system out of service for hours or days”. The challenge of 
establishing good management practices in a geographical dispersed environment is 
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difficult. It is “the [geographically] spread of the organisation which is an obstacle to a 
culture of sharing and control” which is cited by many interviewees. To explain the 
situation the Purchasing Manager stated that it is “a kind of learning experience for all 
of us to actually come to terms with dealing with different cultures and understanding 
...it’s fine when you are speaking face-to-face but it’s a bit more difficult when you are 
dealing with someone working in our, for example, Chinese subsidiary over the phone”.  
5.1.2.2 Organisational Structure 
Structure is complex in a multinational organisation. The reporting structure can impact 
the management of ISS knowledge. The Knowledge Development Group (KDG) 
Officer stated that “the problem with such a big organisation [is that] different groups 
go away and do their own thing”. The Knowledge Champion explained it further by 
stating that, “…all these different geographies are making it [KM] far too complex”. As 
described by the Knowledge Consultant, “CME-Co is a company that has grown from 
small to big very quickly; to a certain degree…knowledge is being managed like a small 
company where the Engineering group would not be willing to open up content to us 
[CS]. A lot of it is historic, in how the company grew - we’ve always had access to this 
and never that so they would want to know why would we want it all of a sudden”. The 
CS Manager explained that for commercial reasons, “internally there are separate 
organisations - it’s two-pronged really”. Essentially, in the opinion of the CS Manager, 
“Customer Support sits in between [Engineering and the customers] and there is a 
reluctance to release information to us in case it leaks out to sales or to the customer 
base and we keep telling them - look you can trust us, but they are still reluctant”.  
The company did undergo a reorganisation to centralise the different point-of-contacts 
for customers. As described by the Knowledge Champion “the organisation went 
through a reshuffle, a year or two ago; it used be managed in each GEO by different 
directors so the reporting mechanisms were different. Now you’ve got one director 
overseeing certain products globally so the infrastructure is there to allow the 
knowledge infrastructure to be built up in the same type of hierarchy”. This is 
necessary, as the Knowledge Champion further explained that, “there’s no point in us 
having you know one set [of reporting layers] over here and whatever they use in Asia - 
it needs to be consistent globally”. Basically, according to the CS Engineer, “the calls 
rotate to wherever the sun is shining so if it’s bright over here we have to know if you 
are dealing with the same customer; you need to be referring to the same content, the 
same console, so you’re giving him the same information, and not one guy saying one 
thing and another guy saying another thing because they are looking at different files”. 
As described by the IT Manager, “CME-Co is a very centralised company with its 
headquarters in the U.S. so while we [IT] support the business functions a lot of our 
core systems are actually physically located in the U.S. and our users are remote users 
of those systems, so that tends to make it quite complex if you’re looking for specific 
information as the answer to that or the knowledge is [located] in the U.S. or sometimes 
it can be here [in Cork]”. IS within CME-Co Ireland facilitates or supports every 
business unit operating in Europe reporting to the Global IS (GIS) Director in corporate 
CME-Co. According to the [Cork] Security Officer, “we [CME-Co] are fairly 
autonomous - if there is a corporate directive on something it will come from Boston”. 
The last significant change was to move the Help desk function to the U.S. As described 
by the Remote Access Coordinator, “Cork was not happy at the time, a lot of autonomy 
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and control was lost”. A new security group, OISRM (Office of Information Systems 
and Risk Management), was also established and based in corporate headquarters to 
source regulatory guidelines and best practices. Communities of practice are also used 
within the organisation. They are formed, according to the IT Manager, “when any 
project begins”. These could incorporate the organisations external stakeholders such as 
customers and partners.  
5.1.2.3 Common Knowledge 
Common knowledge helps integrate employee knowledge through the provision of a 
common vocabulary. CME-Co’s product portfolio is wide and complex requiring 
significant expertise in supporting customer needs. Product design specifications are 
considered common knowledge. According to the Level 1 and 2 technicians, “G.A 
[General availability] product specifications are regarded as common knowledge”. 
Engineering terms pertaining to the status of a product and project management 
terminologies such as Six Sigma and M-Gates are examples of everyday vocabulary. As 
described by the Knowledge Consultant, “Channel CME-Co is our Intranet or our 
central point for all employees and that’s where our CEO would have messages; it’s a 
link to all of the websites in the company and it has general information on corporate 
procedures and methodologies”. An enterprise-wide KM initiative in the form of a 
content management system has also, according to the CS Manager, “been launched – 
it’s more of a common document repository though”. He explained that it [the 
repository] stores “product information that we all need to do our jobs, such as SRDF13 
documentation”. The Knowledge Consultant added that, “it’s something people have 
been screaming for, for a long time…where we can join all of these disparate databases 
together into an overarching content management system”. 
5.1.2.4 Physical Environment 
The physical environment is an important consideration in fostering KM. As explained 
by the KDG Officer “there’s nothing better than [open plan] and getting up off your 
chair and going over to another person for help in solving a problem”. Dispersed 
geographies or subsidiaries are difficult obstacles to solving problems. As described by 
the Knowledge Champion “tech support is located in one building [in Cork] and 
physically they are far apart from the Engineering group [in the States]. In the escalation 
process [for problem-solving] if a technician based in the U.S. Support Centre cannot 
solve a problem “you’ve got the Design Engineers [next door] and initially they’ll 
phone the Engineers at the desk; if they still have a problem the Engineer will pop in the 
door and he’s there and they’ll sit down next to you [the technician]” as added by the 
Knowledge Champion. Unfortunately according to the CS Engineering Trainer “if we 
want to get the Engineer [in Cork] we have to get them by phone and they will ask us to 
disconnect from the Symmetrix [in for example a German bank] so that the Engineer 
can dial-in and have look at it, spend twenty minutes in there and then he’ll come back 
and say “right it’s fixed”. However according to the CS Trainer, “the technician hasn’t 
seen the process used to diagnose the problem [and it is also] rare enough that the 
Engineer would tell us to build a solution”. The only solution, as described by the CS 
Manager, “is to physically rotate [Cork] Technicians enabling them to shadow Design 
13 SRDF (Symmetrix Remote Data Facility) is a family of CME-Co products that facilitates data replication from one 
Symmetrix storage array to another through a Storage Area Network (SAN) or IP network. 
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Engineers in the States and build relationships with them through face-to-face 
interaction”. 
5.1.2.5 IT Infrastructure 
IT infrastructure facilitates an organisation’s KM infrastructure.  As explained by the IT 
Infrastructure Manager CME-Co uses, “a lot of communication technologies and access 
controls as logical types of security capabilities; you have also IP [Internet Protocol] 
based protocols in storage to provide greater data aggregation - in terms of company 
consolidating multiple data centres into fewer data centres”. The Infrastructure Manager 
further explained that this type of infrastructure “leaves you with more eggs in one 
basket type of scenario to adhere to compliance type impacts to protect the data itself, 
not actually the networks, and the physical infrastructure of the company, so the focus 
has switched more from technology and security technology to the needs to secure the 
data itself”. The Compliancy Coordinator stated that, “ISS is very firmly focused on 
preventing an issue happening and keeping threats out of the company”. According to 
the IT Manager, “most projects would end up at some point having to be reviewed by 
security to make sure they are comfortable with the infrastructure that is being 
developed, that it is compatible with their security strategy, which should be aligned to 
the business strategy. 
The organisational infrastructure characteristics are summarised in Table 5.3. 
OVERVIEW OF CME-Co ORGANISATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
DIMENSIONS  CHARACTERISTICS 
Org. Culture 
• Knowledge sharing is group specific 
Interrelationships depend on knowledge trading 
• The value of KM is recognised by management but controlled by Engineering 
• An awareness of Security 
• Knowledge creation is encouraged at a group level but not across the organisation 
• Competition internally and externally is encouraged 
• Emphasis on leadership – for example hero status through stories 
• Multinational organisation with varied cultures and languages 
Org. 
Structure 
• Hierarchical structure with complete autonomy in the U.S 
• Communities of practice (CoP) are created for specific projects  
• Specialised units and roles are used – for example the creation of OISRM and the 
knowledge development group (KDG) 
• Corporate Security Officer, Compliance Officer & Knowledge Champion 
Common 
Knowledge 
• Common Engineering and Industry (Storage and IT) terminology 
• Shared values and norms 
• Recognition of domain specific knowledge – for e.g. IS Security or CS 
• Specialised knowledge, such as product specifications, available to CME-Co 
Physical 
Environment 
• Open plan office in each subsidiary 
• Geographic separation between International CS and Design Engineers 
• No specifically designed rooms for sharing (ISS/CS) knowledge 
• Face-to-face contact is very rare and rotations are considered vital 
IT 
Infrastructure 
• ICT is used extensively | Data aggregation & Consolidation of Data Centres 
• Security is aligned to the business 
Table 5.3: Organisational Infrastructure Characteristics. 

The next section describes the IS Security function’s approach to managing knowledge. 

Page 113 
5.1.3 Customer Support Function 
CME-Co directly “services all of its product offerings”, as stated by the CS Manager, 
making the multinational extremely customer driven. As explained by the Engineering 
Manager the organisation, “will do anything to create a customer for life”. A global 
support operation is utilised to support the products sold by the organisation, “one of the 
primary products we sell is called Symmetrix which is a storage product.  The support 
of the product is based out of three locations [Cork, U.S. and Sydney], and [facilitated] 
through the technical support arm or organisation [which consists of] three hundred and 
eighty members”, as described by the CS Manager. The Customer Support (CS) 
function consists of support Engineers, Field Engineers and Trainers with Developers 
based in Corporate CME-Co operating as the highest level of support. As explained by 
the Knowledge Consultant, “Customer Support ensures the availability and integrity of 
data stored on CME-Co products in thousands of customer sites around the world. It 
supports customer upgrades, modifications and maintenance”.  CS is one of the key 
strategic units within CME-Co which, as described by the CS Manager, “operates like a 
silo organisation servicing customers throughout EMEA”. The Knowledge Consultant 
explained that, “the company offers [or provides] its customers with entire mission-
critical infrastructures – not just storage”. “CME-Co monitors its customers equipment 
through the web using an unmatched remote support tool”, as stated by the E-Services 
Manager. 
As explained by the Engineering Manager, “the Symmetrix product has a call home 
feature that activates upon detection of a problem. Product support Engineers are then 
able to remotely diagnose the error codes and make the necessary adjustments, or 
dispatch a Field Customer Engineer for an on-site resolution”. “When our systems 
phone home, the CS Engineers and Developers diagnose the problem remotely and 
work with customer Engineers in the field to resolve the situation”, as explained by the 
KMS Engineering Trainer. CS also interfaces with “Research and Development, 
Engineering and the Executive Briefing Centre on product feedback to ultimately 
maintain the best customer service satisfaction in the industry”, as stated by the 
Operations (Briefing Centre) Manager. However the Engineering Manager stated that, 
“control [in terms of interaction] between the different groups can vary depending on 
the product or more accurately its status. It doesn’t matter if a manager in CS or in Sales 
requests a design or fix – if it’s not G.A [general availability] no one gets access”. This 
can prove difficult for a function like CS which is supporting a product “especially if a 
bug [problem] is known in Engineering and they have the fix – we could spend half a 
day or more trying to fix a fixed bug”. Thus, existing solutions can and are restricted 
due to the risks identified or perceived by Engineering. 
Customer Support, to become more productive, “identified KM as a strategy which 
could increase productivity and increase both employee and customer knowledge 
regarding CME-Co’s product portfolio”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. The 
function has pioneered the implementation of a KMS “to store solutions for the different 
experts working within CS”, as stated by the KDG Officer. However the KMS 
Engineering Trainer, regarded by the majority of those interviewed as the organisations 
Knowledge Champion stated that, “Primus is just a technological solution to the KM 
problem within CS”. The CS Manager also explained that the current, “corporate KM 
initiative is just a content management system and [essentially] just a Marketing public 
relations KM initiative”. “We [CS] don’t even think of it as knowledge management to 
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be honest”, as explained by the Engineering Manager. Global CS established a team to 
promote knowledge management for supporting customers.  The KCS (Knowledge-
Centred Support) team was created “to help implement knowledge management within 
CS. The team was not set up with experienced knowledge management personnel but 
with people from the existing CS Engineering group with some technical training 
behind them”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. As a result, the members of 
the function were according to the Knowledge Consultant “experienced CS Engineers 
who had an interest in knowledge with little formal training in regards to the whole KM 
concept”. “The KCS team are responsible for knowledge management in the CS 
function and they advocate the use of knowledge management and the Primus system”, 
as explained by the CS Manager. Team members are primarily “trainers and technical 
writers assigned from each site to ensure that Primus is used to carry out the necessary 
activities for [the] creation, storage, and reuse of knowledge”, as stated by the KDG 
Officer. “The Primus system is co-ordinated by the KCS team – they approve all 
solutions before they are submitted to the Primus database” as further explained by the 
CS Manager. The Knowledge Development Group, was created to work with CS and 
the KCS team “to develop skill sets throughout the organisation”, as explained by the 
KDG Officer.  Each subsidiary has a KDG Officer “to identify, coordinate and run 
training for CS using [platforms like] Knowledge-Link and specialised training 
courses”, as stated by the KDG Officer.  
The following section identifies the different types of knowledge utilised by the CS 
function. 
5.1.3.1 Types of Customer Support Knowledge 
The different types of CS knowledge are described in the next three sub-sections. The 
first section describes the general knowledge necessary for the members to conduct their 
day-to-day operations. This knowledge is categorised as general as it is available to CS 
function practitioners operating throughout the organisation.  
General knowledge common to the CS function is specific to the product portfolio. As 
explained by the Level 1 Technician, “you can find just about everything you need 
about the company on Channel CME-Co [the Intranet]. If I need to lookup 
documentation on regulations, policies or someone in GIS or a department head I can do 
a search”. However, as explained by the Level 2 Technician, “it does take time to build 
up a contact list for the different systems or products”. “Hot issues of the day [regarding 
coding errors] are important so people are encouraged when they login to look at email 
notices [internal and vendor specific]”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. He 
further explained that, “there could be a warning about drive errors, from Engineering, 
and a link to training materials, technical procedures for different aspects of  the product 
and descriptions of errors, so a warning [email] could contain a wealth of information 
and could save a Techie time”. “Design specifications for the box [Symmetrix] and 
other products like our drives are fairly well known especially if you have been working 
here more than six months”, as stated by the Level 1 Technician. However the portfolio 
“is wide and complex requiring significant expertise in supporting customer needs”, as 
stated by the KDG Officer. 
The next sub-section describes the technical knowledge utilised by members of the CS 
function. 
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Technically specific knowledge is specific to the CS function. User guides for the 
numerous products are vital but according to the KMS Engineering Trainer, “there’s no 
point in having the same content as the customer so when the customer rings, you need 
to have a much deeper level of knowledge of the product, you need to have operational 
knowledge – how is this thing designed, architected, constructed, coded all the way up”. 
Documentation such as “White Papers, downloaded from vendor [HP] sites are used 
and customised”, as stated by the Level 2 Technician. These sources “help with minor 
problems but deeper skill-sets are needed to support the kind of knowledge that is 
required for some bugs [such as] the inner workings of the product”, as stated by the 
KMS Engineering Trainer. As explained by the Engineering Manager, “it’s not just 
explicit knowledge; there’s a lot of tacit knowledge here [in diagnosing and fixing a 
coding bug] it’s certainly not just the people, it’s delivering mechanisms like 
[Engineering] seminars, training, performance [measures] training, websites, the ability 
to find [existing and create new] solutions, presentations and [email] warnings, it’s a 
whole load of different mechanisms and tools”. Customers can also access technically 
specific knowledge through Power-Link, the organisation’s Extranet. As described by 
the KMS Engineering Trainer, “customers can access the CS knowledgebase through 
their own support page [Power-Link view], they can limit their search or query for a 
particular product or problem as we have about twenty-thousand solutions available to 
customers”. Customer solutions are explicit in nature “they never contain advice or 
opinions such as lessons-learned from previous, for example, solutions. These are 
similar to troubleshooting guides to ultimately save CS time [and money] and provide a 
pool of experts as a service to our customers”, as stated by the CS Manager.  
The next sub-section describes the knowledge used for a particular circumstance or 
problem. 
Contextually specific knowledge within the CS function of CME-Co is primarily used 
to solve customer problems [calls or fixes]. Technicians and support Engineers need to 
be able to “effectively trace the problem through the product’s development so a lot of 
the time we simply reverse-engineer it – especially if some [code or bugs] are not 
available”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. The CS Manager further 
explained that “it’s not how to use [the product] it’s not what it does [as described in 
manuals and White Papers], it’s how everything is connected, what happens when this 
goes wrong and that goes wrong, it’s essentially the what ifs and how’s”. As explained 
by the Engineering Trainer, “CS’s experience at handling hundreds of similar 
symptoms, combined with the customer Engineer’s expertise and knowledge of their 
customer’s particular operating environment help solve the many problems that come 
through the CS function on a daily basis. They also rely on a knowledgebase that allows 
customers access to solutions that have been created”. Therefore CS contextually 
specific knowledge is focussed on interoperability problems.    
Table 5.4 summarises the different types of CS knowledge identified within the 
organisation. 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE 
Types General Knowledge Role Technically Specific Role Contextually Specific Role 
Declarative 
Explicit 
Documentation describing: CME-Co, Stock 
options 
O A document describing: CS & Engineering 
Regulations 
O A (solution) template outlining the requirements of a 
solution for reuse 
O 
Organisational Chart & list of contacts for 
critical systems 
O A document describing: how a product works O List of known errors & bugs for the Symmetrix O 
CME-Co Product specifications O A document describing: how a Vendors product 
works 
O List of solutions for training CS members in 
supporting the Symmetrix 
T 
List of emailed daily warnings & links to 
solutions 
O A document describing: a Customer’s Environment 
- interoperability issues 
O CS Training manuals on procedures & specific 
products 
O 
List of Errors: regarding product/s O Products bugs or new errors – issued by Engineers 
or Vendors 
O List of Vendor bugs for Symmetrix interoperability O 
Tacit 
Knowledge of the Regulations pertaining to 
CME-Co 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider in 
implementing Regulatory Requirements 
O Technician’s knowledge of Symmetrix Errors O 
Knowledge of the priority of Hot Issues T Knowledge of the factors to consider when 
diagnosing an error 
O Engineer’s knowledge of different risks associated 
with the Symmetrix 
O 
Knowledge of the different levels of 
support 
O Knowledge of interoperability problems with 
Vendor products. 
T Engineer’s knowledge of lessons-learned in coding 
the Symmetrix for others to use 
O 
Knowledge of CME-Co Roles & 
responsibilities 
O Knowledge of the potential bugs & impact. T Knowledge of diagnosing Symmetrix bugs O 
Knowledge of external experts O Engineers knowledge of sources of solutions O Knowledge & impact of Vendor bugs O 
Procedural 
Explicit 
Emails describing bugs for different 
products & the solution steps 
O List of Errors & Solutions to Product bugs O Solution with sequence of steps a Technician should 
take in the event of a coding error 
O 
Emails describing Vendor specific errors & 
steps 
O A manual /KMS artefact describing a Solution O Feedback from customers regarding solutions or 
response times 
T 
Tacit 
Knowledge of the steps to align a solution 
to an error 
T CS knowledge in Diagnosing a Solution T Knowledge of steps to take in diagnosing a 
Symmetrix error 
O 
Basic knowledge of the steps needed to find 
or create a solution 
O CS knowledge of the steps necessary to solve a 
problem 
T Knowledge of the steps to take to reverse-engineer 
the Symmetrix & Vendor products 
T 
* Knowledge Roles: Operational = O; Tactical = T and Strategic = S 
Table 5.4: Types of Customer Support Knowledge.  
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5.1.3.2 Reservoirs of Knowledge 
Knowledge, pertaining to the CME-Co CS function, resides in several different 
locations within the organisation. They encompass people and functions, including, 
Engineers, Technicians, Trainers, Knowledge Consultants, Management (CS, 
Engineering and E-Services) and groups/teams (KCS and KDG) within Customer 
Support. Artefacts, including best practices, security technologies, and repositories are 
used. Organisational entities, including organisational units, organisations, and inter­
organisational networks are also sources of knowledge. The organisation itself, in its 
entirety, is a knowledge reservoir. The reservoirs of knowledge are discussed in the 
remainder of this section.  
Customer Support regards people within the function as its greatest knowledge resource 
or asset. As explained by the CS Manager, “the main knowledge asset we have is 
definitely people, without a question”. “We do rely very heavily on the systems like 
Primus but if our system [product] experts walked away [Primus] wouldn’t really be 
hugely helpful to us, without the experience of the people”, as stated by the KMS 
Engineering Trainer. The KDG Officer further explained that, “people feel that they can 
learn more from their peers than from Primus”. As described by the CS Manager, “[in 
problem-solving] it’s what you know and who to call to find out where the solution [or 
part of it] is [stored]”. “Typically if someone wants to be the go-to person for a 
particular skill or particular product it gives the expert a type of status”, as stated by the 
KMS Engineering Trainer. However, according to the Knowledge Consultant, 
“Technicians or Engineers may not want to share [particular] knowledge that can affect 
their status as a Clariion guru, for example. Some people simply don’t want to share 
information or knowledge for their own personal reasons”.  
As described by the Engineering Manager, “Customer Support and Engineering are 
structurally aligned along expertise or skills-sets”. Groups are created to support 
particular products. Skills locators or matrices exist in CME-Co but, according to the 
Knowledge Consultant, “people just seem to know how to get the right person without 
having to use it [the locator]”. An escalation process is utilised in ensuring the quality of 
the solutions created, stored and reused. As explained by the KMS Administrator, “a 
second pair of eyes is required to approve any solution – typically one of the KCS 
writers is used. It would be the subject matter expert in a particular support team that 
would be called on to review the solutions for the approval process”. “The KCS team is 
relatively new [established in 2006] but the goal is to use the group to support the entire 
CS organisation”, as stated by the Knowledge Consultant.   
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. “The CS uses a template for 
the creation of solutions so that they are correctly tagged [for CBR searches] and can be 
reused”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. “This combined with the [call] 
escalation procedure allows us [CS and Engineering] to use our tacit [pool of experts] 
and explicit [stored solutions] knowledge”, as stated by the Knowledge Consultant. A 
considerable amount of knowledge is stored in CME-Co technologies and systems. As 
explained by the Knowledge Consultant, “the KMS contains over thirty-three thousand 
knowledge articles [solutions] detailing best practices and problem solutions”.   
There are a number of KM technologies in use within CME-Co. As described by the 
CS Manager “Primus is the key debugging KMS and contains a repository of 
knowledge objects detailing best practices and solutions”.  Currently “Primus does not 
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link into Knowledge-Link [the online training portal]; although it is possible to attach a 
learning activity [from Knowledge-Link] to a Primus knowledge object [to enhance 
training]” as stated by the KMS Administrator.  In fact, “the only reference to Primus 
made within Knowledge-Link is to an online course on how to use Primus”, as 
explained by the KMS Engineering Trainer. There are numerous KM technologies used 
within CME-Co including a “managers” discussion forum which is available to 
managers as an Intranet application and a system called Engineer Alerts which is used 
by employees within manufacturing for problem management”, as stated by the 
Engineering Manager. 
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. The units are structured for 
“commercial reasons with CS sitting in between Engineering, which are effectively the 
R&D folks who design the product and manufacturing, and customers”, as stated by the 
CS Manager. The CS also interfaces “with other groups such as IT, ISS, Engineering, 
PPMG and the Executive Briefing Centre regarding product feedback and IT services”, 
as stated by the Operations Manager, to ultimately maintain its customer-base. “IT and 
Security are consulted through PPMG when we need to change access rights to any of 
our systems or work with an external company or customer”, as stated by the KMS 
Engineering Trainer. As described by the Knowledge Consultant, “security [the 
function] are used to keep us out of the Engineering systems or to enforce segregation 
of duties”. The objective or goal of adopting a KM approach in CS is “to push 
knowledge toward the customer as the longer it takes for a customer’s problem to be 
solved [from the time the call was logged], the more layers of support it is escalated 
through, increasing cost and the utilisation of [Engineering] resources”, as stated by the 
Engineering Manager. 
As explained by the CS Manager, “group interaction or sharing with the Engineering 
organisation can be problematic. They are scared stiff one of the product designs getting 
out to the customer base [through for example Power-Link] or to the Sales 
organisation”. Additionally, “if Sales get any kind of sniff that there are serious 
deficiencies within the product, for instance, then they won’t sell it”, as further 
explained by the Operations Manager. The KMS Engineering Trainer explained that “[a 
few years ago] we had just scrapes off the table from Engineering but as the pressure 
increased [due to an increased product portfolio] to fix more and more problems they 
had to give us the information we needed to alleviate their workload. [As a result we 
have] taken over more and more and more of the responsibility of the product after it 
has gone G.A”. Knowledge [design specifications and bugs] regarding a new product is 
a valuable asset and a significant “risk if competitors can get a hold of it and reverse-
engineer it and then be the first to market”, as stated by the Operations Manager. As 
described by the Engineering Manager, “depending on where it [new product] is in the 
product life cycle [specifically G.A] we would share as much information as we can 
with Sales to help them understand the product but we don’t want information 
[regarding a new version] released before it’s ready to market”.  
Inter-relationships “with customers is vital for our group; they are considered a key 
source of knowledge [regarding] our products which is collected by tracking calls 
[Power-Link] and through face-to-face meeting in the Executive Briefing Centre”, as 
stated by the Knowledge Consultant. “We also have a good collaborative relationship 
with fifty or more vendors for technical documentation”, according to the Engineering 
Trainer. 
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Knowledge resides in several reservoirs within the organisation, which are summarised 
in Table 5.5. 
CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE 
People: 
Individuals 
• CS Specialists (Table 5.2 provides an overview of the different experts within the 
case) Network of experts/problem-solving for Customer Calls or fixes 
• Engineers – Product designs, fixes and debugging 
• CS Manager –  CS Coordination & Procedures 
• Knowledge Consultant – centralising data, information and knowledge 
• KDG Officer – Developing Subsidiary Skill sets 
• Knowledge Champion – KM Practices 
Groups 
• Management Forum– policy issues 
• Engineering – U.S./Cork, Ireland 
• KDG Corporate Group – KM Strategy for CS 
• GIS/IT Department – IT Services and guidelines 
• Customers – Feedback/Reviews (or evaluations) 
• Executive Briefing Centre (Cork) 
Artefacts 
Procedures 
• Templates for Solutions 
• Call Escalation Procedures 
Repositories 
• Vendor repositories 
• Knowledge-Link for Online Training 
• Documentation of Solutions 
• Managers Discussion Forum 
• Channel CME-Co (Intranet) – Corporate Information and group specific websites 
• Power-Link 
• Engineering Alerts 
• Engineering Bug Tracking System 
Technologies • Primus – Call tracking 
Org. Entities 
Organisation • KM Infrastructure 
(Table 5.3 provides an overview of the organisations knowledge) 
Units 
• Engineering 
• Research & Development 
• Sales 
• Executive Briefing Centre 
Inter-
organisational 
Relationships 
• Customers (stakeholders) – advice regarding products 
Access product solutions through Power-Link 
• Partners (vendors) – joint expertise in providing solutions/requirements 
Access through E-Room and face to face meeting 
Table 5.5: Reservoirs of Customer Support Knowledge. 
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5.1.3.3 Customer Support KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in the CS function.  
The acquisition of knowledge within CME-Co is common. As described by the 
Knowledge Consultant, “Documentum was bought so that departments could 
collaborate with customers, partners and suppliers. We are also trying to encourage CS 
groups to use the platform for storing their own information and knowledge”. “IT and 
ISS allocate controls once our customers register to use E-Room and Power-Link so that 
they can’t access sensitive information and employees can decide who [internally] they 
want to access their own documents”, as stated by the KDG Officer. As explained by 
the IT Manager, “we maintain the different applications and systems used by CS; if 
information sharing [access] is required we [IT] escalate the problem to the assigned 
Security Officer”. “We use NDA14s and we have the capability of tracking what they 
[customers, suppliers and competitors] do as everything on our network is tracked. But 
we would typically limit what they can do, so if someone is coming in to get access to 
the Clarify [the call-logging] system, we would tunnel [using a VPN] their connection 
to Clarify or to our ERP system”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. “The 
firewall rule-base is also regularly checked to block or unblock CS access to [vendor] 
sites for warning emails or White Papers”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. 
“Usually they [CS] tend to bypass some [of our] controls if they want to download 
something like a web crawler, scanning tools or how to guides, making our [ISS’s] lives 
difficult if a virus bypasses the DMZ and disrupts the [Corporate] network”, as 
explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. 
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous reservoirs distributed 
throughout the case organisation (sub-section 5.1.4.2). As explained by the KMS 
Administrator, “Primus enables the availability of the collective knowledge of CS to the 
different end-users so that problems are solved quickly”. “A knowledge worker in 
Hopkinton can easily use a solution constructed by an expert in Sydney. The capture of 
knowledge pertaining to: problems, customer queries and tracking the frequency of 
occurrences enables focused product improvements”, as stated by the Knowledge 
Consultant. “They [CS] look for feedback from customers regarding the problem as 
well as stats from Primus to improve productivity”, as stated by the KDG Officer. The 
CS Manager explained that, “if a solution is continually reused, Engineering can 
examine the root cause and fix new releases of the product”. “Search capabilities and 
queries allow us to retrieve stats for proof of the value of creating solutions and 
analysing their reuse”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer.  
Knowledge is continuously created through the problem-solving process used within 
CS. As described by the KMS Engineering Trainer, “the escalation process used in CS 
is the approach used to manage or resolve calls [to create solutions]”. “Customers are 
encouraged to open a ticket, through Clarify, to all of their vendors [an environment 
could have many platforms] so that different platforms and system Engineers can 
collaborate”, as stated by the CS Manager. “If a problem isn’t resolved by the customer 
or the field Engineer onsite it is escalated to CS. The CS Technician takes the call first 
and then if he or she can’t cancel the problem it is escalated to Level 1 Support [product 
14 A non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is a legal contract between at least two parties that outlines confidentiality 
material, knowledge, or information that the parties wish to share with one another but wish to restrict access to thirst 
parties. 
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support Engineers and Software Analysts]. If it’s not fixed the problem is then raised to 
Tech Support Level 2 along with the work done [through Clarify, phone calls and 
Primus]. If Level 2 can’t fix the problem it goes to Design Engineering in the States”, as 
explained by the Level 2 Engineer. As described by the Knowledge Consultant “we 
have found historically that any resources involved [through the escalation process], 
such as: time personnel, Finance, the cost just goes through the roof”.  
CS shares knowledge through its problem-solving processes. “Solutions are: created, 
stored, shared and used through our KMS [Primus]”, as stated by the CS Manager. 
However, according to the KMS Engineering Trainer, “Field Engineers would be more 
effective if they could pool their knowledge together. A Field Engineer in Japan has no 
interaction with a field Engineer in Germany, France or the U.K. There seems to be a 
hang-up about this group’s technical ability and lack of knowledge regarding projects so 
they cannot share their knowledge or access the same solutions as CS Technicians”. 
Even though Field Engineers “would be more productive and reduce our [CS] calls they 
are blocked from even working together”, as stated by the CS Manager.  
As described by the Knowledge Consultant, “a lot of knowledge transfer is built on 
barstools talking about problems [calls] and building relationships, but if someone 
leaves that relationship ends. Unless you have certain service level agreements between 
functional groups there are restrictions on what they [U.S. Engineering] will share”.  
Feedback from customers suggests that “they are happy with vendors who share 
everything so that nothing is hidden from them. CME-Co utilises a priority mechanism 
that allows customers to tag a problem in Power-Link as urgent and we deal with it 
straight away. We also share revisions of fixed bugs. We are able to draw up the lists of 
all the customers who are affected by known bugs because they have registered their 
software and their revision software and we are able to find out which customers have 
the affected product”, as explained by the KMS Engineering Trainer. The CS Manager 
stated that by “pushing knowledge back towards our customers, customers can help 
themselves to fix product issues without calling us, reducing the burden on the support 
organisation. Giving them more and more access allows them to fix their own 
problems”. 
Knowledge is applied throughout the escalation process. As explained by the KMS 
Engineering Trainer the “product portfolio is so wide and complex that you can’t expect 
any one individual to be able to support them all so we document solutions of problems 
and this increases productivity as the Primus tool allows to reuse existing solutions and 
save the next Engineer from going through a debug procedure”. As described by the CS 
Manager, “if a solution is continually reused, Engineering can examine the root cause 
and fix new releases of the product”. Additionally, according to the KDG Officer, “the 
system is used as a training tool and has dramatically reduced the time to get Engineers 
up to speed in three to four months, a reduction from the six months reported prior to 
the introduction of the system”, freeing senior staff for more complex issues and 
making inexperienced staff more self sufficient.  
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. As 
described by the KDG Officer, “access to our knowledge repositories such as E-Room 
and Primus is restricted to various groups for the time being as there is some 
information that [Management] don’t want out there”. “A quality mechanism is used to 
ensure that new products, new designs are kept at management level until a product 
meeting is arranged and access [to technical design and bugs] is then discussed”, as 
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stated by the Engineering Trainer. “The level of access to the KMS solution [Primus] is 
controlled by Engineering to assure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
product designs and bugs”, as stated by the Engineering Manager. 
The release of solutions or fixes is strictly controlled. Engineering control the process 
due to risks such as “reverse-engineering, new version release dates and improvements 
[fear that Sales will inform customers], release of known deficiencies in the code 
[affecting sales] and the inexperienced application of the debugging procedures and 
commands by some levels of Support”, as stated by the Engineering Manager. As 
explained by the CS Manager, “security comes into play when a fix involves issuing 
privileged commands to a product that is potentially a dangerous command. Some 
commands could completely screw up a network configuration or destroy data. There’s 
an obvious reluctance to make these available to customers and that is something that 
we want to keep to ourselves”. However, according to the Knowledge Consultant, 
“ninety-nine percent of the time nothing goes wrong so customers could and should 
have access to everything”.  
As described by the KMS Engineering Trainer, “CS should have full access, sometimes 
it feels like we are working in different companies and we need access to their [bug 
tracking] systems”. “Access seems to be based on domain access rights 15– for example 
an Engineering student working in the States for an internship would have access to 
their [Engineering] systems. I worked as an Engineer here for thirteen years and I still 
can’t get access to solutions or bugs that I am more than capable of using correctly”, as 
stated by the Knowledge Consultant. Access is tightly controlled and according to the 
CS Manager “we would ultimately like access to the source code for the products, a few 
of our Engineers here [Cork] are technically skilled to use that information. Access to 
their bug tracking system would be very beneficial so that we could search to see if 
Engineering has already solved a bug logged by a customer to CS. It is frustrating for us 
to spend time working on a problem and to discover, when it’s escalated to Engineering, 
that they were aware of the problem and had the fix which could have cost us a week in 
time and resources”.  
As explained by the KMS Engineering Trainer, “they’re very few official security 
restrictions in place; usually controls are allocated based on the requirements of 
individual departments. IT and Security work with PPMG to collect requirements and 
allocate the necessary support”. “Primus solutions have both solution security and 
basement level security, which is a four level security model is currently being used [it 
used to be ten levels]. The least secure level would be a product where anyone that has 
access to the Internet could view those solutions. The next level is the customer with 
access to fifty percent of our solutions through Power-Link. The third level is support 
and the highest level of security [access] which would be heavily restricted and 
accessible through Engineering and selected personnel”, as explained by the KMS 
Administrator. According to the IT Manager, “access rights are very much a challenge 
for us when users, particularly CS, feel that they should have access to certain 
information. But most recognise that we are just doing our jobs and Engineering is a 
law unto them-selves”.   
Table 5.6 summarises the Customer Support KM processes identified within CME-Co. 
15 Domain access rights are used to describe the access rights assigned to a networking workgroup. 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS:  KM PROCESSES 
Processes 
Acquisition 
• Purchased Documentum – to utilise collaborate SW (e-Room) for joint projects with 
Vendors, Partners and Customers 
• Reverse-engineering – competitor and vendor products for debugging 
• Subscription to Technical Groups – Manuals, Procedures, Updates and Tools 
Capture 
• CME-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge (Table 5.8) 
• Pool of Experts – through the problem-solving process 
• Roles and responsibilities – for escalation 
• Solutions retrieved through Primus 
Creation 
• Problem-solving Process – for the creation of a solution 
• Escalation Process – for the collective creation of a solution 
• Collaborating with Vendors for solution generation 
• Lessons-learned – as a result of creating a fix 
Sharing 
• Problem-solving – Sharing knowledge to solve and problem or fix 
• Collaborating with each CS Level 
• Collaborating with partners 
Application 
• Reuse of customised solutions for products 
• Knowledge reused from a previous escalation 
• Reuse of solutions through Primus and Reuse of knowledge from the debugging 
process 
• Pool of Experts – use develops through trading 
Control 
• Acquisition of external knowledge is tracked 
• Quality mechanisms are utilised 
• Level of Access to Primus (solutions) is controlled by Engineering 
• Restricted control of commands 
• Domain specific controls 
• PPMG Mechanism for identifying unit requirements (access) 
Table 5.6: Customer Support KM Processes. 
The next section describes ISS function’s approach to managing knowledge. 
5.1.4 IS Security Function 
The Global IS (GIS) and IS Security functions are, according to the Corporate Security 
Coordinator, “separate yet interdependent”. The IS function within CME-Co is 
described by the CS Manager as “a supporting organisation globally and locally 
[Cork]”. Structurally CME-Co has divided the ISS function, according to the Security 
Officer, “into four autonomous units under the GIS umbrella with the same reporting 
structure”. GIS is the primary corporate IS department based in Hopkinton and a 
separate IS department supports CME-Co International. CME-Co International refers to 
any operations based outside of North America. It is EMEA (Europe, Middle East and 
Africa) and Asia and Australia. As explained by the IT Manager, “the IS department is a 
value-added business support function”, providing IT services for all of the groups 
within CME-Co International. The [Cork] IS department, according to the Corporate 
Security Coordinator, “reports to and collaborates with Corporate GIS”. The mission of 
Global IS (GIS) is, according to the Compliance Coordinator, “to enhance productivity 
and knowledge enablement across CME-Co by proactively delivering and supporting 
innovative, world class business solutions, infrastructure and operations”.  
The IS function collaborates with and services the International Finance group, Sales 
and Customer Support function and importantly the global IS Security function. The 
GIS function operates closely with the Customer Support function which supports the 
CME-Co product portfolio. The two functions use a version of M-Gates for joint 
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projects so that collaborative projects are recorded efficiently, and responsibility (an 
employee) is assigned for stage deliverables. The customer base for the department, 
according to the IT Manager, “is twenty thousand CME-Co International business 
users”. These include Customer Support Engineers, sales representatives, manufacturing 
plants and Engineers. In order to support user needs the GIS function utilises, as stated 
by the IT Manager, “a portfolio group which is the group that interfaces between the IT 
function and the business functions through account managers [from the specific 
business functions] to ensure that what we’re delivering [and] doing is correct for the 
business”. Close to a hundred people are employed in the IS department with the 
primary objective of delivering IT services for the international business function of 
CME-Co. 
The IS department has always been considered part of the overall corporate GIS group. 
Due to its relatively small size in comparison to GIS, the department’s structure is, 
according to the Infrastructure Manager, “simple and the members are highly and 
broadly skilled with needed flexibility”. As explained by the IT Manager the local IS 
group allocated IT staff to “the international business functions on the portfolio side and 
a number of people here in the various functions within IT for application development, 
network [NW] and security, servers and the data centre”. The IT Manager also stated 
that locally security is separated into “internal versus external access, external access to 
the CME-Co corporate network and applications through user accounts and passwords”. 
IS Security is managed locally by a Security Officer who, according to the Corporate 
Security Coordinator, “works as part of the IS function reporting to the IT Manager in 
addition to the Corporate Security Group. The Security Officer is responsible for 
enforcing corporate policy [such as ISO17799] regarding security and compliance”.  
The IS Security function within CME-Co is separate from GIS but reports to the Global 
IS Director in the U.S. who, according to both the IT Manager and Corporate Security 
Coordinator, “reports to the Chief Information Officer who in turn reports to the Chief 
Financial Officer”. Security is divided into two fundamental groups operating within 
corporate headquarters and dispersed throughout the multinational. The Corporate 
Security Group is according to the corporate security coordinator “a representation of a 
group of stakeholders [customers, partners, and regulatory bodies] and what it is that 
they want to do with security and make it [their requirements] part of the corporate 
security plan”. The function, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer, “focuses on 
working with Design Engineers in enhancing CME-Co products with security tools”. 
Therefore, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer, “we can make our products more 
competitive and differentiate them by using security as a differentiator, in meeting 
customer requirements, and providing a new business opportunity for CME-Co”.  
As described by the Corporate Security Coordinator, “Corporate officers are used to 
ensure compliance and the group also has quarterly compliance reviews as part of our 
SEC16 quarterly filings. The Finance department and the Legal department both focus 
intensively on meeting those requirements in conjunction, of course, with external 
advisors and bodies like our audit committee and our external auditors and other 
advisory consultants”. The Corporate Security group is, according to the IT Manager, “a 
small group; there are eight people; it is a cross-functional team; you could say that it is 
a strategy-development team”. The group is as stated by the Corporate Security 
Coordinator “an effort on our part to make security just a part of what it is we do, so it is 
16 An SEC quarterly filing is a financial statement submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Public companies are required to make regular SEC filings. This information is used by investors for investment 
evaluations. 
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not unique or special, it is just something that we pursue as part of our regular 
engineering activities [and] as part of product development activities, customer 
engagement activities, when we are deploying them in the field to demystify security 
and make it part of the company’s infrastructure”. 
Finally the OISRM is the Global ISS function within CME-Co. It is an internal facing 
function and uses Security Officers dispersed throughout the different subsidiaries. As 
described by the OISRM Coordinator it is concerned with “making security a part of the 
technologies that we use internally, and similarly on the product side optimise the use of 
security for our Engineering folks and for the tools that people are using in the field”. 
Additionally the Corporate Security group is responsible for “identifying the different 
requirements of our stakeholders which are CME-Co customers”, as stated by the 
Corporate Security Officer. The OISRM is also, according to the IT Manager, 
“responsible for identifying security standards, implementing security and managing 
security breaches”. The group does interact with the GIS and IS departments in 
coordinating the “rolling out of virus software and collaborations with partners such as 
McAfee and Microsoft”. 
The next section identifies and describes the different types of knowledge utilised by 
CME-Co’s ISS function. 
5.1.4.1 Types of ISS Knowledge 
The different types of ISS knowledge are described in the next three sub-sections. The 
first section describes the general knowledge necessary for the ISS function 
practitioners to conduct their day-to-day operations. Sub-section 5.1.2.2 and section 
5.1.4 described the reporting structure of the organisation and the ISS function itself, 
which is regarded as fundamental knowledge in allocating roles and responsibilities at 
corporate and local (subsidiary) levels. 
General knowledge common to the ISS function is varied. As explained by the IT 
Manager the management of IS Security is a knowledge intensive activity and “multiple 
sources like standards and security technologies are used [and regarded] as security 
knowledge”. Everyone in IT, IS Security and Customer Support, according to the 
[Cork] Security Officer “knows how to search Channel CME-Co [the Intranet] for 
specification docs if there is a problem with a proxy server, firewalls, scanning tools or 
search Microsoft for patch guidelines”. The majority of the ISS interviewees stated that 
external sources such as: “Microsoft and McAfee [vendors] threat warnings are vital”. 
The knowledge of possible impacts due to threats like viruses is also regarded as 
fundamental. According to the Security Officer, “if a virus brings down a high priority 
port17 – it could cost us a lot of money and potentially customers– depending on the 
downtime”. As explained by the Corporate Security Officer a basic knowledge of 
regulations impacting the organisation is vital as “CME-Co like so many other 
companies needs to understand the different regulations out there”. Additionally 
collaborative projects, through the portfolio management system, must utilise the 
corporate project management methodology. As explained by the IT Manager, “M-
Gates is used by everyone so that the same steps are followed no matter what the project 
is – the more projects you’re assigned to, the easier it [project management] becomes”.  
17 A port in a TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol) network is an endpoint to a logical 
connection. The port number identifies what type of port it is. Port 80 is used for HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol) traffic accessing, for example, corporate web services. 
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The next sub-section describes the technical ISS knowledge utilised by members of the 
ISS function. 
Technically specific knowledge is specific to the ISS function. At a strategic level 
CME-Co identified security and regulatory issues as key customer requirements. The 
Corporate Security group was formed, as stated by the Group Officer, to “determine the 
needs of the different stakeholders and map those needs to the strategy of the company”. 
As a result documents describing IT and ISS regulations “are a vital source of reading to 
aid in outlining the steps needed to adhere to regulations such as SOX”, as further 
explained by the Compliance Officer.  The security policy refers to the set of rules, and 
practices which regulate how CME-Co manages, protects and allocates its resources. 
“The [ISS] policy is available to everyone but IT and Security must implement it”, as 
stated by the IT Manager. The principles of security are documented in the ISO17799 
guideline which according to the Corporate Security Officer is “like the U.S. 
Constitution which is a two hundred year document”. The fundamental principles of the 
document itself continue “to apply regardless of changes in technology”. The ISO17799 
requires confidentiality, integrity and availability (C.I.A) and, according to the [Cork] 
Security Officer, “is a type of document which gives you continuing requirements that 
are likely to be relevant ten years from now as they are today”. The organisation also 
keeps ahead of technological changes in the market “by playing a role in the 
development of the protocols”, as stated by the [U.S.] Security Officer. As described by 
the Corporate Security Officer, “CME-Co is represented on the various standards 
setting bodies involving protocols that impact storage and storage security”.  
Security technologies are also a source of technically specific knowledge. According to 
the [Cork] Security Officer, “log files from firewalls are useful, but you need experience 
in differentiating between real threats and everyday annoyances”. Experience in 
analysing the behaviour of traffic and alerts “is the only way to filter out the endless 
lists and prioritise [activities]”, as further explained by the Remote Access Coordinator. 
Knowledge of the business side of the organisation is fundamental to day-to-day 
operations as, according to the [Cork] Security Officer “it helps us [IS Security] to 
identify priority systems and apply the right controls to the different servers and for 
example the engineering databases”. The ISS function also relies on this general 
knowledge and feedback from departmental managers to, according to the IT Manager, 
“allocate the right access to the right users”. 
The next sub-section describes the knowledge used for a particular circumstance or 
project. 
Contextually specific knowledge within the ISS function of CME-Co is primarily used 
to adhere to regulatory issues or for an incident such as a security breach. As described 
by the Corporate Security Officer the company is, “involved with the different 
regulatory agencies themselves that define what the protocols are going to be, 
developing new technologies, filing patents ourselves and just I would say trying to hire 
new people all of the time and training people. These are the ways that you stay ahead if 
you can of those market dynamics”.  
External explicit and tacit knowledge is also sourced for use by the function. As 
explained by the [U.S.] Compliance Officer “we use material such as White Papers on 
SOX, recommended, risk analysis models, audit reports from Deloitte and in-house 
training manuals for SETA”. The Compliance Officer further explained that it is the 
“[ISS] members who then apply these guidelines to make sure we [CME-Co] are 
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compliant and learn from each audit”. The company also utilises the knowledge gained 
from audits to create relevant training for specific functions. As explained by the 
Compliance Coordinator, “if we can we will train the different members of the security 
and IT functions and our Design Engineers in regulatory issues to reduce the duration of 
audits and incorporate security enhancements into our products”.  
Unexpected incidents, such as security breaches, according to the Compliance 
Coordinator, “generally result in reactive measures”. Incident response teams are 
formed from specific areas and utilise “steps customised and outlined in the ISO17799 
document”, as described by the [Cork] Security Officer. Feedback from auditors is also 
used to identify “weaknesses in our security network – so we will generally take steps to 
rectify these”, as explained by the [Australian] Security Officer.  
The different types of ISS knowledge identified within the organisation are summarised 
in Table 5.7. 
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IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS:  SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
Types General Knowledge Role Technically Specific Role Contextually Specific Role 
Declarative 
Explicit 
Documentation describing: CME-Co, 
Stock options 
O A document describing IT & ISS Regulations S A White Paper describing the IT /ISS 
requirements for Sarbanes-and-Oxley 
O 
Organisational Chart: outlining the 
internal reporting structure 
O A document describing the multinationals 
security policy 
S Risk analysis documentation: outlining 
procedures for ID Risks to the Org. 
O 
IT Specifications for Servers, IDS, 
Firewalls & Virus Software 
O Access control lists: for Domain (function) 
access & Segregation of Duties 
O ISS Audit reports: containing evaluation of 
Security Infrastructure 
T 
Vendor threat email warnings O A document describing the ISS Strategy S SETA Training manuals: updated to include 
improvements 
O 
Alert Reports from Security Technologies O 
Tacit 
Knowledge of the Regulations 
pertaining to CME-Co 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider when 
implementing regulatory requirements 
T Compliance officers knowledge of Sarbanes­
and-Oxley requirements 
T 
Knowledge of impact of the different 
possible threats 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider when 
advising CME-Co customers on ISS issues 
S Security Officers knowledge of different risks 
and vulnerabilities 
T 
Knowledge of functional experts & 
escalation levels 
O Knowledge of Domain (Function) access 
requirements 
O Compliance Coordinators knowledge of ISS 
Audit issues that may arise 
T 
Knowledge of CME-Co roles & 
responsibilities 
O Knowledge of the priority systems in CME-Co: 
to align to Controls 
T Compliance Coordinators knowledge of 
regulatory issues to include in SETA 
O 
Security Officers knowledge of risks T Case (Problem & Solution) O 
Procedural 
Explicit 
A White Paper describing the steps in 
aligning Security Controls to internal 
projects 
O ISO17799 – section describing, for e.g., 
Disaster Recovery procedures for a Web Server 
T ISO17799 document identifying the sequence 
of steps a response team should take in the 
event of a security breach 
T 
Manual describing Firewall alert indicators O Auditors  Feedback report identifying issues 
to address and Network (NW) test reports 
T 
Tacit 
Basic knowledge of the steps necessary 
to align IT to internal projects 
O Security Functions knowledge in developing a 
security plan/strategy 
S A Security Officer’s knowledge of steps to 
take in the event of an incident 
T 
Basic knowledge of the steps needed to 
create an up-to-date End user lists 
O Security Functions knowledge of the steps 
necessary to protect the organisation 
T A Security Officer’s knowledge of steps to 
take to prepare for an Audit 
T 
Security functions knowledge of the steps 
necessary to block an attack 
T Compliance Coordinators” knowledge of the 
steps to take in addressing audits 
T 
* Knowledge Roles: Operational = O; Tactical = T and Strategic = S 
Table 5.7: Types of IS Security Knowledge. 
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5.1.4.2.1 Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge, pertaining to the CME-Co ISS function, resides in several different 
locations within the organisation. They encompass people and functions, including, IT 
and Security professionals, Engineers, management and functions/teams within ISS. 
Artefacts, including best practices, security technologies, and repositories are used. 
Organisational entities, including organisational units, organisations, and inter­
organisational networks are also sources of knowledge. The organisation itself, in its 
entirety, is a knowledge reservoir. The norms, values, structures, practices and culture 
are contextually specific knowledge. This reservoir of knowledge is described as part of 
the organisational infrastructure in section 5.1.2. The remaining reservoirs of knowledge 
are discussed in the rest of this section.  
A considerable amount of knowledge resides in people. As explained by the Corporate 
Security Officer, “security is a process that depends heavily on the expertise of 
[individuals] Security Officers, IT staff, and employees in general”. He further 
explained that “it’s who you know that counts – if you have a problem, you need to 
know who to go to”. However, according to the Compliance Coordinator, policies are 
more important than experts “it’s more policies as opposed to going to a Security 
Officer – everything needed is outlined in the [ISS] policy”. According to the [Cork] 
Security Officer, “there’s a pool of people in the U.S. that I would go but there are 
problems getting that knowledge from them when I need it because it’s a different time 
zone, they are five hours behind us”. He further stated that a list of contacts is vital for 
his role “I have my own table of contacts for every system under the sun”.  “It’s not a 
HR system by any means. It’s my own personal system because at the end of the day 
there’s literally in total [of] maybe twenty critical people, who are [based] in the U.S., 
for the various systems”. At a  management level the IT Manager stated that  “it is the 
Global IS Director’s, in the U.S., sole job is the security of systems and to find security 
standards, implement security plans and manage security breaches [by coordinating 
incident response teams]”. 
The structure of the groups/teams working within the ISS function is described in 
section 5.1.4. The different groups, including OISRM, the Corporate Security group, 
GIS, the [Cork] IS department and Remote Services operate individually and 
collectively. As described by the Corporate Security Officer, “the OISRM identifies 
[security] risks for CME-Co, selects and advices the different subsidiaries [through the 
onsite Security Officers] regarding the best practices for allocating appropriate 
controls”. The OISRM is a source of contact [expertise] regarding “the compliance 
aspect of our organisation [we can] go to the group to address a security issue or a 
policy issue or a process issue which could have a compliance or a security impact”, as 
stated by the [Australian] Security Officer. 
The Corporate Security group is, according to the IT Manager, “[a] strategy and 
development group, making security a part of their regular engineering activities as part 
of product development activities and customer engagement activities when deploying 
them [products] in the field”. In turn the IS department, under the umbrella of GIS “is 
responsible for rolling out IT services to address the requirements of the different 
business functions as identified by the portfolio managers”, as stated by the 
Infrastructure Manager. As explained by the [Cork] Security Officer “we have a number 
of people in IT who would have a lot of knowledge of security even though it wouldn’t 
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be their primary role – it would be a main area of focus, around virus protection and 
[Network] monitoring. We [Cork] can roll out a security patch to all of the PCs within 
twenty-four hours. [However] we have had instances in the last eighteen months where 
we have had to upgrade every single server in our network – thousands of servers”. The 
Compliance Officer stated that the organisation “has very strong internal controls and 
was recognised by the SEC [as such]. So we do have Corporate Officers whose job it is 
to ensure compliance and we do have quarterly compliance reviews as part of our SEC 
quarterly filings”. The Finance department and the Legal department focus intensively 
on meeting those requirements in conjunction of course with external advisors and 
bodies like the audit committee, external auditors and other advisory consultants. “The 
Remote Services group enables internal and external access based on the requirements 
of the different domains and the different stakeholders”, as stated by the Remote 
Services Coordinator. This knowledge is combined to create a substantial pool of 
expertise. 
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. As explained by the Corporate 
Security Officer, “compliance procedures outline the steps needed in order to comply 
with whichever law is being prioritised by management”. Due to the nature of the 
environment the organisation is operating in “CME-Co is subject to U.S. and 
international laws”, as explained by the OISRM Coordinator. “Regulatory procedures 
list in sequence the steps IT and ISS must take to comply with the regulations of the 
countries we are operating in”, as stated by the Compliance Officer. CME-Co’s ISS 
procedures have been developed over time through “good and bad experiences”, as 
explained by the Security Officer. As described by the IT Manager “we document 
solutions as much as possible – so that we can solve problems faster and have a source 
for new staff coming in. One of the global initiatives which have impacted us is 
Sarbanes-and-Oxley; we have just implemented a whole series of procedures to support 
the SOX requirements in the U.S”.  
The ISS function stores these procedures in repositories, as stated by the [Cork] 
Security Officer, “we either store solutions, procedures and guides [for example a 
customised ISO17799 document] in our shared drives, Channel CME-Co, the OISRM 
website or Primus [a CBR tool]”. As described by the [Australian] Security Officer, “we 
wouldn’t know what fixes [patches or procedures] Cork or the U.K have unless we 
checked the internal Security [function] websites”. He further stated that, “the OISRM 
online source material [procedures] is vital for us – they [OISRM] direct all of the 
different Security Officers regarding regulations and policies”. As explained by the IT 
Manager, “IT and Security [members and groups] know that we all benefit if we store 
our security procedures in the group drives”. He further explained that, “there is a drive 
led by X [the Knowledge Consultant] to centralise our knowledge and share it – it’s no 
use stored on our desktops”. Vendor sites are also considered invaluable as a source of 
documented procedures for “security technologies like our VPN [Virtual Private 
Network] installations, SID [Secure ID], monitoring tools [administrator software] for 
our firewalls and proxy servers in our corporate network and our IDS [Intrusion 
Detection Software]”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. According to the 
Corporate Security Officer, “there are online repositories of knowledge so if Security 
[experts] have a compliance issue or were wondering if a solution [found online] should 
be used in a particular way there are processes [procedures available] in place which 
facilitate resolving those issues [problems]”. As explained by the [Australian] Security 
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Officer, “there are also portals and a global tech web [site] which is basically [a group 
of online] file servers that store all the random patches of the time and various bodies 
[procedures and standards] of information”. 
A considerable amount of knowledge is stored in CME-Co technologies and systems. 
Primus is used to store solutions for IT and Security problems. As described by the 
[Cork] Security Officer, “we [Security Officers] try to use it [the CS KMS solution] as 
much as possible to track problems and for escalations as it’s designed for that – but 
time wise it’s difficult to document a quality solution sometimes”. Primus is used to 
track calls [from employees] but adding solutions “when if it’s a difficult call – up to 
three or four levels of ISS Technicians and [Security] Officers could be involved and 
it’s hard to make sure everyone does it” as stated by the IT Manager. As stated by the 
Corporate Security Officer, “every attempt is made to use centralised shares and 
technologies so that work isn’t duplicated”. Email is also used to store tacit and explicit 
knowledge as security members “often solve a call through email” as stated by the 
[Australian] Security Officer. As described by the [U.S.] Security Officer, “it’s [MS 
Outlook] a convenient tool to use, it’s fast and easy to unofficially use, but cleaning and 
managing the solutions is difficult – email can be a filtering nightmare”.  
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. These range from the entire 
organisation, units within the organisation and inter-organisational relationships. The 
organisation as a whole is described in section 5.1.2. The culture, structure, values and 
practices are discussed and summarised in Table 5.3. As explained by the Corporate 
Security Officer, “CME-Co is [very much] dependent on [inter-] relationships with 
customers; partners and we even work with our competitors”. He further stated that, 
“customers are basically the advisory group that you [CME-Co] want to pay most 
attention to, insofar as you want to stay ahead of their needs”. As stated by the Briefing 
Centre Manager, “[CME-Co] listens carefully [to customers] in order to build their 
requirements, such as security, support, storage for regulatory needs, into the corporate 
roadmap”. As described by the Corporate Security Officer, “you’re probably at a greater 
risk by not working with them [customers]”. He also stated that “an organisation wants 
to be the advisor that customers go to rather than your competitor”. Customers can also 
access technical knowledge regarding the different corporate products “through Power-
Link [Extranet] which is our [customer] portal to the Primus system” as stated by the 
[Cork] Security Officer. He also added that their access is limited to “fixes approved by 
our Engineering group and some of the Level 2 Technicians here”.   
Vendors are also considered valuable sources of knowledge and collaborators in joint 
projects. As explained by the [U.S.] Security Coordinator, “we would suggest that the 
customer open up a ticket to all the vendors involved and then we would collaborate 
with specific Engineers once the incident was assigned to an Engineer within another 
company”. CME-Co has a relationship with “fifty or more vendors”, as stated by the 
Corporate Security Officer. Suppliers are also considered a valuable source of 
knowledge. As described by the IT Manager, “CME-Co bought a company, 
Documentum, who specialise in E-rooms, to collaborate with suppliers [for example 
Dell] and exchange [customer] feedback about products, changes in the market and 
potential time saving initiatives”. The organisation also collaborates with competitors 
through regulatory bodies “on all of the [security and regulatory] standards” according 
to the OISRM Coordinator. He, as well as the Corporate Security Officer, further 
explained that “when you are supporting common standards that facilitate 
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interoperability you have no other choice but to work with competitors”. External 
consultants are utilised to analyse the effectiveness of the controls in place and 
according to the Infrastructure Manager “audit our IT Infrastructure [by] performing 
penetration tests, review access control lists and anything else needed for SOX”. Even 
though this is generally “a time-intensive process” the knowledge gained as a result is, 
as stated by the Corporate Security Officer, “useful and informative for the next 
review”. 
The ISS function also collaborates with other functions within CME-Co. As described 
by the IT Manager, “during the initial phase [of the M-Gates methodology] when we 
were trying to solve a common problem a dedicated team is put together with 
representatives from every single major function such as Hardware Engineering, 
Software Engineering, Customer Support, Marketing and Finance to build a business 
case [for a proposed initiative] and if approved the project will go ahead with a bigger 
and a more dedicated team”. As explained by the Security Coordinator, “each function 
has their own requirements and skill-sets for a project and must provide details 
regarding their functions access [rights] requirements to us [ISS]”. This knowledge is 
domain or unit specific and dictates individual and group access to CME-Co’s 
knowledge stocks as specified by management and “due to SOX the Finance 
department”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer.  
Knowledge resides in several reservoirs, which are summarised in Table 5.8. 
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IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS: RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE 
People: 
Individuals 
• ISS Specialists (Table 5.2) – network of experts/problem-solving for critical 
systems 
• Engineers  – Product designs, fixes and enhancements (security) 
• GIS Director – Best standards 
• Site Security Officer – Implementing Controls 
• Corporate Security Officer – compliance issues and stakeholder requirements 
Groups 
• Management – Policy issues pertaining to standards & procedures 
• OISRM – Pool of experts regarding: standards and best practices 
• Corporate Security - strategies and development initiatives 
• IT Department – IT Services and guidelines 
• Security Officers – Domain Knowledge 
• Audit Committee  - Compliance issues, internal reviews and guides 
• Remote Services – external access requirements 
Artefacts 
Procedures 
• Compliance procedures – U.S. and International 
• Six Sigma – Business Case Resource Requirements 
• M-Gates – phased approach to project management incorporating checklists 
Repositories 
• Documentation - IT /Security solutions or fixes 
• Shared Drives – solutions, procedures and guidelines (e.g. ISO17799) 
• Channel CME-Co (Intranet) – Corporate Information and group specific websites 
• Desktops /Portals – E-Room and Power-Link 
• Global Tech Web/File Servers – External sources of patches and solutions 
• Question & Answer Repositories – Security Queries, for e.g. Compliance 
• Vendor Sites – Manuals, Installation Guides 
Technologies • Primus – Call tracking 
• MS Outlook – Problem-solving but filtering/retrieving the knowledge stored is 
difficult. 
• VPN – Secure external traffic| SID (Secure ID) – Access logs of employee system 
use. 
• Monitoring Tools – Alert logs of failed & successful system access 
• Firewalls & IDS – Alert logs for internal & external access | tracking 
Org. Entities 
Organisation • Organisational Infrastructure (Table 5.3: an overview of the organisations 
knowledge) 
Units 
• Joint Projects – Domain specific requirements for X project 
• Other functions - Domain requirements & access, roles & responsibilities, 
systems. 
• Finance – Access requirements to corporate knowledge stocks 
• Portfolio Project Management Group (PPMG) 
Inter-
organisational 
Relationships 
• Customers (stakeholders) – advice regarding products, requirements and Corp 
goals.  
• Access product solutions through Power-Link 
• Partners (vendors) – joint expertise in providing customer solutions/requirements 
• Competitors – standards and interoperability agreements 
• Auditors – Reviews, lessons-learned and guides 
Table 5.8: Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge. 
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5.1.4.3 IS Security KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in the CME-Co ISS function.  
The acquisition of knowledge within CME-Co is common (Table 5.1). As explained by 
the Corporate Security Officer, “it is necessary in order to stay ahead of the 
competition”. “We [ISS function] bought Documentum so that we could facilitate a 
secure connection, in the case of the company, with our customers, suppliers but also 
with our vendors [McAfee and Microsoft] so that we could collaborate more 
effectively”, as stated by the IT Manager. As described by the OISRM Coordinator, 
“regulatory guidelines, step-by-step procedures for standards and security frameworks 
are purchased or licensed so that we are compliant”. The knowledge required to develop 
market standards and security procedures is enormous and according to the Corporate 
Security Officer, “impossible to produce internally, agreement is obviously needed 
across the industry regarding interoperability of products and [security] practices are 
developed and tested by regulatory bodies so obviously we purchase this knowledge”. 
The organisation, through the relevant function, will customise this acquired knowledge 
“to suit the environment we operate in”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. 
External consultants such as J.P. Morgan are used to audit the controls and procedures 
internal to the organisation. As described by the GIS Director, “auditors are employed 
because we are legally required to comply with regulations to remain listed on the Dow 
Jones. They do also provide us with valuable reviews of our controls and advice 
regarding segregation of duties”. “Design Engineering reverse-engineer our competitors 
products and we [ISS] customise standards like ISO177 99”, as stated by the OISRM 
Coordinator. 
As explained by the [U.S.] Security Officer, “we pay a type of subscription to public 
technical support groups for [administration] manuals, recovery procedures, updates – 
anything we need we source externally or one of our vendors provide us with updates or 
tools”. The IT Manager stated that, “it takes about six months for new employees to 
become useful, but we are getting better at speeding things up by providing tutorials on 
things like SOX”. CME-Co provides “extensive training programmes throughout the 
different GEO’s [subsidiaries] using Knowledge-Link”. CME-Co employees can 
register for and participate in online training tutorials through Knowledge-Link, a 
training portal. “Tutorials are designed and customised for CME-Co, employees go 
through them online and a record is kept with employee profiles and other data 
repositories that the company uses”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer. 
“Security specialists are also outsourced from security vendors for specific projects to 
reduce project life cycles or to ensure new security technologies are implemented or 
maintained correctly”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. Vendors perform 
ongoing tests of their products to ensure that they can counteract evolving threats. 
Vendors provide “patch updates as part of their contracts with their customers – it’s 
impossible to provide or buy security tools that cannot eventually be bypassed”, as 
stated by the [U.S.] Security Coordinator. As explained by the Corporate Security 
Officer “the rights to off-the-shelf [for e.g.] encryption products are bought and 
developed further internally”. He further explained that the Corporate Security group, as 
part of its development strategy, acquire “source code and all the rest of it to meet the 
requirements of our customer”. As described by the Remote Services Manager “rapid 
remote was a product provided by a company called Quarterdeck and we bought all the 
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rights to it and turned it into CME-Co Remote as a product offering and for internal 
use”. 
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous reservoirs distributed 
throughout the organisation. As described by the IT Manager “experts are just a phone 
call away if we have an issue or fault with one of our thousand or so of critical 
systems”. “Each group within the ISS function has specific roles and responsibilities 
creating an extensive pool of experts”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. Each 
member documents or acquires solutions and best practices and makes them available 
throughout the function. Members of the ISS function generally have “access to 
everything except to some HR systems”, as stated by the [U.S.] Security Coordinator. 
Knowledge is difficult to retrieve from MS Outlook as it can be “difficult to find 
solutions afterwards”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. As explained by the 
Corporate Security Officer, “everyone makes their fixes available through the different 
repositories or websites so that we can help one another out – obviously product designs 
are restricted but everything else is generally available”. He further explained that “we 
use platforms like E-Room and Power-Link to work with our vendors [partners], 
competitors and customers”.  
Knowledge is continuously created through the problem-solving process used within 
ISS. Calls or problems regarding IT or IS Security systems are logged and assigned to 
members of the function. As explained by the IT Manager, “we solve issues or 
problems for the different business functions”. The Portfolio Project Management 
Group (PPMG) was established specifically to ensure that each unit is supported by the 
function. As described by the IT Manager, “the portfolio mechanism used by PPMG is 
to facilitate the needs of our units when approved by Finance”. He further explained 
that, “nothing can get done in IT without having approval”. M-Gates is the project 
methodology used to manage the different project phases. As stated by the IT Manager, 
“specifically projects move from different phases, to get from phase one to phase two 
you actually have to pass a gate and there is a specific set of requirements needed to get 
past the gate”. According to the [Cork] Security Officer, “you get a request in from a 
business function and we have to prepare what we call a value statement which is a 
single page showing the business problem and the impact that the business problem is 
having on the business, the vision in terms of what we want to do to resolve it and we 
need to quantify some benefits”. As stated by the IT Manager, “the goal is to focus  
everybody on what we are doing is meeting some business needs. A project needs a 
level of approval – to do so you [for Customer Support] create a value statement, we 
[ISS] review it with the particular business unit and then it is listed on an approved 
projects list”. As described by the [Cork] Security Officer “a member of the group is 
[then] identified as the lead for an initiative and that person knows what’s happening 
and would coordinate with a developer or the respective portfolio person who will 
identify this as big enough to be a project or is it small enough to be what we call a 
continuous improvement (CI) initiative”.  As explained by the [U.S.] Security Officer, 
“if someone is approved to work on a project they will have access to all information 
unless it’s very confidential financial information or HR information, generally 
speaking people will have access to business requirement documents as we go through 
the phases and gates, things like business requirement documents, functional designs all 
those documents are prepared as you go through that process and they are available to 
everybody [working] on the project”. 
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One of the global projects “initiated across the multinational and implemented by the 
ISS function is Sarbanes-and-Oxley and we have implemented a whole series of 
procedures to support SOX requirements in the U.S.”, according to the OISRM 
Coordinator. As stated by the Corporate Security Officer, “one of the requirements of 
SOX is that the executives of a company have to be able to certify all of their business 
requirements, all of their financial results, our auditors have to be able to certify them 
and when they take it down one level deeper that says that systems and transactions on 
the systems have got to be auditable which means that every change made to a system 
has to be auditable”. He further explained that “any change that is made to a production 
system that could have an impact on our financial statements has to be documented, 
approved and segregation of responsibilities has to be implemented”. As explained by 
the [U.S.] Security Coordinator, “segregation of responsibilities is enforced when the 
person who writes the requirement has got to be different to the person who writes the 
code, who has to be different to the person who puts that code into production and all 
those people have got to be different to the business user who requested it, so you got a 
lot of different people in there so that no one person can say hang on a second I am 
going to add a dollar to every transaction and feed it into my own bank account”. It is 
used to enforce “checks and balances into the process and allocate responsibility to each 
step of the process and the decision-making involved”, as stated by the IT Manager. 
Mechanisms such as “teleconferencing are used to coordinate any problems associated 
with SOX”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer. As described by the Corporate 
Security Officer, “we have these brainstorming sessions regularly to prepare for the 
many reviews by the internal audit committee and then the more important real audit”.  
As described by the IT Manager, “we improve after each audit, it’s regarded now as an 
evaluation of all of the work that the different IT and Security groups do. Before SOX 
we were taken for granted unless something happened [a breach] we are now an 
important part of the process”. The “OISRM was created to coordinate the entire 
organisation and ensure its correct implementation”, as stated by the Corporate Security 
Officer. “My group was established to gain a competitive advantage from the 
compliance issue and identify our customer’s requirements, essentially providing them 
with a full package with our storage offerings”, as stated by the Corporate Security 
Officer. OISRM sources standards and best practices externally and “customises them 
internally by using the internal pool of experts and the audits feedback reports”, as 
stated by the [U.S.] Security Coordinator. This type of collaboration is facilitated 
through “conference calls and discussion forums [E-Room]”, as stated by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. 
An audit is a learning process achieved through “trial and error – we work closely with 
J.P Morgan during their survey process and determine what worked and didn’t, there is 
also a time to improve on any weaknesses and generally our work improves after each 
review”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer. As explained by the [Cork] 
Security Officer, “we take time after each review to set up a teleconference with all of 
the Security Officers and OISRM and work through the review and document the 
lessons-learned by the group”. He further explained that, “the lessons-learned is the 'to 
do list' for the next audit [usually created by the internal committee] which are 
documented properly and stored in our shared drives as well as on our internal 
websites”. As explained by the Corporate Security Officer, “auditing is a never ending 
process that we hope improves each time we are reviewed, it certainly makes us 
[groups] work closely so that the review goes well”. He further explained that guides 
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such as the “ISO17799 and our security policies are always evolving to incorporate new 
environmental changes”, and as a result aid in decision-making. 
The ISS function shares knowledge through its problem-solving processes. As 
explained by the IT Manager, “everyone has to share knowledge, like solutions to solve 
the many issues that we face”. The portfolio mechanism “is the approach we use to 
collaborate outside of our group with the business units, each has a dedicated portfolio 
manager who coordinates the process from the creation of a business case, approval [by 
Finance] to the allocation of IT resources to build a database or to apply security 
controls”. He further explained that “a dedicated IT portfolio manager insures our needs 
or IT itself would be neglected”.  As described by the [Cork] Security Officer, “we 
share solutions, best practices and online resources [website addresses] all the time 
especially when we are working on a global project like SOX or the marketing 
knowledge management initiative [the central repository]”.  “Email, E-Room, Primus 
and Channel CME-Co are the main places we store [security] knowledge”, as stated by 
the [Australian] Security Officer. According to the Corporate Security Officer the 
organisation “uses E-Room to trade interoperability knowledge for our products with 
our partners and competitors as well as allow our customers to have access to [some of] 
our product fixes [patches]”. He further stated that “we are active members of 
regulatory bodies so that we can work with other companies in agreeing on standards 
[and facilitating interoperability] and that’s not because you want to work with your 
competitors it’s because your customers tell you that you need to work together”. 
The process of knowledge application or use is extensive in the ISS function. As 
described by the OISRM Coordinator, “knowledge such as standards and steps to 
implementing best practices is always being applied in CME-Co, we have to or we 
would not be compliant”. He further stated that “all of our problem-solving for 
initiatives like SOX or even the implementation of a database require us to use 
documented procedures which we always try to improve through our regular conference 
calls between the different groups or the onsite [subsidiary] Security Coordinators”. As 
explained by the Corporate Security Officer “SOX forced the company to change and 
document everything [access rights, and internal processes] it gave IT and OISRM more 
control but at the same time took it away as Finance direct and approve the changes. It 
forced us [ISS function] to allocate processes and document them, document every 
change and re-examine them for every internal audit and external audit”. According to 
the IT Manager “it [SOX] forced us to make changes to the way we manage IT and 
security, the audit became a security and IT process that is always changing. It cost us a 
lot of time in the beginning but it has become easier with each Audit”.  
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. As 
explained by the IT Manager, “we allocate controls based on the value of the data or 
knowledge”. He further stated that systems are prioritised “according to the loss of 
money if a critical system is down or loss of time to market if our Engineering 
databases have been accessed and designs stolen”. “Time to market is very valuable to a 
company like ours – it’s essentially the release of one of our products before a 
competitor” as stated by the Corporate Security Officer. He further explained that, “we 
have had instances when our products were reverse-engineered and released by one of 
our competitors so allocating the right controls to design databases is vital. Our 
Engineers are also aware that they can leave any time if they choose not to comply with 
our code of ethics and unknowingly share a design with a competitor”. According to the 
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Briefing Centre Manager, “Engineers will not share with Marketing, Customer Support 
or Sales but they do talk to other Engineers at conferences for example”. As explained 
by the Corporate Security Officer “companies are concerned about what it means to 
protect their knowledge given that you have continued breaches of security and now 
you have potential legal fallout from those continued breaches and so companies 
including us are looking beyond firewalls, VPN, IDS and prevention”.  As a result, 
companies are hiring compliance officers in order to try and understand that very 
complicated legal and compliance environment and try and rationalise it in a way that is 
meaningful and can continue to do business. “Technologies are deployed to comply 
with a regulation without thinking through the impact of the technology side of it. For 
example, technologies like encryption even though there are significant issues with 
regard to the use of encryption, regulations do not take that into account and so you 
have an increase in the use of encryption even though you can actually lose access to the 
data or knowledge”, as explained by the Security Officer. The Corporate Security 
Officer stated that, “the only way is to protect your source code, you limit access to the 
data to those only authorised or needed to use it. So when you have CME-Co, people 
working on certain projects are continually reminded of the need to keep confidential 
data confidential and so you have got code names for certain projects for the next 
version of a product for example and the Engineer working on things like that are 
continually reminded that employment is at will and we are all free to move on and get 
another job and at the same time if we are in breach of compliance as far as the 
company’s policies that there are controls and procedures that you need to comply with 
as far as protecting that is concerned and you can’t lock down security in such a way 
that you couldn’t even theoretically, possibly have a breach or leak of source code”. 
The IS Security KM processes identified within the organisation are summarised in 
Table 5.9. 
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IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS:  KM PROCESSES 
Processes 
Acquisition 
• Documentum – to utilise collaborate SW-E-Room for joint projects with Partners 
• Regulation Guidelines – bought and customised to comply with environmental laws 
• Interoperability Knowledge – collaborative initiatives for (Security) product 
development 
• External Consultants – Auditors for reviews of controls and network testing 
• Reverse-engineered – Security technologies purchased and customised for use and 
sale 
• ISO17799 Guideline – Purchased and customised 
• Subscription to Technical Groups – Manuals, Recovery Procedures, Updates and 
Tools 
• Online Tutorials – Purchased customised and delivered through Knowledge-Link 
• Security Specialists – Hired for specific projects 
Capture 
• CME-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge (Table 5.5) 
• Pool of Experts /Roles and responsibilities  
• MS Outlook/E-Room/Power-Link 
Creation 
• Problem-solving Process – in creating a solution 
• PPMG Mechanism – to create a business case 
• M-Gates – Project Management Method for a divide and conquer approach 
• Auditing process – Checks and balances / Trial and Error Learning Process 
• OISRM Group – Goal to retrieve, customise and share ISS practices and procedures 
• Brain storming – for documenting lessons-learned 
• Conference Calls/Discussion Forums 
• Lessons-learned – documented for the next project 
Sharing 
• Problem-solving – Sharing knowledge to solve and problem or fix 
• PPMG Mechanism – Collaborating through groups 
• Coordination - through Portfolio Manager 
• Email, E-Room, Primus, Channel CME-Co 
• Knowledge Trading – between members. 
• Active participation – in regulatory bodies 
Application 
• Reuse of customised standards, practices, solutions and fixes 
• Auditing – forces documentation and lessons-learned 
• Pool of Experts – use develops through trading 
Control 
• Allocation of the following controls: 
• Informal controls such as policies regarding behaviour 
• Formal controls regarding compliance 
• Technical controls such as VPN, IDS 
Table 5.9: IS Security KM Processes. 
The preceding sections depict the IS Security and Customer Support functions operating 
within CME-Co. The different types of knowledge used by the functions are described, 
reservoirs of knowledge pinpointed and the processes used to manage knowledge by the 
functions illustrated, and summarised in Tables 5.1 to 5.9. The next section compares 
the approaches used by the two functions to manage ISS and CS knowledge.  
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5.1.5  IS Security and CS Functions Managing Knowledge   
This section considers CME-Co’s IS Security and Customer Support functions 
approaches to managing their knowledge. It extends the descriptions discussed in the 
preceding sections by comparing the approaches used. The different types (Table 5.10), 
locations (Appendix D), and knowledge processes (Appendix E) are compared and then 
contrasted. Next, the mechanisms used to promote the management of ISS and CS 
knowledge are described in section 5.1.6. These are categorised as technological and 
non-technological. Use of the different KM tools is outlined and illustrated to determine 
individual and function usage (Table 5.11). Finally section 5.1.7 concludes with a 
description and discussion of the impact gained due to the management of knowledge 
on the (ISS or CS) individual, functions (products, services and processes) and the 
organisation (Table 5.12). Furthermore, display matrices are utilised to illustrate 
functional characteristics, differences and outcomes for each of the variables described. 
Each display matrice was reviewed and verified by the Security Coordinator and 
Knowledge Consultant (Table 5.2). 
5.1.5.1 Types of Functional Knowledge 
This sub-section summarises the different types of knowledge utilised by the CME-Co’s 
IS Security and Customer Support functions. Table 5.10 is adapted from Tables 5.4 and 
5.7. Table 5.10 summarises the different types and roles of knowledge used by the two 
functions to illustrate the similarities and differences. IS Security (Sec) and Customer 
Support (CS) knowledge (K) is categorised as general, technical and contextually 
specific knowledge. These are then further subcategorised as declarative (explicit/tacit) 
or procedural (explicit/tacit). The roles of each are identified, in Table 5.10, as 
operational (O), tactical (T) and strategic (S). Role totals are calculated from Tables 5.4 
and 5.7 and used to compare the importance of each type of knowledge to each function 
(for example general operational knowledge has a ratio of Sec K= 11: CS K=12).  
General knowledge is used for day-to-day operations within the functions. The IS 
Security function regards the following as general knowledge: hardware (HW) and 
software (SW) specifications, regulations, threats, email warnings, procedures and 
escalation levels as operational knowledge. The interviewees did not identify their 
general knowledge as tactical or strategic but “for everyday use and pretty much basic 
for our role”, according to the [Cork] Security Officer. Customer Support also identified 
email warnings of possible errors, regulations and escalation levels as operational (Sec 
K=11: CS K: 12). However the “priority of hot issues” and the “approach used to solve 
a problem” were categorised as tactical by the function (Sec K= 0: CS K= 2).  Hot 
issues, pertaining to the company’s product portfolio, are tactical as they can, if 
prioritised, provide tangible benefits to the CS function. Prioritising hot issues can 
“reduce the workload of [Level 1 and 2] Technicians by eliminating the knock-on effect 
of one product failing, and it can also reduce our customer response time”, as stated by 
the CS Manager. Problem-solving is the goal of the Customer Support function so the 
approach used to solve a problem is “always reviewed so that we can improve the 
process – the customer always comes first and the better and faster we are the more 
loyal our customers are”,  as explained by the KMS Engineering Trainer. Therefore CS 
general knowledge is regarded as tactical due to its impact on productivity. Time is 
saved as Technicians can prioritise and reuse solutions. The importance of the 
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knowledge expert is also emphasised as tactical knowledge is categorised as declarative 
and procedural tacit knowledge. 
Technical knowledge is specific to either function. Lists of errors and documentation 
are regarded as technically operational by the two functions. Customer Support 
identified twice as many types of technical knowledge as operational (Sec K=4: CS K= 
10). This is due to the fact that solutions, once created, are stored and shared but the 
process is very much a day-to-day activity. The product portfolio is also wide and 
complex requiring constant support, making solutions to customer problems dated as 
they are generally fixed before new (product) updates are released. Regulations, product 
specifications, lists of stored solutions, errors, and knowledge of customer environments 
are “fundamental to the objective of the [Customer Support] function”, as stated by the 
KMS Engineering Trainer. IS Security primarily views technical knowledge as tactical. 
The allocation of access control lists to enforce the segregation of duties is “an everyday 
job but it is necessary and important in protecting the data and knowledge in the 
organisation”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. Tactical security knowledge is 
used to implement regulatory constraints and in identifying risks to CME-Co systems. 
Knowledge regarding regulations and standards are viewed as tactical as compliance is 
an environmental issue for the organisation. Customer support also views regulatory 
knowledge as tactical, as working with customer products can have regulatory 
implications, particularly if the problem is due to interoperability issues and the 
customer is located in another country. Additionally, the CS function views its ability to 
diagnose interoperability problems and errors as tactical. “Diagnosing errors is an 
invaluable tool as it requires [the] skills of our experts to trace an error that could be 
buried in lines of code or an interoperability problem with one of our customers systems 
– either way it’s a skill that we can’t teach; it’s learnt through experience”, as stated by 
the KMS Engineering Trainer. 
CS therefore views its approach and ability to diagnose problems as tactical in solving 
calls and Security views the implementation of regulatory procedures as tactical, as non 
adherence could result in financial penalties for the organisation (Sec K=6: CS K= 4). 
However, IS Security has identified security: policies, regulations and strategies as 
strategic while CS does not view its technical knowledge as such (Sec K=5: CS K=0). 
This can be attributed to the role of the Global IS Security function. The security policy 
must be aligned to the strategy of the organisation so that it can support it and manage 
known security threats. Regulatory knowledge is imperative to the function as it has a 
dual role of protecting the organisation from internal risks and the risks associated with 
non-compliance (removal from the stock exchange).   
Contextually specific knowledge is viewed as tactical by IS Security, with audit 
reports and procedures as its main resource. CS identifies its solutions and ability to 
solve problems as tactical (Sec K=9: CS K=3) but primarily this knowledge is viewed 
by CS as operational (Sec K=5: CS K=11) due to the role of the function, which is to 
“fire fight problems that are identified by our customers”, as stated by the CS Manager. 
“Problem-solving is a core activity for Customer Support and the faster the solve, the 
cheaper the activity”, as explained by the KMS Engineering Trainer. Templates, product 
errors, solutions (which are quickly dated), bugs, lessons-learned and the steps to 
diagnosing a problem are operational as these are “basic [knowledge] for our Customer 
Support organisation [function]”, as stated by the Knowledge Consultant. However the 
ability to reverse-engineer, while a threat from our competitors is also regarded as a 
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tactical ability by CME-Co. As explained by the Operations Manager, “they 
[technological companies] all reverse-engineer [in order] to be the first to market and to 
figure out customer problems, as half of the time it’s an interoperability issue and our 
Engineers have to reverse-engineer a competitor’s product to diagnose a customer’s 
problem. CME-Co doesn’t wait for the fault to be allocated to the right vendor; we fix it 
because we know the customer will appreciate it and view us as the go-to service 
provider and not our competitors”.  
The totals illustrated in Table 5.10 indicate that CS knowledge is viewed by the CS 
function as primarily operational (Sec K=20: CS K= 33), and IS Security as tactical 
(Sec K=15: CS K=9). It is surprising that the CS function does not view its knowledge 
as strategic to the company but predominantly operational. Customer or product 
problem-solving is the function’s core purpose (CS K= 33 O| 9 T| 0 S). While the  
activity is knowledge-intensive and utilises a KM initiative the function is not promoted 
or supported at a senior level but regarded structurally as an operational function.  KM 
roles were established on an ad hoc basis and the initiative itself is driven purely at the 
CS level, by Knowledge the Champions. The KCS is regarded as a community of 
practice (CoP) consisting of CS Engineers evaluating the quality of solutions created, 
stored and shared within CS. The omission of KM from the organisational structure 
reduces the strategic and tactical significance of CS knowledge within the function. 
It is evident that IS Security knowledge is regarded as strategic particularly vis-à-vis the 
company’s security policy and strategy (Sec K= 20 O| 15 T| 5 S). The importance of IS 
Security knowledge can be attributed to the structure of the corporation as well and the 
business environment it is operating in. IS Security is a futile function if it is absent 
from the organisational structure. CME-Co has also identified compliance as a customer 
requirement and as a result formed a Corporate Security group to target customer 
regulatory requirements and generate additional income. The organisation has also 
created a group (OISRM) to source and customise regulatory standards and best 
practices in order to adhere to regulatory needs. Compliance has forced managerial 
responsibility in aligning security to the corporate strategy. It is through the IS Security 
function that controls (formal, informal and technical) are allocated to systems and 
employees in meeting regulatory requirements. The steps in applying standards for 
regulatory requirements are vital to the function. Security experts (Officers and 
Coordinators) utilise regulatory and control knowledge to ensure compliance and follow 
external advice regarding audits. The importance of the function is represented in the 
reporting structure of the organisation. The function reports to the Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) who in turn reports to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), emphasising the 
financial implications of the function and therefore the strategic importance of ISS 
knowledge and the necessity to map ISS to every business function, and process.  
Table 5.10 summarises and compares the functional view of IS Security and CS 
Knowledge utilised. 
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ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
D:E/T |P:E/T IS SECURITY KNOWLEDGE ROLE CUSTOMER SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE ROLE 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
D:E Org. Doc.| Vendor |Internal Warnings| Threats O D:E Org.Doc| Email Warnings| Customer & Engineering Errors O 
D:E HW/SW Specifications: Firewalls/Servers O D:T Regulations| Escalations| In/External Roles O 
D:T Regulations| Impact of Threats| Roles| Escalations O D:T Priority of Hot Issues & Errors T 
P:E Procedures| White Papers – Projects ISS Issues O P:E Emails: Bugs| Steps O 
P:T Steps to Align IT & Access Control Lists (ACL) O P:T Problem-solving Approach | Logged Call T 
O T S O T S 
Totals: 11 0 0 Totals: 12 2 0 
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D:E IS Security Policy| Strategy| Regulations S D:E Doc. of Regulations| Products| Environment O 
D:E ACL & Alert Reports from Security Technologies O D:T Regulations| Diagnosing| Interoperability| Bugs T 
D:T Domain Access Rights: Segregation of Duties O D:T Existing Solutions O 
D:T Implement Regulations| Systems| Risk Knowledge T D:E List of Errors & Solutions| O 
D:T Advising Customers: ISS Issues & Tools S D:T Diagnosing & Solving a Problem T 
P:E Standards & Procedures T 
P:T Developing Plan & Strategy| Security Methods S 
O T S O T S 
Totals: 4 6 5 Totals: 10 4 0 
C
o
n
t
e
x
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a
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l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
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D:E SOX Requirements| Risk Criteria| Manuals O D:E Solutions| Template| Product Errors O 
D:E Audit Reports: Evaluation Feedback| NW Testing T D:E Product Solution. T 
D:T ISS Specialists Knowledge of: SOX| Risks| Audits T D:T Bugs| Diagnosing| Lessons-learned O 
P:E ISS Teams: Steps for Standards| Review T P:E Solutions| Steps| Diagnosing O 
P:T ISS Officers: Steps for: Incidents| Audits T P:T Customer Feedback| Reverse-engineering T 
O T S O T S 
Totals: 5 9 0 Totals: 11 3 0 
ISS Knowledge Totals: 20 15 5 CS Knowledge Totals: 33 9 0 
*Declarative (D)/ Procedural (P), Explicit (E)/ Tacit (T). | *Roles: Operational (O), Tactical (T) Strategic (S). 
*Totals are calculated from Tables: 5.4 and 5.7. 
Table 5.10: CME-Co IS Security and Customer Support Knowledge (Adapted from Tables: 5.4 and 5.7). 
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 5.1.5.2 Functional Knowledge Reservoirs 
This sub-section describes the different reservoirs of knowledge utilised by the Case’s 
IS Security and Customer Support functions. Appendix D is adapted from Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.8. The Table summarises the similarities, and differences between the IS 
Security and Customer Support reservoirs.  The third column is derived from 
identifying the different reservoir characteristics from the two functions. The knowledge 
reservoirs of the functions are categorised by their practitioners, functions, artefacts and 
inter-organisational relationships. These different stores or reservoirs of knowledge are 
discussed in the following sub-sections. 
(1) The knowledge residing in individual members or practitioners of a function 
can be identified through the roles and responsibilities attributed to them. 
Problem-solving specialists are used by the functions to diagnose a customer’s 
problem or prepare for an audit. Engineers are used to design and build the 
products supported by CS and secured by ISS.  
IS Security Engineers utilise the requirements identified by the Corporate 
Security Officer (Stakeholder Analyst) to incorporate security add-ons to 
existing and new products. Specific roles in IS Security have been officially 
created to target and identify market demand for security enhancements and aid 
customers in meeting their own, for example, regulatory requirements. A 
Director of GIS is responsible for sourcing appropriate standards, best practices 
and formulating corporate guidelines for CME-Co. This senior role provides the 
ISS function with political power in the organisation. Each subsidiary or site has 
an allocated Security Officer to coordinate and implement corporate guidelines 
and ISS controls. Security Officers or coordinators report to the site IT Manager 
and directly to GIS. 
The CS function is managed directly by a CS manager. The manager is 
responsible for coordinating the different levels of support and developing 
support procedures. A Knowledge Consultant was identified by the CS function 
to tackle the enormous challenge of centralising knowledge for CS. This role 
and that of the Knowledge Champion is ad hoc and specific to CS. However a 
KDG (Knowledge Development Group) Officer was appointed in each CS site 
to identify the training needs of the different support levels. KCS writers are also 
used to review the quality of the solutions created by the function across the CS 
organisation. KCS writers have dual roles. They are quality reviewers but 
primarily CS Engineers.   
It is from the above descriptions of the different roles and responsibilities within the two 
functions that the following characteristics were identified: problem-solving expertise, 
KM leadership/championship to promote KM, stakeholder analysis, senior roles 
sourcing/ assessing best practices and providing ISS with political support across the 
organisation, skills development coordination and external evaluation to assess core 
activities.  Each of these roles provides invaluable expertise in the external and internal 
operations of the two functions. Additionally while ISS is promoted across the 
organisation, CS is internally focussed (Appendix D: Row 1). 
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(2) The group or function reservoir of knowledge is an extension of the practitioner 
store. The practitioners identified are a part of an internal function or an external 
source of expertise. Managers in the two functions are responsible for 
identifying policies, standards and procedures. Security Officers and CS 
Engineers are used to coordinate the different subsidiaries in order to support 
operations. ISS and CS use customer feedback (collected by Sales in product 
evaluation and the Corporate Security Group in identifying stakeholder 
requirements) as a guide or measure productivity and as a source of market 
demand. 
ISS utilises a two-pronged approach to securing CME-Co. Two groups were 
established as separate (yet interacting) entities in order to specialise in specific 
aspects of security. The OISRM acquires and customises regulatory knowledge 
for dissemination throughout the multinational and provides a pool of expertise 
in compliance for audit committees and Security Officers to utilise. The 
Corporate Security Group is used to ascertain the security requirements of 
customers and incorporate security (for compliance) enhancements as a 
competitive advantage for the firm. Internal audit committees are used to 
evaluate internal processes and access rights in preparation for an actual audit. A 
Remote Services Group assesses and provides a secure communication link to 
external partners and customers. The CS function utilises an escalation process 
to effectively utilise the tacit knowledge within CS and Engineering. The higher 
the level of support required the higher the cost for CME-Co. To increase the 
skill-sets within the function a Knowledge Development Group was formed to 
enhance lower-level CS support skill-sets and ultimately reduce costs. 
Additionally, CS established a solution quality team to review and evaluate new 
solutions to improve the quality of support provided to customers.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different groups interacting with the two 
functions that the following were identified: managerial collaboration, compliance 
adherence, innovative and creative teams, skill-set development group, domain 
(function) specific knowledge, measuring or evaluating external group, controlled 
external communication, and internal quality review committees. Each function utilises 
other functions or groups to evaluate activities. Even customer feedback is collected by 
Sales. CS primarily uses internal quality assessments. ISS established a group to 
regularly and formally collect stakeholder requirements and employs an external 
evaluator to measure ISS activities to ensure compliance but to also improve processes 
through post-mortem evaluations (Appendix D: Row 2).  
(3) Knowledge is stored in practices, organisational rules, routines and procedures. 
The IS Security function utilises numerous procedures to ensure its compliance 
to different regulations. Procedures, standards, checklists and best practices are 
purchased from standard making bodies and customised to suit the needs of 
CME-Co. The procedures contain steps and guides for assuring the security of 
the multinational. They are customised to suit the needs of the organisation and 
the environment in which the organisation operates. A project management 
methodology (M-Gates) is used by the function to generate outputs at different 
stages of the project life cycle. This allows the function to collaborate with other 
functions and set deliverables. The function also uses a resource allocation 
justification procedure, Six Sigma, to essentially build business cases for 
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internal projects when competing with other functions for resources. However, 
Customer Support uses a limited number of procedures. A template is used to 
structure the solutions to customer problems and enable effective searches and 
consistency through the application of a template standard. The limited number 
of procedures is due to the closed environment in which the CS function 
operates. IS Security is a cross-organisational support function which must 
ensure CME-Co’s adherence to policies and regulations.  
It is from the above description of the different procedures used by the two functions 
that the following were identified: compliance or regulatory guidelines, standardised 
templates, to-do lists (check lists), documented (escalation) levels of expertise, business 
case requirements and a project management methodology (Appendix D: Row 3).  
(4) Knowledge 	 repositories can be paper-based (manuals, White Papers), or 
computer-based. The two functions primarily use the same repositories. A 
documentation management system (DMS) is used for ISS and CS solutions or 
fixes, the Intranet for corporate information, presentations, and group websites. 
The two functions make use of vendor specific repositories for product 
installation guides or specifications. E-learning resources such as Knowledge-
Link are used for online training courses and portals to collaborate with partners 
and customers. However, the IS Security function identified their desktops and 
shared drives as personal and group repositories. Technical repositories 
subscriptions are used as a source of patch updates and procedures, and Q&A 
repositories for ISS queries. Customer Support uses a discussion forum for 
managers to collaborate in formulating common procedures and goals. The CS 
function is also dependent on notifications from Engineering regarding “hot 
issues”, or priority errors and solutions. 
Customer Support regularly tries to gain access to the Engineering Bug Tracking 
Systems to retrieve known errors/bugs and solutions. CS can spend hours and 
even days trying to solve an error that could already exist in Engineering’s Bug 
Tracking Systems. This issue was raised repeatedly by CS interviewees as a 
considerable waste of resources. Engineering interviewees regarded the 
partitioning of the repositories as a fundamental approach to controlling their 
knowledge (product designs) and ensuring that any (known) risks which could 
seriously damage CME-Co’s reputation are monitored (dangerous commands 
used incorrectly in a customer’s environment).  However it is important to note 
that access to functional and group systems is domain specific. That is once you 
are a part of a function you have access to the functions resources (unless denied 
by the authoring/designing Engineer). Engineering have complete control over 
their systems, labs and therefore networks.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different repositories used by the two functions 
that the following were identified: documentation management systems (DMS), 
solutions, external sources of technical expertise through vendor repositories, shared 
platforms such as: drives, forums, Extranet, Intranet, portals, function websites, 
collaborative E-learning systems, email warnings and hyper-linked or integrated 
solutions (Appendix D: Row 4). 
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(5) Knowledge is stored in firm-specific 	technologies. The two functions use 
technologies to store and retrieve function specific knowledge for day-to-day 
operations and other activities such as auditing. Primus, the CBR tool, is 
available to the two functions. The tool is primarily used by Customer Support. 
Additionally the two functions over-use the corporate email system as a 
problem-solving platform to collaborate in creating and sharing solutions. The 
reported disadvantage to the utilisation of email is the difficulty in managing and 
retrieving solutions, documentation after a period of time.  
Securing and monitoring a geographically dispersed environment is extremely 
difficult. ISS does, as a result, utilise a number of security technologies to aid in 
monitoring and protecting the multinationals corporate boundaries from internal 
and external risks. VPNs are used to encrypt external and internal lines of 
communication, SID for access-control and reporting, monitoring tools to 
generate alert logs, firewalls for enforcing internal/external access rules and IDS 
to track internal and external network traffic. Each technology generates streams 
of data which is pulled into monitoring databases in order to filter, query and 
generate a view of the CME-Co’s security landscape.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different technologies used by the two functions, 
that the following were identified: problem-based reasoning tools, monitoring and 
tracking technologies and combined integrated analysis through ISS technologies 
(Appendix D: Row 5). 
(6) Knowledge is also stored within entities such as other 	functions. The ISS 
function interacts with every other function within CME-Co. It is through, for 
example, collaborative projects that security requirements are identified and 
(resource permitting) allocated. CME-Co utilises a Portfolio Project 
Management Group (PPMG) to identify function requirements and facilitate 
collaboration between the different business and technical units. It is also one of 
IS Security’s tasks to know and understand functional roles and responsibilities 
in order to enforce segregation of duties across CME-Co under the governance 
of the Finance and Legal departments.   
However, the CS function interacts with a limited number of units. It interacts 
with Engineering, R&D teams, ISS, IT and Sales. Internally CS is referred to as 
a customer supporting organisation operating within CME-Co, sitting between 
Engineering and the corporate customer-base. This is due to its core role of 
supporting the CME-Co product portfolio and fire-fighting problems.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different units/functions interacting with the two 
functions that the following were identified: cross-functional collaborative projects, 
project management mechanism, segregation of duties and governance (Appendix D: 
Row 6). 
(7) Knowledge is also stored in inter-organisational relationships or networks 
such as collaborative partnerships. The two functions make use of inter­
organisational relationships in order to collaborate on specific projects. Vendors 
are used to provide product and technology specifications. CS requires access to 
the product specifications of their competitors so that they can resolve a 
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customer’s interoperability errors. CME-Co customers can use several products 
from many different vendors in their environments. Additionally the CS function 
uses customer feedback as an informal review mechanism. 
ISS also use external knowledge sources. However ISS does employ a Corporate 
Security group to determine stakeholder (customers, partners) security 
requirements. This group is used to increase the organisation’s competitive 
advantage by identifying how security (services and tools) could generate 
additional income. The ISS function also participates in and drives regulatory 
bodies to guide the ISS and storage market/s and therefore create business 
opportunities. External auditors are used as evaluators for regulatory purposes. 
Audit reports are also used as a form of measurement to determine the 
usefulness of the function to CME-Co. Finally the two functions use Power-Link 
and E-Room as internal and external collaborative platforms.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different inter-organisational relationships or 
networks that the following were identified: stakeholder feedback, Extranet, partner 
collaborative software, industrial groups and external evaluation reviewers (Appendix 
D: Row 7). 
In summary, the different levels of expertise are viewed as a significant source of 
knowledge within the two functions. CS created an ad hoc Knowledge Development 
Group (KDG) and Coordinator to develop lower level support skill-sets and ensure 
solution standards through a quality review mechanism or group (KCS). Procedures 
such as solution templates and management techniques are viewed as important sources 
of knowledge. Documentation from internal and external sources was used to comply 
with functional or corporate requirements, particularly in documenting lessons-learned 
and case solutions. Knowledge tools such as a CBR tool, repositories and email were 
used to store knowledge. It is also evident that both functions were dependent on inter­
relationships with an external evaluator for the IS Security function. However the CS 
functions knowledge stores are primarily internal to the function. CS knowledge was 
focussed on the organisation’s product portfolio and similar (competitor) product 
offerings. Therefore internal sources of knowledge are vital. The ISS function was 
differentiated by its position structurally in CME-Co. It was a separate function from IT, 
and reports directly to the Finance department indicating its structural and financial 
importance to the organisation. Additionally this ensures that ISS has political support 
at senior levels particularly in relation to regulatory drivers and evaluations. Groups 
(OISRM and the Corporate Security Group) were also established to focus on 
regulatory issues and identify stakeholder requirements. As a result the ISS function 
was dependent on external sources of knowledge. 
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 5.1.5.3 Functional Knowledge Processes 
This sub-section summarises the different knowledge processes utilised by CME-Co’s 
IS Security and Customer Support functions. Appendix E is adapted from Tables 5.6 
and 5.9. Knowledge is pulled from the ISS and CS reservoirs outlined in Appendix D 
and used through the processes outlined in Appendix E. The Table summarises, 
compares and highlights the differences between the processes used within the two 
functions. The third column illustrates the characteristics of the practices used to 
manage ISS and CS knowledge. 
(1.)Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained and 
transformed into a representation that can be internalised by CME-Co. Table 5.1 
outlines the organisations propensity to (budget permitting) purchase companies 
in order to acquire knowledge and simultaneously enhance its product portfolio. 
The acquisition of Documentum in 2003 provided CME-Co with a pool of 
expertise in the development of web-based environments and the use of a ready-
made collaborative web-based room. E-Room was purchased as an internal and 
external (suppliers, partners and customers) collaborative environment. CME-Co 
also purchased the rights to a remote access product (rapid remote) from a 
company called Quarterdeck. CME-Co Engineers reverse-engineered the tool, 
enhanced its functionality and repackaged it as CME-Co Remote. These 
corporate acquisitions are used by the two functions to enable secure 
collaboration. 
ISS and CS use acquisitioned software to collaborate. Subscription to external 
technical communities of practice (CoP) and vendor repositories is fundamental 
to acquiring external knowledge regarding, for example, new security 
technologies, manuals and best practices. Training courses are also purchased, 
customised and delivered through Knowledge-Link. However CS uses 
simulations of the support lab to train new Technicians in fire-fighting. 
Corporate and competitor products are used in developing reverse-engineering 
and diagnostic skill-sets. Competitor’s products are also reverse-engineered to 
understand how a competing product works and interoperates with the CME-Co 
product portfolio. This practice provides knowledge for training, problem-
solving, product enhancement and competitor analysis. Best practices, 
regulatory guidelines, and standards are purchased and customised, by ISS, to 
comply with U.S. and international regulatory laws. External auditors and 
security specialists are hired to avail of their testing and audit expertise. 
Membership of regulatory bodies allow the IS Security function to ascertain the 
steps taken by other companies in auditing and reviews. CME-Co, as a result, 
participates in driving the market to stay ahead of its competitors. CS is 
dependent on its internal pool of experts and therefore acquires a limited volume 
of external knowledge. ISS sources a larger volume of external knowledge 
regarding its business environment to identify risks, threats, and adhere to 
regulatory requirements. Procedures, security technologies and software are 
purchased, and customised. External experts are also hired to refine audit 
reviews and evaluate the function and security controls used.  
It is from the above description that the following were identified: collaborative 
platforms, customised guidelines, reverse-engineering and diagnostic skill development, 
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subscription to CoPs, external repositories, measurements, customised training and 
expertise (Appendix E: Row 1). 
(2.)ISS and CS capture or pull knowledge from the different CME-Co reservoirs 
(Appendix D). The two functions use their respective pools of expertise to 
address function queries and problem-solving. The different roles and 
responsibilities allocated to individuals facilitate the identification of experts 
located across the multinational. Applications, such as email and portals, enable 
the functions to pull knowledge from the different reservoirs to collaborate, 
create, share, and store, for example, technical and product debugging solutions. 
ISS uses external experts to conduct evaluations in preparation for audits to test 
the level of security within the organisation, through for example network 
vulnerability testing. CS, primarily, captures knowledge with the case-based 
reasoning tool (CBR) Primus. The tool is used to capture, create, share, store and 
reuse solutions pertaining to the CME-Co product portfolio. The CBR tool 
facilitates external collaboration (Power-Link). Customers and partners can, 
once registered, retrieve existing solutions and create new solutions. Therefore 
CS can capture and reuse partner knowledge in solving CME-Co's product bugs.   
The two functions capture external expertise. ISS uses evaluators to measure 
goals determined by the requirements of individual audits (particularly the 
previous audit). This is an ongoing review process requiring the documentation 
and adoption of lessons-learned from one review to the next. CS, in comparison, 
captures partner and customer knowledge to create solutions and then share the 
solutions internally and externally with other partners. CS has also identified the 
value in pushing knowledge towards partners and customers. Self-service 
enables partners and customers to solve their own problems and therefore reduce 
CS costs while simultaneously increasing CS productivity.  
It is from the above description that the following were identified: case-based reasoning 
tools, pools of expertise, roles and responsibilities and collaborative platforms 
(Appendix E: Row 2). 
(3.)The two functions create solutions through problem-solving. Lessons-learned 
are documented due to the utilisation of the M-Gates project management 
methodology and ISS audits. ISS creates and acquires evaluation reports (audit 
reviews), identifies security controls, customises standards and best practices for 
compliance deliverables. Mechanisms such as brainstorming (enabled through 
online forums and teleconferences) are used to conduct post-mortems of 
activities such as audits. CS creates solutions internally using the different levels 
of support (escalation process). Partners are also used to generate solutions 
which are shared through the online view of Primus (Power-Link).  
The primary difference between the two functions in creating knowledge is that 
ISS use of an external evaluator. Mechanisms are widely used by the ISS 
function to facilitate the creation of new security knowledge and support other 
functions. The Portfolio Project Management Group (PPMG) identifies the 
security requirements of other business functions as well as those of ISS. 
Brainstorming, M-Gates and a coordinating security group (OISRM) are used to 
ensure collaboration in achieving ISS and corporate goals. However, the 
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evaluation and resulting documentation of audit reviews and lessons-learned is 
environmentally driven. CS identified the potential of leveraging the knowledge 
of CME-Co partners and vendors in creating and sharing new solutions 
(knowledge) to reduce costs. 
It is from the above description that the following were identified: problem-solving 
process, business requirements mechanisms, project management methodologies, 
escalated support, and specialist groups for external collaboration (Appendix E: Row 3). 
(4.) Knowledge sharing is the process through which explicit and tacit knowledge 
is communicated between individuals, functions or organisations. The ISS and 
CS functions share knowledge through the utilisation of tools such as email, E-
Room, Primus, and Channel CME-Co. Problem-solving and levelled support 
(through the escalation process) also enable the generation and sharing of 
knowledge. Knowledge trading is also used. Help, in the form of an expert or a 
manual, is requested by one expert from another to solve a problem. The help is 
often traded to ensure collaboration at a later date or access to a knowledge 
store. The two functions exploit external knowledge to create and share 
solutions. Regulatory bodies are used to participate in the creation and sharing of 
standards and partners are used for solution generation. However the use of 
mechanisms can vary. ISS employs a coordinator and the PPMG mechanism to 
encourage the collaboration and sharing of knowledge, while CS uses the CBR 
tool Primus.  
It is from the above description that the following were identified: problem-solving, 
PPMG mechanism, coordinators, knowledge tools, knowledge trading and participation 
in industrial forums (Appendix E: Row 4).  
(5.)Knowledge application is used to guide decisions and actions. The two 
functions create, use, customise and store knowledge in the form of solutions, 
standards, and best practices. Pools of ISS and CS experts are used to 
collaborate, share and therefore use and reuse knowledge in making problem-
solving decisions. However CS uses the CBR tool to store and reuse solutions. 
ISS exploits the auditing process to apply and reuse knowledge from past 
reviews as benchmarks for forthcoming reviews.  
It is from the above description of the different that the following were identified: reuse 
of customised practices and solutions, documentation of lessons-learned, benchmarking, 
and knowledge trading (Appendix E: Row 5). 
(6.)Knowledge control secures valuable corporate or functional knowledge. ISS is 
responsible for protecting corporate assets. However CS, and particularly 
Engineering are regarded by senior management as innovators who require 
complete control over their systems and networks. Engineering apply controls, 
such as access rights, to their own systems resulting in weak points in the CME-
Co network. ISS uses formal, informal and technical controls to control the 
behaviour of individuals and unauthorised users. Tools and mechanisms are used 
to monitor and track internal traffic to identify or scan any rogue behaviour.  CS 
uses controls such as tracking, monitoring and domain-specific controls to 
assure the validity and utility of the solutions created and stored in Primus.  
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It is from the above description of the different examples of knowledge control that the 
following were identified: controls (informal, formal and technical), tracking internal 
and external traffic, quality mechanisms, access rights, managerial reviews and goal 
setting (Appendix E: Row 6). 
In summary, a significant amount of knowledge is acquired externally. Collaborative 
software, regulatory guidelines, subscriptions, products and external evaluations are 
acquired by the functions to ensure that the organisation is compliant with its business 
environment and aware of any and all business opportunities such as market changes 
and competitor product advancements. Problem-solving is the principal approach used 
to create knowledge and applied through the reuse of the solutions created and stored. 
The ISS function does purchase significantly more external knowledge than CS. This is 
due to regulatory requirements such as the Sarbanes-and-Oxley Act of 2002 (section 
2.4.4) which requires the application of segregation of duties and adherence to 
environmental standards. However this environmental driver enabled ISS to exploit the 
auditing process and use reviews as benchmarking aids in applying lessons-learned to 
internal and external ISS activities.  
5.1.6 IS Security and Customer Support KM Mechanisms 
This section describes the mechanisms used in CME-Co, either directly or indirectly, to 
promote the management of ISS and CS knowledge. Table 5.11 outlines the 
mechanisms which are divided by type, and illustrates which are common or unique to 
both functions and as a result available at an organisational level (√√). The first sub­
section describes the mechanisms used at an organisational level, and the second at a 
functional level. Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the mechanisms 
used. 
(1) Organisational Level 
The company is rich in legendary tales of business daring and a culture of doing 
“whatever it takes to create customers for life” [CME-Co Website]. Induction training 
for CS Technicians, Engineers and ISS practitioners is used to provide “new hires with 
knowledge of key products, key clients and company specific skills such as M-Gates 
and [ISS] policies”, as stated by the Learning Officer. New inductees are also “made 
aware of the founders of the company through analogies and story-telling, as well as 
Engineering Gurus”, according to the Knowledge Consultant. Specific training such as 
“compliance courses or lab simulations are used in addition to the usual induction 
sessions, through E-learning from the CME-Co university”, as stated by the IT 
Manager. 
“Learning on-the-job through mentoring or job shadowing is very useful in building up 
relationships and reducing the time needed to get up to speed, but it isn’t formal even 
though every business function does it, it’s sort of on an ad hoc basis”, according to the 
Engineering Trainer. According to the IT Manager, “face-to-face meetings in a globally 
dispersed organisation are very useful; you need to establish some sort of relationship 
with your colleagues especially if you’re managing them”. Additionally “the PPMG is 
very useful for integrating the different business functions. For IT it’s vital in ensuring 
that we and Security meet our customer’s needs and that our own [IT and ISS] are also 
met”, as further explained by the IT Manager. As explained by the Corporate Security 
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Officer, “brainstorming at the end of each [audit] review is very beneficial, even more 
so if Deloitte [the Auditor] are involved or immediately after their feedback. It makes 
the next review far easier”. “Recording lessons-learned at the end of a project or review 
is necessary for us to improve for the next project or review. Even for a joint project it is 
very useful to note how a competitor operates”, as stated by the Corporate Security 
Officer. 
As described by the Purchasing Manager, “the most useful technologies in CME-Co 
are; teleconferences, email, which is a nightmare to manage after a while, the Intranet 
and Excel. Even though we are a storage company everyone downloads to Excel, it’s 
just easier than trying to find what you need through all the different Oracle views. We 
download, filter what we need to do our jobs and generate reports; anything else I need I 
can access Channel CME-Co, our [central] document repository, and E-Room to work 
with my suppliers”. The organisation has also created specific groups and forums in 
order to coordinate different initiatives and core functions. As explained by the CS 
Manager, “the management discussion forum is used at a functional level for 
collaborating across subsidiaries. It is used to select key best practices and guidelines 
for specific functions”. Groups such as the OISRM and the Corporate Security group 
were established “to drive our internal and external security agenda in compliance and 
in selling our security expertise”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer. According 
to the KMS Engineering Trainer, “the Knowledge Development group [KDG] was 
created in CS to develop our Level 1 and 2 training needs and the KCS team were 
established to act as a [solution] quality review community of practice”. Additionally 
the role of the Knowledge Consultant was created to champion KM and “drive the 
centralisation of our internal knowledge”.  
The next sub-section describes the KM mechanisms used primarily by the ISS and CS 
functions. 
(2) IS Security and Customer Support Function Levels 
The ISS function avails of “vendor resources or repositories of best practices, security 
forums, M-Gates for project management and many, many teleconferences”, as stated 
by the [Cork] Security Officer. Pagers also notify practitioners if there are alerts from 
the firewalls or IDS monitoring tools; and daily emails are sent from the OISRM group 
with warnings and hyperlinks to solutions or procedures. As explained by the Security 
Coordinator, “[the] SETA [security, education, training and awareness] programmes are 
useful in informing new hires about the [different] threats to CME-Co and to be wary of 
man-in-the-middle attacks as well as the penalties for breaking [security] policies”. As 
described by the Knowledge Consultant, “CS uses the same tools available to every 
other function; common and individual shares – but we would prefer if employees 
would use E-Room for storing [individual] documentation, Power-Link for our 
customers and partners. Email, vendor websites, Q & As [forums], external technical 
forums and Channel CME-Co are also used”.  
The Engineering Manager explained that “multiple mechanisms are used to create, share 
and use knowledge in the CS arm of the organisation. We have a mechanism called 
subject matter expert programme [which] involves sending our people to work with 
[U.S.] Engineering for up to six weeks, where they shadow an Engineer, working with 
him, by front-ending calls. On their return they continue to front-end the calls saving the 
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[U.S.] Engineers time especially at three o’clock in the morning [due to a five hour time 
difference]”. As described by the KMS Engineering Trainer and the Engineering 
Manager “valuable trusted relationships were created as a result, especially when the 
Engineers recognised the benefits [time] of mentoring – [Cork] Engineers”. The 
disadvantage of the programme was, according to the Engineering Manager, “the cost in 
getting our people from here [Cork] or Sydney to the U.S. to work with the Design 
Engineers on a regular basis”. According to the Engineering Trainer “the escalation or 
problem-solving process is another mechanism to ensure the quality of the solutions 
stored in Primus [the CBR Tool]”. “Primus is used by CS and ISS to track calls and the 
escalation process”, as stated by the Remote Services Manager. Experts are used to 
review solutions and technical writers from the KCS team are also used to ensure that 
fixes are valuable and follow the tools [Primus] template. “Initially this [solution 
process] wasn’t monitored and the fix standard was poor and difficult to search 
[untagged]”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. Prior to the introduction of 
Primus  in 1994, “CS identified a number of inefficiencies such as: (1) lack of technical 
content, (2) content was often written at the wrong level, (3) little or no procedural 
information, (4) manuals were often written with insufficiently detailed information, 
and (5) technical information  wasn’t always added”, according to the KMS 
Engineering Trainer. 
As described by the CS Manager, “we [have] moved away from email and other sources 
of information points to effectively change information from document-centric focus to 
workflow focus and try and capture new information in the workflow”. The Knowledge 
Consultant explained that, “end-users [CS Engineers, Engineers, Field technicians and 
trainers] wanted all the information regarding products in one centralised location. They 
did not want the process of finding a fix or answer to be a separate process and [needed 
it to be] integrated into the workflow - the day-to-day routine followed to service 
customers. Rather than finding the fix for a problem and later going back and recording 
it for others to use, users wanted to capture the information as it is developed and make 
it available to everyone to improve the service of products and prevent problems from 
occurring”. However the CS Manager and Knowledge Consultant contend that, “the 
Engineering bug tracking system is completely partitioned from CS”. Power-Link the 
Corporate Extranet, then “connects customers to the Customer Support, training, 
product, and interoperability information [in Primus] that they may need at any time”, 
according to the E-Services Manager. “Customers can personalise their view so that the 
Knowledge tool makes it easier to find information and resources on the products that 
they use”, as stated by the KMS Engineering Trainer. Customers and CS members can 
also “use Channel CME-Co [Extranet and Intranet] to locate an expert on a [particular] 
product”, as stated by the Knowledge Consultant.  
The next sub-section compares KM mechanism usage by the ISS and CS functions. 
(3) CME-Co KM Mechanisms 
KM mechanisms are structural methods used to promote the exploitation of KM tools 
and are supported by the organisational infrastructure (section 5.1.2).  Table 5.11 
outlines and summarises the forty-one KM mechanisms used within CME-Co which 
were verified by the Knowledge Consultant, KMS Engineering Trainer and the Security 
Officer. The proportion of mechanism usage, within the two functions, was high with 
seventy-eight percent of the mechanisms, available used. Overall fifty percent of the 
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mechanisms identified were categorised as organisational (used by the two functions). 
Twenty-one percent of the organisational mechanisms were identified as non-
technological and twenty-six percent as technological.  On the-the-job training, ad hoc 
mentoring, training, face-to-face meetings, brainstorming sessions, analogies, stories of 
business daring, the documentation of lessons-learned was each exploited by the ISS 
and CS functions.  
The contribution of IS and CS practitioners to CME-Co was reported to be easier when 
knowledge was made accessible through technology. The content stored was explicit, 
shared and modified if required. CME-Co combines its document management system 
with Channel CME-Co (the Intranet) to provide centralised knowledge. The other 
mechanisms used by the two functions were identified as: common shares, 
technological forums, an Extranet for external collaboration, excel, email, vendor 
repositories, an E-learning platform, electronic contact lists, internal repositories, 
lessons-learned databases, hyperlinks and two-way pagers. The mechanisms used to 
facilitate socialisation included: cooperative projects across the functions (PPMG), 
repositories of best practices and lessons-learned. Combination was facilitated by 
collaborating through documentation management systems (DMS), databases, problem-
solving, escalation processes and web-based access to knowledge. 
The integration of CS practitioner expertise was regarded as a strategic initiative. 
Primus was created to combine explicit and tacit knowledge of CS practitioners. The 
CBR tool (Primus) was used to acquire and manage CS knowledge and distribute it 
within CS and among partners. The tool was used to disseminate and reuse the solutions 
created which ultimately improved the effectiveness of CS decision-making. 
Knowledge capture was also facilitated by Customer Support’s case-based reasoning 
(CBR) tool. Knowledge sharing was enabled through the use of repositories, lessons-
learned systems, expertise locators through contact lists and the corporate Intranet – 
Channel CME-Co. Knowledge application systems such as the CBR tool and the 
hierarchical relationships outlined in the structure of the organisation enabled 
practitioners to create, store, share and use solutions. The ISS and CS functions were 
also categorised as support centres and as such were used to facilitate direction, policies 
and standards used to support and protect CME-Co. Thirty-nine percent of the CS 
mechanisms identified were categorised as non-technological with just twelve percent 
technological. This low percentage indicated a significant difference in its use of non-
technological mechanisms such as employee shadowing, simulated training and rotation 
in order to share Engineering expertise and build relationships between the different 
levels of support. CS utilised ad hoc groups and roles to coordinate the development of 
skills, and the incorporation of a quality solution review group. A Knowledge 
Consultant role was also created to coordinate the centralisation of CS knowledge 
across the dispersed support groups and levels.  
Thirty-nine percent of the ISS mechanisms identified were categorised as non-
technological with an equal percentage as technological. The ISS function utilised non-
technological mechanisms such as SETA to control employee behaviour regarding 
external risks and threats to CME-Co. Formal groupings were established to drive the 
different facets of ISS. The OISRM and Corporate Security groups were established to 
source regulatory standards, coordinate internal security and identify customer and 
therefore market requirements. Additionally membership of and participation in 
regulatory bodies and ISS forums enabled the organisation to steer the ISS regulatory 
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market. Security technologies were used to pull data from across the geographically 
displaced subsidiaries to develop a picture of the CME-Co security landscape.  ISS 
knowledge was also captured through solution templates and stored in repositories 
where it could easily be retrieved by ISS practitioners.  
Table 5.11 illustrates the high volume of KM mechanisms used in CME-Co. It is 
evident that ISS utilised formalised mechanisms and external measures compared to 
Customer Support’s ad hoc mechanisms to drive KM within the function. The 
significant difference between the functions was the use of the CBR tool. CS positioned 
its KM initiative around Primus. Due to the dedication of CS practitioners the role of 
the tool was gradually increased as its value to CME-Co was continuously 
demonstrated. Additionally, Primus was used to provide CS solutions and as a self-
service support environment for CME-Co customers and partners. CS utilised quality 
mechanisms for the solutions created, allowed knowledge filtering and advanced search 
criteria’s and pushed CS knowledge towards CME-Co customers. Therefore ISS was 
externally driven to comply with specific goals and measures due to regulatory 
requirements and CS was driven to develop skills and utilise practitioner knowledge 
more efficiently. ISS utilised KM mechanisms to supports the function’s goals of 
protecting the corporate assets, adhering to regulatory constraints and sourcing 
environmental opportunities for exploiting the regulatory market. However the 
utilisation of a CBR tool and lab simulations could enhance the ISS functions 
effectiveness in supporting the needs of the organisation.  
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IS SECURITY AND CUSTOMER SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE MECHANISMS 
Mechanisms: Use ISS CS 
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Induction Training: Specialised for CS Technicians & Engineers √ √ 
Analogies: Founders & specific Engineers are promoted as heroes √ √ 
Learning on the Job: New staff are introduced to role gradually √ √ 
SETA: Security awareness training for general new hires √ 
Lab simulations: CS Tools & procedures are taught in a fake CS lab √ 
Mentoring: On an ad hoc basis √ √ 
Rotation: With Corporate Engineering group – subject to budget √ 
Job shadowing: Learning by observation √ 
Teleconferences: Regular meetings with Security Coordinator & team √ 
Face-to-face meeting: Onsite & arranged ISS team meetings √ √ 
Development Group: (KDG) Coordinating skills development & solution quality √ 
Quality Review Group: (KSC) Engineers assigned to review internal & partner solutions √ 
OISRM Group: Coordinating the roll down of ISS policies & best practices √ 
Compliance Group: Enhancement of products with security features √ 
External Evaluation:  Auditors (Review) & Security Vendors (Penetration Testing) √ 
Expert Status: Identified through Primus for solution with most hits /use √ 
CME-Co University: E-learning – for e.g. Six Sigma / SOX /  SW Engineering √ √ 
M-Gates Method: Step by step project management for collaborating √ 
Brain storming: Internal Collaborative Forum to Record Lessons-learned √ √ 
Informal Contact list: To ensure that hires have a basic contact list – re function √ 
PPMG: Project Portfolio Mgt Group for Unit Requirements √ √ 
Knowledge Consultant: To drive CS effort in centralising knowledge √ 
Problem-solving: Escalation process √ √ 
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Primus: Case based reasoning tool √ 
Common Shares: Function share drives √ √ 
Global Tech Forums: External Vendor Repository of Best practices √ √ 
E-Room: External collaboration & internal share √ √ 
Excel: Used to summarise data from ERP for day-to-day use √ √ 
CME-Co Channel: Intranet /Central document repository √ √ 
Email: Warnings re threats/ bugs √ √ 
Vendor Repositories: Product specifications /  Security alerts & guidelines √ √ 
Knowledge-Link: General online training – on request √ √ 
Mgr Discussion Forum: Used at function level for collaborating across subsidiaries √ 
Power-Link: Extranet/Customer & Partner access  √ 
Eng Bug tracking Sys: Limited access to CS / used for Eng solution generation √ 
Contact Lists: Online & personal Expert pools list √ √ 
Repositories: Best practices & guides √ √ 
Lessons-learned DB: For recording end of a project / review √ √ 
Security Forum: Collaborative Corporate Forum √ 
Scanning SW Monitoring the NW 
VPN: Tunnelling to protect communication √ 
Hyperlinks: Daily email warnings with links to solutions & guides √ √ 
Wireless technology: 2-way pagers from Firewall etc alerts / Calls √ 
*Organisational Level (√√): √ ISS and √ CS 
* Specific to One Function: √ 
Table 5.11: IS Security and Customer Support KM Mechanisms.  
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5.1.7 Impact of Managing IS Security and Customer Support Knowledge  
This section describes the impact of managing IS Security and CS knowledge within 
CEM-Co. The direct and indirect management of this knowledge has impacted the 
organisation at the following three levels: (1) individual; (2) functional and (3) finally at 
an organisational level. 
Level (1) Individual Impact 
The management of knowledge has impacted employees in the IS Security function 
through “attendance at security conferences, employee reviews as well as external 
reviews”, as stated by the IT Manager. As explained by the Corporate Security Officer 
“it makes our jobs easier as new security technologies are complex and [knowledge] 
tools and best practices help us keep ahead of threats like hackers”. Ultimately the audit 
process helps the group improve, as according to the [Cork] Security Officer, “audits 
were a pain but they have become so much easier and are a kind of evaluation of our 
role”. 
CS has measured the impact of the use of its CBR tool on members. As explained by 
the KMS Engineering Trainer, “training has been reduced from six to three months, 
managers use a report [from Primus] of the number of solutions created by employees 
and the number of hits [solution use] during employee reviews”. Employees also regard 
the CBR as invaluable “in keeping ahead of product changes”, as stated by Level 1 
Technician. Access to a “greater number of solutions makes our jobs a lot easier and [it] 
is ultimately recognition of our role within CME-Co”, as stated by the CS Manager. 
Greater use of the CBR coupled with greater access allows CS employees to “tackle 
more calls and frees senior staff for more complex issues”, as stated by the Knowledge 
Consultant. 
Level (2) Functional Impact 
As described by the OISRM Coordinator, “the overall performance of the group isn’t 
measured using conventional means”. “Return on investment is not suitable in 
measuring the value of security; we are measured in terms of loss of productivity due to 
system downtime or the time to re-establish a network”, as stated the GIS Director. The 
ISS function “does not measure how well we manage our security knowledge, we look 
at ways to improve our processes, speed up decision-making and time necessary to get 
new members up to speed”, according to the IT Manager. “Members know where to 
find security knowledge and who the different experts are”, as stated by the Corporate 
Security Officer. “A [specialised] group was created to coordinate and share [best] 
practices and standards across the organisation”, as stated by the Corporate Security 
Officer. 
As explained by the CS Manager, “[increased] sharing across the different levels 
reduces cost and improves [the] productivity”, of the function. Customer “problems are 
escalated through the different levels to develop new solutions”, as stated by the KMS 
Engineering Trainer. “Someone in Hopkinton can easily use a solution constructed by 
someone in Sydney”, as stated by the Engineering Manager. “The utilisation of Primus 
has made the support of a complex growing portfolio of products achievable”, 
according to the CS Manager. “The benefits of our technological solution to our 
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knowledge management problem are numerous”, as stated by the KMS Engineering 
Trainer. The use of the Primus solution allows “the collective knowledge of CS to be 
available to everyone for solving customer problems more quickly and effectively”. The 
KMS Engineering Trainer stated that, “usage [internal and external combined] is 
doubling every eight weeks, freeing up Engineers”. 
(2.1) Product / Service Impact 
As explained by the Security Coordinator, “best practices and standards are bought and 
evaluated to develop the best security solution for the organisation”. “Diagnosing of 
problems increases [knowledge of Security groups and] response times for fixes”, as 
stated by the IT Manager. Audits are used as “evaluations of our work but they are also 
used as an extra for our customers, we incorporate tools to make things easier for our 
customers”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer.  
Capturing problems and questions from customers and “tracking the frequency of 
occurrence enables focused product improvements”, as stated by the Knowledge 
Consultant. “If a solution is being continually reused, we can look at the root cause and 
fix it”, as stated by the CS Manager. “Escalations and reverse-engineering are very 
useful in problem-solving”, as stated by the CS Manager. Additionally if a solution is 
continually reused Engineering “can examine the root cause and fix new releases of the 
product”, as explained by the Engineering Manager.  
(2.2) Processes 
As described by the [Cork] Security Officer, “brainstorming sessions at the end of a 
project allow us to record the results or lessons-learned, which will be useful for the 
next review or incident”. A high number of external web sources; repositories, forums 
are used by Security Officers. “We know what’s going on, more often than not – when 
we come in the morning we have emails warning us of potential threats and the steps we 
should take. The warning could come from the U.S. or McAfee”, as stated by the 
Security Coordinator. “We do record [the frequency of] calls per customer and solves 
[per employee] internally but it’s the reviews which are used by management to 
determine our value”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. Compliance has forced the 
creation of “a security group as well as a stakeholder group to identify ways to sell 
security enhancements”, as stated by the Corporate Security Officer.  
CS uses “employee rotation to learn from Engineers, brainstorming sessions, use of 
forums, and the number of solution hits as measures for Primus”, as stated by the 
Engineering Manager. Additionally “the longer it takes for a customer’s problem to be 
solved, the more layers of support it travels through, increasing cost and utilising 
resources. Each successive layer is equipped to handle fewer and fewer calls. By 
pushing knowledge back toward the customer we are able to free up resources [money, 
personnel] which can be better utilised to improve products and get products to market”, 
as stated by the Knowledge Consultant. The CS Manager further explained that, “every 
day spent by Engineers on customer problems is a day that the next generation of 
product will be delayed, thereby eroding our market advantage”. Innovative solutions 
are pushed towards customers to reduce costs and time and therefore the use of internal 
stored and tacit knowledge. 
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Level (3) Organisational Impact 
Security strategy is aligned to the business strategy “due to environmental drivers and 
the fact that poor security would have a dramatic effect on our image since we are a 
technological organisation and sell security”, as stated by the Corporate Security 
Officer. As described by the GIS Director, “best practices are sourced and evaluated 
before we distribute them to the different subsidiaries. This enables us to be more 
effective in protecting CME-Co”. As explained by the Compliance Officer, “the 
auditing process has made a huge difference internally and with our customers, we use 
compliance as a selling feature for our products and SOX gave the group a lot of 
[internal] political power”. “Members are also learning how to apply their [security] 
knowledge effectively due to the evaluation process that we have now, through internal 
and external auditing”, as stated by the Compliance Coordinator. Membership and 
coordination of “regulatory bodies allow CME-Co to drive and influence the market, 
it’s the only way to stay ahead of everything and everyone”, as explained by the 
Corporate Security Officer.  
As described by the CS Manager, “it [Primus] enhances our relationship with 
customers”. “The [KM] approach used here [CS] is just for CS [and not aligned to the 
business strategy], we have proved a reduction in escalation costs but it’s not used 
across the different functions”, as stated by the Engineering Trainer. However, the CS 
Manager stated that, in addition to CS, “Primus supports IT, specific quality assurance 
and Engineering personnel and a part of manufacturing use the software”. Customer 
Support “quickly discovered that the knowledge management system enables them to 
spend more time on the job learning rather than searching for answers”, as explained by 
the E-Services Manager. Making the tool available to customers for “self-help has also 
reduced the time needed to answer calls”, as stated by the KDG Officer.  
The system was created due to “falling profit margins, increasing demand for product 
technical knowledge (both by customers and internally), increasing complexity of 
products as well as number, and the rising cost of the CS”, as stated by the KMS 
Engineering Trainer. The objective or goal of adopting a KM approach in CS is to push 
knowledge toward the customer as the longer it takes for a customer’s problem to be 
solved (from the time the “call was logged”), the more layers (functions) of support it is 
escalated through, increasing cost and the utilisation of resources.  
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IMPACTS ISS FUNCTION: NO KM INITIATIVE CS FUNCTION: KM INITIATIVE 
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Learning Security conferences, Employee reviews as well as external reviews Amount of time in Training before use on the job – reduced from 6 to 3 months, 
Employee reviews 
Adaptability Product complexity is high & constant – K Tools Product complexity is high & constant – CBR Tool supports the process. 
Satisfaction Job is easier due to specific processes & tools/practices available Access to greater number of solutions – makes job easier & is recognition of value within 
the organisation.  
Adaptability Specialised group to coordinate & share knowledge across organisation. Increased sharing across the different levels reduces cost & improves productivity. 
Satisfaction Shared knowledge across the different groups Customer problems are escalated through the different levels to develop new solutions 
(
2
.
1
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Value-added Best practices & standards are sought & evaluated to improve security 
within the organisation. Diagnosing of problems increases knowledge of 
Security groups & response times for fixes 
Escalation processes enables improved service & products for customers.  
Reverse-engineered products (Corporate & Vendor) increased value of solutions & 
products 
Knowledge 
(based) 
Fewer surprises in regular audits, increased security information & tools 
for customer products 
Improvements on products from Customer feedback & repeated bugs are passed back to 
Engineering to fix in the next release. Faster response time for fixes, Pushing knowledge 
back to the Customer reduces costs. 
Full package inc security provided to Customers Solutions for problems are made available to Customers. 
(
2
.
2
)
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Effectiveness Brainstorming sessions; Use of GW (email) & repositories of Best 
Practices, Standards, & lessons-learned 
Employee rotation to learn from Engineers; Brainstorming sessions; Number & use of 
Forums, No of shared solutions published per CS member. 
Fewer mistakes made – after evaluations Fewer mistakes made – with access to knowledge reservoirs 
Efficiency High number of external web sources; High volume of K stored in 
repositories. Number & use of Forums 
No of Solution hits is measured & rewarded; Reuse of Solutions 
Frequency of Calls per Customer / Employee, Use of Corporate Expert 
list.| No. of improvements as a result of an Evaluation 
High number of external web sources used; High volume of K stored in repositories. 
Frequency of Calls per Customer, Use of Corporate Expert list, No of improvements as a 
result of KM or Knowledge Tools, No of hits for solution links. 
Innovation Brainstorming for Audit reviews to improve the process & the 
evaluation, Group formed to use security as a selling enhancement 
Innovative Solutions are pushed back to the customer to reduce costs & time required of 
Innovators, Improved use of internal stored & tacit knowledge 
(
3
)
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Direct Security strategy is aligned to business strategy KM is not aligned to business strategy; KM is ad hoc & specific to CS. However 
knowledge (solutions) is pushed towards the customer to reduce CS costs. 
Membership of regulatory bodies to drive the industry Reduction in escalations reduces costs 
Indirect Poor security has dramatic affect on Corporate image Enhance Customer loyalty by being open 
Best practices shared to be more effective in protecting the org. Product designs shared in Eng. to increase productivity, Faster response than competitors 
Table 5.12: IS Security and Customer Support KM Impacts. 
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 5.1.8 Summary: Managing ISS and CS Functional Knowledge   
Table 5.12 outlines the different impacts generated as a result of the two approaches 
used to manage knowledge within the two functions. While CS has a formalised KM 
initiative through the application of the CBR tool, the IS Security function benefits from 
the formalised processes used to manage the organisation’s regulatory requirements. 
ISS has significantly impacted the organisation. The ISS strategy is aligned to the 
business strategy ensuring that ISS is mapped to every organisational technology and 
process. ISS is an active member of regulatory bodies and steers the market to create 
potential financial gains for CME-Co. An inefficient ISS function would result in 
corporate breaches and loss of earnings. The KM strategy used in CS is not aligned to 
the business strategy and as a result is dependent on the CS practitioners who are 
driving the use of KM tools and processes. KM is also specific to Customer Support. 
However CS costs are reduced and time which would have been spent answering calls 
by Engineers is spent creating new products. Customer loyalty is also increased when 
an organisation is open and willing to share knowledge. Therefore the two functions 
have benefited from managing knowledge. CS utilised a KM initiative to positively 
impact the CS function and ISS manages knowledge due to environmental 
requirements. However ISS has also identified market niches to target and ultimately 
increase profits. The functions have been positively impacted by managing knowledge. 
To benefit from the lessons-learned from CS the ISS function could exploit case-based 
reasoning tools and devise incentives for ISS practitioners to become problem-solving 
gurus. 
The findings provided a rich description of the approaches used by the IS Security and 
Customer Support functions, in CME-Co, for managing knowledge and its impact on 
the members, functions and the organisation. While the Customer Support functions 
attempted to implement and manage their knowledge, the findings showed that the IS 
Security functions were just as effective without implementing a KM initiative. The 
findings also showed that the circumvention of control by the Customer Support 
functions has a “knock-on” effect on the IS Security function and their roles in 
protecting the organisations. The implementation of regulatory controls provided the IS 
Security functions with tools, processes, specialised roles and mechanisms to 
coordinate, control, evaluate and monitor functions, traffic flows, access to corporate 
knowledge stocks and rogue (internal and external) behaviour. It is clear from the 
findings that these control mechanisms, which appear to stem primarily from 
environmental drivers specifically impact the organisation’s IS Security functions 
positively and the CS functions negatively. 
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CHAPTER SIX 

EXPLORING THE TELE-CO CASE STUDY 
6.0 Introduction 
The preceding Chapter presented the data gathered in the first case study. The purpose 
of this Chapter to address the first research and the second research questions through 
steps 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the research protocol described and illustrated in Chapter 3 
(section 3.5 and Figure 3.1). The case organisation has been assigned a pseudonym, 
which is a condition of the researcher’s authorisation to access the organisation and 
conduct and publish the study as it pertains to the organisation (Figure 1.1). This 
Chapter consists of eight primary sections (6.1.1 to 6.1.8) to structure the case as 
required by the research lens (Figure 2.5 and described in section 2.7.1). Sections 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2 describe the organisational background and infrastructure. Sections 6.1.3 and 
6.1.4 describe the management of knowledge within the ISS and CS functions. Section 
6.1.5 compares the approaches used by the two functions. Sections 6.1.6 and 6.1.7 
describe the mechanisms used to promote the management of knowledge and the 
impacts at a functional and organisational level. Sections 6.1.7 and 6.1.8 conclude by 
highlighting the impact of compliance on the management of knowledge within the 
organisation (Table 6.12). 
6.1 TELE-Co 
6.1.1 Organisational Background 
TELE-Co (pseudonym) is an Engineering company and a global leader in 
wireless, broadband and automotive communications. The organisation operates in a 
very dynamic industry where knowledge and learning are paramount to the 
development of new products. The business environment is influenced by rapid 
technological advancement, high demand and short product lifecycles and therefore a 
high level of uncertainty. Threats such as reverse-engineering, viruses and regulatory 
constraints are considered significant. TELE-Co’s product portfolio is complex and 
range from wireless handsets and networks to embedded telematics systems that enable 
automated navigation. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the company’s profile since it 
was formed in 1928 (Table 3.4). The organisation entered the mobile communications 
sector in 1936 and has since then strived to be the first to release new mobile 
technologies into the market. This goal is, according to the Director of HR, “driven by 
an innovative working environment and a highly rated Customer Support service”. The 
corporation’s mission is to leverage the collective knowledge of the global corporation 
through strategically utilising processes and software tools which can enhance its 
efficiency. The efficiency of the company’s product realisation process is one of its key 
competitive strengths. As described by the PKM Coordinator “TELE-Co today faces the 
challenge of developing innovative products to build market share, while at the same 
time reducing the time to market, improving the total product cost, and meeting the 
quality, performance, reliability and value needs of our customers and markets”. This 
drive is towards mass customisation, through “a market-of-one as well as for supply 
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chain efficiency”, as stated by Design Engineer 1, has highlighted the need to manage 
product development resources efficiently and in a manner that coordinates [the many 
facets of] Engineering, Manufacturing, Marketing, and Distribution. The organisation 
has recognised the need for both a secure and a productive control environment. 
Knowledge is regarded as a corporate resource and according to the PKM Coordinator 
“significant investment has been made into establishing a global prototyping knowledge 
management group and in implementing ICT to support both a culture of collaboration 
and security”. As described by the TGS Coordinator “security is considered at a senior 
level to be both a necessity and a key selling enhancement for new product releases”. 
The organisation is a global organisation “with regional divisions defined by product 
under the World Engineering Corporation [WEC] umbrella”, as stated by the Former 
Engineering Manager. Each division is regarded and “referred to as an organisation 
supported by a CS, IT and Security Support functions”, as stated by the TIP Auditor.  
For the purpose of this investigation the Global Telecom Solutions Sector (GTSS) is 
investigated. As explained by the CS Manager “cell phone support, for customers such 
as O², varies from [queries regarding] coding errors, product changes, interface changes 
and usability support”. The ISS function is “charged with assuring the infrastructure of 
the organisation and protecting assets such as product designs and processes”, as stated 
by the TGS Coordinator. 
PROFILE OF TELE-Co 
1928 TELE-Co started as Galvin Manufacturing Corporation in 1928. 
1936 Entered the Mobile Communications business with Police Cruiser Radio. 
1943 First portable FM two-way radio for U.S. Army. 
1955 First high-power transistor in commercial production. 
1963 Developed first rectangular picture tube for colour TV. 
1969 First words from the moon relayed via a TELE-Co radio 
1970 Formed the Science Advisory Board Associates (SABA)  
1976 Moved its Headquarters to Illinois U.S. 
1983 World’s first commercial handheld cellular phone. 
1986 Invented the Six Sigma Quality Improvement Process. It provided a common Worldwide 
language for measuring quality and became a global standard.  
1995 The TELE-Co pager is the world’s first two-way pager. 
1996 World’s smallest and lightest cell phone. 
2000 Wireless phone for always-on Internet access. 
2003 TELE-Co announced that it would spin off its semiconductor product sector into a separate 
company called Free-scale Semiconductor, Inc. The new company began trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange on July 16th of the following year. 
2004 Iconic RAZR V3 wireless phone introduced. 
2005 Fast Broadband Network using a relay system. 
2006 Sold its Automotive Division in order to streamline cell phone business. 
2007 Sold its Embedded Communications Group to Emerson Electric Co. – provided services and 
products to manufacturers in Defense, aerospace and medical imaging. Closed its plant in Cork 
Ireland.  TELE-Co had a presence in Ireland for over 20 years and has grown to the unique 
position as the only major supplier of both mobile communications and embedded solutions. 
2008 Split into two independent companies: TELE-Co Mobile Devices and TELE-Co Broadband & 
Mobility Solutions, with two Co CEOs. 
Table 6.1: History of TELE-Co (Corporate Documentation: Table 3.4). 
With respect to this investigation, Table 6.2 provides an overview of the data gathered 
from multiple sources within TELE-Co. 
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OVERVIEW OF TELE-Co 
TELE-Co 
-Multinational, 
-Engineering 
-53k Employees 
-€3.6 Billion “07 
Industry Sector Customers Products Competitors Partners/ Vendors 
Telecommunications Industry Fortune 500 Companies, 
Vodophone, O² 
Semi-conductors, Cellular 
Phones, Two-way Radios, Pagers, 
Medical Systems, Power Supplies 
Nokia, Ericsson, 
Lucent, Samsung 
Microsoft, Cisco, McAfee, 
Security Forums, Regulatory 
Bodies, Interoperability Groups 
Corporate Strategy Mission Subsidiaries ISS Function CS Function 
To be the world leader in 
telecommunications infrastructure 
and product developments 
To leverage knowledge to 
achieve product realisation & 
a market of one 
N. America, France, Ireland, 
Israel, Sweden and UK 
Full function is 
displaced throughout 
Org. 
Supporting regional customers 
Interviews 
IS Security Function Customer Support Function Other 
Role Years Subsidiary Role Years Subsidiary Role Years 
• IT Manager 
• TGS Coordinator 
• Security Officer 
• Security Officer (Networks) 
• Security Coordinator 
• TIP Auditor 
• Security Officer 
• TIP Coordinator 
• Compliance Coordinator 
9 
7 
3 
4 
8 
2 
1 
5 
4 
Cork/EMEA 
U.S. 
Cork. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
Australian. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
• CS Engineer 
• CS Eng. Manager 
• Design Engineer 1 
• Design Engineer 2 
• Design Engineer 3 
• Design Engineer 
PKM Coordinator 
• DB Analyst (Compass) 
12 
10 
5 
7 
3 
7 
9 
Cork/EMEA. 
Cork. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
U.S. 
• Director of HR 
• Former 
Engineering 
Manager 
• Former Project 
Manager 
6 
15 
7 
Documentation 
Analysed 
Security Documentation Customer Support Documentation Corporate/Public 
• TELE-Co Customised – ISO17799 Documentation 
• Security Policies Re: email/ Internet/ Remote Access/ SID 
• POPI – (protect our proprietary information) 
• Business Continuity Procedures 
• TELE-Co Electronic Info. Security Standards = ISO17799+ 
• TELE-Co Standard Operating Procedures 
• Standards of Internal Control (SIC) 
• TELE-Co Code of Ethics 
• Disciplinary Measures for Policy Breaches 
• Presentations: 
• KM Courses @ TELE-Co University 
• Six Sigma – A Necessary Change 
• TELE-Co Technology White Papers: M-Gates 
• Intranet: Customer Services Website 
• University – Online Courses: Six Sigma, M-Gates 
• TELE-Co Website – www.TELE-Co.com 
• Annual Reports: 
2000/05/06/07 
• Code of Business Conduct: 
Our Responsibility as 
Employees. 
• Corporate Newsletters 
• Timeline Overview of TELE-
Co History 1928-09 
Table 6.2: TELE-Co Data (Adapted from Tables: 3.3 (Roles & Responsibilities of the Interviewees) & 3.4 (Case Documentation 
Analysed)). 
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6.1.2 Organisational Infrastructure 
The organisational infrastructure is the foundation on which KM resides and is 
composed of: organisation culture, structure, communities of practice (CoP), common 
knowledge and ISS infrastructure. These TELE-Co components are discussed in the 
next five sub-sections. 
6.1.2.1 Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture reflects the norms and beliefs which guide the behaviour of 
TELE-Co’s employees. TELE-Co’s culture is reported by the PKM Coordinator as a 
“knowledge sharing and innovative culture”. The CS Manager contends that the culture 
“very much depends on the region, and affects the sharing of knowledge across the 
organisations [functions]”. As explained by the Engineering CS Technician “EMEA is 
quite different from APAC [Asia Pacific], Europe and India are very open to sharing 
information or knowledge but China will forget about you as soon as you leave the 
country [after a meeting] and escalate calls as soon as they can [pass a problem on]”. As 
described by the IT Manager, “TELE-Co does not have an overly restrictive 
environment”. The TGS Coordinator further explained that “physical security is very 
visible and policies and ethics are evident to all employees, security is transparent and 
seen as a necessity given the competitive environment [the organisation] operates in”. 
The business environment and customer requirements have forced a culture of security 
awareness. 
6.1.2.2 Organisational Structure 
Organisational structure is complex in a multinational organisation. The reporting 
structure can impact the management of ISS and CS knowledge. “The structure of the 
organisations is convoluted and we are trying to reorganise it to be more effective in 
supporting the business”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator. Currently the organisation 
is divided according to “five separate [product] divisions [situated] across the globe”, as 
explained by the TIP Auditor. Each division is under the WEC umbrella and described 
as follows: (1) the Broadband Communications Sector, (2) the Commercial, 
Government and Industrial Solutions Sector, (3) the Integrated Electronic Systems 
Sector, (4) the Personal Communications Sector, and finally (5) the Global Telecom 
Solutions Sector (GTSS). The Global Telecom Solutions Sector delivers the 
infrastructure, network services and software that meet the needs of operators 
worldwide, while providing a migration path to next-generation networks that enables 
TELE-Co to offer innovative, revenue-generating applications and services to 
customers. As explained by the CS Manager, “the GTSS is composed of Design, 
Development and Support Engineers with business units such as Sales, Marketing and 
HR and ISS functions”. “The calls rotate to a local dispersed support team, then it is 
escalated to the next level of support and then to Design Engineering and so on”, as 
stated by Design Engineer 2. A PKM group was “established in 2000 to support the 
knowledge requirements of Customer Support and Design and Development 
Engineering to reduce product life cycles”, according to the PKM Coordinator. “The 
PKM group coordinates the alignment of knowledge management to existing TELE-Co 
processes [M-Gates]”, as stated by Design Engineer 3.    
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6.1.2.3 Common Knowledge 
Common knowledge helps integrate employee knowledge through the use of 
terminology relevant only to the organisation. TELE-Co’s product portfolio is wide and 
complex requiring significant expertise in supporting customer needs. As explained by 
the Former Engineering Manager “product design specifications are considered 
common knowledge”. “Methodologies developed internally, such as the Six Sigma 
quality system, are regarded as additional languages. Employees are taught [Six Sigma] 
as part of our induction programme through TELE-Co University”, as stated by Design 
Engineer 3. As described by the [Cork] Security Officer “anything available on our 
corporate Intranet is pretty much viewed as common knowledge, employees have access 
to contact lists, presentations, policies and best practices for whatever function you are 
working in”. “SETA is also a necessary part of our induction programme with emphasis 
placed on the different penalties for breaking security policies, this is an Engineering 
organisation and security education about common threats is necessary”, as stated by 
the Director of HR. Therefore TELE-Co utilises common knowledge to induct new 
hires into an engineering and competitive culture. 
6.1.2.4 Physical Environment 
Physical environment is an important consideration in fostering knowledge 
management. As described by the [Cork] Security Officer “an open plan office is 
consistent across the organisation except at a managerial level and for conference 
rooms”. “Physical security is evident but this is more for outsiders coming in. While we 
have to follow [restrictions such as] swipe key access – it becomes the norm after a few 
weeks”, as stated by the TIP Coordinator. The CS Manager further explained that “it 
[physical security] isn’t even noticeable now but I have problems with a geographically 
displaced support team for GTSS. Not only is time and language an issue but so is our 
presence for some groups. If I or a member of my team is physically present in our 
APAC offices; knowledge sharing is easy but as soon as we leave it disappears”. 
Therefore geographically dispersed subsidiaries are a challenge for ISS and knowledge 
management. 
6.1.2.5 IT Infrastructure 
IT Infrastructure facilitates and supports an organisation’s KM infrastructure. As 
explained by the PKM Coordinator, “Engineers can avail of content management 
systems [which store lessons-learned and documentation] that allow all employees to 
search for any published documents and, depending on their access rights, retrieve the 
necessary documentation”. Therefore “employees can determine the existence of work 
already carried out and request access if needed”, as stated by the DB Analyst. 
“Information systems to support knowledge capture and reuse are presently in place or 
being rolled out, one example is: Metaphase, a system for product data management 
[PDM] and configuration management [CM]” according to the PKM Coordinator. 
“Communication is controlled [and monitored] with technologies such as scanning 
devices, firewalls and secure identification cards [SID], yet the organisation thrives due 
to the balance between security and productivity determined as effectively as possible 
through trial and error”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator.  
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Due to various legal issues TELE-Co is not a single global organisation. The 
organisation “requires a global security infrastructure with roles allocated to the 
different categories of security who collaborate through call conferencing, video 
conferencing, the Intranet, email and Compass which is based on a package called 
LiveLink18”, as explained by the Security Coordinator. TIPs utilises “specialised 
hardware and software to conduct forensic data analysis to search for files related to 
ongoing litigation, investigative support, breaches of network security and loss of 
intellectual property”, as stated by the TIP Coordinator.  
Table 6.3 summarises the TELE-Co Organisational Infrastructure. 
OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
DIMENSIONS  CHARACTERISTICS 
Org. Culture 
• The value of KM is recognised by management but championed by a CoP - PKM 
• An awareness of Security but not a part of the culture 
ISS is transparent to users 
• Knowledge sharing and innovative environment 
• Multinational Organisation with varied cultures and languages 
Can cause communication problems 
• Knowledge sharing and innovative culture 
Org. 
Structure 
• Hierarchical structure with product divisions (GTSS) 
• Umbrella organisations for e.g. WEC, Security Organisation 
• Reorganisation in progress: constantly shifting 
• Communities of practice (CoP) are created for specific projects – PKM 
• Specialised units/divisions and roles are used – for e.g. TGS, the TIP 
  TIP Auditor, Corporate Security Officer & Knowledge Champion (Unofficial) 
Common 
Knowledge 
• Common Engineering and Telecommunications terminology 
• Shared values and norms 
• Corporate University – for skills development, induction training & common 
methods 
Physical 
Environment 
• Open plan office in each subsidiary – except at a management and function level 
• Geographic separation between Security Officers, CS and Design Engineers 
• No specifically designed rooms for sharing knowledge – Teleconference rooms 
• Face to face contact within teams is very rare  
• Visible physical security presence – Guards, SID & Swipe card access, secure 
rooms 
IT 
Infrastructure 
• Corporate content management systems/Central repositories 
• Controlled, protected lines of communication: -Trial & Error approach to access 
• Global security infrastructure with allocated roles to each security category 
• Intensive forensic analysis of files across the organisation 
Table 6.3: Characteristics of the Organisational Infrastructure. 
The next section describes the Customer Support function’s approach to managing 
knowledge. 
18 LiveLink is a Web-based content management system. 
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6.1.3 Customer Support Function 
TELE-Co is “divided into separate [internally referred to as] organisations such as 
Security and regional divisions under WEC [World Engineering Corporation] which is a 
coordinating umbrella for the divisions”, as stated by the CS Manager.  Each is 
“supported by a CS, IT and security team”, as expanded by the CS Engineer. The GTSS 
division designs, and develops cell phones, and peripheral devices. The division utilises 
a Customer Support team to interact with customers and Engineers. “GTSS along with 
its Customer Support team is dispersed throughout the world and depending on the 
number of Engineers in any one location – that group could have [an] IT, Security and 
compliance, Marketing, Sales and HR teams [assigned”, as described by the Former 
Engineering Manager. As described by the CS Manager “the CS Team, is located 
throughout EMEA and APAC, so support Engineers [different levels of support] are 
located in Cork, the UK, Germany, India, China and Australia”. “GTSS is responsible 
for designing, developing and supporting a wide portfolio of complex [cell phone] 
products [and or components]”, as stated by Design Engineer 1.  
Engineers are also “divided according to their role in the development of a product [or 
component], such as design [Engineering], product [Engineering] or development 
[Engineering], testing Engineers and Support Engineers”, as explained by the Former 
Engineering Manager. This can be “further broken down by [design] domains, for 
example, a cell phone can have multiple parts with groups of Design Engineers working 
in design [knowledge] domains like interface design, coding or the [outer] casing”, as 
stated by the CS Manager. Additionally each [design] domain has to work “separately 
yet simultaneously to design each part while generating a great deal of [design, test and 
projection] knowledge for a single product”, as stated by Design Engineer 4. “It is very 
difficult to combine and share the knowledge generated during this process so we 
decided to create an ad hoc team, made up of GTSS Engineers, to coordinate the 
different domains and called [it] PKM”, as further explained by Design Engineer 4. 
The PKM team was established in 2000 and “uses teleconferences and net meetings, 
approximately every two weeks. It has grown to about thirty Engineers, across a range 
of TELE-Co organisations [including iDEN, the Commercial, Government, and 
Industrial Solutions Sector (CGISS), the PCS Applied Manufacturing Systems 
Technology (AMST) group, the Software and Systems Engineering Research Lab 
(SSERL), and the Compass/Desktop Solutions group]”, as stated by Design Engineer 2. 
The Prototyping Knowledge Management (PKM) team’s mission statement is as 
follows: to partner with product development and core process teams, to integrate 
design knowledge sources within TELE-Co’s product realisation process. By focusing 
on M-gates 7 to 5 (Figure 6.1) and coordinating access to the PKM system [a document 
repository accessed through Compass] and other software tools, our cross-sector team 
will work towards significantly reducing design cycle times and total cost of ownership 
[TELE-Co Website]. 
As described by the PKM Coordinator “the team is facilitates discussions [through] 
forums and developing a community of practice to address the need for applying TELE-
Co’s best technical expertise across a wide range of projects and functional 
organisations”. The team is specifically “addressing the need to access best-in-class 
knowledge, without requiring direct access to, for example, Engineers as virtual experts 
and virtual product designs”, as explained by the Former Engineering Manager. The 
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PKM team is “working to integrate and leverage prototyping, knowledge management 
[PKM], teams, and other communities of practice (CoPs) in TELE-Co. Even though the 
team is essentially a volunteer effort it has grown from five [founding members] to 
thirty”, according to the PKM Coordinator. This indicates the increasing perceived 
value of using PKM by additional domains and Engineers.  
The following section identifies the different types of knowledge utilised by the 
Customer Support function. 
6.1.3.1 Types of Customer Support Knowledge 
The different types of CS knowledge are described in the next three sub-sections. The 
first section describes the general knowledge necessary for practitioners to conduct their 
day-to-day operations. This knowledge is categorised as general as it is available to the 
CS function working throughout the organisation. 
General knowledge common to the CS function is specific to a “product during its 
design, development, implementation and support”, as stated by the CS Engineer. 
“Corporate information, and policies are available on the Intranet through Compass, and 
product designs and trouble-shooting guides are available through the group portal”, as 
stated by the CS Manager. “Any warnings about a product identified by one customer or 
by an Engineer are emailed to the entire support function as well as any links that might 
be useful”, as explained by the CS Engineer. As explained by the PKM Coordinator, 
“Prototyping is a complex process that is familiar to everyone [across WEC]. It includes 
all design evaluation methods that do not require a physical prototype”. However “in a 
broader context the process includes both tactical and strategic prototyping – it’s how 
our innovative products are originally conceived”, as explained by the Former 
Engineering Manager. Traditional “prototyping focuses on evaluation and improvement 
of existing product designs, [PKM] addresses design concept exploration, design 
optimisation, product platforms, product families, product behaviour emulation, 
requirements management and everything else”, as stated by the PKM Coordinator. As 
explained by Design Engineer 4 “Knowledge in TELE-Co is domain [product] specific 
and generated through simulations, so knowledge regarding RF19, systems, circuit 
simulation, mechanical CAD, hardware/software co-design, semiconductors, materials, 
manufacturing, and reliability, and audio quality is general in those domains”. 
“Engineers would also regard themselves as experts on the inner workings of every area 
[domain] if you asked them”, as stated by the Director of HR.   
The next sub-section describes the technical knowledge possessed by members of the 
CS function. 
Technically specific knowledge is specific to the CS function. “Design data is initially 
valuable knowledge but does end up as general knowledge posted on Compass for the 
support team”, as explained by the DB Analyst. As described by Design Engineer 2 
“design knowledge is anything associated with a design. Low-level design data is [the] 
raw output of simulation programs and the contents of CAD files. Design information is 
design data that is potentially useful for decision-making.  The values of design 
19 RF: short for radio frequency, any frequency within the electromagnetic spectrum associated with radio wave 
broadcasts. 
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information are capable of being directly compared to product specifications [the 
estimated average talk-time or physical size of a phone]”. As explained by the PKM 
Coordinator “design knowledge is the knowledge that is actually applied in the 
decision-making process”. In order to be applied “design knowledge must first be 
defined as design information, communicated to the product designer, and then actually 
applied by the Product Designer in making [specific] design decisions”, as explained by 
the Former Engineering Manager. Examples of design knowledge are “learned values of 
simulated talk-time and physical size of a planned portable product, which are applied 
by the Product Designer in making decisions during the design process”, as stated by 
Design Engineer 4. 
As explained by the CS Manager “phones are complex and so difficult to support [given 
the fact that] each product has a large number of interacting components. A digital cell 
phone can have more than five hundred parts, like: SMT [surface mount technology] 
components, housing, speaker, microphone, display, battery, and a keyboard, each 
requiring some type of support”. Additionally, the CS Engineer further explained that 
“each element can interact with neighbouring elements in a variety of ways. For 
example, adjacent SMT components can interact among each other in terms of layout 
space, electrical routability, signal propagation delay, EMI [electromagnetic 
interference], as well as mechanical performance during a [physical] drop of a phone”. 
“CS has to [therefore] support all [of] the components and the coding behind the device, 
which is usually a divide-and-conquer approach in figuring out what the problem is and 
escalating it to the right level, ” as stated by the CS Manager. 
The next sub-section describes the knowledge used for a particular circumstance or 
problem. 
Contextually specific knowledge within CS is primarily used to solve customer 
problems [calls or fixes] and prototyping issues. Customer Support, “use design 
specifications to help solve product bugs” according to the CS Engineer. According to 
the CS Manager “we spend a lot of time trying to reverse-engineer a phone or the part 
my team is responsible for. If we can’t solve a call, we escalate it to the Engineer 
responsible for coding, or interoperability – whoever is needed”. “Product specifications 
are available through the CS and Engineering portals [accessed through Compass], as 
are manuals and trouble-shooting procedures”, as stated by the CS Engineer. According 
to the PKM Coordinator “knowledge regarding a new product design changes during 
the design as we try new variations and test them using our different simulation 
models”. “[Variations of designs are] recorded so that we can review the changes and a 
parts [display] possible interaction with another part”, as explained by Design Engineer 
2. “Although single-domain simulation models have been developed to understand 
some of [these] interactions, [the complexity] of all interactions has been beyond [both] 
human understanding and the limits of traditional, single-domain simulation tools”, as 
explained by the Former Engineering Manager.  
As explained by Design Engineer 1 “some simulations and analyses [testing] are 
restricted to a single domain [for example a drop test in the mechanical Engineering 
domain] and if a problem cannot be solved it can and does often affect other tests [or] 
other components”. “[This] deficiency would still occur even if all [of the] single-
domain simulations were performed [to completion] with a high level of accuracy, as 
the simulations still would be inadequate to predict total product performance”, as 
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explained by the Former Engineering Manager. “To minimise design cycle time, the 
subsystems of new products must be designed concurrently, by focused expert design 
teams [each designing in a different design domain], as further explained by the PKM 
Coordinator. Decisions made within each team tend to affect the performance of other 
subsystems or components. As described by the Former Engineering Manager “if these 
design dependencies are not identified and controlled, the interactions can lead to design 
errors and product failures. Identifying these interactions is beyond the scope of single-
domain simulations”. “It is our experienced Engineers who are skilled in combining the 
different design [outputs] from the different teams to create an integrated model [or] 
prototype of a new product or component”, as stated by the PKM Coordinator. 
Furthermore “customer specifications collected by our Marketing organisation or from 
the feedback from Customer Support are [regarded as] very useful in terms of 
determining trade-offs during the design phase”, as stated by Design Engineer 1. As 
described by the PKM Coordinator “trade-offs regarding mechanical, electrical, and 
manufacturing domains have first to be defined, and then evaluated to produce the 
lowest cost and highest performance products [subject to customer specifications]”. 
“This [additional dimension] also lies beyond the scope of single-domain simulations 
and often depends on the experience of Design and Product Engineers”, as explained by 
Design Engineer 3. 
Table 6.4 summarises the different types of CS knowledge identified in TELE-Co. 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE 
Types General Knowledge Role Technically Specific Role Contextually Specific Role 
Declarative 
Explicit 
Documentation describing TELE-Co, Stock 
options, Org. Chart 
O A document/ report  describing: Design Data from 
Simulations  
O A document describing known problems re: 
X Product 
O 
Email warnings from Engineering/CS 
 re: Errors & links to a solution 
O A document describing: Product trouble-shooting 
procedures 
O Feedback from customers re: product 
requirements 
S 
Documents/reports of (a GA product) 
specifications 
O Reports of Simulation data & CAD Files O Feedback from CS Technicians re: product 
errors or problems 
O 
Document outlining the different Domain 
functions and their objectives 
O Documents outlining the different interacting 
components of a product 
O A document/report of a new product design S 
Document outlining the design decision-making 
process 
O A document describing problems re: 
unreleased X Product 
T 
Tacit 
Knowledge of the Regulations pertaining to 
TELE-Co products 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider in comparing 
Domain Knowledge results (product components). 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider in 
determining trade-offs 
T 
Knowledge of Prototyping, M-Gates. T Knowledge of the factors to consider when 
developing a new product. 
O Knowledge of the different variations for a 
new product 
O 
Knowledge of Evaluation Techniques T Knowledge of the interoperability of customer 
products 
O Knowledge of the simulation tools O 
Knowledge of functional/Domain 
Knowledge-Product experts 
O Knowledge  of the different escalation levels O Knowledge of the limitations of single 
domain simulation tools 
O 
Knowledge of Roles and responsibilities O Knowledge of coding part of a product’s 
functionality. 
O Knowledge of the possible knock-on effect 
of one product/component on another 
T 
Knowledge of Market/Customer 
Technologies 
T Knowledge of solving/ diagnosing coding error 
procedures. 
O 
Procedural 
Explicit 
A white paper describing the steps in the 
M-Gate methodology 
O Knowledge of the steps needed to utilise the data 
from simulations & CAD files 
T Knowledge of the different simulations and 
the ability to combine the results 
S 
A white paper describing the steps in PKM O Knowledge of the steps in applying design data to a 
Design Decision 
T Sequence of steps a CS Technician uses to 
solve a coding error 
O 
Tacit 
Basic knowledge of the steps necessary to 
apply M-Gates 
T Knowledge of the steps involved in solving a 
coding error or reverse-engineering 
O Knowledge of the steps in applying 
feedback & incorporating it into the design. 
T 
Basic knowledge the steps needed to  apply 
PKM 
T Knowledge of the steps in dividing and conquering 
a problem. 
O Knowledge of the steps in evaluating a 
design/product 
T 
* Knowledge Roles: Operational = O; Tactical = T and Strategic = S 
Table 6.4: Types of Customer Support Knowledge. 
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6.1.3.2 Reservoirs of Customer Support Knowledge 
Knowledge pertaining to the CS function resides in several different locations within 
the organisation. They encompass people and functions, including, Engineers, 
Technicians, HR, management (CS, and Engineering) and groups/teams (CS, Design 
and Product Engineers, and PKM); artefacts, including procedures, repositories; and 
organisational entities, including organisational units, and inter-organisational networks. 
The reservoirs of knowledge are discussed in following sub-sections.  
Customer Support regards people or practitioners within the function as its greatest 
knowledge source. As explained by the CS Manager “support staff are our greatest 
asset, they have to be up-to-date on the latest products [regarding] design specifications, 
coding faults and error passing [or trapping], interoperability [with vendor products, 
customer infrastructure] and trouble-shooting [approaches]. Without their expertise we 
would not be able to support our customers as quickly as we can”. “Technicians [as the 
first-line of support] are able to retrace problems using a very old approach called: 
divide and conquer [to] diagnose a problem, if they can’t [rectify the problem] it’s 
escalated to the closest Level 1 or 2 support team which could be located anywhere in 
EMEA or APAC”, as stated by the CS Engineer. “We [the regional teams] then escalate 
the call based on its type – the component we think is at fault or if it’s a design issue 
[high-level coding] we then escalate it to a Product or Design Engineer”, as explained 
by the CS Manager. As explained by Design Engineer 3 “when calls or fixes are 
escalated to us, and we are in the same building as the EMEA team, it’s easy to work 
with them but if the Level 1 or 2 Support Engineer is in APAC we usually just fix the 
problem ourselves [without collaborating]”. “Engineers are [regarded as] TELE-Co’s” 
key asset; they are the innovators and develop our products, we provide them with as 
much support and leeway as possible so as not to stifle the creative process”, as stated 
by the Director of HR. He further explained that “the HR database is a priority system 
here and many security controls are [aligned] to it as we keep all of the details regarding 
our Engineers stored on it. We not only keep details [regarding] their designs but also 
[regarding] how they actually work so that we can allocate appropriate people to their 
teams or train them to work effectively with these key Engineers who are usually 
managers”.  As described by the IT Manager “a significant number of [security] 
controls are added to the HR database [PeopleSoft, Oracle DB] because our Engineers 
are headhunted and you don’t want Nokia to have access to profiles of our Engineers as 
well as our designs”. According to the PKM Coordinator “Design and Product 
Engineers are experts in their product ranges and we can utilise them more if we allow 
them to collaborate across the organisation”. 
Groups are created to support particular products. TELE-Co uses the term organisation 
for specific functions within the company such as the Engineering organisation or the 
IT, Security and compliance organisations. As described by the Director of HR 
“Customer Support consists of support Engineers who are our front line defence or 
provide support to our customer-base, Design Engineers are split into teams according 
to the different products such as GTSS which is wireless and anything in 
communications”. “[We also have] Product Engineers, who take the design and build 
the actual product, combining the different component [domain] designs and the trade­
offs, which is then tested and hopefully the first to market”, as explained by the Former 
Engineering Manager. As explained by the PKM Coordinator, “Design Engineers are 
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experts in their fields with significant knowledge of [the] TELE-Co product portfolio 
and their components as well as those of our competitors. They can diagnose or retrace 
any design problem and apply a cross-team approach to the design process by using our 
internal M-Gates process”. “The PKM team was created to utilise their experience more 
productively and collaborate across the different design domains to ultimately improve 
the process and the realisation of the first-to-market goal”, as further explained by the 
PKM Coordinator.  As explained by the CS Engineer “each [design domain], for 
example radio frequency Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing 
Engineering, typically performs at least a few basic simulations within its domain and 
an overall team, like PKM, combining those processes could increase productivity but it 
isn’t supported by senior management”. “Members of the team are purely there on a 
volunteer basis and while it’s a good idea they have to prove its monetary value to 
WEC”, as explained by the Former Engineering Manager. Another group used as a 
source of processing knowledge by the different Engineering groups is the CMPR 
(Concept to Manufacturing Process Redesign) team. As described by the PKM 
Coordinator, “CMPR created the M-Gates process, as a part of their initiatives in the 
areas of system and product development (SPD) and market and product line planning 
(MPP)”. “The M-Gates process [or framework] has been implemented by GTSS, 
CGISS, PCS, and other associated [business] groups”, as stated by Design Engineer 2. 
“The objective of the CMPR team is to improve product and system time-to market and 
business predictability”, as stated by Design Engineer 3.  As described by the CS 
Engineer “CMPR advise everyone, especially the design and development groups how 
to apply M-Gates so that they are all using the same process”. This approach is used to 
standardise the management of projects within TELE-Co. 
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. As explained by the CS 
Manager “CS uses a number of routines and procedures in solving calls, When a 
customer such as O² calls its local support a ticket is created through our tracking 
system, which is the beginning of the procedure. If a Technician cannot point the 
customer to a solution or fix, the call is escalated to Level 1 and 2 and so on. During 
each escalation the work or coding is recorded in a trouble-shooting document which 
we review and reuse”. “We do need a type of system to effectively allow [us] to create, 
store, share and reuse our solutions; we are just recording them in Compass for now”, as 
stated by the CS Engineer. “Everything in TELE-Co is documented in some sort of 
template to be signed-off and stored, primarily due to corporate policy. We do use 
approaches in trouble-shooting and a coding process but the more experienced 
[Technicians] tend to take short cuts in using the different processes and recording 
solutions; but we are getting better at it”, as explained by the CS Manager. As explained 
by Design Engineer 2, “M-Gates is our version of a best practice approach for designing 
a new product. It’s divided into phases or gates and each phase forces us to document 
the result which might be requirements or test results [outputs]”. “Prototyping is a 
methodology which allows the design teams to follow specific steps [simultaneously] 
and document the results for each model”, as explained by Design Engineer 2. “Product 
specifications must also be documented as part of M-Gates and versions [levels of 
detail] of this document are released to our customers, Customer Support and stored 
with WEC”, as explained by Design Engineer 1.  
A considerable amount of knowledge is stored in TELE-Co technologies and systems. 
“Compass is the internal repository which operates as part of the corporate Intranet”, as 
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stated by the DB Analyst. “Employees and groups can use it as an Intranet to post and 
access documentation and presentations, or at a deeper level it can be customised to 
share group-specific material like trouble-shooting manuals”, as explained by the CS 
Engineer. According to the CS Manager “repositories are used to record our calls and 
solutions; these are reviewed internally by the support team but we also use Compass 
and regional shared drives for sharing solutions”. “Vendors provide us with access to 
their product specifications or solutions [as] customers use other products as well and 
sometimes the problem can be caused by interoperability issues”, as stated by the CS 
Manager. As described by the PKM Coordinator “computer simulations can predict 
product behaviour before physical assembly. These [simulations] are an integral part of 
Engineering”. “Simulations are performed to reduce cycle time, to aid in understanding 
the behaviour of complex systems, to improve designs, and reduce production risk”, as 
explained by the Former Engineering Manager. “Design tools are used at different 
stages of the M-Gate process. CMPR provides simulation models and support services, 
for example, electrical circuits [analogue, digital, mixed-signal, RF] and mechanical 
assembly. CAD tools are also used to model the processes and aspects of the prototype 
as a record for a gate”, as stated by Design Engineer 1. According to the PKM 
Coordinator “a set of web pages have been created in the TELE-Co document 
repository Compass which contain a list of members, and short summaries of projects 
related to PKM. The web pages also include links to repositories like meeting minutes 
and the reference library. The library is constantly being updated by PKM team 
members and covers categories like best practices, communities of practice, creativity 
and innovation, knowledge management, TELE-Co core process redesign examples, 
TELE-Co software tools and guidelines, and industrial applications for tools we use like 
CAS [Complex Adaptive Systems]”.   
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. “M-Gates activities are cross-
functional and require an integrated team effort”, as stated by the PKM Coordinator. 
The PKM team works closely with the CMPR team during the design process and for 
access to information useful for evaluating product designs”, as stated by the Former 
Engineering Manager. As described by the CS Manager “besides Product and Design 
Engineering we work with Marketing, IT and Security. Engineering support us in 
solving calls and IT provide our IT services. Security set up direct links with our 
customer-base. They also have to allocate access to the different systems that we use or 
want to develop for internal use”. “Marketing work with our customers in selling our 
products. We have to help Marketing by acting as Technical Advisors because they 
wouldn’t understand the technical aspects of our products, and they provide us with 
feedback from the customers”, as stated by the CS Manager. Additionally, “Engineering 
collaborates with marketing in preparing brainstorming sessions and sales pitches to 
customers”, as explained by the Director of HR. “Technical knowledge is currently not 
shared with other business units due to a lack of understanding of TELE-Co products”, 
as stated by the CS Engineer. 
TELE-Co collaborates with partners and customers to form mutually beneficial inter-
relationships and to ensure customer platform independence and manufacturing 
standards. “Engineering in TELE-Co utilise a direct line of communication with 
customers, for example O², over a virtual private network (VPN) to debug errors”, as 
stated by the Security Coordinator. According to the CS Manager “the connection is 
restricted to Engineering to prevent an inexperienced employee from modifying code”. 
As explained by the PKM Coordinator “developments in simulation have been reported 
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at many TELE-Co symposiums, where we [Engineers] have the opportunity to meet 
with other Engineers and swap knowledge regarding our approaches and design issues”. 
“The symposia allows the company to participate or lead the industry by its 
involvement in leading simulation software developments, regulations regarding 
standards – which is the way to stay ahead in this industry”, as explained by the CS 
Engineer. “We have established a connection with a government-sponsored resources 
[such as the] repository to extract Green component advice in making our products 
more environmentally friendly”, as stated by Design Engineer 2. Finally “online forums 
hosted and run by TELE-Co Engineers are used to help other Engineers, students or 
anyone interested in SW Development, it’s also used to collaborate on programming 
errors”, as stated by the CS Engineer. 
Knowledge resides in several reservoirs within the organisation, which are summarised 
in Table 6.5. 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE 
People: 
Individuals 
• CS Specialists (Table 6.2 provides an overview of the different Engineering 
Experts) 
• Technicians – Product specifications, Coding faults, Trouble-shooting 
• Level 1& 2 Support Engineer – Problem-solving 
• CS Engineer – Problem diagnosing 
• Product or Design Engineer – Design the product range 
• CS Manager – Coordination of the regional teams  
• IT Manager/Security Officer – aligns security controls 
• PKM Coordinator: Promotes the use of KM across the Engineering Domains 
Groups 
• Regional Teams – Support teams based in EMEA and APAC. 
• Customer Support  (Engineers) - Support Customers 
• World Engineering Corporation - Coordinating umbrella for the Product 
Divisions 
• Engineering: Develops products & reverse-engineers competitor products. 
• GTSS Engineers – Cell Phone Division |Product Domain Engineers 
• PKM (Ad hoc) Team – Products, M-Gates & Prototyping 
Artefacts 
Procedures 
• Problem-solving routines & procedures – Step-by-step guides for tackling calls 
• Escalation procedures – requires collaboration with the required expert 
• Templates – recording solutions 
• Trouble-shooting Documents – To solve problems 
• Coding process – Step-by-step divide & conquer procedure 
• Corporate policies – Compliant procedures for documenting processes & 
responsibility 
• M-Gates – Design best practice approach 
• Prototyping – Methodology for testing prototype designs 
• Document process – Recordings of product specifications 
Repositories 
• Compass – Corporate repository of Manuals, Presentations, everything 
• Group Website (Compass) – Documentation, Trouble-shooting manuals, Best 
practices 
• CS Repository (Ad hoc) – Records Calls & Solutions | Regional Share Drives 
• Vendor Repositories – Product specifications 
• Documentation  Management System (DMS) – Procedures 
• Government Sponsored Repository – Extract Recommendations |Online Forums 
Technologies • Simulations – Design data | CAD Tools – CAD Designs 
Org. Entities 
Organisation • Organisational Infrastructure (Table 6.3) 
Units 
• Marketing – Collect Customer feedback & Technical Advisors to Marketing 
• IT Organisation – Provide IT Support & Services 
• Security & Compliance – Provide Secure Connections to for e.g. Customers 
• Core Process Redesign Team – M-Gates process 
• U.S. Engineering – Call Escalation 
Inter-
organisational 
Relationships 
• Vendors – Product specifications/Market standards 
• Product interoperability problems & Feedback re: Trade-offs | Debug Customer 
Errors 
•  TELE-Co Symposia – Engineering Industrial Collaborative Forum 
• Participate in the Development in Mobile Standards & Regulations 
• Government – Extract Requirements re: Environment Design Considerations 
• General Public – Programming Errors 
Table 6.5: Reservoirs of Customer Support Knowledge. 
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6.1.3.3 Customer Support KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in Customer Support.  
The acquisition of knowledge within TELE-Co is not common. The M-Gates 
framework was “developed internally but has been utilised by other companies; we do 
collaborate through our TELE-Co symposia but unless we need guidelines regarding 
regulations we usually develop everything in-house”, as stated by the Director of HR. 
As described by the PKM Coordinator “the M-Gate framework is a high-level process 
for product development”. Figure 6.1 is an illustration of the TELE-Co M-Gate process 
with its five phases and fifteen gates. Knowledge is acquired through regular 
conferences which enable the organisation to collaborate with industry and academia.  
Figure 6.1: TELE-Co M-Gate Process. 
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous simulation repositories used in 
Engineering “to build models or review previous tests”, as stated by Design Engineer 2. 
As explained by the PKM Coordinator, “Compass is used as a central repository for any 
and all guidelines needed for Engineers. It is also an access point to other repositories 
owned and maintained by other teams like CMPR”. Customer Support pulls knowledge 
from the different repositories described in sub-section 6.1.4.2. 
Knowledge is continuously created and shared through the problem-solving and M-
Gates processes. “Engineering does use M-Gates for product realisation. It leverages the 
collective knowledge of the company through strategically targeting processes and 
software tools to enhance efficiency”, as explained by the Former Engineering 
Manager. According to the Security Coordinator “the [M-Gates] process provides 
product development milestones which do incorporate security considerations as part of 
the overall development process”. “TELE-Co [specifically Engineering] is driven by the 
realisation of the corporate product process as a competitive advantage, as time or first-
to-market is the goal of the development process”, as stated by the CS Engineer. “As 
design cycles become faster, learning cycles become faster, thereby enabling better 
execution of product introduction plans”. Each stage of which is risk assessed in terms 
of cost and failure”, as explained by the PKM Coordinator.  
As explained by Design Engineer 1, “M-Gates is a divide-and-conquer standard that we 
can all use across the organisation from Engineering to IT. It is really used to make sure 
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we are all consistent in our approaches to problem-solving”. “Each phase or gate forces 
an output from the team, such as a case for the development of a new product, a 
proposed solution, then approval from cross-domain team leaders and a Security 
Advisor to testing results and simulations”, as stated by Design Engineer 2. “M-Gates 
forces the creative process and collaboration of a design team not only for a specific 
component but across the different design domains each sharing the different designs 
and test result outputs. Sometimes advisors from other departments are needed, like 
security if for example we have to work with a partner and a secure connection is 
required”, as stated by Design Engineer 3. As explained by Design Engineer 2 “sharing 
of design documents is easy using systems such as email, Compass and mentor graphics 
[a CAD tool]; we also use teleconferencing and face-to-face meetings”.  
Knowledge is applied throughout the different phases and gates. According to the PKM 
Coordinator simulation modelling [as required by M-Gates] can help drive design and 
innovation, decision-making processes and knowledge reuse and capture”. Requirement 
number 3 for M-Gate 8, states that simulation must be performed, “but there are no 
guidelines for what simulation is required or how the tests should be preformed”, as 
stated by Design Engineer 2. “The basis for decision-making processes and knowledge 
reuse and capture and, in a larger sense, all aspects of the M-Gates framework, is 
knowledge. [Therefore the] management of knowledge through the M-Gate framework 
is vital to [the successful] execution of the framework”, as explained by the PKM 
Coordinator. M-Gates also forces a “holistic approach to the design process by requiring 
the design teams to re-evaluate the process”, according to the Former Engineering 
Manager. “The design specifications created by the design teams are stored and 
distributed through Compass”, as stated by the CS Engineer. As explained by the CS 
Manager “Customer Support has limited access to product designs, code and known 
bugs”. “We use trouble-shooting guides from different sources, mostly internally, and 
try and solve customer calls; a fix really depends on the different support teams” ability 
to diagnose a problem and reverse-engineer the product”, as stated by the CS Manager. 
As explained by the CS Engineer “we use a divide-and-conquer approach to problem-
solving; a problem is escalated through different support levels until it’s fixed”. “Work 
is shared as the problem is escalated and we do try and store solutions for future use. At 
the moment everything is stored in Compass but it isn’t a knowledge management 
system”, as stated by the CS Manager. As explained by the CS Engineer 
“teleconferences, Compass, email and face-to-face meetings are our primary ways to 
share and reuse solutions”. 
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. 
“Security is applied in protecting product designs through access control lists which are 
decided by Engineering”, as stated by the Former Engineering Manager. According to 
the [Cork] Security Officer “secure connections are used for establishing connections 
with customers, partners and off-site support teams for GTSS”. However “the primary 
control for Engineers are legal documents requiring non-disclosure of our trade secrets 
and we have enforced this [through penalties] with former [Engineering] employees”, as 
explained by the Director of HR. As described by the CS Manger “they [Security] 
apply controls and we have to fill-in SRD [security requirements documents] forms 
when developing a database or requesting a secure connection but really we only 
contact them when the network or a system is down”. 
Table 6.6 summarises the CS knowledge management processes. 
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CUSTOMER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS: KM PROCESSES 
Processes 
Acquisition 
• TELE-Co Symposia – Regulations, Market  and Guidelines 
• Reverse-Engineer competitor products to determine their product design 
Capture 
• Simulation Models – Product Designs, Data, Test Data 
• TELE-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge (Table 6.8) accessed through: 
Compass – Procedures, Product Specifications & Manuals 
• Roles & Responsibilities for the Escalation Process 
Creation 
• Problem-solving Process – for the creation of a Design or a Solution 
• Trouble-shooting Guides – Created by CS Team Members 
• M-Gates Process – for Product realisation & documentation  
• Product Development Milestones – Deliverable at each stage or gate 
• Security Considerations – Added to the product Design 
• Product  Introduction Plans – Produced 
• Divide & Conquer Approach – Each problem is broken down into smaller problems 
• Risk Assessment – Risks are identified – e.g. Costs and Trade-offs 
• First to Market Product – End result 
• Approval Process – Cross domain/team approval of each design component 
• Security Evaluation – Results of Product Testing for security considerations. 
Sharing 
• Creation Process – Every Output is shared between the Domain Teams 
• Problem-solving – solutions are shared across the Regional Teams 
• Email, Compass, Teleconferencing, and CAD Tools – Design Documents 
• Product Designs – Customer Support Teams (limited access) 
• Code & (known) Bugs – Customer Support Teams (limited access) 
• Trouble-shooting  
Application 
• M-Gates – Each Gate requires the application of knowledge 
Decision-making, holistic approach to Design | Incorporates an Evaluation Phase 
• Simulation Modelling – Drive designs, innovation, decision-making process 
• Design Reuse – through Simulations, Gates, and Prototyping 
• Solve Customer Calls – through Experts and stored solutions 
• Diagnose Problems – through Problem-solving 
• Reverse-engineering – to solve problems 
• Escalation Process – to solve problems 
Teleconferences, Compass, Email, and Face-to-face collaboration 
• Stored Solutions – for reuse 
Control 
• ACL: Access Control Lists are used to control access to Product Designs 
• VPN: Virtual Private Networks are used to encrypt communication tunnels 
• Legal Documents – NDAs are used to control Engineers re: sharing & selling designs 
• SRD – Security Environment Document to identify security requirements 
• Engineering – Decide access and use Security as a support function 
Table 6.6: Customer Support KM Processes. 

The next section describes ISS function’s approach to managing knowledge. 
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6.1.4 IS Security Function 
TELE-Co Global Security (TGS) function “is dedicated to providing security and loss 
prevention services both internally and externally to customers and employees [alike]”, 
as stated by the TGS Coordinator. “The Corporate Security function is recognised 
throughout the world as a group of experts with in-depth experience and knowledge in 
the security industry”, as stated by the Director of HR. As described by the [Networks] 
Security Officer “they have built a solid structure designed to resolve risks by 
improving [ISS] processes that ensure a secure infrastructure for employees through 
proactive security strategies [policies, secure technologies and business assessment 
methodologies]”.  
“Due to policies like POPI [protect our proprietary information], TGS reduces loss and 
damage to corporate property and supports employee productivity by maintaining a 
secure control environment”, according to the Compliance Coordinator. The 
organisation’s internal security function is based in the U.S. “TIP [TELE-Co Intellectual 
Property group] is separated into six sectors each focusing on a different technology and 
self-contained”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. According to the IT 
Manager “Corporate TIP rolls down the policies regarding the protection of 
information. It is responsible for investigating, reacting and recommending technologies 
to each GEO [subsidiary]”. “In fact the businesses are so diverse that one factory could 
be more concerned with physical security than another where information security is of 
a higher priority”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. As a result TIP is divided into 
divisions to “ensure that every aspect of security is covered but it’s not integrated”, as 
stated by the TIP Auditor. The divisions are as follows: (1) policies, (2) tools, (3) 
compliance, (4) incident investigation, (5) recommendations, and (6) crisis management 
[TELE-Co website]. 
As described by the TIP Auditor “TIPs are responsible for developing global [TELE-
Co] security procedures and policies which are disseminated to the various GEOs 
[subsidiaries] who customise the policies for use as some controls, especially in an 
international company such as this, like encryption tools [levels] can be used legally in 
the U.S. but cannot be exported to other countries”.  “The TIP organisation follows two 
standards SIC (Standards of Internal Control) and EISS (Electronic Information 
Security Standards) or ISO17799 as a guideline or checklist to secure the assets of the 
multinational”, according to the Compliance Coordinator. “The primary difference 
between the use of these standards is the degree to which they are internally enforced”, 
as stated by the [U.S.] Security Officer. “The standards are suppose to be followed by 
every employee in the company and are used as internal self-assessments for the 
organisation”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. According to the TIP 
Auditor, “once every three years each subsidiary is audited by corporate TIPs to 
determine the degree to which they adhere to the standards or [security] documents 
[checklists]”. “They each [subsidiary] follow local policies, process documents 
[templates] and procedures to ensure compliance”, as stated by the Compliance 
Coordinator. The report will either document a failure or a pass for the subsidiary. “If 
they fail they are re-audited within six months”, as stated by the [Cork] Security 
Officer. However, this fact is contradicted within the ISS function, that is, some 
Security Officers stated that “TIPs are stringent in enforcing audits, [others stated that] 
it varies – depending on I suppose the profile of the site [which could be a 
manufacturing plant or an R&D centre]”. As explained by the TIP Auditor “an audit is 
Page 183 
an intensive and time consuming process, as long as the subsidiary makes the 
recommended changes and meets the JP Morgan’s review - we are happy”. JP Morgan 
is used as a compliance consultant as well as the official audit reviewer for TELE-Co. 
Each corporate sector assigns an individual as a Security Officer who “spends [his/her] 
time completing one or more or parts of an audit, such as for example disaster recovery 
or physical and electronic procedures”, according to the Compliance Coordinator. “The 
IT function supports each division [and in this organisation GTSS] using the same 
security policies”, according to the IT Manager. “GTSS is located throughout three 
regions and is supported throughout the world”, as stated by the CS Manager. “There is 
a single point of contact [usually an assigned Security Coordinator] within the different 
sectors who share knowledge through emails and conference calls”, as stated by the IT 
Manager. “Sixteen [IT] staff are located in the Cork team, all of whom follow different 
security policies, for example building machines [security control requirements] to 
reviews [audits]”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. The primary activity 
conducted by the ISS function is the “electronic tracking of employees [in WEC] 
through the use of SID and network monitoring software”, as stated by the TGS 
Coordinator. The network is continuously scanned “to check for breaches in security 
and to ensure that internal users are not allowed to access restricted information or 
knowledge”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. This activity or process is 
limited to prioritised internal corporate networks such as the Engineering domains “due 
to the cost of the activity and the priority of Engineering compared to other business 
functions”, as stated by the Security Coordinator.    
6.1.4.1 Types of IS Security Knowledge 
This section identifies the different types of knowledge utilised by the ISS function. The 
different types of ISS knowledge are discussed in the next three sub-sections. The first 
section describes the general knowledge necessary for ISS practitioners to conduct their 
day-to-day operations. This knowledge is categorised as general as it is available to all 
IT professionals working throughout TELE-Co. Section 6.1.2 described the culture, ISS 
structure and common knowledge used in the organisation, all of which is regarded as 
general knowledge by the interviewees. It is fundamental to the function’s knowledge of 
roles and responsibilities at corporate and local levels.  
General knowledge common to the ISS function is varied. As explained by the 
Security Coordinator “TELE-Co utilises the ISO17799 standard with the objective of 
covering all aspects of information security so therefore: the security policy; 
organisational security; asset classification and control; personnel and physical security; 
communications and operations management; access control lists; systems development 
and maintenance; business continuity planning and compliance – it pretty much covers 
everything”. “Knowledge of security technologies, [current] threats, and risks are also 
[regarded as] basic security knowledge”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. 
Initially regulatory knowledge was categorised as technical knowledge by the function 
but “today regulation knowledge is part of our online training [portfolio available 
through the TELE-Co university] and we all have to know about compliance”, as stated 
by the [Australian] Security Officer. “Policies, procedures and a good understanding of 
the organisation is also important now so that we [ISS function] know what’s important 
instead of just letting management identify assets – sometimes they don’t know what’s 
[connected to] a part of the network”, according to the [Networks] Security Officer. As 
described by the TIP Auditor “templates such as the SRD [security requirements 
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 document] and AAG [access administration guide] should be considered general 
knowledge once filled-in”. The templates are used by the different business functions 
“to identify security requirements”, or the “resources needed from Security for a 
project”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer.  The SRD [security requirements 
document] provides “the place [template] for the Project Managers to indicate how the 
requirements [and resources] were met”, as stated by the IT Manager. The AAG is 
designed to document access administration procedures to maintain adequate security 
for each system or process. 
“Checklists are used to control internal operations, we have checklists for everything 
such as: assessment criteria’s for ASPs [active server providers], other providers [NSP], 
best practices for secure development and anything to do with our external operations - 
primarily”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. The [Australian] Security 
Officer further explained that “they [checklists] will always be used – auditors and 
management like them but there are too many of them and they are used just once or 
perhaps edited for the next time”. As explained by the [Cork] Security Officer “control 
checklists are very useful and common, we use them for all of the information systems 
– it seems silly but we need them and use them as an inventory of servers, routers, 
tunnels [VPN], different security technologies that are connected to the network, 
otherwise we just wouldn’t know [what is connected to the network]”. The [Networks] 
Security Officer added that “even in TELE-Co some employees – we’ll say for example 
Engineering can bypass our controls and add unsecured boxes [servers] causing 
problems in terms of risk [backdoors] to the corporate network”.  
The next sub-section describes the technical ISS knowledge possessed by members of 
the ISS function. 
Technically specific knowledge is specific to the ISS function. The purpose of the 
ISO17799 is to define and establish a consistent set of ISS controls which are required 
to protect TELE-Co’s information or knowledge assets and intellectual property (IP). 
As explained by the Compliance Officer, the standard “is categorised as technically 
specific knowledge once “it is customised and it is reused over and over again”. Audit 
reports are documents “generated by the internal audit committee under TIPs”, as stated 
by the TIP Coordinator. “If a group or subsidiary fails the [audit review] document can 
be used to learn from the mistakes made and rectify them for the next audit”, as further 
explained by the TIP Coordinator. According to the TGS Coordinator “participation in 
regulatory bodies enables us to evaluate the best practices available and utilise them in 
the organisation”. “Log files from our firewalls, VPN monitoring software, IDS and 
scanning tools like Black Ice provide a wealth of technical knowledge about our 
network”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. According to the TGS 
Coordinator “we monitor and track everything our employees do as well as rouges – 
rouges are our biggest threat”. 
“Scanning tools allow us to track any rouge activity but they are also [used by hackers 
in] scanning our network for vulnerabilities [network backdoor]”, as further explained 
by [Networks] Security Officer. “Security companies are used [either by TGS or the 
external auditor] to perform network penetration tests in order to evaluate our network 
security controls”, as stated by the TIP Coordinator. The security company provide ISS 
with “a report documenting any and all weakness”, as explained by the [Networks] 
Security Officer. Vendor sites provide “technical and troubleshooting manuals on their 
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products”, as stated by the Security Officer. Forums such as “the Irish Security Forum 
[ISF], the international forum, CIO surveys, [emailed] vulnerability alerts contain 
valuable knowledge regarding other companies” security problems and environmental 
threats”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. As explained by the TIP Coordinator, 
“security conferences are a great source of papers regarding for example: the latest 
security issue, the security market, academic research describing organisational issues 
and evaluations of the different vendor technologies, we [TELE-Co] hold an 
international conference on security through our university every year so that we can 
participate in moulding the market”.   
The next sub-section describes the knowledge used for a particular circumstance or 
project. 
Contextually specific knowledge within the ISS function is primarily used to adhere to 
regulatory issues or for incidents such as a security breaches. As described by the TIP 
Coordinator “specific knowledge is required on compliance and the different standards 
and best practices available”. Auditors [external] conduct “an extensive review of our 
security controls [formal, informal, technical], network security and everything needed 
to ensure that we are complying with, for example, SOX; the ramifications of not being 
compliant are enormous so we source as much knowledge as we can on compliance and 
the effect of using different security technologies [such as encryption]”. “We try and use 
[the feedback from the last review] to guide the steps we should take – it does get 
easier”, as stated by the Compliance Officer.  
Knowledge regarding incidents is also regarded as useful. “Rouges behave [a] certain 
way and we try and use our [documented] lessons-learned from previous incidents to 
build profiles of viruses, rouge or hacker behaviour on the network as well as recovery 
procedures. We are trying to be more proactive and actually be more aggressive”, 
according to the [Networks] Security Officer.  
Table 6.7 summarises the different types of ISS knowledge identified in TELE-Co. 
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IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS: SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
Types General Knowledge Role Technically Specific Role Contextually Specific Role 
Declarative 
Explicit 
Documentation describing TELE-Co, 
Stock options 
O A document describing an Audit, Log files from 
Firewalls 
O A White Paper describing regulatory issues. O 
Organisational chart, contact lists, 
presentations 
O A document describing the multinationals 
security policies 
S Standards & best practice   documentation O 
Servers, routers inventory list O A document describing a penetration test O ISS Audit reports T 
SRD Template O A document describing the ISS Strategy S Incident reports O 
AA Guide – filled in O Security alert reports O 
Tacit 
Knowledge of Security technologies, 
threats and risks 
O Knowledge of the factors to consider in 
evaluating security controls. 
T Auditor’s knowledge of regulations, standards and 
best practices. 
T 
Knowledge of regulations O Knowledge of the factors to consider when 
evaluating security technologies 
S Security Officers knowledge of different risks and 
vulnerabilities 
T 
Knowledge of systems on the 
network 
O Knowledge  of Domain (Function) access 
requirements 
O Auditors review of Security controls T 
Knowledge of TELE-Co Roles and 
responsibilities/Domains 
O Knowledge of scanning tool report indicators T Auditors knowledge of complying with SOX O 
Knowledge of ISO17799 procedures O Knowledge of Security Forums and the security 
market developments 
T Knowledge of impact of using different security 
technologies 
O 
Procedural 
Explicit 
Checklists: for internal operations O ISO17799 – section describing policies O Document outlining the sequence of steps in 
applying lessons-learned. 
T 
Security policies O A manual describing troubleshooting procedures O A Security Officer’s knowledge of steps needed to 
use (Audit) feedback. 
T 
Tacit 
Steps in identifying security assets O Security functions knowledge in applying the 
lessons-learned from an Audit 
T A Security Officer’s knowledge of steps in 
incident recovery 
T 
Basic knowledge in the steps for 
assessment criteria 
O Security functions knowledge of the steps 
necessary to evaluate security best practices 
T Knowledge of the steps to identify rouges and 
hackers. 
T 
Basic knowledge in reusing checklists O Security functions knowledge of the steps 
necessary to prioritise vulnerabilities 
O Knowledge of the steps needed to react to rouges T 
* Knowledge Roles: Operational = O; Tactical = T and Strategic = S 
Table 6.7: Types of IS Security Knowledge. 
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6.1.4.2 Reservoirs of IS Security Knowledge 
Knowledge, pertaining to the TELE-Co ISS function, resides in several different 
locations within the organisation. They encompass people and functions, including, IT 
and Security professionals, Engineers, management and groups/teams within ISS; 
artefacts, including best practices, security technologies, and repositories; and 
organisational entities, including organisational units, organisations, and inter­
organisational networks. The organisation reservoir is the TELE-Co organisation in its 
entirety. This reservoir of knowledge is described as part of the organisational 
infrastructure in section 6.1.2. The remaining reservoirs of knowledge are described in 
the following section. 
A considerable amount of knowledge resides in people. As described by the TGS 
Coordinator, “experts are allocated to the different corporate security requirements such 
as network security, WEC, auditing, compliance, intellectual property and the different 
GEO offices”. Additionally, “an Export Manager is assigned to each site to make sure 
that everything [product or SW licences, encryption] moving from one [office or 
facility] region to another is checked by the manager so that TELE-Co does not break 
any International or U.S. laws”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. As explained by 
the IT Manager, “a Compliance Coordinator was hired to make sure that we know and 
do everything we are supposed to do”. “Policies, best practices and standards are rolled 
out by the [Compliance] Coordinator who evaluates them for TELE-Co”, as explained 
by the TIP Auditor. “Audits [initially] were very time consuming but our internal 
committee coordinated by a TIP Auditor provides useful reviews and general assurance 
that we will comply with any and all of the regulations”, as explained by the TGS 
Coordinator. As described by the IT Manager, “the Security Officers are assigned 
regions and have enormous responsibilities in ensuring that these regions meet TELE-
Co security needs and they could be physically hundreds of miles away”. “They 
[Security Officers] need to be on top of all the risks we face and the controls we need to 
work effectively”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator.   
The structures of the different groups working within the ISS function is described in 
section 6.1.3. The different groups, including TGS, TIPs, Networks and IT operate 
individually and collectively. However, the groups “interact primarily though email, 
which is difficult to manage and find [existing] solutions to calls when needed again”, 
as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. “Reporting is also difficult as each Security 
Officer reports to the site IT Manager but is structurally aligned to the Corporate 
Security group”, as explained by the IT Manager. “TIP is responsible for providing the 
regulatory guidelines for all of TELE-Co, they are the go-to group for all things 
compliance”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. According to the Compliance 
Officer, “TGS manages the entire security organisation through the Security Officers; it 
isn’t what would be viewed as a two-way relationship as the Security Officers provide 
TGS with status reports and TGS instructs the [security] officers in rolling out patches 
for example”, as explained by the [Networks] Security Officer.  
Knowledge is stored in artefacts such as practices, technologies and repositories. 
Practices can be organisational routines and procedures. As described by the Security 
Coordinator, “the ISO17799 standard is used as a guide or procedure in protecting every 
aspect of security”, as stated by the Security Coordinator”. As explained by the 
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Compliance Coordinator, “procedures such as: disaster recovery and continuity plans 
are regularly updated and stored in the security repository [through Compass]”. 
Adherence to SOX and other regulations “is vital and steps are identified to adhere to 
audit requirements, which are continuously updated before, during and after internal and 
external audits”, according to the TIP Coordinator. According to the Security 
Coordinator, “depending on the procedures or guides in question we will store [them] in 
multiple locations [databases, shared drives, websites and repositories] which are 
integrated through Compass”. “Alerts and guidelines on their [TIPs] internal website 
but normally they send us whatever they want us to implement”, as stated by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. Therefore the function stores security practices and procedures in 
different repositories. 
A considerable amount of knowledge is stored in TELE-Co technologies and systems.  
“Vendor sites are particularly useful as practitioner’s sources of manuals, patches and 
troubleshooting documentation”, as stated by the [U.S.] Security Officer. Security 
technologies are also used to provide security members with technical knowledge such 
as log files. Data is pulled through and filtered by security databases. As explained by 
the Security Coordinator “[security] technologies generate a lot of technical knowledge, 
and it is difficult sometimes to mine through to find the alert”. “We filter the data from 
the different firewalls, IDS software and scanning tools into a database so that we can 
summarise what’s going on in the network”, as explained by the [Networks] Security 
Officer. However “these [technical] controls and steps are used to protect the WEC 
networks leaving the other business functions without as many controls to monitor, 
which is a weak points”, according to the [Networks] Security Officer. As described by 
the [Cork] Security Officer, “there are numerous tools and security technologies in 
TELE-Co that we need to do our jobs”. He further explained that the different 
technologies are categorised by use “by the group, ourselves and by the company – 
email and Compass are used to collaborate on different projects, incidents or something 
like an audit, but I would use my customised portal for storing my documents, papers, 
and checklists – I use Excel for everything, particularly [reused] lists and identifying 
variances in scans. We also use logs generated by scanners, servers, and firewalls to 
provide us with knowledge of the corporate network”. Excel is used extensively 
throughout the organisation; “the group uses spreadsheets automatically [programmed 
to] calculate the level of risk [or vulnerability associated with a particular system] and 
produces a brief summary of risk for TGS”, as stated by the [Networks] Security 
Officer. 
The [Networks] Security Officer identified “scanners [as] the ultimate resource for 
networks, scanners perform scans of [to monitor]: the data centre, the Intranet, Extranet 
and employees”. He further explained that “we have separate scanners for each of the 
systems that I mentioned and they identify high, low and medium vulnerabilities in 
detailed reports for us”. “The findings and trends are reported to our system 
administrators through ART [the automated analysis, reporting, remediation and 
tracking tool). System administrators are responsible for implementing fixes to remove 
any vulnerabilities identified”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. Scanners are also 
used to generate a view of the TELE-Co network “by scanning selected IP addresses 
and the results are correlated into a central vulnerability data repository”, as stated by 
the [Networks] Security Officer. The data repository “allows TIPs to generate reports to 
describe the security health of the TELE-Co network as a whole as well as create 
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specific vulnerability reports for system and network administrators”, as stated by the 
TIP Coordinator. “ART is used to track the vulnerability remediation process. Attacks 
like CodeRed20 and Nimda21, travelling through email and the web, can and do breach 
firewalls which means that our entire Intranet connected devices need to be secured. We 
use scanning and mitigation to limit TELE-Co’s internal exposure by examining our 
current information infrastructure and determining what is required to assess our 
internal vulnerabilities on a continuous basis”, as explained by the [Networks] Security 
Officer. 
Knowledge is also stored within organisational entities. These range from the entire 
organisation, units within the organisation and inter-organisational relationships. The 
organisation as a whole is described in section 6.1.2. The culture, structure, values and 
practices are discussed and summarised in Table 6.3. TELE-Co outsources to 
“application and Internet service providers for website hosting, business processes and 
managed services, [TELE-Co] must ensure that its vendors can provide an acceptable 
level of security as part of their business practices”, as stated by the Security 
Coordinator. Risk analysis procedures are used by ISS to determine a potential partner’s 
level of security. Additionally TIPs is a contributing member of ISF [the International 
Security Forum]. “ISF is composed of seventy-five to eighty-five member organisations 
that are based in a variety of countries and operate in sectors such as financial services, 
information services, manufacturing, advisory services, retail, transport and energy”, as 
stated by the TIPs Coordinator. “The forum generates [security] papers with direct 
applicability to the information security issues troubling TELE-Co [as well as its other 
members]”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. As explained by the Compliance 
Coordinator, “JP Morgan and Deloitte provide invaluable feedback from the audits 
conducted and surveys produced”. Regulatory bodies are “useful sources for the best 
practices used in the industry”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator. 
The ISS function also collaborates with other functions within the organisation. It 
interacts with “primarily WEC (the World Engineering Corporation), they are 
prioritised by headquarters, most of our controls are aligned with Engineering networks 
which obviously makes the business functions weak-links and they shouldn’t be”, as 
stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. According to the TGS Coordinator, “the 
[security] organisation works with every department [or organisation] in TELE-Co. 
Project leaders have to document using, a SRD [Security Requirements Document], 
what [security] resources they need and an assigned Security Officer will determine the 
risks of, for example, another repository and ensure that the right access has been 
aligned”. “TELE-Co employees are also expected to participate in audits and ensure that 
their departments adhere to security policies”, as stated by the Compliancy Coordinator. 
He further explained that “Finance and HR also collaborate with us, the CFO signs-off 
on audits and is involved in determining access for employees to different repositories 
and HR enforces penalties for breaches of security when we produce proof of an 
employee’s inappropriate traffic accessing sites [through individual scans]”, as stated by 
the Security Coordinator. 
Knowledge resides in several reservoirs, which are summarised in Table 6.8.  
20 CodeRed: is a computer worm that proliferates on Microsoft operating systems and causes widespread Internet 

slowdown. 

21 Nimda: is a computer virus with a mass mailing worm which spreads quickly.
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IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS: RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE 
People: 
Individuals 
• ISS Specialists (Table 6.2 provides an overview of the different experts within the 
case) Network of experts/problem-solving for internal & external security 
• IT Manager – understanding of regions meet corporate IT and Security needs 
• TGS Coordinator - identifies corporate security requirements 
• Security Officer (regions) – responsible for site security 
• Security Officer (Networks)  - network controls 
• Security Coordinator – Corporate view 
• TIP Auditor /TIP Coordinator – provides reviews 
• Compliance Coordinator – best practices and standards 
• Export Manager – Site product, encryption or SW licences 
Groups 
• ISS function – IT Services 
• TGS – strategies and development initiatives 
• TIP – pool of experts on standards and best practices 
•  Networks – IT Services and guidelines 
• Corporate Security Group 
• Security Officers – Domain Knowledge 
Artefacts 
Procedures 
• ISO17799 & Compliance procedures – U.S. and International 
• POPI (protect our proprietary information) 
• SIC & EISS Standards 
• Security Checklists 
• Audit Review Reports 
• Disaster recovery & Continuity plans 
• Security practices & procedures 
Repositories 
• Documentation – IT/Security solutions or fixes 
• Portals – Customised by individual and group 
• Vendor sites – External sources of patches, manuals and solutions 
• Database – Capturing log files, scanning reports 
• Vulnerability Data Repository 
• TELE-Co Intranet 
Technologies • Compass – Content management system 
• MS Outlook – Problem-solving but filtering & retrieving knowledge stored is 
difficult. 
• MS Excel – Levels of risk calculator 
• ART – Tracking tool 
• Network Scanning Tools  (Authenticate users when accessing resources) 
– Tracking Employees & Rouges & – Vulnerability Testing 
Org. Entities 
Organisation • Organisational Infrastructure  
(Table 6.3 provides an overview of the organisations knowledge) 
Units 
• Joint Projects – Domain specific requirements for X project 
• Business functions (WEC) 
Domain specific requirements, group access, roles and responsibilities, critical 
systems. 
• HR – Enforce security policies  
Inter-
organisational 
Relationships 
• Partners (vendors) – joint expertise in providing security procedures 
• Regulatory Bodies – best practice 
• Auditors – Reviews, lessons-learned and guides 
• ISF – External collaboration 
Table 6.8: Reservoirs of IS Security Functional Knowledge. 
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6.1.4.3 IS Security KM Processes 
This section describes the processes used to support the acquisition, capture, creation, 
sharing, application and control of knowledge in the ISS function.  
The acquisition of knowledge within ISS is common. “Key assets are identified, 
prioritised and appropriate controls are then aligned”, as stated by the [Networks] 
Security Officer. TELE-Co acquired the ISO17799 standard “to utilise as a 
methodological, stepped approach in assuring the security [C.I.A] of information, data 
and IP [intellectual property]”, as explained by the TGS Coordinator. The standard “is 
customised by TIPs [TELE-Co Intellectual Property group] and covers known security 
threats to our internal assets. The purpose of the TIPs group is to control, through 
policies and procedures, the ISS requirements of the different GEOs [subsidiaries], to 
adhere to regulatory requirements and to deliver a unified security approach”, as stated 
by the TIP Coordinator. As explained by the Security Coordinator “SecSDLC [Secure 
Systems Development Life-Cycle] covers all aspects of information security [from the 
definition of] the security policy [to stipulate that security is aligned to the goal of the 
organisation], asset identification [the identification of key knowledge repositories], 
personnel, physical, communication security and security measures, like access 
controls, the re-evaluation and maintenance of security and [finally] business 
continuity”. “Standards and policies are licensed or purchased, if they are suitable for 
us, but then they are customised as TELE-Co standards”, as explained by the 
Compliance Coordinator.  
Knowledge is captured or retrieved from the numerous reservoirs distributed 
throughout the organisation (sub-section 6.1.3.1). As stated by the Security Coordinator 
the function “collaborates primarily by phone because we are spread across the 
organisation”. Every system, Intranet, database and [for example an audit] process “is 
assigned a security expert to ensure that everything is monitored and that everyone 
knows who is responsible for [a] resource”. “If there is an incident we try to record 
everything [profile of behaviour] and sit down afterwards to figure out what the 
scanners can tell us and what to do the next time”, as stated by  [Networks] Security 
Officer. “We have a group portal in Compass where we store and retrieve all of our 
operational procedures and trouble-shooting guides”, as explained by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. As explained by the [Australian] Security Officer “reams of data are 
collected by the TELE-Co scanners, they are programmed to collect different levels of 
vulnerability risks, incidents and provide information and recommendations [through a 
filtering databases and a pre-programmed Excel matrix] on how to summarise incidents 
for management”. The function also “searches for [trouble-shooting] guides on different 
architectures being adopted and their impact on security”, as stated by the IT Manager.   
Knowledge is continuously created through the problem-solving process used within 
ISS. “Once every three years each subsidiary is audited by corporate TIPs to determine 
the degree to which they adhere to standards and [security policies] procedures. They 
each follow local policies, process documents and procedures to ensure compliance”, as 
stated by the TIP Auditor. As described by the Security Coordinator “an audit report is 
generated at the end of the process, with everyone feeding results into the document”. 
The review report will either document a failure or a pass for a subsidiary. “If they fail 
they are re-audited within six months. Each corporate sector [product division] assigns 
an individual as a Security Officer who spends of his time completing one or more of 
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the audits [such as for example disaster recovery or physical and electronic 
procedures]”, as explained by the TIP Coordinator. 
However “if there is a crisis [such as a security breach], the cost of the incident is not 
measured essentially because it is too hard to assess. Lessons-learned or knowledge of 
the crisis and the steps taken to recover are saved and shared through TIPs to be used 
for the next threat to TELE-Co”, as stated by the TIP Auditor. “Data [regarding] the 
business impact in time and delays in fixing a system or downtime for a customer 
application is stored. Loss of productivity in the time it takes ISS practitioners to 
combat a security breach is not measured”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. As 
explained by the IT Manager “the time allocated [by employees] is the overtime worked 
to pull the company back on track [after a security breach] unless the site is a 
manufacturing outlet with deadlines to meet”.  
As stated by the [Cork] Security Officer “email, Compass and teleconferences are the 
main tools used to share knowledge [regarding] standards, regulations, sources [for 
example external threat lists], and guides”. “TELE-Co also leads a symposium of 
similar organisations to discuss the future of the security industry for improving our 
products but also to determine the type of [security] technologies we will need to 
incorporate, and future issues”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator. “We are also active 
members of ISF where we, as well as eighty odd companies, discuss and share our 
[security] experiences with other Security Officers as a type of collaborative effort, 
since 9/11 [due to the infrastructure ripple effect of the tragedy]”, as explained by the 
Security Coordinator. 
Knowledge application or use is extensive in ISS. As stated by the [Networks] Security 
Officer “security uses everything at our disposal to give a full a picture as possible of 
the security health of TELE-Co”. “Knowledge pulled from our security technologies is 
collected, stored, retrieved and analysed by the group”, as stated by the TGS 
Coordinator. “Manuals, standards, trouble-shooting guides, policies, vendor 
specifications and email warnings from TIPs, Microsoft or SANs are customised and 
refined with use”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator. The auditing process enables 
“TELE-Co to evaluate the internal security processes across the different GEOs; we 
have to coordinate the generation of a report for the external auditor as a group”, as 
stated by the TIP Auditor. This evaluation “allows us to reuse the knowledge gained 
from a previous audit as well as the feedback [outlined] in the review report, which is 
very useful as we are given a list of things to improve [in a given time frame]”, as stated 
by the TIP Coordinator. As explained by the [Australian] Security Officer “audits are 
time intensive but the review is almost like a review of [security] us for Corporate, it 
certainly makes us more visible to the organisation”. Therefore management and ISS 
function regard an audit as an approach to measure the value of security to the 
organisation. 
Knowledge control is necessary to assure the validity and utility of knowledge. Security 
in TELE-Co is applied through the use of a “three pronged approach covering network 
security, consisting of typical security technologies such as firewalls, VPNs, bastion 
servers, SID, automatic virus updates and network monitoring software, all of which 
impact the management of knowledge”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. He 
further explained that “if our controls are too restrictive then the productivity of the 
company will be reduced – the trick is finding that balance and the only way is through 
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trial and error”. As explained by the [Networks] Security Officer “users are tracked so 
we can see if someone is trying to access a system they shouldn’t be or looking for 
specific information”. “Network security is considered very transparent to internal users 
and facilitates the communication network for our Engineers”, as stated by the 
[Networks] Security Officer. As stated by the Compliance Coordinator “tunnelling 
[VPN] is used to protect our innovative network but this can be problematic as well 
because as you pass international virtual borders the level [of Encryption] has to 
increase and it [data, information or knowledge] can then be difficult to retrieve”.  
“Ownership of knowledge artefacts [solutions] in repositories is controlled by the 
authors and access can be requested by email to the individual who created and owns 
the artefact”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. “Reverse-engineering of products 
is a significant threat [to TELE-Co] and first to market or the creation of a market of 
one is one of our goals. We as a result allocate a lot of controls to our key [Engineering] 
repositories”, as stated by the Security Coordinator. As explained by the Director of HR 
“repositories and databases in HR are allocated effective security controls and 
monitored by network scanning software, as knowledge of expert skill-sets is a key 
asset and potential threats such as head-hunting key developers is a risk to KM within 
TELE-Co”. 
However, according to the Security Coordinator, “we do experience difficulty 
controlling Engineering groups who [ultimately] circumvent security controls in the 
pursuit of innovation”. “Engineers require and have full control over boxes [servers] 
and remove and add them to and from the corporate network as desired”, as stated by 
the [Networks] Security Officer. Therefore Security Officers are constantly “battling 
with Engineering to adhere to the standards and guidelines”, as explained with the 
Security Coordinator. As described by the TGS Coordinator “groups have implemented 
internal demilitarised zones (DMZ) as a separate control environments for developers 
but full control of demilitarised zones has caused serious network breaches resulting in 
the unavailability [at times] of parts or all of the [corporate] network”, as further 
explained by the Coordinator. Failures such as these are considered by Security to be “a 
barrier to the innovative process and [a significant] waste of resources in fixing the fault 
and loss of productivity due the unavailability of knowledge assets to [other] groups. 
“Unfortunately, Engineering have far more political support [at senior management 
level] but security is often sacrificed for the business case”, as stated by the TGS 
Coordinator. Senior management view this as a necessary sacrifice “so as not to 
interfere with the innovation process”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer.  
“External connections [any connection between a TELE-Co network and a partner are 
difficult to secure and require a very substantial investment in hardware, software and 
administrative time”, as stated by the [Networks] Security Officer. According to the 
Security Coordinator “log files, and operating system security issues must be monitored 
continuously and fixes implemented immediately”. “Potential rogues or intruders probe 
[scan] TELE-Co’s Internet connections for weaknesses every day. New types of attacks 
occur within several hours of a vulnerability being discovered and [successful attacks] 
are then published on the Internet for other hackers or to embarrass the company”, as 
explained by the Security Coordinator. Managing an external connection “requires 
advanced skills, state-of-the-art security technology, and a strong commitment of time 
and resources. [Therefore] a security boundary must be maintained between the TELE-
Co corporate network and external networks to protect the corporate network and 
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resources”, as stated by the TGS Coordinator. “The [external] connections are managed 
through a control process. The process outlines how TELE-Co establishes a network 
connection with the Internet or a business partner, joint venture, contractor, consultant, 
contract manufacturer, [an] ASP, distributors, and compliant partners”, as explained by 
the [Australian] Security Officer. To promote consistency across the Corporation; 
“standardised security exhibit [an NDA] was developed by a cross-functional team. [It 
is] by holding our vendors accountable for their security practices [that] we can better 
protect TELE-Co’s brand equity in the marketplace”, as stated by the Compliance 
Coordinator. 
Table 6.9 summarises the ISS KM processes. 
IS SECURITY FUNCTIONS: KM PROCESSES 
Processes 
Acquisition 
• Regulation Guidelines – bought and customised to comply with environmental laws 
• ISO17799 Guideline – Purchased and customised 
• Sec-SDLC - Purchased and customised 
Capture 
• TELE-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge (Table 6.5) 
• Pool of Experts – security technologies and practices 
• MS Outlook – for collaborating and filtering 
• Corporate repository – documentation, procedures 
Creation 
• Problem-solving Process - solutions 
• Auditing process – Checks and balances 
• Audit – Trial and Error Learning Process 
• Lessons-learned – from current and previous reviews 
Sharing 
• Problem-solving – Sharing knowledge to solve and problem or fix 
• Incidents – Collaborating through groups to solve the problem 
• Coordination - through Security Coordinator 
• Email, Compass, TELE-Co Intranet, Teleconferences 
• TELE-Co Security Symposia for sharing with Academics and Security Professionals 
• Active participation – in regulatory bodies 
• ISF – Collaborating with other companies 
Application 
• Use of security technologies, experts and processes for integrated view of Security 
• Reuse of customised standards and practices 
• Auditing  – forces documentation and lessons-learned 
• Reuse of solutions/fixes 
• Pool of Experts – use develops through trading 
• Use of Audit process in raising the Security groups profile 
• Email warnings – prioritised and carried out 
Control 
• Alignment of controls 
• Automatic virus updates 
• Testing of controls to prevent an unproductive environment 
• Network security – protect communication 
• Scanning of network to protect groups – Engineering 
• Tunnelling – applying encryption to cipher transmissions 
• Author Ownership of knowledge artefacts 
• HR repositories and databases - allocated effective security controls 
Table 6.9: IS Security KM Processes. 
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The preceding sections depict the IS Security and Customer Support functions operating 
within TELE-Co. The different types of knowledge used by the functions are described, 
reservoirs of knowledge pinpointed and the processes used to manage knowledge by the 
functions illustrated and summarised in Tables 6.1 to 6.9. The next section compares the 
approaches used by each function to manage ISS and CS knowledge.   
6.1.5  IS Security and CS Functions Managing Knowledge   
This section considers TELE-Co’s IS Security and Customer Support functions 
approaches to managing their knowledge. It extends the descriptions discussed in the 
preceding sections by comparing the approaches used. The different types (Table 6.10), 
locations (Appendix F), and knowledge processes (Appendix G) are compared and then 
contrasted. Next, the mechanisms used to promote the management of ISS and CS 
knowledge are described in section 6.1.6. These are categorised as technological and 
non-technological. Use of the different KM tools is outlined and illustrated to determine 
individual and function usage (Table 6.11). Finally section 6.1.7 concludes with a 
description and discussion of the impact gained due to the management of knowledge 
on the (ISS or CS) individual, functions (products/services, processes) and the 
organisation (Table 6.12). Furthermore display matrices are utilised to illustrate 
functional characteristics, differences and outcomes for each of the variables described. 
Each display matrice was reviewed and verified by the Security Officer, PKM 
Coordinator, and CS Manager (Table 6.2). 
6.1.5.1 Types of Functional Knowledge 
This sub-section summarises the different types of knowledge utilised by the TELE-
Co’s IS Security and Customer Support functions. Table 6.10 is adapted from Tables 
6.4 and 6.7. Table 6.10 summarises the different types and roles of knowledge used by 
the two functions to illustrate the similarities and differences. ISS (Sec) and Customer 
Support (CS) knowledge (K) are categorised as: general, technical and contextually 
specific knowledge. These are then further subcategorised as declarative (explicit/tacit) 
or procedural (explicit/tacit). The roles of each type are identified in Table 6.10 as 
operational (O), tactical (T) and strategic (S). Role totals are calculated from Tables 6.4 
and 6.7 and used to compare the importance of each type of knowledge to each function 
(for example general operational knowledge has a ratio of Sec K= 15: CS K=9).  
General knowledge is used for day-to-day operations within the functions. The ISS 
function regards the following as general (operational) knowledge: organisational 
charts, which outline the general roles and responsibilities of the different business 
units, hardware (HW) specification, templates, and contact lists. Customer Support also 
regards organisational documentation and HW specifications as operational knowledge. 
However, email notifications and domain specific knowledge was identified by the 
function as operational. ISS regards expertise in regulations, security technologies, 
systems, networking and threats as operational. Procedures such as ISS checklists, 
policies and assessment criteria’s were all identified as operational general knowledge. 
CS identified the steps in implementing M-Gates and PKM as operational. However, 
while ISS did not categorise any of its general knowledge as tactical or strategic, CS 
identified their expertise in and application of prototyping, the M-Gates methodology, 
customer technologies and PKM as tactical (Sec K= 0: CS K=5). While neither function 
view their general knowledge as strategic (Sec K= 0: CS K=0), CS did view its 
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application of development and project management methodologies as tactical. 
Therefore the CS function has identified the importance of expertise in applying step-
by-step approaches to problem-solving due to the necessity to combine and coordinate 
the outputs (solutions) of different (design) domains and teams. 
Technical knowledge is specific to either function. CS views its technical knowledge in 
designing new products as operational. ISS views alerts, procedures and evaluation 
reports as operational. Knowledge pertaining to domains (access rights and designs), for 
the functions, while requiring expertise, is categorised as operational (Sec K= 7: CS 
K=13). ISS regards external forums, security controls, scanning and audit reports as 
tactical. CS views the ability to use CAD files and design data from multiple sources 
(design domains) in designing a new products as tactical knowledge (Sec K= 5: CS 
K=2). Therefore CS views its expertise in combining knowledge from different 
Engineering domains as vital as it is needed to build TELE-Co products. However it is 
interesting that problem-solving is not viewed as tactical but operational due to the fact 
that “it’s normal for us, we solve customer problems every day, it’s what we do”, as 
stated by the CS Manager. ISS views security policies, strategies, and regulations as 
strategic knowledge. The function also regards expertise in evaluating security 
technologies as strategic. However the CS function does not view its technical 
knowledge in diagnosing solutions or product design as such (Sec K= 3: CS K=0).  This 
can be attributed to the alignment of ISS to the TELE-Co corporate strategy and the 
implications of non-compliance to environmental regulations. CS goals are not 
explicitly aligned to TELE-Co’s corporate strategy.  
Contextually specific knowledge was viewed as operational by the two functions. 
Regulations and best practices were considered operational knowledge by ISS and code 
errors as operational CS. CS also viewed errors, design variations and solving errors as 
operational (Sec K= 5: CS K=6). Contextually specific knowledge such as audit reports, 
lessons-learned, the reactive ability of ISS experts and procedures were categorised as 
tactical by ISS. Examples of tactical knowledge, for ISS, were identified as regulatory 
procedures, best practices and lessons-learned from audits and reactive strategies. 
Trade-off factors and the ability of Engineers in applying customer requirements to the 
design of new products were categorised as tactical by CS (Sec K= 9: CS K=5). The 
differences in the ratios can be attributed to financial implications of not having the 
necessary knowledge and expertise in applying regulatory controls, lessons-learned 
from audits and the inability to recognise internal and external risks. Incorporating 
customer feedback and trade-offs knowledge into product development is important as 
it would affect sales. Finally, ISS does not regard its contextually specific knowledge as 
strategic. However, CS categorised product designs, as well as the combined knowledge 
from the multiple domains, as strategic (Sec K= 0: CS K=3). This was due to the 
importance of engineering expertise in combining the knowledge of different domains 
in creating an integrated solution. This was also compounded by the fact that current 
simulation models cannot integrate multiple component designs. Thus, the development 
of innovative products is dependent on experts. 
In summary the totals outlined in Table 6.10 indicate that ISS and CS knowledge is 
equally viewed by the two functions as operational (Sec K=27: CS K=28). ISS 
knowledge was viewed as slightly more tactical than CS knowledge (Sec K=14: CS 
K=12). The two functions regard their knowledge equally strategic (Sec K=0: CS K=0). 
However CS regarded its contextually specific knowledge as strategic. ISS viewed 
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regulatory technically specific knowledge as strategic. The totals illustrated a significant 
difference, within the functions, between the different roles of knowledge. ISS regard 
the allocations of controls and problem-solving as operational, the application of 
regulatory requirements as tactical and ISS policies and strategies as strategic (Sec K= 
27 O|14 T|3 S). The importance of ISS knowledge can be attributed to the alignment of 
ISS policies and strategies to that of the organisations. The categorisation of the 
functions tactical and strategic knowledge is environmentally driven. The ability to 
identify and react to rogues (hackers) is also viewed as strategic, emphasising the 
functions recognition of its expertise in rectifying security incidents. However proactive 
strategies were not identified by the function as an important skill indicating the 
functions inability to be proactive in fighting attacks. The CS function can and does 
combine knowledge from different sources to solve problems. It was evident that the 
function categorises its internal expertise as strategic. The function primarily solves 
customer problems and categorises its knowledge as a result as operational (CS K= 28 
O|12 T|3 S). Incorporating customer requirements and feedback into product design did 
highlight the importance of this knowledge in developing products that are practical and 
meet customer demands.  
Table 6.10 summarises ISS and CS Knowledge. 
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ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
D:E/T |P:E/T IS SECURITY KNOWLEDGE ROLE CUSTOMER SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
D:E Org. Documentation| Charts| Contacts O D:E Org. Documentation| Chart| Contacts 
D:E Security HW Lists| Template O D:E Warnings| Specifications| Domains 
D:T Regulations| Technology| System| Threats| Roles O D:T Regulations| Experts| Roles 
D:T Networks| Domains| Procedures O D:T Prototyping| M-Gates| Customer Technology 
P:E Checklists| Policies O P:E Steps: M-Gates & PKM 
P:T ID Assets| Assessment Criteria O P:T Apply: M-Gates & PKM 
O T S 
Totals: 15 0 0 Totals: 
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D:E ISS Policy| Strategy| Regulations S D:E Design Data| Trouble-shooting 
D:E Audit| Alert & Evaluation Report O D:E CAD Files| Processes| Prod. Parts  
D:T Domain Access Rights O D:T Domain Results| Development. Process 
D:T Controls| Scanning| Forums T D:T Product Interoperability 
D:T Evaluation of Technologies S D:T Escalation Process| Diagnosing 
P:E ISO17799 | Trouble-shooting O P:E Use of CAD Data| Design Data 
P:T Audit Reviews| Best Practices T P:T Coding Errors| Reverse-engineering 
P:T Prioritise Vulnerabilities O P:T Divide & Conquer Approach 
O T S 
Totals: 7 5 3 Totals: 
C
o
n
t
e
x
t
u
a
l
l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D:E Regulations| Standards| Practices| Alerts O D:E Product: Problems & Requirements 
D:E IS Security Audit Reviews T D:E Unreleased Product: Problems 
D:T SOX| Impact of Technologies O D:E Product Designs 
D:T Regulations| Practices| Risks| Controls T D:T Product: Variations| Simulations| Limits 
P:E Steps: Lessons-learned| Audits T D:T Trade-off Factors| Interoperability 
P:T Steps: Identify & React to Rogues T P:E Steps: Coding Errors 
P:E Combining Domain Results 
P:T Applying Feedback| Evaluations 
O T S 
Totals: 5 9 0 Totals: 
ISS Knowledge Totals: 27 14 3 CS Knowledge Totals: 
*Declarative (D)/ Procedural (P), Explicit (E)/ Tacit (T). | *Roles: Operational (O), Tactical (T) Strategic (S). 
*Totals are calculated from Tables: 6.4 and 6.7. 
ROLE 
O 
O 
O 
T 
O 
T 
O T S 
9 5 0 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
T 
O 
O 
O T S 
13 2 0 
O 
T 
S 
O 
T 
O 
S 
T 
O T S 
6 5 3 
28 12 3 
Table 6.10: IS Security and Customer Support Knowledge (Adapted from Tables: 6.4 and 6.7). 
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6.1.5.2 Functional Knowledge Reservoirs 
This sub-section describes the different reservoirs of knowledge utilised by TELE-Co’s 
IS Security and Customer Support functions. Appendix F is adapted from Table 6.5 and 
Table 6.8. The table summarises the similarities, and differences between the IS 
Security and Customer Support reservoirs.  The third column is derived from 
identifying the different reservoir characteristics from the two functions. The knowledge 
reservoirs of the functions are categorised by their practitioners, functions, artefacts and 
inter-organisational relationships. These different stores or reservoirs of knowledge are 
discussed in the following sub-sections. 
(1.)The knowledge residing in individual practitioners of a function can be 
identified through the roles and responsibilities attributed to them. Problem-
solving specialists are used by the functions to diagnose problems. Managers 
(ISS and CS), armed with project management and policy expertise, are used to 
coordinate the day-to-day operations of the functions within specific subsidiaries 
or regions (EMEA/ APAC). 
ISS utilises domain specific experts to target different aspects of IS Security. 
The TGS umbrella function, through a coordinator, identifies the ISS 
requirements of the multinational, which can be difficult given that one 
subsidiary (a manufacturing factory), could just require physical security while 
another plethora of ISS controls. Security Officers, based in and with the 
responsibility for specific sites roll-out informal, formal and technical controls. 
Security Officers are also used as experts in each aspect of security from 
communications network to information. Network experts are used to assure 
security of the corporate network which crosses over different geographic areas. 
They encrypt and monitor the communication network utilised by TELE-Co. 
Coordinators are used to ensure that Security Officers have the necessary 
resources, knowledge (for example regulatory) to apply the directive from the 
Corporate Security group (TGS). Internal auditors are used to allocate the 
required regulatory controls. Auditors evaluate and review corporate security. 
Lessons-learned are generated by audit experts to aid sites and the entire 
organisation in order to be more prepared for an external audit.  
An Export Manager is used as a knowledge gateway for the different 
geographically dispersed TELE-Co subsidiaries. Each subsidiary is required to 
adhere to different U.S and international laws. This is particularly pertinent to 
technological multinationals dependent on utilising encryption (with or without 
VPN tunnelling) as a component of a product or for internal and external 
communication. Each country and or region stipulates a specific level of 
encryption and as a result multinationals can easily break these laws 
communicating between different parts of TELE-Co’s communication network. 
Export Managers use encryption and regulatory knowledge to ensure that site 
encryption, software licence encryption levels for products and network points 
comply with regional laws.  The CS function assigns experts to different 
(escalation) support levels. Expertise in product development, interoperability 
knowledge and diagnostic skills are valuable assets. Therefore the utilisation of 
experts, for problem-solving, operating at a high level of support diverts 
knowledge away from product design and development. CS Engineers are used 
in creating product designs, to diagnose fixes, level (1 and 2) Technicians 
provide front-line support to customers by coding faults and trouble-shooting 
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problems. A PKM Coordinator (a design Engineer) is used on an ad hoc basis to 
promote the use of KM in prototyping new products and designs. 
It is from the above descriptions of the different roles and responsibilities within the two 
functions that the following characteristics were identified: escalated levels of expertise, 
trouble-shooting specialists, coordinating activities, diagnostic expertise, regulatory 
coordinators, innovators, and regional management (Appendix F: Row 1). 
(2.)The managers of the two different functions are responsible for identifying 
policies, standards and procedures. TGS is responsible for formulating and 
developing security strategies for TELE-Co. Security Officers, as a group, 
coordinate the roll-out of controls across the subsidiaries and collaborate on 
activities such as audits particularly in preparing for them and conducting post­
mortems after the process has ended. A Corporate Security group coordinates 
the global ISS operations. TIPs acts as a pool of compliance experts selecting 
and customising standards and practices. Network (NW) experts provide 
services and control expertise. The IT departments provide the infrastructure and 
services necessary for the different business functions to operate.  
CS utilise an umbrella group to coordinate the different Engineering divisions. 
The GTSS division provides expertise regarding every component and aspect of 
Cell phone design and development. CS Engineers support and develop the 
different Cell phone components and the end products. Support Engineers 
(including regional teams) provide diagnosing expertise in supporting the needs 
of TELE-Co customers. PKM is an ad hoc community of practice composed of 
Design Engineers determined to combine the different design domains of 
knowledge through the use of KM and the project management methodology M-
Gates. The primary difference between the two functions is that CS uses an ad 
hoc community of practice to promote the management of knowledge and ISS 
purchases and customises its procedures.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different groups and teams interacting with the 
two functions that the following were identified: regional coordinating teams, strategic 
development, pool of expertise, measuring assessors, overview group, 
domain/functional expertise, product/service evaluators, cross-functional team: 
prototyping (Appendix F: Row 2). 
(3.)Knowledge is stored in practices, organisational rules, routines and procedures. 
Document management systems (DMS) are used to control the quality of the 
solutions created within the two functions. ISS acquires numerous procedures 
externally and customises them to suit the needs of the organisation. ISO17799 
is an ISS guideline that is used to provide step-by-step guidelines in protecting 
the organisation. Internally produced standards are also used.  POPI (protect our 
proprietary information) is used to control employee behaviour in terms of 
protecting TELE-Co specific knowledge, particularly pertaining to product 
design. ISS checklists are used to track jobs done regarding particular projects or 
activities. Audit reviews are regarded as valuable sources of knowledge as they 
are externally sought evaluations of the ISS function. Review reports have been 
used as lessons-learned and a form of to do or checklist for additional audits. 
Business continuity plans (BCP) and best practices are externally sourced by the 
global security function. Procedures are customised as TELE-Co policies and 
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plans for internal security activities in protecting the organisation from known 
risks. 
CS utilises templates and procedures to create uniform solutions for effective 
filtering and searches. This ensures that solutions can be shared, reused and 
tagged for CBR searches. Trouble-shooting guides are vital (if regularly 
updated) in order to force Technicians to follow step-by-step procedures in 
solving problems. This is an attempt to ensure that steps in, for example, coding 
are not bypassed. Bypassing steps in trouble-shooting can cost additional time if 
a call is escalated to another level of support. The next level of support will not 
be able to retrace the steps already taken. Therefore a systematic approach in 
problem-solving can ultimately save time. The use of a guideline enables the 
different support levels to collaborate as each other in coding or trouble­
shooting. 
TELE-Co policies dictate the documentation of processes as a prerequisite for 
different regulations (for example segregation of duties). M-Gates, as a 
collaborative project management mechanism, was developed internally to also 
ensure that each TELE-Co function utilises a common strategy for managing 
and collaborating on function-based, cross-functional and external projects. It is 
essentially a common project management guideline and (gate) vocabulary 
reference model to ensure organisational consistency across projects. 
Prototyping as a methodology is used throughout CS and Engineering to test 
new designs and to learn from failures as well as successes.  
The primary difference between the functions, when retrieving knowledge from 
procedures, is that ISS externally sources and customises procedures to comply 
with environmental regulations and are dependent on checklists for completing 
reviews or any other ISS activity. Procedures are also used to control the 
behaviour of TELE-Co employees. Penalties for breaking corporate procedures 
are outlined and reminders are used to ensure employee compliance. 
Methodologies are used by CS. However they are created internally to comply 
with TELE-Co standards in approaching problems and building products. 
It is from the above descriptions of the different procedures used by the two functions 
that the following were identified: best practices and procedures, planning, problem-
solving techniques, escalation procedures, standardised templates, solutions, divide and 
conquer approach to problem-solving, corporate policies, project management 
methodologies, prototyping, document management systems (DMS) for managing 
corporate and functional documentation (Appendix F: Row 3). 
(4.)Knowledge repositories can be paper-based or electronic. The two functions use 
paper-based document management systems to create standardised solutions and 
guides. Portals, Intranets and shared drives are used to store documents, 
solutions, corporate policies, by function or across the organisation. Vendor 
repositories are also used to source manuals regarding security technologies, 
guidelines for recovering from security incident or product specifications in 
solving inter-operability problems in a customer’s environment. ISS uses the 
knowledge pulled from repositories to create a picture of the organisation’s 
security landscape. Repositories are used to automatically pull (multiple) 
firewall, scanning and IDS logs located throughout the corporate network in 
order to collate filtered knowledge into a prioritised list of issues for Security 
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Officers. CS use manually entered logs and solutions to track customer issues 
and solutions. External knowledge is also pulled from government repositories 
to comply with, for example, green regulations in product development. CS uses 
public online forums to share coding solutions as an initiative to attract potential 
employees in the form of IT and Engineering graduates. Therefore ISS uses 
security repositories to automatically generate knowledge and CS uses 
repositories to build and store solutions. External collaboration is also sought by 
CS in product development to comply with external regulations and also to use 
external experts in coding designs. 
It is from the above descriptions of the different repositories used by the two functions 
that the following were identified: documentation management systems, collaborative 
forums, central repositories, external vendor sites, databases for extracting security data 
such as vulnerabilities, and government sponsored repositories (Appendix F: Row 4). 
(5.)Knowledge is stored in firm specific technologies. Email is used as a 
collaborative forum in problem-solving, accessing internal and external 
documentation and for storage throughout TELE-Co. ISS use Excel to create 
checklists and in calculating levels of risk for TELE-Co systems. Risk is 
calculated so that the appropriate level of control is determined. Scanning 
technologies, such as ART and Found-stone, are used to monitor the corporate 
network and track employees and rouges. CS exploit simulation software and 
CAD tools to create models of new products and test designs.  Simulations are 
not used by ISS to create and test decision-making in simulated scenarios. 
Modelling is used by CS to identify different scenarios and plan for potential 
anomalies in design. This could also be used by the ISS function.  
It is from the above descriptions, of the different technologies used by the functions, 
that the following were identified: collaborative forums (email), comparative analysis 
tools (Excel), tracking tools (for rogues), and decision-making tools (Appendix F: Row 
5). 
(6.)Knowledge is also stored within functions representing the individual stores of 
knowledge specific to the unit. TELE-Co procedures such as the SRD stipulate 
the involvement of a Security Advisor for projects and determine the level of 
security risk has been identified. The roles and responsibilities of every TELE-
Co employee are outlined due to regulations (such as SOX). It is the 
responsibility of the ISS function to allocate or assign access to TELE-Co 
systems and knowledge resources based on the roles and responsibilities of 
employees and business functions. The HR department is responsible for 
identifying roles and in enforcing penalties for breaches of corporate policies. 
CS collaborates with the Marketing function as a source of technical expertise in 
sales pitches. This collaborative relationship is regarded as a supportive role as 
well as a control for protecting TELE-Co IP rights. CS also works closely with 
IT. The IT function provides CS with IT services. ISS secures remote 
connections with customers and collaborative partners. Teams such as the 
CMPR provide CS with a source of expertise in M-Gates. Additionally U.S 
Engineering is a source of support for the regional CS and Engineering teams 
dispersed across the TELE-Co subsidiaries.  
ISS transparently supports every function and applies controls to both enable 
and restrict employee access to TELE-Co systems, repositories, forums and KM 
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tools. CS interoperates, as a technical advisor, with customer facing units to 
protect product designs and customer feedback. 
It is from the above descriptions of the different units/functions within or interacting 
with the two functions that the following were identified: customer feedback, technical 
advisors, roles and responsibilities, coordinating group, and groups to enforce policies, 
secure connections, and escalations (Appendix F: Row 6).  
(7.)Knowledge is also stored in inter-organisational relationships. The two 
functions avail of external knowledge in the form of collaborative partnerships. 
Vendors are used to collaborate in problem-solving and as a source of product 
specifications and standards. However the ISS function uses regulatory bodies as 
a source of externally approved standards and best practices. Auditors are used 
to review and evaluate ISS activities. The report generated, as a result, is used to 
plan and prepare for future reviews and for post-mortem brainstorming. IS 
forums are regarded as a source of knowledge. Forums consist of a network of 
ISS professionals from other multinationals collaborating and exchanging details 
regarding attacks or the customisation of best practices and standards.  
CS uses knowledge collected from customers to alter product designs, the 
removal of flaws identified and the incorporation of potential trade-offs in 
product design. Conferences are also used by TELE-Co to determine the 
direction, for example, simulation software is taking and to play a part in leading 
new developments. Therefore the purpose of the TELE-Co symposia is to direct 
and collaborate with academia and industry. Public and government sponsored 
forums are also used as a source to estimate the future direction mobile 
technologies developments are taking and possible (environmental) restrictions 
that could be forced on the telecommunications industry.  
The differences, regarding the inter-relationships used, are not profound. ISS 
exploits and attempts to direct regulatory bodies. In the process of doing so the 
function uses external evaluators and other organisations as sources of 
knowledge in order to comply and prefect ISS activities in terms of the 
environment the organisation is operating in. Similarly, CS makes use of 
customer feedback and conferences to manipulate the mobile market and 
incorporate identified customer requirements into product designs.  
It is from the above descriptions of the different inter-organisational relationships that 
the following were identified: vendors: interoperability knowledge, regulatory bodies, 
evaluation groups, forums, specialist and public expertise, and government regulatory 
requirements (Appendix F: Row 7). 
In summary the different levels of expertise are viewed as a significant source of 
knowledge within the two functions. CS created an ad hoc knowledge group and 
Coordinator to enable collaboration between the different design domains. 
Documentation from internal and external sources was used to comply with functional 
or corporate requirements, particularly in documenting lessons-learned and case 
solutions. Knowledge tools such as a central repository tool, vendor repositories and 
email are used to store knowledge. Finally it is evident that the functions are dependent 
on inter-relationships with an external evaluator for the ISS function and customer 
feedback for CS. 
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6.1.5.3 Functional Knowledge Processes 
This sub-section summarises the different knowledge processes utilised by TELE-Co’s 
IS Security and Customer Support functions. Appendix G is adapted from Tables 6.6 
and 6.9. Knowledge is pulled from the ISS and CS reservoirs outlined in Appendix F 
and used through the processes outlined in Appendix G. The Table summarises, 
compares and highlights the differences between the processes used within the two 
functions. The third column illustrates the characteristics of the practices used to 
manage ISS and CS knowledge. 
(1.)Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained and 
internalised by TELE-Co. The IS Security function acquires regulation 
guidelines, and standards such as ISO17799. ISS methodologies are purchased, 
customised and used internally to suit the needs of the function. External 
expertise in the form of consultants are hired and used to evaluate the network 
boundaries, through testing, and internal controls for audit reviews  
CS collaborates with and acquires knowledge from academics and other 
organisations through a yearly TELE-Co symposium. This platform enables the 
function to determine the direction of new simulation software and to direct the 
market. Reverse-engineering is a fundamental process in acquiring new 
knowledge. The technique allows the function to determine how competitors are 
building their products and if the improvements (if any) can be incorporated to 
enhance TELE-Co products. This knowledge is used in interoperability 
problem-solving as customers will inevitably be using other products in addition 
to the TELE-Co product portfolio. 
The difference between the two functions approaches to sourcing external 
knowledge is their dependence on their individual external drivers. ISS is driven 
by the functions remit to comply with TELE-Co’s environmental regulatory 
constraints. The function has to acquire necessary standards and best practices. 
CS needs to stay ahead of market developments and their competitors. 
Therefore, CS attempts to lead the market by facilitating a collaborative forum 
and reverse-engineer the competitions product offerings. 
It is from the above description of the different acquisition processes that the following 
were identified: customised guidelines, methodologies and standards, industrial 
collaboration, reverse-engineering and external evaluation (Appendix G: Row 1). 
(2.)Knowledge capture is the process of retrieving knowledge residing within 
practitioners, artefacts, and organisational entities. The two functions utilise a 
pool of experts to solve function related problems. Technologies such as a 
plethora of KM mechanisms are used to enable collaboration across dispersed 
subsidiaries. Email and the central repository Compass are the primary tools 
used to retrieve manuals, documentation and procedures.  CS, in addition to the 
above, utilises simulation models to design and test data. Allocated roles and 
responsibilities are used in locating expertise and the escalation process enables 
practitioners and teams to pool expertise from different support levels within the 
organisation. 
The only difference between the two functions in capturing knowledge is 
predominantly the simulation tools used by CS to retrieve product component 
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designs and the escalation process used. This has been due to the goals of the 
two functions. IS Security full-fills internal employee and function requirements 
and monitors the external network environment. CS builds and takes apart 
mobile products. 
It is from the above description of the different processes for capturing knowledge that 
the following were identified: security technologies, simulation models: design and test 
data, roles and responsibilities, escalation processes, groupware and a central repository 
(Appendix G: Row 2). 
(3.)Knowledge creation occurs when experts collaborate and use existing 
knowledge. IS Security and CS creates solutions through problem-solving 
processes. Lessons-learned are documented through the auditing process for ISS 
and in the utilisation of the M-Gates methodology by the two functions.  
ISS utilises a trial and error approach in allocating controls in TELE-Co. 
Employees are granted access to different systems and documentation based on 
their roles and responsibilities within the organisation. However access rights 
change as employees require additional access or insufficient access was granted 
initially. This has been due an initial lack of understanding by the Finance 
department in enforcing segregation of duties for regulatory purposes. ISS have 
often reassessed access rights based on the feedback from employees and 
management. Lessons-learned and audit documentation are created and used to 
improve internal processes. Applying the M-Gates methodology or auditing 
steps result in the creation of lessons-learned documentation and review reports. 
CS has undertaken a number of activities which have resulted in the creation of 
solutions and product builds. A divide-and-conquer approach is used to break a 
problem down into smaller parts to simplify the process, trouble-shooting guides 
and M-Gates are all used to solve problems and phase the development of 
TELE-Co products. Methodologies for product development and project 
management are used to coordinate a collaborative approach to problem-solving. 
Documents such as the SRD and risk assessment techniques are used to 
determine security requirements and identify security product enhancements.  
However the CS function does not use an external evaluator to measure 
activities performed. CS utilises numerous KM mechanisms (such as M-Gates 
and brainstorming) to manage projects and to break down problems into more 
manageable chunks.   
It is from the above description of the different processes for knowledge creation that 
the following were identified: problem-solving processes create solutions, trouble­
shooting guides, M-Gates produces the following: product realisation, product 
development mile-stones, the auditing and escalation process, create a trial and error 
approach to granting access to knowledge assets, lessons-learned are created from 
reviews and planning. Finally security requirements are identified through M-Gates and 
risk analysis techniques (Appendix G: Row 3). 
(4.)Knowledge sharing is the process through which explicit and tacit knowledge is 
communicated between individuals, groups, units or organisations. The two 
functions use the problem-solving process to create, store and share solutions. 
The solutions are often created through collaborating with other members of the 
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functions or in the case of CS with the customers themselves. However the IS 
Security function shares, through email, compass, teleconferences internally and 
utilises public forums, regulatory bodies and symposiums for external 
collaboration. ISS practices are shared externally to learn from and collaborate 
with other organisations in sharing lessons-learned and in steering the security 
industry. 
CS share product designs, solutions and test data predominately internally. KM 
is used to share across the function not externally with partners. Therefore the 
difference between the functions in their approaches to sharing is that ISS will 
search for and collaborate with partners to steer the security market and CS will 
push or drive solution knowledge across the different design domains and CS 
teams. 
It is from the above description of the different processes for sharing knowledge that the 
following were identified: the creation process is facilitated by email, Compass, 
teleconferencing. Problem-solving enables the creation of product designs, coding, 
trouble-shooting. Collaborative forums enable ISS to share issues with other security 
professionals working within different organisations as well as play a part in driving the 
security market (Appendix G: Row 4).  
(5.)Knowledge application involves the use of knowledge in guiding decisions and 
actions. The ISS function utilised security technologies to build a picture of 
TELE-Co’s security landscape. Standards and best practices were purchased 
customised and reused. Experts for knowledge trading and therefore problem-
solving can be located through Compass. Audit reviews were used to improve 
ISS practices in the organisation as lessons-learned are documented. Email 
warnings from the TGS or external vendors use email to warn of potential 
threats so that Security Officers can avail of warnings and linked solutions to 
react to a potential problem.   
The CS function utilises the M-Gates methodology to apply the knowledge 
generated at each gate. The outputs vary from the identification of project 
requirements, the allocations of necessary resources (such as a Security Advisor) 
to evaluate risks. Simulation software enables Customer Support to build 
prototypes and collaborate across the different design domains. However the 
software used cannot integrate the different product components created in each 
design domain. Experienced Engineers are used to integrate the designs 
manually. Reverse-engineering is also used to assess and incorporate competitor 
knowledge into TELE-Co products. Product builds, problem-solving are each 
enabled through collaboration and facilitated through email, teleconferences, and 
face-to-face meetings. 
The application of knowledge in the two functions is very different. ISS 
purchases, customises and reuses external knowledge. Lessons-learned are 
documented through post-mortems and external measures or processes are used 
to improve internal activities and raise its political profile in the organisation as 
external audits have monetary implications. The CS function requires the use of 
a project management methodology to enable the coordinated reuse of 
knowledge. The function is also dependent on the tacit knowledge of its 
Engineers and their ability to innovate without the use of modelling software 
which at the moment cannot integrate the designs created across the different 
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design domains. As a result knowledge is pulled from different design domains 
and designers to innovate. ISS as a function purchases and customises external 
knowledge to predominately adhere to environmental requirements. 
It is from the above description of the different processes for knowledge application that 
the following were identified: integrated view of the organisations security landscape 
generated from security technologies. Standards are purchased and customised for use. 
Audits have provided ISS with unexpected sources of knowledge. The review reports 
are used for post-mortems. CS utilises a standardised approach in managing projects but 
an innovative process to create new products (Appendix G: Row 5).  
(6.)Knowledge control processes secure valuable corporate or functional 
knowledge. The IS Security function utilises a three pronged approach to control 
each facet of ISS. Security technologies are predominately used to control and 
protect knowledge. Systems are prioritised according to their value and the 
necessary recourses are aligned. Corporate resources such as HR repositories 
and Engineering labs are allocated controls in order to protect the innovative 
process and the innovators themselves. Controls are even allocated to documents 
to ensure consistency and ownership. 
The CS function’s access rights are domain specific. However Engineering has 
complete rights over their systems and labs so that the innovation process will 
not be interfered with. Virtual private networks are used to encrypt the 
communication lines between CS, Engineering and external partners. Legal 
documents, such as NDAs, are used to control employee behaviour. Penalties for 
breaking TELE-Co regulations regarding sharing IP with for example 
competitors are outlined and agreed through the NDA which is a formal 
contract. 
It is from the above description of the different examples of knowledge control that the 
following were identified: Control Method, Alignment of Controls, Centralised Control, 
Testing of controls, Monitoring, Ownership /Decision-maker, Priority Systems, ACL 
/VPN/ Tunnelling, Legal and Control Documents (Appendix G: Row 6). 
In summary a significant amount of ISS knowledge is acquired externally. 
Collaborative software, regulatory guidelines, subscriptions, technologies and external 
evaluations are acquired by the functions to ensure that the organisation is compliant 
with its business environment and aware of any and all business opportunities such as 
market changes and competitor products. Knowledge is retrieved from the reservoirs 
outlined in Appendix F and very much dependent on experts and knowledge tools. 
Problem-solving is the principal approach used to create knowledge and applied through 
the reuse of the solutions created. 
Page 208 
6.1.6   IS Security and Customer Support KM Mechanisms 
This section describes the mechanisms used in TELE-Co, either directly or indirectly, 
to promote the management of ISS and CS knowledge. Table 6.11 outlines the 
mechanisms which are divided by type, and illustrates which are common or unique to 
both functions and as a result available at an organisational level (√√). The first sub­
section describes the mechanisms used at an organisational level, and the second at a 
functional level. Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the mechanisms 
used. 
(1.) Organisational Level 
TELE-Co uses a variety of non-technological mechanisms to facilitate learning and 
enhance quality control in the organisation. As described by the Director of HR “a 
number of mechanisms are used: induction training for new hires to introduce them to 
our way of doing things. Specialised training is necessary for some organisations as 
there is a shortage of Software Engineers or graduates with special skills. We created 
TELE-Co University to up-skill our new hires”. “Due to the special skill-sets required 
by TELE-Co in Software Engineering, Compliance and Customer Support we take in a 
lot of graduates as interns but we can never recruit enough [with the right skills]. We 
have created a TELE-Co University to deliver online training through E-learning and 
develop a wide range of core software engineering skills,” as stated by the Director of 
HR. “Mentoring is a key process in TELE-Co it provides a new hire or an employee 
whose responsibility has changed access to an expert or a group of experts,” as stated by 
the Former Project Manager. “Learning on the job, and manager – employee reviews 
are used to help employees learn and expand their skills here, reviews are a way to 
informally evaluate the employee and help guide their progress. We also use 
brainstorming sessions to develop profiles of our managers so that we know who we 
should make part of their teams,” as stated by the Director of HR. As explained by the 
Former Engineering Manager “in a global organisation like TELE-Co teams are 
coordinated [primarily] through teleconferences, and when possible face-to-face 
meetings. Minutes of meetings are recorded and are TELE-Cos way of tracking projects 
and their status, usually these are then stored in Compass”. 
As explained by the [Cork] Security Officer “TELE-Co standardises everything 
[regarding] our jobs. Templates are used and tagged using a corporate format which 
[stipulates] the author [owner], date written, name of anyone who has updated or 
changed the document along with the reasons [for doing] and these dates. It’s a way to 
manage our TELE-Co documents”. “Project management [methodologies are] used to 
standardise the approaches across the multinational. M-Gates was developed in-house 
and it phases projects so that they are more manageable and require [specific] outputs 
like for example a requirements doc.  Six Sigma is also used and practically a second 
language for TELE-Co employees in building a case for corporate resources,” as 
explained by the Former Project Manager. Symposiums are used to “collaborate with 
Industry in driving certain goals of our organisation like the mobile market or for 
regulatory requirements,” as stated by the Director of HR.   
The central repository for TELE-Co is Compass. “It was created to allow TELE-Co 
employees to share information across the different subsidiaries. It is our Intranet, or a 
central document repository. Groups and communities of practice can collaborate 
through Compass as our Engineering teams or Security Officers are distributed 
throughout the globe,” as stated by the Director of HR. As explained by the DB Analyst 
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“Compass has many functions which are available through four levels of access, as you 
[an employee] progress through the organisation you are granted more and more access 
to the different resources available through the system or it can be allocated based on 
your role and the group you are in”. “Members can utilise a search tool and find experts 
or work-done on previous projects, it is as advanced as we need at the moment,” as 
further explained by the DB Analyst. As described by the Director of HR “Compass is 
just a content management system (CMS); it is used to store documents and lessons-
learned for the financial audits. TELE-Co University is the learning environment that 
we use to increase our employees skills. It identifies skills needed and provides either 
face-to-face training or online courses”. “MS Outlook is the most used tool for 
communicating and sharing resources. Every group or function uses it to collaborate 
and share solutions either directly or indirectly by sending out warning emails from 
Engineering or TGS. If a bug or a virus has been identified emails with hyperlinks to 
internal or external solutions are distributed to specific divisions or the entire 
organisation,” as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. As explained by the CS 
Manager “Common shares are used by regional teams to store procedures and trouble­
shooting guides, vendor portals are also vital for us as we need to have access to 
information about vendor products. A lot of the time we need to be able to reverse-
engineer a competitor’s product because the bug is due to an interoperability problem”. 
Call logging systems are used “to track calls by employees and customers and log the 
different escalation levels,” as explained by the Former Engineering Manager. “Two­
way pagers from are issued to the majority of our Engineers and IT and Security 
organisations. They are used to provide twenty-four hour support and as a virtual 
connection to our scanning tools,” as explained by the TGS Coordinator. Public portals 
are also used to [facilitate] collaboration with external programmers,” as stated by 
Design Engineer 2. 
(2) IS Security and Customer Support Function Levels 
The IS Security and Customer Support functions use a number of knowledge 
mechanisms. Some tools are common, others are function specific.  “Brainstorming 
sessions are used at [the] end of project phases [M-Gates] and audits [for compliance],” 
as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. As explained by the TIP Coordinator, 
“conference calls are regularly arranged by the group especially during an audit”. “On­
the-job training through unofficial mentoring, job shadowing or employee rotation are 
used to speed up the learning process in the [security] group,” as stated by the Director 
of HR. Employees are also motivated to “collaborate and mentor their colleagues with 
promotion schemes and monetary incentives,” as stated by the Former Project Manager. 
As described by the TGS Coordinator “the overall [security] operation within the 
organisation is monitored by formal groups [TGS, in/external Audit Committees, and 
TIP] and on site [Security] Officers with review measures to determine the effectiveness 
of the procedures in place”. According to the [Cork] Security Officer “new hires 
undergo an induction programme with security emphasising the security culture of the 
organisation. The new employees are made aware of all of the policies and the 
requirements to ensure that all of the corporate procedures are adhered to”.  “SETA is 
one of the best ways to educate employees of the risks to the company, it is [necessary] 
to remind them of threats like man-in-the-middle22 attacks and TELE-Co ethics [for 
code of conduct], but these are useless if they are not enforced by HR [penalties for 
22 Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM): is a form of active eavesdropping, through which the attacker makes 
independent connections with the employee(s) and relays messages from what seems to be a trusted source (for e.g. a 
bank) to obtain information such as a password. The information is then used to bypass ISS controls and sniff a 
corporate network. 
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breaking Security procedures],” as stated by the Security Coordinator. As described by 
the IT Manager “SRD require Security Advisors [depending on the project Security 
Officers or Engineers who specialise in Security enhancements] involvement in every 
stage of a project, they [Managers] must state the risks to TELE-Co and the Security 
controls, resources required for in-house or an external project”.  
The IS Security function depends on the different Security technologies to generate a 
picture of the TELE-Co Security landscape. According to the [Australian] Security 
Officer “we use a number of scanning tools to monitor our networks [subsidiaries] and 
identify anyone [rogues or employees] trying to access our systems or behaving in an 
unusual /unauthorised manner”. Tools such as “VPNs for secure tunnelling with our 
partners and ART [Automated Analysis, Reporting Tracking Tool] feed us reports and 
identify vulnerabilities in our network, but the majority of controls are allocated to 
Engineering systems leaving other networks less secure and this is an obvious weakness 
yet controls / resources will not be as evenly allocated as we [Security] would like,” as 
explained by the [Networks] Security Officer. “Excel and Outlook are our main tools 
for the job, Excel is used for creating risk matrixes, to calculate the levels of risk to 
critical systems so that enough controls can be added and email [is used] to check for 
any warnings from Microsoft, Cisco, McAfee or from TIPs,” as stated by the [Cork] 
Security Officer. According to the Security Coordinator, “TELE-Co is an active 
member of regulatory bodies for developing [Security] standards and the International 
Security Forum to collaborate with leading companies regarding Security issues”.  
“Problem-solving or fire fighting is our [Customer Supports] job, we use email, a call 
tracking /logging system for escalations and Compass to collaborate with the different 
regional teams for our [product/component] division,” as stated by the CS Manager. As 
described by the CS Engineer “trouble-shooting guides are very useful to us and we 
either develop them internally or we are provided with guides from our customers 
vendors. TELE-Co templates and guides are used for building solutions to errors or 
bugs identified by our customers, these are then stored in Compass or in our regional 
shares”. According to the CS Manager “CS collaborates a lot with Marketing, we act as 
Technical Advisors to shadow a Marketing Manager during a sales pitch with a 
customer, we are their product experts and we know what should or shouldn’t be said to 
a customer about our new products”.  
As explained by Design Engineer 3 “[the] M-Gates methodology is a phased approach 
to [not only] managing projects [but to] sharing knowledge across the different teams or 
[Design] domains. The CMPR [Concept to Manufacturing Process Redesign] team 
developed it and are the official experts on the methodology if [you] have any questions 
they provide excellent help”. [The] “PKM team were unofficially formed by Design 
Engineers to encourage collaboration across the different domains to [ultimately] reduce 
the time involved in designing a product and handing it over to Product Developers. 
PKM is coordinated by the Knowledge Champion of the team”, as stated by Design 
Engineer 2. According to the PKM Coordinator, “prototyping is our approach to testing 
new designs and building alternatives, using our modelling software, we store 
prototypes and test data, even if they are not used as we can quickly eliminate problems 
encountered in future releases or designs”. “Our modelling software and lab simulations 
allow us to experiment, to innovate and create new products, simulations are brilliant 
learning environments in creating and problem-solving for customer problems and new 
requirements,” as further explained by Design Engineer 1. Additionally, according to 
the PKM Coordinator, “TELE-Co Symposiums are organised by the company to 
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collaborate with academia and industry to determine the direction in simulation 
[software] or compliance [practices]”. 
Customer Support uses a number or tools to collaborate across and within the various 
functions. As stated by the PKM Coordinator “simulation models and software [system 
and paper-based] for product component designs are vital to test and share ideas. They 
give a 3D representation of an Engineer’s ideas and allow us to collaborate, to be 
innovative”. “CAD [computer aided design] tools are used to help us design our 
products, [and] we can also store the designs,” as stated by Design Engineer 2. However 
the “simulation software used cannot facilitate the combination of all of the different 
Design Domains and we could be working on multiple components but this is where our 
experienced Engineers can pull everything together to form the integrated prototype 
before it’s passed on to Product Developers. M-Gates and PKM force a more 
collaborate design initiative and phase the design [process],” as stated by the PKM 
Coordinator. Additionally according to the Director of HR “every effort is made to 
make these [Engineers] as productive and as innovative as possible, they have full 
control over their Labs [and networks], and use the latest simulation modelling software 
and we use brainstorming sessions to build profiles of our key Engineers. A HR 
database is used to create and record profiles of Engineers and match-up their teams”. 
The organisation also utilises an online forum to collaborate with the general public “on 
programming queries so that we can promote ourselves to third-level student,” as 
explained by the Director of HR. 
The next sub-section compares KM mechanism usage by the ISS and CS functions. 
(3) TELE-Co KM Mechanisms 
Table 6.11 outlines and summarises the different KM mechanisms within TELE-Co 
which were verified by the Knowledge Consultant and the [Cork] Security Officer. The 
mechanisms are supported by the organisational infrastructure (section 6.1.2).  Forty-six 
KM mechanisms were identified. The proportion of mechanism usage within the two 
functions was high with seventy-one (ISS) and seventy-eight percent of the mechanisms 
available used. Overall fifty percent of the mechanisms identified were categorised as 
organisational (used by the two functions). Thirty percent of the organisational 
mechanisms were identified as non-technological and nineteen percent as technological. 
Learning mechanisms, mentoring, induction training, face-to-face meetings, 
brainstorming sessions, quality reviews and the documentation of lessons-learned, 
groupware, symposiums and the corporate Intranet were each exploited by the ISS and 
CS functions. The contribution of IS and CS practitioners to TELE-Co was reported to 
be easier when knowledge was made accessible through the M-Gates methodology and 
Compass. The content stored was explicit, shared and modified if required. TELE-Co 
combined its document management system with Compass to provide centralised 
knowledge. The other mechanisms used by the two functions were identified as: 
common shares, technological forums, vendor portals, Excel, email, TELE-Co 
University, electronic contact lists, internal repositories, expert list, hyperlinks and two-
way pagers. The mechanisms used to facilitate socialisation included: cooperative 
projects across the functions (M-Gates) and external forums.  
Combination was facilitated by collaborating through documentation management 
systems (DMS), problem-solving, escalation processes and web-based access to 
knowledge. The integration of Design knowledge was regarded as a strategic initiative. 
The PKM group was established to combine explicit and tacit knowledge of Design 
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 Engineers. Simulated software was used by Engineering to design new products and aid 
decision-making in determining the most appropriate design. The combination of the 
group and software was to encourage collaboration across the different design domains. 
However, this initiative is very much domain specific as opposed to functional and 
organisational. CS utilised Compass – a central repository, portals and group shares to 
store, retrieve and use functional knowledge. Knowledge sharing was enabled through 
the use of repositories, portals, expertise locators and the corporate Intranet – Compass. 
Knowledge application is dependent on the hierarchical relationships outlined in the 
structure of the organisation. The escalation process was identified as a key mechanism 
for sharing and using solutions which were often created using email. Thirty percent of 
the CS mechanisms identified were categorised as non-technological with forty-seven 
percent as technological. These high percentages indicated a significant difference in its 
use of non-technological mechanisms such as mentoring, ad hoc groups, roles and 
simulation models. CS utilised an ad hoc group and a Knowledge Champion to promote 
and drive KM across the design domains. Forty-one percent of the ISS mechanisms 
identified were categorised as non-technological with thirty percent as technological. 
The ISS function utilised non-technological mechanisms such as SETA to control 
employee behaviour regarding external risks and threats to TELE-Co. Formal groupings 
were established to drive the different facets of ISS. The TGS and TIPs groups were 
established to source regulatory standards, coordinate internal security and perform 
internal audits. Additionally participation in regulatory bodies and ISS forums enabled 
the organisation to steer the ISS regulatory market. Security technologies were used to 
scan the geographically displaced subsidiaries to develop a picture of the TELE-Co 
security landscape. ISS knowledge was also captured through solution templates and 
stored in repositories and accessed through where it can be easily retrieved by ISS 
practitioners. 
Table 6.11 illustrates the high volume of KM mechanisms used in TELE-Co. It is 
evident that ISS utilised formalised mechanisms and external measures compared to 
Customer Supports ad hoc mechanisms to drive KM within the function. The significant 
difference between the functions was the more formalised approach to promoting ISS 
knowledge management than CS knowledge. CS positioned its KM initiative around M-
Gates and PKM for specific design domains as opposed to the function. ISS utilised KM 
mechanisms to supports the functions goal of protecting the corporate assets and adhere 
to regulatory constraints. However the utilisation of simulation models could aid the ISS 
function in adopting a more proactive approach to supporting the security needs of 
TELE-Co. 
Page 213 
IS SECURITY AND CUSTOMER SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE MECHANISMS 
Mechanisms: Use: ISS CS 
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Induction Training: Specialised for the different functions  & as an  introduction √ √ 
Learning on the Job: Responsibilities are added gradually √ √ 
Lab Simulations: Learning environment to create new products & experiment √ 
SETA: Penalties for Breaking Security Procedures √ 
Mentoring: Provide Access to Experts & a Ready-made Network √ √ 
Teleconferences: Used for Global Communication √ √ 
Reviews: 6 month Assessment of Employees √ √ 
Minutes of Meetings Recorded & Stored in Compass √ √ 
Face-to-Face Meetings: Yearly Meetings (attempted, constrained by budget & time) √ √ 
TELE-Co University: Up-skill to meet Specific Needs (not inc. in 3rd Level Courses) √ √ 
Brain Storming Audit Reviews of Engineering Domains through M-Gates √ √ 
Expert Status: Expertise List √ √ 
Quality Doc. Review Internal Document Sign-off Procedure (Author Tracking) √ √ 
Technical Advisors: CS Collaborate with Marketing to Shadow a Sales Pitch √ 
Symposia : Collaborate with Industry in Driving the (Regulatory) Market √ √ 
DMS: Doc. Templates & Quality Procedures (Authors/Editors/Dates) √ √ 
Problem-solving Process: Escalation Process √ 
SRD: Aligning Security Requirements to a Function Project √ 
Six Sigma: Build a Case for Project Resources & ID Responsibilities √ √ 
M-Gates: Methodology Phased Approach to managing projects √ 
Trouble-shooting Guides: Templates & Guides for Building Solutions √ 
External Evaluation:  Auditors (Review) & Security Vendors (Penetration Testing) √ 
TGS: TELE-Co Global Security Group: Coordinate Teams √ 
TIP: TELE-Co Intellectual Property Global Compliance Group √ 
PKM (Ad hoc) Team to encourage collaboration across Engineering Domains √ 
CMPR Team: Concept to Manufacturing Process Redesign, M-Gates Experts √ 
Knowledge  Coordinator Champions KM Approach to Virtual Prototyping √ 
K
M
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Compass: Intranet Central Document Repository, Group Resource, Contact Lists √ √ 
MS Outlook: Collaborating & Sharing Solutions √ √ 
CMS: Stores Lessons-learned, Document Store √ √ 
MS Excel: Risk Matrixes, to calculate the level of risk √ 
Emails: In/External Warning Alerts √ 
Emails: Internal Solutions & Hyperlinks to Guides √ 
Hyperlinks Links to Internal & External Solutions √ √ 
Common Shares Groups, Regional Shares, Stores Procedures and Guides √ √ 
Vendor Portals Procedures, Guidelines and Best Practices √ √ 
Simulation Models System & Paper-based for Product Components √ 
CAD Tools: Computer Aided Design for Product Simulations and Stores √ 
Call logging System Calls are Tagged by Expert & Escalation Levels √ √ 
ART: Automated Analysis, Reporting Tracking Tool √ 
Scanning SW: Monitors Rogues & Internal Employees √ 
VPN: Tunnelling to Protect NW – Partners & Customers √ 
Security Forum: International Security Forum √ 
TELE-Co Forum: Public Programming Q&A Forum √ 
HR Database: Records Profiles of Engineers & Used to match-up Teams HR√ 
Wireless Technology: 2-way Pagers from Systems or Call logging System √ √ 
*Organisational Level: √ ISS and √ CS 
* Specific to One Function: √ 
Table 6.11: TELE-Co KM Mechanisms.  
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6.1.7 Impact of Managing IS Security and CS Knowledge  
This section describes the impact of managing IS Security and CS knowledge within 
TELE-Co. The direct and indirect management of this knowledge has impacted the 
organisation at the following three levels: (1) individual; (2) functional and (3) finally at 
an organisational level. 
Level (1) Individual Impact 
The rate an employee climbs the learning curve “depends heavily on what resources 
his/her individual manager provides, rather than on the [collective] body of knowledge 
available in TELE-Co,” as stated by the Director of HR. TELE-Co University provides 
“essential training for employees in general regarding security issues and TELE-Co 
intellectual property guidelines”, as explained by the [Cork] Security Officer. As stated 
by the TGS Coordinator “security technologies and external sources like Microsoft 
[Vendors] provide us with a lot of knowledge about the network as well as potential 
risks”. ISS practitioners are encouraged to “attend security conferences and forums such 
as [the] ISF [Irish/International Security Forums], to talk to other [Security] 
coordinators and share experiences and best practices”, as explained by the Security 
Coordinator. According to the [Australian] Security Officer “we really depend on the 
different tools used in TELE-Co so that we can work together and solve problems as 
well as follow corporate guidelines [regarding] rollouts and SOX”. According to the 
TGS Coordinator “all of the sites and GEOs are assigned to individual Security Officers 
and Coordinators so that the correct controls are provided for each TELE-Co 
manufacturing plant or R&D centre”. Structurally ISS is a separate function from IT in 
TELE-Co. “Having a separate function [from IT] allows a separate budget and much 
needed political support [all of which is] due to SOX and 9/11”, as explained by the 
TIPs Coordinator. 
“KM tools and systems have enhanced TELE-Co’s ability to create knowledge, capture 
it in a usable format, and reuse it for different projects,” as stated by Design Engineer 3. 
“PKM processes build intellectual capital by facilitating learning and communities of 
practice,” as stated by the PKM Coordinator. “[KM] tools help retain the results of our 
[functions] learning and make Engineering expertise available around-the-clock, world­
wide. By using structured, standard processes it is possible to build global teams,” as 
stated by Design Engineer 2. Furthermore, “employees seem to enjoy their work and 
can grow in their careers at TELE-Co, as PKM processes and tools help create a more 
stable environment with readily available design knowledge,” as stated by the Former 
Engineering Manager. Tools are essential to “provide access to past [product] designs 
and solutions and we need to experiment with simulation software and processes like 
prototyping and PKM”, as explained by the Former Engineering Manager. However “it 
is the TELE-Co University and Symposiums that provide the necessary skills for our 
[Design] Engineers and support Engineer as well as allow TELE-Co to steer the 
industry”, as stated by Design Engineer 1.   
Level (2)  Function Impact 
Specialised ISS (TGS & TIP) groups coordinate and share knowledge across the 
organisation. As explained by the TGS Coordinator “[the] security [function] is separate 
from IT and focuses on the different aspects of security. We use a three-pronged 
approach to ensure that the technical side of security is managed as well as monitoring 
and protecting TELE-Co assets for the organisation as a whole. We also have a group 
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that specialises [in] auditing to make sure we are all [subsidiaries and GEOs] compliant 
as the implications of not being are pretty severe”. “Auditing is time intensive but we 
learn from each cycle and [reviews] are used to see if we are doing what we are suppose 
to be doing by corporate as well as the [external] auditor”, as stated by the [Australian] 
Security Officer. “We do collaborate but it’s mostly due to the different audits, we have 
to [adhere] to TIPs requirements. Obviously, to stay ahead of hackers, the groups share 
knowledge and resources across the GEOs through Compass and from our vendors”, as 
stated by the Security Coordinator. As explained by the TIP Coordinator “audits have 
resulted in the documentation of everything including lessons-learned for our 
brainstorming sessions. They have forced a more practical approach to using or forcing 
what we have learned from one audit to the next and for our incident teams in targeting 
hackers or internal risks like an unhappy employee”. ISS also use a “trial and error 
approach for figuring out how many controls or how restrictive we should be as we 
don’t want affect productivity in TELE-Co – it’s just a constant battle  to protect TELE-
Co assets and make sure groups like Engineering can access what they need”, as 
explained by the Compliance Coordinator.  
PKM processes and tools help to manage the “down side” of a project or design. The 
data-centric process of prototyping “enables designers and product managers to 
understand parameters impacting risk”, as explained by the PKM Coordinator. As stated 
by the Design Engineer 1 “based on best-in-class design domain knowledge and a 
characterisation of design trade-offs, it is possible to identify and quantify the likelihood 
and impact of risk [events] such as the project being over budget, the product design 
process taking longer than the allocated time, the design being more expensive than the 
target cost”. PKM provides a method for assessing the predictability of schedules, 
processes, and product requirements. Standardised documents and templates “ensure 
easy collaboration for problem-solving and advanced filtering for solution [Compass] 
searches”, as stated by the DB Analyst. According to the PKM Coordinator 
“prototyping tools, and knowledge management as well as M-Gates allow us [Design 
Engineers] to collaborate as communities of practice when designing different [product] 
components and figuring out how the parts fit together”. “Greater collaboration would 
reduce the inefficiencies of using different design domains, but it’s really up to senior 
management to agree to using something like PKM across WEC”, as explained by the 
Former Engineering Manager.  
(2.1) Product / Service Impact 
As explained by the Security Coordinator “best practices and standards are selected 
from vendors and regulatory bodies so that we use the best [approaches] and we follow 
industry standards”. “Auditing is now very useful and they do provide a lot of 
information or knowledge about how good we are at securing TELE-Co. We do make 
every attempt to sit down or organise teleconferences at the end of each one so that all 
[of the] lessons-learned are recorded”, as stated by the TIP Coordinator.  
“Reverse-engineering provides very useful knowledge about the different product our 
customers are using. We need to know how these products work so that we can solve 
inter-operability problems and obviously to [determine] how good our competitors 
products are”, as explained by Design Engineer 2. According to the Former Engineering 
Manager “first to market is every Engineering organisations goal [in order] to maximise 
profits and reverse-engineering is a skill or technique used to achieve this”. “We use a 
lot of things to enhance the service we provide. Our support engineers need to have 
diagnostic skills and know who to escalate problems to as well as the right trouble-
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shooting manuals and solutions [to] support customers and [as a result] our products”, 
as stated by the CS Engineer. Collaborating with Marketing as a technical advisors 
“allow CS and Engineering to collect important customer feedback [regarding] trade­
offs and fixes”, as explained by the CS Manager. As stated by the PKM Coordinator 
“sharing knowledge across the different design domains will reduce design and 
development times. We just need more and more Engineers to participate and then 
management will adopt PKM throughout TELE-Co like M-Gates”.  
(2.2) Processes 
ISS utilises “a number of tools like POPI to ensure the functions effectiveness in 
securing TELE-Co”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer. “Brainstorming sessions 
at the end of each review are pretty common. They are difficult to organise because of 
time differences as well as finding the time needed to chat, email and record the lessons-
learned”, as stated by the [Australian] Security Officer. As explained by the TGS 
Coordinator “we use Compass, vendor sites, ISF, TELE-Co processes like M-Gates, 
standards and the best practices selected by TIPs”.  According to the Compliance 
Coordinator “reviews are used to guide future audits, document the different processes 
and as a form of assessment for [the] security [function]  
Effective decision-making has an indirect impact on an organisation. As explained by 
the PKM Coordinator, decision-making is defined as, “an individual or group process 
that takes knowledge about a given scenario, and selects one or more potential courses 
of action”. Decision-making in TELE-Co includes the following: “identifying the 
decision stakeholders and their roles in the decision-making process, selecting criteria 
based on which the decision is made, gathering information, identifying and evaluating 
[alternatives], and selecting the best [alternatives],” as stated by Design Engineer 2. As 
described by the PKM Coordinator “the effectiveness of a decision-making process can 
be measured by the time needed to make decisions, how well they [timeliness of 
decisions] match scheduled times when action is required, how well they [robustness of 
decisions] account for uncertainties and risks, cost or effort of the decision-making 
process, how well the decision-making process is understood and visible throughout 
WEC [the Engineering organisation] or other organisations [functions]”. The validity of 
the decision-making process, that is, “how well it follows generally accepted principles, 
the clarity of the decision alternatives selected by the process, and the acceptance of the 
decisions from the process or TELE-Co buy-in,” as stated by the Former Engineering 
Manager. 
As explained by Design Engineer 2 “the primary way in which the impact of PKM can 
be measured is cycle time the time required to transform a concept into a production 
product”. Cycle time can also be measured for each of the individual process steps or 
stage gates within the product realisation processes. “Cycle time is measured [according 
to] the time to complete a given process step, [for example a prototype], and the number 
of steps to complete the total process,” as explained by Design Engineer 2. According to 
the PKM Coordinator “the goal of PKM is to create a process with fewer and faster 
prototype cycles”. Access to reliable and timely knowledge is crucial for cycle time 
reduction. “If knowledge is not reliable, a [Engineering] Designer or Project Manager 
making decisions will make errors. These errors can [subsequently] multiply as 
decisions are made using the wrong results of the original decisions. At best, this will 
result in the need for error correction activities if the error is detected. At worst, the 
error will not be detected until the product reaches the market,” as explained by the 
Former Engineering Manager. “The time spent on [error correction and] damage control 
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would be actually better spent executing the product development process,” as further 
explained by the PKM Coordinator. “Standardised templates allow us to incorporate 
fairly advanced searches for Customer Support and we do try to monitor solution use 
through Compass but it is just a repository and not a tracking case-based reasoning 
tool”, as explained by the DB Analyst. As stated by the Former Engineering Manager 
“internal processes and approaches like M-Gates as well as Six Sigma are developed 
internally. TELE-Co uses internal expertise and rarely looks externally unless it’s to 
reverse-engineer a product. Even internally it’s difficult to work across the different 
design domains. TELE-Co is very much dependent on Engineering expertise in 
combining different designs and figuring out trade-offs”. “PKM is the solution for our 
Engineers to share and understand the different risks”, as stated by the PKM 
Coordinator. 
Level (3) Organisational Impact 
The impact of ISS is difficult to measure. “A cost model is used in TELE-Co 
manufacturing sites to determine the downtime for production and the overtime needed 
to fix a problem resulting from a security breach”, as explained by the Security 
Coordinator. As described by the TGS Coordinator “obviously a low level of security 
will have a dramatic affect on the image of an organisation if, for example, a breach in 
TELE-Co was made public – customer confidence in our products would be reduced”. 
“Like every organisation we have experienced [security] incidents and can calculate the 
cost in downtime and in the resources needed to fix things but really it’s a work-in­
progress in trying to come up with a ROI type measurement”, as stated by the 
[Networks] Security Officer. “Audits are measures of how we apply controls and 
[determine] access rights for TELE-Co employees. It’s also a trial-and-error kind of 
approach [because] we are always updating peoples access so that they have what they 
need to do their jobs”, as stated by the [Cork] Security Officer.  According to the 
Compliance Officer “compliance and 9/11 changed managements [and] everyone’s idea 
of security, there are financial implications if TELE-Co isn’t compliant, our customers 
expect us to be and we know that to make things easier for ourselves - we have become 
active members of [security] regulatory bodies to drive the market and play a part in 
agreeing new standards and practices”. IS Security is directly aligned to the 
organisations strategy as “we regularly check to make sure that security is mapped to 
TELE-Co processes and the [security] policy is mapped to the goal of the organisation”, 
as stated by the Security Coordinator. 
CS and Engineering costs are incurred if “delivery of a product is pulled as fines are 
demanded by the customer”, as stated by the CS Engineer. The cycle time benefits are 
closely related to the risk mitigation benefits of PKM. If the flow of knowledge at a 
given “step in the product realisation process is not timely, it will [in most cases] delay 
the execution of subsequent steps”, as explained by Design Engineer 1. When it is 
necessary to move forward to the next step in the project schedule, “[the] Project 
Manager may opt to do so with incomplete knowledge, [thereby] increasing the risk 
associated with the design”, as explained by the Former Engineering Manager. Risk is 
introduced into the project/product by the lack of knowledge to support a timely, high-
quality decision. As stated by the CS Engineer “the PKM team believes that if reliable 
and timely knowledge flows were available within TELE-Co’s product realisation 
process, dramatic reductions could be achieved in both product cycle time and project 
risk”. Cycle time improvement is an organisational goal. It is “the main lever for driving 
cost reduction,” as stated by Design Engineer 2, which is the primary area in which the 
benefits of PKM can be measured. Increasing the productivity of Designers and 
Page 218 
therefore reducing “the level of effort for a project will reduce Engineering costs”, as 
stated by the CS Manager. As described by the PKM Coordinator “total Engineering 
costs are roughly proportional to the number of prototype cycles that need to be 
completed for a given product”. Based on the analyses by the CMPR team in the first 
quarter of 2001 [TELE-Co website], it was determined that “even a five percent 
improvement in Engineering costs [through the application of design simulation and 
prototyping] would lead to a significant reduction in the overall Engineering costs for a 
new product”, as stated by the PKM Coordinator. “The PKM team developed an 
activity-based cost (ABC) model, that incorporates the staffing levels and cycle times 
for each of the gate owners and suppliers for the M-Gates methodology,” as stated by 
the Former Engineering Manager. As explained by the PKM Coordinator “the financial 
impact of PKM is generally viewed in terms of reduced Engineering costs, due to fewer 
prototype cycles, faster prototype cycles, and a higher level of design reuse and 
knowledge sharing”. “It is possible to generate increased revenue, thanks to better 
satisfaction of identified customer requirements, higher quality products, more 
customer-centric designs, and earlier market release,” as further explained by Design 
Engineer 2. Finally “the return on investment [ROI] for project management activities 
has been pigeonholed in terms of organisational maturity, project schedule slippage, and 
budget slippage. If we can reduce these the overall benefit will be huge,” as explained 
by the CS Manager. 
6.1.8 Summary: Managing ISS and CS Functional Knowledge  
The TELE-Co findings also provided rich descriptions of the approaches used by the 
two functions in managing knowledge. Table 6.12 outlines and summarises the different 
impacts generated as a result of the approaches used to manage knowledge within the 
two functions. While CS utilised a KM approach to prototyping, the IS Security 
function benefited from formalised processes used to manage the organisations 
regulatory requirements. The IS Security strategy was aligned to business strategy. Non 
compliance has financial implications and provides the function with a measurement. 
Membership of regulatory bodies was and is a necessity as it allowed TELE-Co to 
participate in driving the industry. However KM was not aligned to business strategy. 
KM was implemented on an ad hoc basis and specific to CS and Design Domains. 
Therefore ISS is more effective in managing knowledge than the CS function. However 
the utilisation of simulated software for incident decision-making could allow the 
function to document rogue behaviour and predict and plan for future incidents. The 
impact of the regulatory and internal control mechanism are analysed in Chapter 7 in 
leveraging IS Security on a KM environment in order to address the third research 
question. The analyses necessary to address the three research questions will also enable 
the researcher to derive a model for managing IS Security knowledge. 
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Direct 
Indirect 
ISS FUNCTION: NO KM INITIATIVE CS FUNCTION: KM INITIATIVE 
Access to SETA programmes through the Corporate University.| 
Security conferences, Employee reviews as well as external reviews.| 
Prototyping & KM facilitate learning for Design Engineers. University develops core 
skills. Attendance of Engineering conferences & TELE-Co Symposia for collaboration. 
Security Technologies & Threat complexity is high & constant, 
Knowledge Tools: centralises knowledge.| ISS Expertise coordinated. 
KM Tools (such as Compass) retain individual knowledge for reuse.| Available design & 
solution knowledge reduces the time needed to solve a problem /design a new product. 
Job is easier due to specific processes & tools/practices available.| 
Political support at senior level.| ISS technologies provide knowledge. 
Access to greater number of solutions (Compass): reduces the complexity of problem-
solving. Simulation SW provides access to past designs.| Knowledge is centralised. 
Specialised (TGS & TIP) groups coordinate & share knowledge across 
organisation.| Audits provide a measures & learning.| 
Development standards (M-Gates|PKM) & Templates ensures easy collaboration & 
advanced filtering for solution searches. 
Shared knowledge across the different groups.| Proactive stance against 
risks through brain-storming, lessons-learned.| 
Collaborative teams are possible through structured development processes. However, SW 
designs are specific to design domains which can be frustrating.| Access to CoP. 
Best practices & standards are sought & evaluated to improve security 
within the organisation.| 
Reverse-engineering & diagnosing skills provide valuable knowledge re: competitor and 
customer products/problems.| Escalation processes enables improved service & products 
for customers. DMS enables the creation of detailed solutions.| 
Fewer surprises in regular audits & increased security information.| 
Lessons-learned from Audit post-mortems. 
Improvements on products from Customer feedback & repeated bugs are passed back to 
Engineering to fix in the next release. Faster response time for fixes.| Pushing knowledge 
around the design domains reduces time needed.| Experienced Engineers combine designs.| 
Solutions for problems/designs are not made available to Customers or to some Domains. 
Brainstorming sessions.| Use of GW (email) & repositories of Best 
Practices, Standards, & lessons-learned.| M-Gates, SRD, & POPI 
Employees are mentored by Engineers.| Use of Prototyping, KM to integrate and leverage 
design knowledge.| 
Reviews are used to guide the next review.| Ongoing evaluations Fewer mistakes made.| Time to Market reduced.| 
High number of external sources.| High volume of K stored in 
repositories, technologies.| Number & use of ISF Forums.| M-Gates is 
used as a best practice approach.| 
No. of Solution hits is monitored.| Reuse of Solutions through Compass.| M-Gates is used 
as a best practice approach.| PKM enables Engineers to understand parameters impacting 
risk (of failure/over budget).| Method for understanding schedules & product requirements. 
No. of improvements as a result of an Evaluation.| Auditing requires the 
documentation of ISS processes. 
Low number of external web sources used; High volume of Knowledge stored in 
repositories.| 
Audit process- enables learning, measurements, post-mortems & guide 
next review.| 
A CBR Tool is not used to enhance & support problem-solving.| DMS & Compass: 
centralise & standardise. 
Brainstorming for Audit reviews to improve the process & the 
evaluation. 
Engineers combine the design knowledge created from single domains & simulation SW.| 
Trade-off knowledge is captured & incorporated into designs. | PKM enables integration. 
Security strategy is aligned to business strategy.| Non compliance has 
financial implications.   
KM is not aligned to business strategy.|KM is ad hoc & specific to CS & Design Domains.| 
No support from Senior management in PKM adoption.| First to market- new products 
Difficult to measure ISS – downtime & overtime necessary to rectify an 
ISS breach can be calculated. 
Reduction in escalations reduces costs.| Learning & design times are reduced.| Reduction 
in cycle-times.| Monetary penalties are incurred if a product is late (ABC). 
Poor security has dramatic affect on Corporate image.| Auditing allows 
an unbiased measurement of the function. 
Collaboration across Domains to ultimately improve the process & the realisation of first 
to market.| CS collects and incorporates customer feedback.| Effective decision-making. 
Best practices are shared.| Membership of regulatory bodies to drive the 
industry. An overly restrictive environment 
Best practices are shared across participating Design Domains.| Symposiums drive market. 
Table 6.12: IS Security and Customer Support Impacts.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 

INTERPRETING HOW ISS CAN LEVERAGE

THE CONCEPT OF KM 

7.0 Introduction 
This Chapter analyses the findings to address the research questions by using a cross-
case analysis. The Chapter consists of three primary sections (sections 7.1; 7.2; 7.3), 
one for each of the research questions. The following sections highlight the findings 
associated with each component of the research framework (Figure 7.1) identified from 
the synthesised IS Security and KM literatures discussed in Chapter two (Figure 2.5) 
and set out in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1). The framework was used as a lens to analyse the 
different operational factors and outcomes identified in literature and to differentiate 
between them through their applications within CME-Co (Chapter five) and TELE-Co 
(Chapter six). The factors and outcomes acted as a basis for grounding the investigation 
of the approaches used to manage knowledge in two specialised support (IS Security 
and CS) functions. Chapters five and six examined how the two functions managed 
knowledge within the organisation. 
This Chapter discusses how KM can be leveraged to manage IS Security knowledge 
across the two organisations. Section 7.1 discusses how the different components of the 
organisational infrastructure can support the management of IS Security knowledge. 
Section 7.2 describes the concept of managing IS Security knowledge. The intention is 
to understand how organisations manage this knowledge. Section 7.3 discusses how 
firms align IS Security to a KM environment. 7.4 describes and justifies the model 
derived from this analysis. Each section of the four sections brings together some of the 
key issues identified in the two case organisations, and draws out some general 
statement for interpreting the management of IS Security knowledge. Finally, section 
7.5 concludes the Chapter. 
7.1 	 Organisational Infrastructure Supporting the Management of IS Security 
Knowledge 
This section discusses the concept of organisational infrastructure. The intention is not 
to undertake a review of the literature, but to understand how the organisational 
infrastructure can support the management of IS Security knowledge and therefore 
protect the organisation and its processes. The following sub-sections highlight some of 
the basic ideas associated with each organisational infrastructure component.  Section 
7.1.2 describes the common knowledge utilised. Sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 respectively 
explain the importance of the corporate physical environment and structural 
requirements for ISS. Sections 7.1.5 and 7.1.6 describe the IT infrastructure necessary 
and the importance of the business environment in which the two case organisations 
operate in. The first part of each section interprets the components in the two 
organisations. The second compares each to literature. Finally, a synthesised perspective 
on how the organisational infrastructure can support the management of IS Security 
knowledge is presented in sub-section 7.1.7. However, first cultural dynamics are 
discussed. 
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Figure 7.1: Conceptual Model (Figure 2.5): KM Approach to the Management of IS Security Knowledge. 
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7.1.1 Interpreting IS Security Cultural Dynamics in the Case Studies 
The CME-Co and the TELE-Co multinationals displayed a consistent effort to promote 
a culture of knowledge sharing. However, in both cases it has and continues to be a 
battle to prove to employees that they will benefit from being more open (Hislop, 2005). 
Significant blame can be attributed to the manner in which management of the two 
organisations view KM. It was evident from the two the case organisations that KM has 
been relegated to the form of an IT solution rather than with the organisational culture 
and with the employee incentive reward structure used by the two case organisations. 
TELE-Co and CME-Co have, at a corporate level, implemented a global content 
management system (CMS) as their solution to a KM initiative. This was in spite of the 
vocal demands by academics and practitioners alike that KM and a culture of 
knowledge sharing should be supported at the senior levels in an organisation. KM 
needs to be considered as a strategic issue, especially in today’s climate where it was 
becoming difficult to compete and internal resources should be utilised more 
effectively. 
Mechanisms such as mentoring, SETA and employee rotation are used to encourage 
employees to share knowledge. Analogies are used to develop cultures of competition in 
both cases which has been reported as effective by interviewees. CME-Co strives to 
encourage this ethos of business daring and pride in its successes. Employees are 
encouraged to be regarded internally as gurus in their areas of expertise. However 
knowledge sharing in the cases was function or team specific. The Customer Support 
function in CME-Co regularly battles senior management, and particularly Engineering, 
to share internal knowledge. The PKM community of practice, despite the obvious 
benefits of sharing designs across the different (design) domains, continuously tries to 
prove the financial benefit of sharing to TELE-Co senior management.  Therefore 
specific functions have knowledge sharing cultures, and attempt to allocate time and 
resources to enable staff to share. CS drives KM in both cases as it was a fundamental 
aspect of their role in the organisations. The day-to-day activities the CS functions 
described in the case organisations was problem-solving and the more they share 
knowledge the faster and cheaper the process. However, Engineering units are reluctant 
to share product designs, specific commands and bugs due to the financial risks of this 
knowledge becoming public. It was through the sheer persuasiveness of the CME-Co 
Knowledge Champions in proving the cost-saving benefits of pushing knowledge 
towards the customer that the culture was becoming more open. The geographical 
spread of the organisations was also an obstacle to a culture of sharing and control. 
Managing different cultures is difficult when language and even time zones are factors. 
Building relationships through face-to-face (F2F) meetings has been identified as the 
best approach to combating these problems and the two case organisations have 
encouraged this. 
Changes in the business environment created a culture of security awareness for the two 
case organisations. Senior management were committed to enhancing security both 
internally and externally so much so that it became an inherent part of organisational 
operations. Traditionally security was categorised as an IT problem. Since 9/11 and 
regulatory changes such as SOX, ISS has become one of the key business drivers for 
CME-Co and TELE-Co. The two case studies identified the possible competitive 
advantage that can be gained from incorporating security enhancements into their 
products, steering standard making bodies and providing a one-stop-shop for customer 
compliancy requirements. As a result roles and official groups have been established in 
the two cases raising the profile and political power of the IS Security functions. The 
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resources necessary to enable the global function to collaborate were also allocated. 
However the circumvention of (security) controls by Engineering continues to create a 
culture of resentment from a security perspective as it weakens the control environment 
used to protect organisational assets. Therefore from a IS Security and CS (front-line 
support) perspective a culture of entitlement and circumvention of rules creates 
knowledge sharing issues for both functions despite the fact that security was aligned 
strategically to the goals of the two case organisations. Consequently, managing IS 
Security knowledge was vital in order for IS Security professionals to be proactive 
regarding security - particularly in sharing (SETA) threat and risk knowledge with the 
general employee population. 
7.1.1.1 IS Security Cultural Dynamics 
The two case organisations fostered very competitive cultures (Tsohou et al., 2006). The 
corporate ethos was ingrained into employees, initially through the two corporate 
universities, then through norms and practices, corporate symbols, and in-house 
Engineering terminologies (De Long & Fahey, 2000; Pettigrew, 1979). CME-Co 
assigned individuals (particularly Engineers) with hero statuses to promote knowledge 
sharing (Davenport & Prusak 1998; Walsham 2001). Stories of living CME-Co legends 
and their business daring that epitomised the corporate philosophies of: the customer is 
always right and minutes equals millions were common. The targeting of competitors in 
setting corporate wide goals not only facilitated a corporate level culture of 
competitiveness but also at functional and subsidiary level as geographies and functions 
competed to meet targets. 
The two organisations exhibited strong functional cultures (Deal & Kennedy 1982). The 
Customer Support functions developed internal strategies to cope with diagnosing and 
solving problems (Schein, 1985). The problem-solving escalation procedures utilised 
were evident within functions and could run though a (expertise) leveled escalation 
procedure aligned to a corporate product or problem (diagnostic) domain.  Practitioners 
working at the different levels of support shared solution knowledge even if separated 
by distance and time zones as long as trust existed between the practitioners (Davenport 
& Prusak, 1998). Therefore, as in literature, the theories that conceptualize culture do 
so in terms of reference group value orientations (Jackson, 1995) such as value 
dimensions at the organisational and functional levels (Jackson & Philip, 2010). These 
functional levels in CME-Co and TELE-Co have had an impact on the behaviours of 
firm members by creating a social control environment that sets the expectations and 
boundaries of appropriate behaviours for the different group practitioners (Wenger & 
Snyder, 2000). CME-Co boundaries are very much domain and trust specific as skilled 
support Engineers are denied access to Engineering knowledge reservoirs. However, an 
intern with little experience and technical knowledge is given access when assigned 
(access rights) to the Engineering domain (Dhillon, 2006).   
Culture was an obvious enabler of KM in the two case organisations (Davenport & 
Prusak, 1998). A supporting organisational culture helps motivate practitioners to share 
knowledge and find the time for KM. Enabling employees to share knowledge was, as 
reported, the hardest aspect of KM (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). The culture that is 
conducive to KM is likely to value elements such as networking internally and 
externally, respect for individuals, creativity and innovation, trust, sharing ideas and 
information, sound underlying systems and procedures, and continuous learning and 
development. However, even though, the two case organisations exhibited all of these 
aspects of a KM enabling culture, it was to varying degrees. The support functions were 
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very dependent on the internal and external networks with CME-Co pushing knowledge 
towards their customers to be more competitive and TELE-Co more aggressively 
targeted regulatory and academic forums then trusting external partners. Communities 
of practice were used, while unofficially in TELE-Co, between trusted parties to 
promote quality and sharing (Buchel & Raub, 2002).  This difference could easily be 
attributed to the fact that CME-Co’s CS function has been pushing and pushing the 
benefits of KM to support customer needs and reduce operational costs (Coakes, 2004; 
Brelade & Harman, 2003). As a result a gradual increase in access rights to Engineering 
solutions and bugs were provided and KM roles (knowledge consultant and knowledge 
writers) and communities of practice (knowledge development group) were created. 
Perhaps, with time, the TELE-Co PKM group will expand and become a formal CoP. 
Attributes of an enabling organisational culture include understanding the value of KM 
practices, management support for KM at all levels, incentives that reward knowledge 
sharing and creation (Hislop, 2005; Orlikowski, 2002). This attribute varied from one 
case organisation to the next. CS in CME-Co understood the value of KM practices 
(proved through cost reductions); support existed at high levels in the CS organisation 
(within CME-Co) but was very much controlled by the Engineering function. The 
incentives for all employees were identified after a trial and error process of 
determining the most effective. Monetary rewards were eliminated after the number of 
solutions created increased and quality was reduced. CME-Co allocates an expert or 
guru status to practitioners who share valuable (used solutions) knowledge. TELE-Co’s 
KM initiative is very much on an ad hoc basis. The value of KM is understood but not 
officially supported within the CS and Engineering domains.  
These same cultures enabled individual and function hoarding, limited employee 
interaction and lack of managerial support in CME-Co and TELE-Co which inhibit 
knowledge sharing. Davenport and Prusak (1998) identified a number of cultural 
factors that act as inhibitors or frictions as they can slow the process of sharing 
knowledge down. Table 7.1 outlines the different types of frictions that have been 
identified in the two case organisations and the approaches used to solve them. By being 
aware of these frictions organisations can avoid them. There is a complete lack of trust 
between the CS and Engineering domains and more so between Engineering and CS 
than with the other corporate functions within the two case organisations. CMC-Co has 
identified the problem and encourages face-to-face meetings and when possible job 
shadowing or rotation. TELE-Co utilises mentoring but is not as proactive as CME-Co 
in addressing the issue of trust and individual hoarding. It is one of the responsibilities 
of the knowledge consultant to drastically reduce hoarding in the CME-Co CS function. 
FRICTIONS SOLUTIONS 
Lack of trust Build relationships and trust through face to face meetings 
Different cultures, vocabularies, frames of 
reference 
Create common ground through education, discussion, 
publication, teaming, job rotation 
Lack of time and meeting places; narrow idea of 
productive work 
Establish times and places for knowledge transfers, fairs talk 
rooms, conference reports. 
Status and rewards go to knowledge owners Evaluate performance and provide incentives based on sharing 
Lack of absorptive capacity in recipients Educate employees for flexibility provide time for learning, 
hire for openness to ideas 
Belief that knowledge is prerogative of 
particular groups, not invented here syndrome 
Encourage non-hierarchical approach to knowledge; quality of 
ideas more important than status of source 
Intolerance for mistakes or need for help Accept and reward creative errors and collaboration; no loss of 
status from not knowing everything 
Table 7.1: Knowledge Transfer Inhibitors (Source: Davenport & Prusak, 1998). 
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The two organisations have strived to foster the corporate culture through training, 
common terms of reference, practices and on-the-job mentoring. The issue of having 
time to transfer knowledge is targeted officially by CME-Co through regular 
demonstrations of the eventual time saved by sharing knowledge. In escalated levelled 
support if knowledge is pushed down to the lower levels time will be saved at the higher 
levels for more important processes such as innovation. Additionally, by reducing the 
numbers of levels a problem is raised to - the cheaper the operation. External knowledge 
transfer is supported in the two organisations through participation in conferences, 
symposiums and regulatory bodies.  CME-Co evaluates performance and allocates 
status to practitioners who share, TELE-Co does utilise employee reviews but 
knowledge sharing is not evaluated (conducted by managers). The practitioners in the 
two case organisations have a high absorptive capacity and are hired for their ability to 
innovate. A non-hierarchical approach to knowledge is understood yet not encouraged 
across functions. The Engineering functions in TELE-Co and CME-Co have a high 
sense of importance in themselves. Unfortunately this is encouraged at senior levels 
within the two case organisations. CS and ISS in CME-Co have encouraged the fact that 
it is the quality of the ideas that are more important than status of the source. The use of 
learning from mistakes is encouraged in ISS through the auditing process. Post-mortems 
are carried out after a review to identify mistakes and learn from the different lessons 
gained in order to improve. This post-mortem analysis is very much aligned to the 
literature (Baskerville, 2008) as lessons can be learned from mistakes.  
However, outside of Engineering and CS the other functions, including ISS, in the two 
case organisations, did not utilise KM. ISS have benefited from the enforced sharing, 
documented processes, best practices and evaluations which have resulted in similar 
benefits to the CS KM initiatives used but are a direct result of the impact of 
compliance. Compliance (and the implications of non-compliance) has endowed ISS 
with a separate structural, political (senior support) and budgetary identity in CME-Co 
and TELE-Co. Therefore IS Security culture is composed of more than the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of messages (Dhillon, 2006). Policies and 
procedures which are clearly articulated and supported by management are a good 
mechanism for setting the cultural tone regarding risks (Greenstein & Feinman, 2000). 
Beliefs and best practices influence the behaviour of employees regarding IS Security 
(Thomson & Von Solms, 1998; Hu et al., 2008) and as a result staff should be aware of 
procedures aimed at preserving IS Security of corporate assets. It is vital that IS 
Security awareness is instilled in the culture of an organisation (Ettinger, 1993) by the 
IS Security function and management (Borodzicz, 2005; Dojkovski et al., 2007). 
The cultural theory literature argues that a practitioner’s position can be controlled by 
the functions in which they work (Jackson & Philip, 2010). As argued by Douglas 
(1970), who recognised that belonging to a group can place constraints on how people 
behave, CME-Co and TELE-Co exhibited cross functional conflict and knowledge 
hoarding. As explained by Jackson and Philip’s (2010) cultural cosmologies (outlined in 
section 2.3.4) the two case organisations display elements of three of the four types. 
Hierarchism is characterised by strong grid and strong group. There was a strong 
emphasis on order, discipline and coordination of tasks in the ISS and CS functions of 
the two case organisations. This provided visionary leadership and coordination in 
achieving IS Security and CS targets. However, Engineering tended to have too much 
control and power and smothered CS and ISS (through the circumvention of controls) 
vision, fostered dissatisfaction, ultimately leading to an impassive cultural orientation 
(Tolsby, 1998). Individualism/Market was also evident as there were opportunities for 
creativity and innovation. In its constraining form it created a culture where individuals 
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seized opportunities to their own advantage, leading to non-collaborative behaviour 
(Tsohou et al., 2006) in the form of knowledge hoarding. However CME-Co has taken 
formal steps to avoid the constraining elements of individualism. Egalitarianism was 
strongly evident in the two case organisations. Functional concerns took priority over 
individual practitioner interests. Members stressed the importance of group-ethos, 
teamwork and trust. At a functional level it fostered knowledge sharing, teamwork and 
trust to exist between functional members (Adler, 1991). However neither of the two 
case organisations exhibited this at an organisational level. Functional conflict regarding 
knowledge sharing was constant. Change can only be effective if individuals are willing 
to work as part of a team/group. In its constraining form, egalitarianism due to its lack 
of leadership and authoritative values, can lead to breach of trust and unsettled 
disagreement and internal corporate rivalry which can if unchecked have negative 
implications.  Neither of the two case organisations demonstrated fatalism which results 
in values of apathy and fear. This creates a hampering environment to transcend 
throughout the organisation in times of change (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999) 
possessing no enabling characteristics. 
Therefore ISS managers should strive to reduce constraining cultural characteristics and 
create a facilitative IS Security environment by promoting the enabling cultural values. 
As described by Jackson and Philip (2010) organisations require the drive and 
innovation of individualism/market for enhancement and improvisation; the visionary 
leadership, resources and coordination of hierarchism, and the teamwork, trust and 
knowledge sharing of egalitarianism. This view is supported by a number of researchers 
(Ruppel & Harrington, 2001; Hendriks, 1999; Adler, 1991). However, membership of a 
cosmology is not fixed or permanent. It is dynamic as an individual could be a member 
of multiple cosmologies at the same time and drift between them. This was very much 
evident in the communities of practice identified in the two case organisations (as 
discussed in section 7.1.4). 
7.1.2 Interpreting the use of Common Knowledge in the Case Studies 
The two case organisations utilised common terminology (knowledge) to integrate 
employees into the TELE-Co and CME-Co cultures. This approach enabled a common 
communication platform in order to foster competitive cultures. The case organisations 
utilised corporate universities (CME-Co and TELE-Co Universities) to, not only, 
develop their employees skill-sets but to teach the common corporate knowledge used 
in Engineering, CS, IT and IS Security. The two case organisations used M-Gates and 
Six Sigma to ensure all employees utilised the same terminology in collaborating and 
managing projects across the different business and support functions. Additionally, the 
two organisations offered a wide array of complex products to their customer bases. 
Product designs and specifications were considered common knowledge in the 
technological functions. The corporate Intranets were used to publish general or 
common knowledge pertaining to corporate procedures or newsletters, contact lists, 
presentations, policies and best practices were stored on functional websites. The case 
organisations also used enterprise-wide KM initiatives in the form of content 
management systems to act as central document repositories. The IS Security functions 
used SETA induction courses to introduce new hires to the different corporate security 
risks, policies and penalties for policy breaches. It was the intention of the different 
induction and training programmes to educate new hires in behaving like a TELE-Co or 
CME-Co employee. 
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7.1.2.1 IS Security Common Knowledge 
In literature common or general knowledge refers to cumulative experiences which 
support communication and coordination through: language, vocabulary, recognition of 
individual knowledge domains and shared norms (Grant, 1996). This approach provided 
a sense of unity to the members of the two case organisations. The corporate 
universities helped enhance the value of individual expert’s knowledge by integrating it 
with the knowledge-base of existing TELE-Co and CME-Co employees. These two 
engineering organisations used terminology regarding the development status of a 
product, modelling terms, M-Gate requirements when discussing project management 
and technical terminology regarding ISS technologies, vulnerability levels and the 
corporate rule base (for monitoring software and firewalls) and standards. Common 
CME-Co and TELE-Co knowledge was owned by the majority of the employees and 
was easily transferred through KM mechanisms. However it was specific to each 
organisation. The value of an expert’s knowledge increases once integrated, as is cannot 
be shared with the organisations competitors, thus impeding knowledge leakage (Argote 
& Ingram, 2000; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004).  Finally, common knowledge can aid 
in creating a competitive environment and overall corporate culture of the organisation 
(Bennet & Bennet, 2004). 
Therefore common knowledge was used, as stated in literature, as an approach to 
creating a corporate culture driven towards competition across the two case 
organisations (Hislop et al., 2000; Buchanan & Gibb, 2008). However CME-Co 
purchased best practices (such as M-Gates) to utilise industry recommended 
terminology as opposed to enhancing the corporate common knowledge base and 
therefore enabling the transfer of core knowledge outside of the organisation instead of 
retaining its value within. While TELE-Co did create common knowledge and operating 
procedures it also shared these with its industry competitors and partners to create and 
expand industrial common knowledge in order to enhance industrial standards and 
therefore market and product interoperability.  
7.1.3 Interpreting the Physical Environment in the Case Studies 
The two case organisations are multinational organisations with subsidiaries located 
throughout the world. CS, IS Security and Engineering functions were also distributed 
throughout the different subsidiaries to support the needs of internal and external 
customers. CME-Co, in one subsidiary, used an open-plan layout to allow CS 
employees to collaborate in problem-solving. However when a problem was escalated 
to Engineering the customer call was diverted to the U.S. creating a physical barrier to 
sharing knowledge through distance and different time zones.  Face-to-face problem-
solving was regarded by TELE-Co and CME-Co CS and IS Security functions as an 
imperative to building collaborative relationships. To reduce the negative aspect of this 
physical environment the functions used job rotation and shadowing to send new hires 
to corporate head quarters in order to build relationships. Additionally, meeting rooms 
were used to brainstorm ideas or conduct post-mortems for quarterly and yearly audits. 
These distributed physical environments were also a security challenge. Securing a 
corporate network which has subsidiaries scattered around the world is an enormous IS 
Security undertaking. In order to protect geographically dispersed subsidiaries the IS 
Security functions utilised Security Officers or Coordinators. Such roles had the 
responsibility of rolling-out selected ISS standards and controls identified by the 
corporate ISS groups. They collaborated by using a number of KM mechanisms (Table 
7.2) provided by TELE-Co and CME-Co. Physical security adds to the issue of the 
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physical environment. The two case organisations utilised a security presence in the 
form of guards and access (swipe) keys to remind employees and visitors of the 
different environmental risks. However, TELE-Co was far more stringent in enforcing 
penalties for physical security checks regarding employee responsibility. This was a 
physical reminder to employees that they should always be aware of security risks. 
However many employees reported that this and other controls were not regarded as 
barriers to sharing knowledge or as a security reminder as they eventually became 
transparent after a few weeks to new hires.  
7.1.3.1 IS Security Physical Environment 
The physical environment in TELE-Co and CME-Co was identified by the different 
practitioners as important as it allowed them to meet and share ideas and knowledge. It 
includes the physical layout of the buildings used by the two case organisations, how 
the different buildings and organisational functions were separated and the forums used 
to enable employees to collaborate. Web-based forums were used by the two case 
organisations to bypass the distance barrier, in order, to share knowledge through 
collaborative platforms such as E-Room, Compass and vendor repositories providing 
opportunities for practitioners to meet and share ideas (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). 
In the literature it was reported that most employees acquired their knowledge from 
informal conversations with their colleagues as opposed to training or standard 
operating procedures (Wensley, 1998). CME-Co in particular identified the importance 
of job rotations and shadowing to transfer knowledge between the different levels of 
problem-solving support. However, neither case organisation intentionally created 
spaces for their employees to meet face-to-face and share knowledge as advised by 
Stewart (2000). Therefore the physical environment can foster or impede knowledge 
sharing. In contrast to the literature, regarding the importance of the physical 
environment for knowledge sharing, both organisations were constrained by distance 
and the different time zones. While job rotations and IS Security coordinators 
(positioned within each subsidiary) were utilised, neither could replace the advantage of 
face-to-face problem-solving.  
7.1.4 Interpreting Structural Requirements in the Case Studies 
The structure of the two case organisations is complex. The difficulty in managing 
dispersed geographies makes the reporting process complex. CME-Co is a multinational 
that has grown from small to a large organisation very quickly. This growth has resulted 
in an approach to the management of knowledge which mirrors that of a smaller 
organisation, with specific departments such as Engineering reluctant to share 
knowledge. TELE-Co too has rapidly expanded, “resulting in a convoluted mess”, and 
like CME-Co it is dominated by Engineering. Commercial drivers have forced CME-Co 
to divide its core customer functions into two. Customer Support sits in between 
Engineering and CME-Co customers. This structural model has resulted in a reluctance 
to share knowledge (product designs, coding errors) between Engineering and Customer 
Support due to the perceived risk of CS passing product designs and bugs onto 
customers. TELE-Co aligns CS regional teams to divisions which are categorised 
according to the different products developed by the company. Engineering and CS are 
reluctant to share knowledge with one another and with other organisational units such 
as Marketing due to the same perceived risk of code (or dangerous commands) 
becoming public knowledge.  
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CME-Co has analysed its organisational structure to reduce the number of managerial 
layers needed for decision-making and reporting in each geographical location. This 
change resulted in creation of one umbrella role for specific products ensuring the 
customer, through one knowledge channel, was provided with the following: one 
contact, the same content, (terminal) console and information pertaining to the problem 
raised. This avoids the scenario of a customer requiring access to multiple files and 
more than one Technician. This was common when support responsibility, due to 
multiple CS teams, was varied for interoperability problems. Additionally, CME-Co 
removed core functions such as the Help Desk support from its international 
subsidiaries to centralise the organisation even further in order to reduce costs and 
dependency on corporate subsidiaries. TELE-Co, at the time of undertaking this study, 
was in the process of re-evaluating its structure and reducing the number of in decision-
making layers as, like CME-Co, it has created problems.  TELE-Co was divided into 
five separate divisions across the globe under the WEC (World Engineering 
Corporation) umbrella and very much separated according to product development and 
support. 
The two case organisations have established formal IS Security functions with political, 
structural, and budgetary independence from the corporate IT function. This change in 
the corporate structure and strategy of the cases was due to external, environmental 
drivers (in the form of regulatory changes) and customer demands. The cases were 
proactive in ensuring compliance with the required regulations to operate across 
different geographies but also in identifying customer demand for security enhanced 
products and services. CME-Co established the OISRM to source regulatory guidelines 
and best practices. These were then customised as CME-Co branded guidelines and best 
practices for internal use.  The IS Security function within CME-Co was separate from 
the GIS function but reported to the Global IS Director in the U.S. who reported to the 
Chief Information Officer who in turn reported to the Chief Financial Officer. Locally 
security was managed by IS Security Officers who were responsible for the security 
needs and audit reviews of individual sites. IS Security was divided into two 
fundamental groups operating within corporate headquarters and dispersed throughout 
the multinational. The Corporate Security group represents CME-Co stakeholders and 
(customers, shareholders, and partners) by identifying their product, service needs and 
aligning security to the strategy of the organisation, driving the development of security 
enhanced tools and identifying customer compliancy needs. Customers (large 
multinationals) were unsure of their regulatory preparatory needs regarding technology 
and standards. The Corporate Security group identified this as a potential market and 
has aggressively targeted it. Therefore CME-Co has raised the profile of the IS Security 
function structurally, politically and strategically due to environmental requirements 
and potential monetary gain.  
The new reporting structures in the two case organisations required ISS to report to the 
Finance and legal departments. External reviews from auditors and consultants has 
forced a significant change in the importance of the two IS Security functions.  TGS 
like OISRM resolve security-related problems by improving IS Security processes 
which ensured a secure infrastructure for employees through proactive security 
strategies (policies, secure technologies and business assessment methodologies). 
TELE-Co also created a group (TIPs) responsible for developing global security 
procedures and policies which were disseminated to the various subsidiaries. Customer 
Support and Engineering are key strategic units within CME-Co and TELE-Co 
operating like silo organisations servicing customers throughout EMEA and APAC. 
The IS Security functions support their infrastructural and communication needs. 
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However due to the status of Engineering and CS, in the two case organisations, 
members of these units regularly circumvent security controls in order to access specific 
knowledge or experiment in their labs23. This creates weak points in the corporate 
network making backdoors available to potential hackers and affecting the stability of 
the corporate networks. Therefore despite the new structural and strategic status of the 
IS Security functions their position was irrelevant in a multinational with an 
Engineering dominated culture.  
7.1.4.1 IS Security Structural Requirements 
The management of IS Security depends, to a considerable extent, on the structures of 
CME-Co and TELE-Co. Traditional reporting relationships influenced the flow of data, 
information, knowledge, the nature of decision-making and in sharing knowledge across 
the different functions (Dhillon, 2006). Organisational structures can cause more 
complicated process flows compared to hierarchical structures. Knowledge sharing was 
facilitated when CME-Co was more decentralised (Borchgrave et al., 2001). TELE-Co’s 
convoluted structures caused more complicated process flows compared to hierarchical 
structures (Borchgrave et al., 2001). A further layer of complexity was added when the 
two case organisations established relationships with other enterprises (Gal-or & Ghose, 
2005; Dhillon, 2006). TELE-Co utilised collaborative relationships to steer the industry 
while CME-Co additionally utilised partner knowledge to expand the corporate 
knowledge-base and reduce CS operating costs. While the ISS functions in the two case 
organisations extensively utilised collaborative partnerships with vendors to adhere to 
regulations and source the best practices and standards as reported in the ISS literature 
(Stewart, 2005). ISS in TELE-Co and CME-Co allocated a number of ISS 
countermeasures in managing increasingly complex security architectures to support 
these collaborative partnerships (Gal-or & Ghose, 2005). 
The organisational structures in CME-Co and TELE-Co facilitated knowledge sharing 
through formal and informal communities of practice (CoP) mirroring the structures 
identified in literature (Wenger & Snyder, 2000). These communities of practice 
provided access to external knowledge sources such as vendors and in CME-Co 
stakeholders (Belsis et al., 2005; Stewart, 2005). These external stakeholders were often 
a greater source of ISS knowledge than the organisation itself. One of TELE-Co’s 
informal communities of practice, PKM was informally created by design Engineers to 
manage and promote KM. CME-Co created formalised CoP to properly coordinate and 
control their activities internally with the KDG (Knowledge Development Group) and 
the KCS (Knowledge-Centred Support) communities of practice. The corporate security 
group was established to form extended communities of proactive between the CME-Co 
and external stakeholders for the sole purpose of identifying security opportunities. This 
contradicts Kimble and Hildreth’s (2004) question regarding whether communities of 
practice are always suitable for the business setting, arguing that their interests may not 
be aligned with those of the organisation. The CoP in CME-Co were formally created 
and were directly aligned to the needs of CME-Co. TELE-Co’s KM CoP was 
informally created to take advantage of the benefits of KM. CME-Co and TELE-Co 
workers do, to a point, operate in an individualistic manner to obtain resources through 
personal networks and individual relationships but in order to solve function specific 
problems. This corroborates Pan and Leidner’s (2003) goal of utilising KM initiatives to 
develop networks where knowledge is shared and used by developing communities of 
practice (CoP). New knowledge is constantly created through for example auditing and 
23 Engineering networks are separated using a DMZ. Two firewalls are used to partition sections of the corporate 
network. 
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collaborating with vendors (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Wenger & Snyder, 2000). KM 
mechanisms such as: a knowledge champion (TELE-Co’s PKM) or a knowledge 
consultant /champion (CME-Co’s KDG and KCS) were facilitated through a variety of 
communications tools such as e-mail, telephone, or groupware.  
Specialised structures and roles, such as the IS Security functions, specifically support 
organisational operations (Brown & Magill, 1994; Strassman, 1995). The individuals 
responsible for IS Security are vital in ensuring the success of any plan to prevent 
known threats and respond to unplanned incidents (Im & Baskerville, 2005). ISS 
methods, strategies and procedures ensured the protection of the resources of the two 
case organisations. Therefore the IS Security policies in TELE-Co and CME-Co 
functioned as guides These will then be the basis for formulating policies or strategies 
and procedures for risk and IS Security management (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; 
Booz et al., 2005; Jones & Ashenden, 2005). The IS Security function structure attempts 
to match corporate objectives by supplying a complete framework for planning and 
developing in TELE-Co and CME-Co through OISRM and TGS. The assignment of 
authority and responsibility through ISS governance is an extension of the structures of 
the two case organisations (Kaen, 2003; Sundt, 2006). 
The organisational structures in TELE-Co and CME-Co strongly influenced the 
implementation of IS Security activities and the consistency with which they facilitated 
the enterprise’s goals. The role of senior management is to guarantee that its structure is 
supportive of the deployment of security-related initiatives, without necessarily 
impeding business processes. This was evident in CME-Co’s collaborative relationships 
with partners and vendors as sensitive processes, through the extranets, were separated 
into different entities and more secure measures (such as VPNs) were established 
specifically for them. Finally, the two case organisations followed advice from industry 
and academia in separating the ISS function from IT and in the case of CME-Co a 
senior ISS role was created specifically to source and coordinate the implementation of 
ISS standards and practices (Dutta, & McCrohan, 2002). 
7.1.5 Interpreting IT Infrastructure s used in the Case Studies 
CME-Co uses a number of communication technologies to collaborate (section 7.2.4). 
Logical access rights are used to control the provision of access to CME-Co and TELE-
Co knowledge stores. CME-Co provides its customers with an integrated infrastructure 
package to enable them to utilise their storage platforms more effectively, therefore to 
consolidate multiple data centres into possibly one (section 7.2.2.1). Security was used 
to enhance these product offerings in light of the regulatory requirements already 
described. TELE-Co does not target customers with corporate infrastructural solutions 
(unless the requirement was a wireless, mobile problem). The two case organisations 
availed of content management systems to store lessons-learned and documentation. 
Information systems were used extensively to support knowledge capture and reuse 
(section 7.2.3). Additionally, the two case organisations required a global security 
infrastructure with roles allocated to the different categories of security (section 7.3). 
Collaboration was enabled through call conferencing, video conferencing, the Intranet, 
email and the corporate Intranets.  
7.1.5.1 IT Infrastructure 
IT infrastructures of the two case organisations include data processing, storage, 
systems and information communication technologies (ICT). This framework connected 
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the practitioners of the two organisations to the different internal and external 
knowledge and processes (section 7.2). It was the IT and ISS infrastructures which 
secured the organisations and assured the value and utility of the different knowledge 
reservoirs (section 7.2.3; Figure 7.7(b)). The infrastructures secured and supported the 
processes, people and technology involved to prevent unmanaged organisational 
knowledge (Holsapple & Singh, 2004; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Belsis et al., 2005; 
Randeree, 2006) in CME-Co and TELE-Co. The type of infrastructure utilised 
determined the level of access ISS and CS practitioners had to the knowledge located in 
CME-Co and TELE-Co, the amount of knowledge that was communicated through 
platforms (section 7.2.4) the richness of the communication mediums such as Primus in 
CME-Co and Compass in TELE-Co and the aggregation of data from multiple sources 
through the internal and external platforms. 
Technological changes, in both secure hardware and software, are as constant as the 
increase in the number of threats to corporate security (section 2.4). Secure protocols, 
standards and encryption were used to protect business environments (Stallings, 2001; 
Dhillon, 2006) and security technologies such as firewalls, scanning tools and intrusion 
detection systems were used to filter out possible threats (Jamieson, 1991). Virtual 
private networks were used by the case organisations to encrypt communication lines 
with external customers who were risk assessed and controlled through NDAs. CME-
Co utilised a mesh of controls to create a secure tunnel between its partners and its 
internal resources. Theoretically the data derived from the tools used should, if utilised 
correctly, provide an integrated view of knowledge pertaining to the security landscape 
of the two organisations (Belsis et al., 2005). CME-Co and TELE-Co (in particular) 
pulled the data from its multiple monitoring tools and software into tracking databases 
to aggregate the data and build a picture of the security landscape (Stewart, 2005) to 
improve the security of the environment (Whitman & Mattord, 2005) when 
implemented. 
7.1.6 Interpreting the Case Studies Business Environments 
The two case organisations operate in a business environment influenced by rapid 
technological advancement, high demand and short product lifecycles and therefore a 
high level of uncertainty (Tables 5.1 & 6.1). Threats such as reverse-engineering, 
viruses and regulatory constraints were considered significant. CME-Co and TELE-Co 
were effectively being bombarded by regulations. As U.S. multinationals with overseas 
subsidiaries the two case organisations were required to comply with local, State and 
Federal laws in the U.S. and E.U. regulations in their international markets. CME-Co 
and TELE-Co operate in a fragmented security market sector with over three hundred 
security companies supplying hundreds of different security (compliance) products 
which have made it very difficult for companies, including CME-Co and TELE-Co, to 
select suitable technologies. This was compounded by the fact that the only compliance 
advisors (regarding security technologies) were vendors. As a result CME-Co identified 
the competitive opportunity of incorporating security add-ons to their storage product 
portfolios and in offering compliance related knowledge-based activities.  
CME-Co regards competition as a means of learning, regularly comparing the 
company’s performance with its competitors in order to drive its workforce. As a result 
KM was identified as a strategy that would allow the company to efficiently use its 
internal and partner knowledge. A CBR was used to pull knowledge from the external 
environment to act as a source of competitive knowledge. CME-Co identified 
compliance as an opportunity to full-fill customer’s storage and regulatory needs. As a 
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direct result the CME-Co product portfolio became wider and more complex. Its 
stakeholder group (the Corporate Security Group) provides significant expertise in 
identifying and supporting customer needs. TELE-Co’s engineering teams identified 
KM as an approach to manage knowledge across the different design domains. Through 
the use of an informal community of practice the function utilised KM to manage 
product development resources efficiently and to coordinate the different facets of 
Engineering.  However the focus of the initiative was purely to drive collaboration 
between the different design domains as opposed to all of Engineering, the CS function, 
customers or any other part of the organisation. This did not enable knowledge sharing 
across the organisation. It was team specific as opposed to function, as is the case in 
CME-Co. 
Evolving with their business environments was an imperative for the two case 
organisations. CME-Co targeted the market and identified niche areas to develop 
products which incorporated compliance needs into designs. Additionally CME-Co 
used its KMS to push knowledge (solutions) towards its partners and customers. 
Therefore the goal of the two case organisations was to keep pace with the rate of 
technological change in their respective business environments. This did provide 
significant challenges while operating in the telecommunications and storage industries. 
Deregulation has changed the business landscape of the two case organisations, 
resulting in competition from a wide range of telecom service providers (for TELE-Co) 
and technological companies diversifying into new markets such as storage (for CME-
Co). Finding and retaining customers was (and is) vital. The main challenge was to 
understand and identify customer requirements and then to satisfy them. The ISS and 
CS Support functions were, as a result, crucial for the two case organisations in their 
interactions with their respective business environments.  
7.1.6.1 Business Environments 
The ISS activities of the two case organisations affected not only the organisations 
themselves, but also their inter-relationships (Von Solms, 1999). The more sensitive 
knowledge, when communicated to a partner, was transferred via encrypted tunnels 
(CSI/FBI, 2005; Sundt, 2006). Deficiencies in IS Security can cause direct negative 
consequences for business processes due to errors, delays and information leakage 
(Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Booz et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006;  Jones & Ashenden, 
2005). However, the ISS functions operating within the two case organisations were 
slow to report deficiencies (Kaarst-Brown & Kelly, 2005; CSI/FBI, 2006). CME-Co did 
highlight the weakness created through the allocation of controls to Engineering and 
neglecting other functions which inevitably created weak points in the corporate 
network, a warning identified by Dhillon (2006).  Such Failures in IS Security can 
temporarily deny network resources to employees and hackers can then use one 
organisation’s resources as a stepping-stone in attacking another organisation (Dutta & 
McCrohan, 2002). 
To make effective decisions regarding IS Security, management must know about the 
various threats facing CME-Co and TELE-Co, their employees, data, information, 
knowledge and systems. Thus, knowledge of threats and attacks are crucial to 
management when allocating resources, formulating security policies and performing 
risk assessments (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). This was reported as a difficult task by the 
ISS functions. The changes made to comply with regulatory requirements did force the 
functions to acquire ISS knowledge externally from vendors, retrieve ISS from the ISS 
technologies, create filtered reports highlighting internal and external threats, share this 
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knowledge across the dispersed ISS functions and apply the knowledge for reviews and 
to ISS strategies. While reported in the ISS literature as a necessity it was not identified 
as an advantage in enforcing compliance processes (Kaen, 2003; Chou, 2005; Sundt, 
2006). The organisations encountered numerous IS Security challenges, such as: a rapid 
expansion of the enterprise ecosystem through external partnerships and new global 
markets, a value migration from the physical to information-based and intangible assets, 
continuing pressure to reduce costs (Booz et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006), and compliance 
regimes (Butler & McGovern, 2008). The two case organisations identified these same 
challenges. However, the two ISS functions were positively impacted by the 
requirements of compliance as it significantly improved the management of ISS 
knowledge, provided political and structural advantages and increased the corporate 
revenue of CMECo through the offerings of knowledge-based services regarding 
compliance. CME-Co also identified the opportunity of utilising its external 
partnerships to create additional knowledge and therefore reduce support operational 
costs, contradicting the issues reported in the literature (Borodzicz, 2005; Gal-or & 
Ghose, 2005; Booz et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006). 
Organisations must design and create a safe environment in which business processes, 
procedures, employees and units can function. This environment must maintain the 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of the organisation’s information and 
knowledge (Doyle, 1997; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004).These goals are met through the 
effective application of IS Security knowledge which is undoubtedly a critical resource 
for organisations (Escamilla, 1998) and the two case organisations.  
7.1.7 A Synthesised Perspective on Organisational Infrastructure 
The aim of this section was to determine how the organisational infrastructure could 
support the management of IS Security. Table 7.2 provides a summarised comparison of 
the two case organisations.  Levels of the organisational infrastructure necessary to 
support the management of IS Security knowledge was evident in CME-Co and TELE-
Co. However it was primarily due to the structural component of the organisational 
infrastructure. The two IS Security functions were formal departments which provided 
the IS Security functions with political status, resources and budgets separate to IT 
(Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Dhillon, 2006). Environmental drivers, specifically 
compliance, has both raised the status of the function and forced the documentation of 
processes and collection of knowledge regarding the security landscape of the 
organisations for external evaluations. However this fact was not reported in the ISS 
literature. Furthermore, the positive impacts (Tables 5.12 & 6.12) gained from adhering 
to regulatory requirements for ISS were as significant as those of the KM strategies 
utilised in the CS functions. 
Common organisational language and a culture of sharing were promoted in the two 
case organisations. The Engineering units in CME-Co and TELE-Co were and are 
reluctant to share knowledge due to the perceived risk of (design) knowledge becoming 
public or used incorrectly (high risk commands initiated in a customer environment). 
This conflict is a significant issue yet it is ignored by senior management. Barriers to 
sharing knowledge appear to be more historic than environmental. The CME-Co CS 
function was constantly battling to prove to Engineering and management the value of 
sharing knowledge through cost savings and as a result did gain more and more access 
to Engineering systems and solutions. External collaboration with CME-Co partners 
was proving effective in cutting costs in allowing customers and partners to “self­
service” through the corporate Extranet. However TELE-Co and CME-Co used a 
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domain specific (role-based) approach to KM. That is, once a practitioner regardless of 
his/her expertise is assigned to a domain, access was provided to the functions 
knowledge reservoirs and blocked from experts working in other domains. 
Communities of practice were created for collaboration across the two case 
organisations in order to collaborate across units or through inter-relationships. CME-
Co formalised its CoP to coordinate and control their activities to ensure quality 
standards and enhance practitioner skill-sets. TELE-Co utilised informal CoP to share 
domain specific knowledge. Therefore knowledge was pushed around the Engineering 
design domains and not to CS or the corporate customer base.  
In the literature the importance of organisational infrastructure in supporting KM is 
high. Nevertheless, by overlooking the need to formulate a clear business case, many 
KM implementations fail (Coakes, 2004). Neither of the two case organisations support 
KM at a senior level beyond the creation of a corporate central repository. The co­
ordination of KM requires the leadership of senior management if the organisation is to 
benefit from its utilisation. Even though many researchers highlight the importance of 
an overall KM strategy (Hansen et al., 1999; Choi & Lee, 2002; Malhotra, 2000; 
Coakes, 2004), it was not implemented in CME-Co and TELE-Co. KM has impacted 
CME-Co and TELE-Co directly and indirectly but only at functional levels. The 
literature has warned against companies isolating KM in functional departments such as 
CS (Hansen et al., 1999). The majority of organisations focus on the operational side of 
KM as opposed to an integrated approach. However the ISS functions did effectively 
(albeit indirectly) manage, due to the impact of compliance, their knowledge and 
benefited from structural, political and budgetary independence. 
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ORGANISATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CME-Co ORG. INFRASTRUCTURE TELE-Co ORG. INFRASTRUCTURE 
(1
)  
C
ul
tu
re
 
• Promote a culture of Knowledge sharing 
• CoP battle to prove to management| Engineering 
the benefits of knowledge sharing 
• KM is  an IT Solution at corporate level 
• Mentoring| Job Shadowing, Rotation| University 
• KM is function specific 
• Compliance has created an awareness of ISS 
• Compliance has raised the profile of ISS 
• Geographical spread| Time Zones| Language are 
barriers 
• Silo mentality regarding KM 
• Domain rights supersede trust 
• Promote a culture of Knowledge sharing 
• CoP battle to prove to management| 
Engineering the benefits of knowledge sharing 
• KM is  an IT Solution at corporate level 
Mentoring| Job Shadowing, Rotation| 
University 
• KM is CoP specific 
• Compliance has created an awareness of ISS 
• Compliance has raised the profile of ISS 
• Geographical spread| Time Zones| Language 
are barriers 
• Silo mentality regarding KM 
• Engineering snobbery supersede trust 
(2
)  
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
• ISS is structurally aligned 
• Complex structures with geographically 
dispersed subsidiaries 
• ISS function created to source external 
knowledge 
• Access rights are domain specific 
• No of managerial levels have been reduced to 
provide a better service to customers 
• Politically Engineering is a controlling unit 
capable of circumventing ISS controls and CS 
access rights 
• ISS is structurally aligned 
• Complex structures with geographically 
dispersed subsidiaries 
• ISS function created to source external 
knowledge 
• Access rights are domain specific 
• Politically Engineering is a controlling unit 
capable of circumventing ISS controls and CS 
access rights 
(3
) C
om
m
on
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
• Used to build a culture of competitiveness  
• A corporate university is used to re-educate new 
hires into becoming CME-Co employees 
• Product portfolio 
• Engineering terms and methodologies 
• Stories of corporate legends 
• Used to build a culture of competitiveness  
• A corporate university is used to re-educate 
new hires into becoming TELE-Co employees 
• Product portfolio 
• Engineering terms and methodologies 
(4
) P
hy
si
ca
l
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t 
• Distributed subsidiaries 
Creates divisions through distance and time 
• Open plan offices 
• Face-to-face problem-solving is regarded as the 
best approach 
• Uses Job rotation to build relationships 
• Meeting rooms| teleconferences for 
brainstorming 
• Distributed subsidiaries 
Creates divisions through distance and time 
• Open plan offices 
• Face-to-face problem-solving is regarded as the 
best approach 
(5
) I
T 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
r • ICT used predominately in supporting KM 
• KMS used to create, share and apply knowledge 
• Access rights are administered in a trail & error 
approach 
• ICT used predominately in supporting KM 
• A central repository is used to share knowledge 
• Simulation SW is used to collaborate 
• Access rights are used to control knowledge 
(6
.)
B
us
in
es
s E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t 
• Stakeholders drive the market 
• Membership of regulatory groups 
• CME-Co utilises a group to identify their needs 
• Dual role as a stakeholder driving the ISS 
market 
• Stakeholders drive the market 
• Membership of regulatory groups 
• 
• Compliance has become a business driver 
• Membership of Regulatory bodies to drive 
market 
• Rapid technological changes 
• Pushes knowledge towards the customer 
• Learn from their environment 
• Targets the Fragmented ISS market 
• Threat of reverse-engineering 
• Compliance has become a business driver 
• Membership of Regulatory bodies to drive 
market 
• Rapid technological changes 
• Pushes knowledge around an internal domain 
• Threat of reverse-engineering 
Table 7.2: Organisational Infrastructure Characteristics. 
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7.2 Managing IS Security Knowledge 
Sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 describe: the different types of IS Security knowledge, 
reservoirs and processes identified in and across the CME-Co and TELE-Co case 
organisations. Section 7.2.4 describes and outlines (Table 7.2) the different KM 
mechanisms identified and section 7.2.5 compares the impacts gained across the two 
case organisations. The first part of each section interprets these variables across the two 
organisations. The second compares each to literature. Finally, section 7.2.6 concludes 
with a synthesised perspective of managing IS Security knowledge.  
7.2.1 Interpreting the Types of IS Security Knowledge used in the Case Studies 
This section describes the types of knowledge used within CME-Co and TELE-Co. IS 
Security (Sec) and Customer Support (CS) knowledge (K) are categorised as: general, 
technical and contextually specific knowledge. The roles of each type are identified as 
operational (O), tactical (T) and strategic (S). 
General knowledge is used in day-to-day operations. CME-Co’s IS Security and CS 
functions regarded hardware (HW) and software (SW) specifications, threats, email 
warnings, procedures and escalation levels as general operational knowledge. TELE-Co 
functions categorised organisational charts (roles and responsibilities), templates, and 
contact lists as such. Expertise in regulations, security technologies, systems, 
networking, procedures, checklists, policies, email notifications, assessment criteria’s 
and threats were also identified as operational by TELE-Co. However the priority of hot 
issues and the approaches used to solve a problem were categorised as tactical by CME-
Co’s CS function (CME-Co Sec K= 0: CS K= 2). Hot issues are tactical as they can, if 
prioritised, provide tangible benefits such as: reduced workloads. Project management 
methodologies and prototyping-KM techniques, developed internally, were categorised 
as operational. Conversely, expertise in applying the techniques was categorised as 
tactical by TELE-Co (TELE-Co Sec K= 0: CS K=5). Reviewing the problem-solving 
process to increase productivity saves time as practitioners can prioritise and reuse 
solutions. The importance of expertise in applying step-by-step approaches to problem-
solving is evident due to the necessity to combine and coordinate the creation of 
knowledge by practitioners. 
Technical knowledge is specific to a function. Lists of errors and documentation are 
regarded as technically operational by CME-Co functions (CME-Co Sec K=4: CS K= 
10). Regulations, product specifications, lists of stored solutions and errors, and 
knowledge of environments are fundamental. TELE-Co views its technical knowledge 
in designing new products, alerts, procedures and evaluation reports as operational. 
Knowledge pertaining to domains (access rights and designs), for the functions, while 
requiring expertise, is categorised as operational (TELE-Co Sec K= 7: CS K=13). 
Tactical IS security knowledge is used to implement regulatory constraints and in 
identifying risks to CME-Co systems. TELE-Co’s IS Security function regards external 
forums, security controls, scanning and audit reports as tactical. CS views the ability to 
use knowledge from multiple sources as tactical knowledge (TELE-Co Sec K= 5: CS 
K=2). CME-Co regulatory knowledge was viewed as tactical as compliance is an 
environmental issue for the organisation. The CS function views its ability to diagnose 
interoperability problems and errors as tactical. However it is interesting that problem-
solving is not viewed as tactical in either of TELE-Co’s functions. IS Security in CME-
Co has identified policies, regulations and strategies as strategic (CME-Co Sec K=5: CS 
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K=0). Security policies, strategies, and regulations and expertise in evaluating security 
technologies were regarded as strategic in TELE-Co (TELE-Co Sec K= 3: CS K=0). 
This can be attributed to the alignment of IS Security to the TELE-Co corporate strategy 
and the implications of non-compliance to environmental regulations. The security 
policy must be aligned to the strategy of the organisation so that it can manage known 
threats to the organisations. Regulatory knowledge is an imperative to CEM-Co as it has 
a dual role of protecting the organisation from internal risks and the risks associated 
with non-compliance. CS goals are not explicitly aligned to TELE-Co’s or CME-Co’s 
corporate strategies. 
Contextually specific knowledge is viewed as tactical by CME-Co with audit reports 
and IS Security procedures as the organisations foremost resource. CS categorised its 
solutions and ability to solve problems as tactical (CME-Co Sec K=9: CS K=3) but 
primarily this knowledge is viewed by CS as operational (CME-Co Sec K=5: CS 
K=11). Contextually specific knowledge such as audit reports, lessons-learned, the 
reactive ability of IS Security experts and procedures were categorised as tactical by 
TELE-Co. CME-Co regards templates, product errors, solutions, bugs, lessons-learned 
and the steps to diagnosing problems as operational (TELE-Co Sec K= 9: CS K=5). 
However the ability to reverse-engineer is regarded as a tactical ability by CME-Co. 
Contextually specific knowledge was viewed as operational by TELE-Co (TELE-Co 
Sec K= 5: CS K=6). The differences in the TELE-Co ratios can be attributed to 
financial implications of not having the necessary expertise in applying regulatory 
controls, lessons-learned from audits and the inability to recognise risks (TELE-Co Sec 
K= 0: CS K=3). Thus, innovation is practitioner dependent.     
The next section describes the IS Security knowledge identified and then compared to 
the literature. 
7.2.1.1 IS Security Knowledge 
There is a general consensus among theorists (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka, 1994; Dieng et 
al., 1998; Coakes, 2004) that knowledge can be split into two different facets: (1) 
explicit and (2) tacit. Coakes (2004) posits that tacit knowledge is more difficult than 
explicit to codify as it is retained in people’s minds and is not easily shared. Saint-Onge 
(1996) argues that the largest amount of knowledge within an organisation is tacit and is 
unarticulated. However, to be competitive CME-Co and TELE-Co must generate or 
create new knowledge. Explicit knowledge is viewed as knowledge that is codified, 
documented, archived and communicated. Explicit knowledge can be easily transferred 
from one place to another in a systematic and structured format (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; 
Coakes, 2004). The second classification of knowledge is between declarative and 
procedural knowledge. Essentially declarative knowledge is described as “knowing 
that” and procedural knowledge as “knowing what”. The third classification of 
knowledge focuses on whether the knowledge is possessed widely or narrowly 
(Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). Knowledge is also divided into support knowledge, 
which relates to the organisational infrastructure and facilitates the day-to-day 
operations; tactical knowledge, which relates to the short-term positioning relative to its 
business environment, competitors and suppliers; and finally strategic knowledge, 
which pertains to the long-term positions of the enterprise regarding its corporate vision 
and strategies in achieving the identified business goal (Patterson, 2005).  
CME-Co regarded HW and SW specifications, threats, email warnings, procedures and 
escalation levels as explicit knowledge and necessary for everyday operations. TELE-
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Co identified practitioner roles and responsibilities, templates, and contact lists as such. 
Each type easily codified and therefore transferred and stored. Tacit regulatory, 
technological and procedural knowledge was very much owned by practitioners. 
Therefore expertise in enforcing policies and regulations, identifying threats and the 
ability to proactively target alert notifications were regarded as tacit but operational to 
both case organisations. However the priority of hot issues and the approaches used to 
solve a problem were categorised as tactical by CME-Co. Hot issues are tactical as they 
can, if prioritised, provide tangible benefits such as: reduced workloads. Reviewing the 
problem-solving process to increase productivity saves time as practitioners can 
prioritise and reuse solutions. The ability in knowing how to apply the list and problem-
solve the issues identified is a value-adding service. The importance of expertise in 
applying step-by-step approaches to problem-solving is evident due to the necessity to 
combine and coordinate the creation of tacit knowledge by practitioners. The 
documentation of the solution, by the practitioners in the two cases, allows this 
knowledge to be reused by other practitioners. This process contradicts the view of ISS 
knowledge in the literature (Belsis et al., 2005; Stewart, 2005, Randeree, 2006) as 
purely sourced from vendors. 
Specific knowledge (technical or contextual) is possessed by a limited number of people 
and is both difficult and expensive to transfer (Hayek, 1945; Jensen & Meckling, 1996). 
Technically specific is deep knowledge about a specific field through both training and 
applied experience, and contextual refers to the knowledge of particular circumstances, 
such as an IS Security audit, of time and place in which tasks must be performed 
(Hayek, 1945) as it cannot be acquired through training. Knowledge can also be 
classified according to its role within organisations (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). 
Lists of errors and documentation are regarded as technically operational by CME-Co 
(CME-Co Sec K=4: CS K= 10). Regulations, product specifications, lists of stored 
solutions and errors, and knowledge of environments are fundamental. TELE-Co views 
its technical knowledge in designing new products, alerts, procedures and evaluation 
reports as operational. Knowledge pertaining to domains (access rights and designs), for 
the functions, while requiring expertise, is categorised as operational. Tactical IS 
security knowledge is used to implement regulatory constraints and in identifying risks 
to CME-Co systems. TELE-Co regards external forums, security controls, scanning and 
audit reports as tactical. CME-Co regulatory knowledge was viewed as tactical as 
compliance is an environmental issue for the organisation. However problem-solving is 
not viewed as tactical in TELE-Co. CME-Co and TELE-Co identified policies, 
regulations and strategies as strategic, which contradicts Wrapp’s (1991) of the 
importance of each for strategic decision-making. This was due to the alignment of IS 
Security to the corporate strategy and the implications of non-compliance to 
environmental regulations for both case organisations. Contextually specific knowledge 
is viewed as tactical by CME-Co with audit reports and IS Security procedures as the 
organisations foremost resource with audit reports, lessons-learned, the reactive ability 
of IS Security experts and procedures were categorised as tactical by TELE-Co. This 
has been attributed to the financial implications of not having the necessary expertise in 
applying regulatory controls, lessons-learned from audits and the inability to recognise 
risks. Thus, innovation in the two case organisations is practitioner dependent as 
reported in the KM literature (Blacker, 1995; Gherardi, 2000; Orlikowski, 2002; Hislop, 
2005) and not in the ISS literature (Randeree, 2006; Hu et al., 2008). 
Figure 7.2 presents a synthesised representation of the different types of IS Security 
knowledge an organisation should utilise. The IS Security knowledge roles were not 
identified as this is very much dependent on the environment an organisation is 
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operating in (section 7.1.6). The arrows represent the eventual categorisation of IS 
Security knowledge as it is reused. Therefore, eventually contextually and technically 
specific knowledge will become IS Security general knowledge. The totals outlined in 
Tables 5.10 and 6.10 indicate that functional knowledge is viewed primarily as 
operational in the two organisations (CME-Co Sec K=20: CS K= 33 and TELE-Co Sec 
K=27: CS K=28). However, CME-Co IS Security knowledge was considered tactical 
(CME-Co Sec K=15: CS K=9). IS Security knowledge was viewed as slightly more 
tactical than CS knowledge (TELE-Co Sec K=14: CS K=12) in TELE-Co. The two 
organisations regard customer problem-solving as vital and knowledge intensive yet a 
fundamental operation (CME-Co CS K= 33 O| 9 T| 0 S). Neither organisation promoted 
or supported their Customer Support functions at a senior level. KM is utilised by the 
two CS functions but as ad hoc initiatives (TELE-Co CS K= 28 O|12 T|3 S).  TELE-Co 
categorises the allocations of controls and problem-solving as operational knowledge, 
the application of regulatory requirements as tactical and IS Security policies and 
strategies as strategic (TELE-Co Sec K= 27 O|14 T|3 S). IS Security knowledge is 
regarded as strategic particularly vis-à-vis the security policies and strategies used by 
the two organisations (CME-Co Sec K= 20 O| 15 T| 5 S) (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002).  
Figure 7.2: IS Security Types of Knowledge 
The importance of IS Security knowledge can be attributed to the structures of the two 
organisations and their competitive business environments (Borchgrave et al., 2001; 
Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Dhillon, 2006). IS Security is a futile function if it is absent 
from the organisational structure. The ability to identify and react to rogues (hackers) is 
also viewed as strategic, emphasising TELE-Co’s recognition of its expertise in 
rectifying security incidents (Baskerville, 2004). However proactive strategies were not 
identified by either organisation as an important skill indicating an inability to be 
proactive in tackling security challenges (Dhillon, 2006). CME-Co has identified 
compliance as a niche market and as a result formed a group to target customer 
regulatory requirements and generate additional income. The steps in applying 
standards for regulatory requirements are vital to the function. IS Security practitioners 
utilised regulatory and control knowledge to ensure compliance and follow external 
advice regarding audits. The importance of IS Security is represented in the reporting 
structures which emphases the financial implications of IS Security and therefore its 
strategic importance in mapping IS Security to every business function, and process 
(Patterson, 2005). As a result knowledge use and development is therefore regarded as a 
fundamental aspect of activity (Hislop, 2005), making knowledge inseparable from 
human activity (Orlikowski, 2002). Equally, all knowledge work, whether using ISS 
knowledge, sharing ISS knowledge, developing ISS knowledge or creating ISS 
knowledge will involve an element of activity to ensure the value of ISS knowledge. 
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 7.2.2 Interpreting the IS Security Knowledge Reservoirs used in the Case Studies 
Knowledge pertaining to the functions of the two organisations is located in several 
different reservoirs. They encompass practitioners, artefacts and organisational entities. 
The reservoirs of knowledge are described and compared in the following sub-sections. 
(1) The different roles and responsibilities attributed to individual practitioners of 
the two organisations were identified as significant sources of knowledge (Appendix D 
& Appendix F: Rows 1). Problem-solving specialists diagnose reverse-engineer and 
solve problems.  CME-Co utilised specialists to identify stakeholder (customers and 
partners) requirements and as a result targeted the market demand for (product) security 
enhancements and regulatory solutions. A senior position was created (Director of GIS) 
in CME-Co to source IS Security standards and best practices and to formulate 
corporate guidelines for the organisation providing the IS Security functions with 
political power. The TELE-Co TGS umbrella function, through a coordinator, was 
reported to identify the IS Security requirements of the multinational. Security Officers 
are also used in two organisations as experts in each aspect of security from 
communications network to information. Internal and external auditors were used to 
evaluate and review corporate security by the two organisations. However TELE-Co 
used Export Managers to enforce and comply with U.S and international laws, 
specifically regarding encryption. The two organisations assigned experts to different 
levels of support. Expertise in product development, interoperability knowledge and 
diagnostic skills are regarded as valuable assets. 
The cost of escalation problems has been analysed by the CS functions operating within 
the two organisations. To reduce costs knowledge management was identified as an 
approach to alleviate the pressure in fire-fighting and integrating product designs. CME-
Co’s CS function created an ad hoc Knowledge Consultant role to tackle the challenge 
of centralising CS knowledge. KDG Officers were appointed to identify the training 
needs of the different support levels. However, the roles are function-based. KCS 
writers were also allocated the responsibility of reviewing the quality of CS solutions. 
TELE-Co used a PKM Coordinator, on an ad hoc basis, to promote the application of 
KM in prototyping new products and designs. Therefore neither organisation formally 
recognises the role of KM and that it is function specific. However, IS Security is 
structurally aligned to the corporate strategy in the two organisations with CME-Co 
specialising in the application of IS Security knowledge in targeting niche markets 
(Stewart, 2005). 
(2) The function reservoir of knowledge is an extension of the practitioner reservoir 
(Appendix D & Appendix F: Rows 2). Managers in the two organisations are 
responsible for identifying policies, standards and procedures. Security Officers and CS 
Engineers are used to coordinate the different subsidiaries in order to support 
operations. CME-Co and TELE-Co use customer feedback as a guide or measure for 
productivity and as a source of market demand. However CME-Co established a group 
specifically to target IS Security stakeholders. The two organisations have adopted 
specific approaches in securing corporate assets.  Specialised groups were established as 
separate yet interacting entities to target key IS Security requirements. Groups (CME-
Co’s OISRM and TELE-Co’s TGS) acquire and customise regulatory knowledge for 
dissemination throughout the multinationals and provide pools of expertise in 
compliance and IS Security controls. Security Officers, as groups, coordinate the roll­
out of controls across the subsidiaries and collaborate on activities such as audits 
particularly in preparing for them and conducting post-mortems after the process has 
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ended. However CME-Co utilised a Remote Services group to assess and provide 
secure communication links to external partners. The two organisations utilise an 
escalation process to effectively exploit the tacit knowledge within CS and Engineering. 
Communities of practice were identified in CME-Co and TELE-Co within the CS 
functions. CME-Co has established a skill-set development and (solution) quality 
assurance groups to promote the management of knowledge within CS. A prototyping 
and knowledge management community of practice was created by TELE-Co Design 
Engineers to integrate knowledge across the different design domains. Thus, the two 
organisations CS functions established KM communities of practice which are function 
specific. However, while CME-Co has pushed knowledge towards customers and 
partners, TELE-Co’s utilisation is internally focussed. 
(3) Knowledge is stored in practices, routines and procedures within the two 
organisations (Appendix D & Appendix F: Rows 3).  The IS Security functions utilised 
a number of procedures, standards, checklists and best practices to ensure CME-Co and 
TELE-Co’s compliance to different environmental regulations. TELE-Co enforced strict 
use of its DMS to control the quality of the solutions created. ISO17799 was identified 
by the two organisations as a vital IS Security guideline. While the two organisations 
purchased and customised externally produced standards, TELE-Co created in-house 
policies as behavioural controls in terms of protecting the organisations proprietary 
information (POPI). Audit reviews were regarded as valuable sources of knowledge by 
the two organisations as externally sought evaluations of their IS Security functions. 
Review reports have been used as lessons-learned and checklists for the ongoing audit 
processes. M-Gates and Six Sigma were used by the two organisations as a common 
project management guideline and (gate) vocabulary reference model to ensure 
organisational consistency across projects. Usage varied within and across the 
organisations as CME-Co’s IS Security function and TELE-Co’s CS functions reported 
their use. However while the two organisations used the methodologies, CME-Co 
acquired them and TELE-Co created the tools.   
CS templates were used to structure the standard operating procedures (SOP) enable 
effective searches and consistency. Bypassing steps in trouble-shooting can cost 
additional time if a call is escalated to another level of support. Prototyping as a 
methodology was used throughout CS and Engineering to test new designs and to learn 
from failures as well as successes. A limited number of procedures were used due to the 
closed environment in which the CS functions operate. However IS Security was 
described as cross-organisational support functions ensuring organisational adherence to 
policies and regulations. 
CME-Co and TELE-Co used internal and external knowledge repositories (Appendix 
D & Appendix F: Rows 4). These were categorised as either paper-based or computer-
based. The IS Security and CS functions, primarily, used the same repositories. DMS 
stored IS Security and CS solutions or fixes, which were accessed through the Intranet. 
The two organisations used vendor repositories to source manuals regarding security 
technologies, guidelines for incident recovery or product specifications in solving inter-
operability problems (Belsis et al., 2005). The corporate IS Security functions exploited 
IS Security repositories to automatically pull (multiple) firewall, scanning and IDS logs 
located throughout the corporate network in order to collate filtered knowledge into a 
prioritised list of issues for Security Officers and coordinators. The CS function used 
managerial discussion forums in order to collaborate in formulating common 
procedures and goals. Notifications disseminated from Engineering, regarding “hot 
issues”, or priority errors and solutions, were considered valuable sources of 
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knowledge. However access to CME-Co Engineering repositories was reported to be 
highly restrictive and resulted in partitioned knowledge. This is a necessary ISS 
countermeasure but it contradicts the advice provided by KM literature (Jamieson & 
Handzic, 2004). Engineering interviewees regarded the partitioning of the repositories 
as a fundamental approach to controlling their knowledge (product designs) and 
ensuring that any (known) risks which could seriously damage CME-Co’s reputation 
were monitored (dangerous commands used incorrectly in a customer’s environment). 
TELE-Co utilised external knowledge pulled from government repositories to comply 
with regulations in product development. CS also used public online forums to share 
coding solutions as an initiative to attract new hires. Therefore the IS Security functions 
used security repositories to automatically generate knowledge and CS used repositories 
to build and store solutions. However, the two organisations used E-learning tools to 
develop IS Security and CS practitioner skill-sets. E-learning resources were provided, 
through the two corporate universities, for online training courses. CME-Co in contrast 
to TELE-Co used portals to collaborate with partners and customers (E-Room and 
Power-link). Desktops and shared drives were also identified by CME-Co’s IS Security 
function as individual function specific repositories. Subscriptions to technical 
repositories were used as a source of patch updates, procedures, and Q&A repositories.  
(4) Knowledge was stored and retrieved in firm-specific technologies for day-to­
day operations and other activities such as auditing (Appendix D & Appendix F: Rows 
5). Email was reportedly used as a collaborative platform in problem-solving, accessing 
internal and external documentation and for storage throughout CME-Co and TELE-Co. 
The reported disadvantage to the utilisation of email was the difficulty in managing and 
retrieving solutions and documentation after a period of time. The IS Security functions 
exploited a number of security technologies to aid in monitoring and protecting their 
corporate boundaries. VPNs were used to encrypt lines of communication, SID for 
access-control and reporting, monitoring tools to generate alert logs, firewalls for 
enforcing internal/external access rules and IDS to track internal and external network 
traffic. Additionally, TELE-Co utilised Excel to create checklists and to calculate risk 
levels. Scanning technologies, such as ART and Found-stone, were used to monitor the 
TELE-Co corporate network and track employees and rouges. While, scanners were 
used in CME-Co they were not reported to be as highly valued as in TELE-Co. 
However, each IS Security technology generated streams of data which was pulled into 
monitoring databases in order to filter, query and generate a view of CME-Co’s and 
TELE-Co’s security landscapes. The CS functions utilised different technologies. CME-
Co was very dependent on Primus, which was available across the organisation but only 
utilised by CS and Engineering. TELE-Co exploited simulation software and CAD tools 
to create models of new product and aid in decision-making. TELE-Co used a content 
management system (Compass) to centralise its knowledge across the different 
functions. Simulation tools were not used by either IS Security function to create and 
test decision-making in simulated scenarios.   
(5) The two organisations displayed varying degrees of cross-functional interaction 
(Appendix D & Appendix F: Rows 6). CME-Co utilised a project management group as 
a collaborative mechanism across the functions. TELE-Co employed procedures (SRD) 
to stipulate the functional requirements of projects and the involvement of a Security 
Advisor to determine the level of risk to the organisation. The two organisations 
assigned the IS Security functions the task of determining the different roles and 
responsibilities of each employee. This task was necessary to enforce segregation of 
duties across the two organisations under the governance of the Finance and Legal 
departments.  However, the CS functions of the two organisations interacted with a 
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limited number of units. CME-Co’s CS function interacted with Engineering, R&D 
teams, ISS, IT and Sales. TELE-Co collaborated with Marketing as a source of 
technical expertise and as a control in protecting TELE-Co IP rights during sales 
pitches. The two case organisations regarded the CS functions as silos or corporations 
operating within the firm. Finally, the IS Security functions (transparently) supported 
every corporate unit and applied the controls necessary to enable and restrict employee 
access to systems, repositories, forums and KM. CS interoperates, as a technical 
advisor, with customer facing units to protect product designs and customer feedback. 
(6) Collaborative partnerships or inter-organisational relationships were exploited 
by the two organisations as sources of IS Security and CS knowledge (Appendix D & 
Appendix F: Rows 7). Vendors were used to provide guidelines, product and 
technological specifications. The inter-relationships were formed to exploit financial 
opportunities. CME-Co established and utilised a Corporate Security group to analyse 
the security industry and identify stakeholder requirements. It was determined that the 
organisation could generate income through the incorporation of security tools and 
services into the CME-Co product portfolio and support. TELE-Co has hosted IS 
Security and CS symposiums to identify the direction of regulatory and market 
requirements.  The two organisations have been active participants in regulatory bodies 
and IS Security forums to guide the market and create business opportunities. The 
forums consisted of networks of IS Security practitioners collaborating and exchanging 
details regarding attacks, best practices and standards. However, CME-Co enhanced 
their inter-organisational relationships through the use of collaborative forums such as 
Power-Link and E-Room. Knowledge was shared with customers as well as partners in 
order to generate solutions and reduce CS costs. The IS Security functions utilised 
external auditors as evaluators to adhere to regulatory requirements. The reports created 
were used as a form of measurement, a plan or checklist for future reviews and as a tool 
in post-mortem brainstorming sessions. The CS functions used customer feedback as 
informal review mechanisms. Knowledge collected from customers was used to alter 
product designs, remove flaws identified and the incorporation of potential trade-offs in 
product design. The two organisations exploited inter-organisational relationships to 
acquire market and regulatory knowledge and to ultimately manipulate the 
environments the organisations operate in. 
The next section describes the IS Security knowledge reservoirs identified and then 
compared to the literature. 
7.2.2.1 IS Security Knowledge Reservoirs 
Problem-solving specialists diagnosed, reverse-engineered and solved problems. IS 
Security Knowledge reservoirs encompass people (individuals and groups), artefacts 
(practices, technologies and repositories) and organisational entities (organisations, 
functions, inter-organisational networks) (Becerra-Fernandez, et al., 2004). Drucker 
(1993) contends that knowledge is always embodied in a practitioner, created, 
augmented or improved, applied, taught and shared by a person (Argote & Ingram, 
2000). 
CME-Co utilised specialists to identify stakeholder requirements and as a result targeted 
the market demand for security enhancements and regulatory solutions. A fact not 
reported by the ISS literature as a value adding implication of compliance (Sundt, 2006) 
A senior position was created in CME-Co to source standards and best practices and to 
formulate corporate guidelines for the organisation providing the IS Security functions 
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with political power. TELE-Co utilised an IS Security coordinator to identify the IS 
Security requirements for the multinational. Auditors were used as experts to evaluate 
and review corporate security. The two organisations assigned experts to different levels 
of support. Expertise in product development, interoperability knowledge and 
diagnostic skills are regarded as valuable assets. CME-Co’s CS function created an ad 
hoc Knowledge Consultant role to tackle the challenge of centralising knowledge. 
TELE-Co used a PKM Coordinator, on an ad hoc basis, to promote the application of 
KM in prototyping new products and designs. Therefore neither organisation formally 
recognised the role of KM and that it is function specific. However, CME-Co appointed 
a senior manager to align IS Security to the corporate strategy (Dutta & McCrohan, 
2002; Dhillon, 2006). 
A significant amount of organisational memory is stored in organisational artefacts. 
The IS Security functions utilised a number of procedures, standards, checklists and 
best practices to ensure CME-Co and TELE-Co’s compliance to different environmental 
regulations. Audit reviews were regarded as valuable sources of knowledge by the two 
organisations as externally sought evaluations of their IS Security functions. Some 
knowledge is stored in practices, organisational rules, routines and procedures which are 
developed through experience over time, such as disaster recovery procedures (Levitt & 
March, 1988). 
Knowledge stored in repositories and technologies represents other methods of storing 
knowledge in artefacts. Knowledge repositories can be paper-based, embodied in books, 
white papers, and procedures or web-based (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). CME-Co 
and TELE-Co used internal and external knowledge repositories such as a 
documentation management system to store solutions. The two organisations used 
vendor repositories to source specifications in solving inter-operability problems. The 
corporate IS Security functions exploited IS Security repositories to automatically pull 
(multiple) firewall, scanning and IDS logs located throughout the corporate network in 
order to collate filtered knowledge into a prioritised list of issues for Security Officers 
and coordinators (Stewart, 2005). However access to CME-Co Engineering repositories 
was reported to be highly restrictive and resulted in partitioned knowledge. Engineering 
interviewees regarded the partitioning of the repositories as a fundamental approach to 
controlling their knowledge (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004) and ensuring that any risks 
which could seriously damage CME-Co’s reputation were monitored. The two 
organisations used E-learning tools to develop IS Security and CS practitioner skill-sets 
(Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992; Dojkovski et al., 2007). CME-Co in contrast to TELE-Co 
used portals to collaborate with partners and customers (E-Room and Power-link).  
IS Security knowledge is also stored within entities such as organisational units, the 
organisation itself and inter-organisational networks. The firm stores specific 
knowledge regarding: the norms, values, practices and culture which embody the 
organisation. The knowledge stored in units, such as a department represent the formal 
functions of individual stores of knowledge specific to a unit or function (Huang et al., 
2007). CME-Co and TELE-Co used customer feedback as a guide or measure for 
productivity and as a source of market demand. However CME-Co established a group 
specifically to target IS Security stakeholders. Security Officers, as groups, coordinate 
the roll-out of controls across the subsidiaries and collaborate on activities such as 
audits and in conducting post-mortems. Thus, the two organisations established KM 
communities of practice which were function specific. Knowledge transfer has extended 
from passing information from individual to individual (Cantoni et al., 2001) to moving 
knowledge around the organisation (Rutkowski, 1999). As a result the collective 
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knowledge of a function is synergistic (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). Conversely 
while TELE-Co’s utilisation is internally focussed, CME-Co pushed knowledge 
towards customers and partners to create additional knowledge and reduce cost through 
the utilisation of a knowledge self-help reservoir. 
Knowledge is also stored in inter-organisational relationships such as collaborative 
partnerships. Vendors were used to provide guidelines, product and technological 
specifications. The inter-relationships were formed to exploit financial opportunities. 
CME-Co established and utilised a Corporate Security group to analyse the security 
industry and identify stakeholder requirements. TELE-Co has hosted IS Security and 
CS symposiums to identify the direction of regulatory and market requirements.  CME-
Co enhanced their inter-organisational relationships through the use of collaborative 
forums such as Power-Link and E-Room. The two organisations exploited inter­
organisational relationships to acquire market and regulatory knowledge and to 
ultimately manipulate the environments the organisations operate in. While the 
importance of collaboration between organisations is reported in the literature (Dutta & 
McCrohan, 2002), the advantage of steering the market as not reported (Stewart, 2005).  
Figure 7.3 presents a synthesised representation of the different reservoirs of IS Security 
knowledge an organisation should utilise. The different levels of expertise are viewed as 
a significant source of knowledge within the two organisations. CME-Co created ad hoc 
knowledge development groups and coordinators to develop lower level support skill-
sets and ensure solution standards.  Procedures such as solution templates and 
management techniques are viewed as important sources of knowledge. CME-Co’s and 
TELE-Co’s internal and external documentation was sourced to comply with corporate 
requirements, particularly in documenting lessons-learned and case solutions. 
Knowledge tools, repositories and email were used to store knowledge. It is also evident 
that both organisations are dependent on inter-relationships with external evaluators for 
IS Security. However CS knowledge stores were primarily internal to the functions. CS 
knowledge was focussed on the organisations product portfolios. Therefore internal 
sources of knowledge were vital. The reporting structures used, highlighted IS 
Security’s structural and financial importance to the two organisations. This ensured 
that IS Security had political support at senior levels particularly in relation to 
regulatory drivers and evaluations. Finally formal groupings were also established, in 
the two organisations, to focus on regulatory issues. However CME-Co used the 
opportunity to create a group to identify stakeholder requirements. As a result the IS 
Security functions are dependent on external sources of knowledge.  
Figure 7.3: IS Security Reservoirs 
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7.2.3 Interpreting the IS Security Knowledge Processes used in the Case Studies  
The objective of most organisations, attempting to manage knowledge regardless of the 
type, is to capture, share, acquire, use, control and create explicit and tacit knowledge 
(Standards Australia, 2001). The ISS knowledge processes identified in the CME-Co 
and TELE-Co case organisations are described and compared in the following sub­
sections. 
(1) Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge was obtained and 
transformed into a representation that was internalised by CME-Co and TELE-Co 
(Appendix E & Appendix G: Rows 1). Tables 5.1 and 6.1 broadly outline the tendency 
of the two organisations to acquire external knowledge. CME-Co was inclined to 
purchase companies to enhance its product portfolio (rapid remote) and enhance its 
inter-organisational relationships through collaborative software (E-Room). However 
the acquisition of knowledge by TELE-Co is not common. Table 6.1 illustrated a 
propensity to sell companies, diversify, enter new markets, innovate with first to market 
products, create methodologies and quality mechanisms (acquired by other leading 
multinationals). Therefore the multinationals, at firm level, utilised two different 
approaches in acquiring external knowledge resulting in or due to profit inclines and 
declines. The two organisations, at functional levels, used acquired software to 
collaborate, techniques such as reverse-engineering to innovate, and IS Security 
standards to adhere to industrial best practices. Subscription to external technical 
communities of practice and vendor repositories was fundamental in acquiring new 
security technologies, manuals and best practices. Additionally, active membership of 
regulatory bodies, by CME-Co and TELE-Co, allowed the organisations to determine 
the steps taken by other companies in auditing, reviews and the expected direction of 
the industry. As a result the two organisations have participated in driving their 
respective markets to stay ahead of their competitors and mould their regulatory 
environments. Best practices, regulatory guidelines, and standards were purchased and 
customised, by the IS Security functions, to comply with U.S. and international 
regulatory laws. External auditors and security specialists were hired to avail of their 
testing and auditing expertise.  
Training courses were purchased, customised and delivered through Knowledge-Link 
by CME-Co. However, the two organisations used simulations to train new CS 
Technicians for fire-fighting in CME-Co (lab simulations) and for product development 
in TELE-Co (CAD). Corporate and competitor products were acquired and used, by the 
two organisations, in developing reverse-engineering and diagnostic skill-sets. The 
practice provided knowledge for training, in interoperability problem-solving, product 
enhancement and competitor analysis. The two organisations have collaborated with 
academia and industry through collaborative forums such as the ISF and conferences. 
However TELE-Co has facilitated the collaboration of academics and other 
organisations through a yearly TELE-Co symposium. This platform enabled the 
organisation to determine the direction of, for example, new simulation software and to 
in effect direct the market. Therefore the two organisations have sourced external 
knowledge to comply with environmental regulatory constraints and to stay ahead of 
market developments and their competitors.  
(2) The IS Security and CS functions captured knowledge from the CME-Co 
(Appendix D) and TELE-Co (Appendix F) reservoirs (Appendix E & Appendix G: 
Rows 1). The two organisations utilised a pool of experts or practitioners in problem-
solving. The roles and responsibilities assigned to individual members of the 
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organisations aided the identification of experts located across the multinationals. 
Technological mechanisms such as email and portals enabled the organisations to pull 
knowledge in order to facilitate collaboration, the creation, sharing, and storage of 
solutions. Central repositories (Channel CME-Co and Compass) were identified as the 
primary tools used to retrieve manuals, documentation and procedures. The IS Security 
functions used external evaluators to conduct evaluations in preparation for audits to 
test the level of security within the organisation, through network vulnerability testing. 
This is an ongoing review process requiring the documentation and adoption of lessons-
learned from one review to the next. However the CS functions used technological 
mechanisms to capture knowledge. CME-Co’s CS function used the case-based 
reasoning tool (Primus) to capture, create, share, store and reuse solutions pertaining to 
the CME-Co product portfolio. TELE-Co’s CS function used simulation models and 
software to design and test data across design domains. The CME-Co CBR tool 
facilitated external collaboration (Power-Link). Customers and partners have retrieved 
existing solutions and created new solutions. Therefore CME-Co has captured and 
reused partner knowledge in problem-solving. This self-service programme and 
platform enabled partners and customers to solve their own problems and reduce CME-
Co costs and increase CS productivity. 
(3) The two organisations created solutions through problem-solving (Appendix E 
& Appendix G: Rows 3). Lessons-learned were documented due to the utilisation of the 
M-Gates project management methodology and IS Security audits. Mechanisms were 
used by the IS Security functions to facilitate the creation of new IS Security and CS 
knowledge. The Portfolio Project Management (PPMG) group identified the security 
requirements of other business functions within CME-Co. TELE-Co utilised 
methodologies (M-Gates) to coordinate a collaborative approach to problem-solving. 
Documents such as the SRD and risk assessment techniques were used to determine 
security requirements and identify security product enhancements. The evaluation and 
resulting documentation of audit reviews and lessons-learned were environmentally 
driven. CS identified the potential of leveraging the knowledge of CME-Co partners and 
vendors in creating and sharing new solutions (knowledge) to reduce costs. The CS 
functions operating within CME-Co and TELE-Co created solutions using the different 
levels of support (escalation process). CME-Co’s partners were used extensively to 
create and share solutions in order to reduce costs. TELE-Co created design solutions 
through the utilisation of simulation software and the M-Gates methodology. Solutions 
were not shared with partners but function specific. The IS Security functions created 
and acquired evaluation reports (audit reviews), identified security controls, customised 
standards and best practices for compliance deliverables. Mechanisms such as 
brainstorming (enabled through online forums and teleconferences) were used to 
conduct post-mortems of activities such as audits. The IS Security functions utilised a 
trial and error approach in allocating controls in TELE-Co and CME-Co. Individual 
members were granted access to corporate resources based on their organisational roles 
and responsibilities in enforcing segregation of duties. The IS Security functions 
reassessed access rights when additional requirements were identified. Lessons-learned 
and audit documentation were created and used to improve internal and cross-functional 
processes. 
(4) The IS Security and CS functions shared knowledge through the utilisation of 
tools such as email, teleconferences and collaborative platforms (Appendix E & 
Appendix G: Rows 4). However CME-Co utilised a CBR tool and TELE-Co utilised a 
central repository to share knowledge internally and symposiums to share knowledge 
publicly. The two organisations generated and shared knowledge through their problem-
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solving escalation processes. Knowledge trading was identified in CME-Co and TELE-
Co. Help, in the form of an (ISS or CS) practitioner or a document was often traded to 
ensure collaboration at a later date.  CME-Co collaborated extensively with customers 
and partners in sharing solutions to reduce support costs and increase the productivity of 
the CS function. Regulatory bodies were used to participate in the creation and sharing 
of standards and to drive the market. The IS Security functions used coordinators and 
mechanisms (PPMG and SRD) to encourage the collaboration and sharing of 
knowledge across functions and subsidiaries. IS Security practices were shared 
externally through forums to learn from and collaborate with other organisations in 
sharing lessons-learned and in steering the security industry. CS shared product designs, 
solutions and test data internally in TELE-Co and increasingly with partners in CME-
Co. Therefore, the difference between the organisations approaches to sharing is 
functional. IS Security will search for and collaborate with partners to steer the security 
market and CS will push or drive solution knowledge across the different design 
domains in TELE-Co and towards customers or partners in CME-Co. 
(5) Knowledge application involved the use of knowledge in guiding decisions and 
actions (Appendix E & Appendix G: Rows 5). The two organisations created, used, 
customised and stored knowledge in the form of solutions, standards, and best practices. 
Pools of IS Security and CS practitioners were used to collaborate, share and therefore 
use and reuse knowledge in problem-solving and decision-making.  The IS Security 
functions utilised security technologies to build pictures of the CME-Co and TELE-Co 
security landscapes. Standards and best practices were purchased customised and 
reused. Audit reviews were used to improve practices as lessons-learned were 
documented.  The IS Security functions exploited the auditing process to apply and 
reuse knowledge from past reviews as benchmarks for forthcoming reviews. However 
TELE-Co’s CS function utilised the M-Gates methodology to apply the knowledge 
generated at each gate. Simulation software enabled the function to build prototypes and 
collaborate across the different design domains. CME-Co’s CS function utilised a CBR 
tool to efficiently store, share, retrieve and reuse solutions. Experienced Engineers were 
used to integrate knowledge manually as reverse-engineering and diagnostic skills 
cannot be replicated by the technologies used in either organisation. The application of 
IS Security and CS knowledge across the functions was very different. IS Security 
purchased customised and reused external knowledge. Lessons-learned were 
documented through post-mortems and external measures or processes were used to 
improve internal activities. The CS functions required the use of project management 
methodologies and tools to enable the coordinated reuse of knowledge. As a result 
knowledge was pulled from different sources. The IS Security functions purchased and 
customised external knowledge to adhere to environmental requirements and CS created 
knowledge internally. 
(6) Knowledge control secured valuable functional and therefore corporate 
knowledge (Appendix E & Appendix G: Rows 6). The two organisations used focused 
IS Security strategies in protecting their corporate boundaries. IS Security was divided, 
in the two organisations, structurally to focus on its different security facets. Groups 
targeted external environmental requirements to adhere to regulations and internally for 
controlling dispersed organisations. Security technologies were used to control and 
protect resources. Systems (assets) were prioritised according to their value and controls 
aligned were aligned as required. Organisational resources such as repositories, product 
designs and Engineering labs were allocated controls in order to protect the innovative 
processes and the innovators themselves. Controls were extensively allocated to 
documents to ensure quality, utility, consistency and ownership. However CS, and 
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particularly Engineering, was regarded by senior management as innovators who 
required complete control over their systems and networks. Engineering applied 
controls, such as access rights, to their own systems. The two organisations used formal, 
informal and technical controls to control the behaviour of unauthorised users. 
Additionally the two organisations utilised tools and mechanisms to monitor and track 
internal traffic in order to identify rogue behaviour. Virtual private networks were used 
to encrypt the communication lines and legal documents, such as NDAs, were used to 
control employee behaviour.  
The next section describes the IS Security KM processes identified and then compared 
to the literature. 
7.2.3.1 IS Security KM Processes 
Knowledge Management (KM) is concerned with ensuring that knowledge is available 
in the right form to the right processors (systems, people and processes) at the right time 
for the right cost (Holsapple & Singh, p.220). 
Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained (Huber, 1991, 
p.90). Once it is identified it is transformed into a representation that can be internalised 
(Holsapple & Singh, 2004). CME-Co was inclined to purchase companies to enhance its 
product portfolio and enhance its inter-organisational relationships. However the 
acquisition of knowledge by TELE-Co was not common. The multinationals, at firm 
level, utilised two different approaches in acquiring external knowledge. The two 
organisations, at functional levels, used acquired software to collaborate, techniques to 
innovate, and IS Security standards to adhere to industrial best practices. Subscription to 
external technical communities of practice and vendor repositories was fundamental in 
acquiring new security technologies, manuals and best practices as advocated by 
Stewart (2005). Active membership of regulatory bodies, by CME-Co and TELE-Co, 
allowed the organisations to determine the steps taken by other companies in auditing, 
reviews and the expected direction of the industry (Stunt, 2006). The two organisations 
have participated in driving their respective markets to stay ahead of their competitors 
and mould their regulatory environments. Training courses were purchased, customised 
and delivered through the corporate universities. Corporate and competitor products 
were acquired and used in developing reverse-engineering and diagnostic skill-sets 
(Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004). As a result the two organisations have sourced external 
knowledge to comply with environmental regulatory constraints and to stay ahead of 
market developments and their competitors. 
The IS Security and CS functions captured knowledge from the corporate reservoirs as 
described in the literature (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004).. The two organisations 
utilised a pool of experts or practitioners in problem-solving. The roles and 
responsibilities assigned to individual members of the organisations aided the 
identification of experts located across the multinationals (Eppler, 2004). Technological 
mechanisms such as email and portals enabled the organisations to pull knowledge in 
order to facilitate collaboration, the creation, sharing, and storage of solutions. Central 
repositories were identified as the primary tools used to retrieve manuals, 
documentation and procedures. The CME-Co CBR tool facilitated external 
collaboration (Power-Link). Customers and partners have retrieved existing solutions 
and created new solutions. Therefore CME-Co has captured and reused partner 
knowledge through problem-solving (Nonaka, 1994).  
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Knowledge creation is a sign of a healthy organisation becoming a learning 
organisation (Coakes, 2004), arguing that knowledge does not remain static as in either 
of the two case organisations. Leveraging tacit knowledge is a difficult process and 
central to its attainment is the collaboration of the actors (Hislop, 2005). The IS Security 
and CS functions captured knowledge from the CME-Co and TELE-Co knowledge 
reservoirs. The two organisations utilised a pool of experts or practitioners in problem-
solving. Central repositories (Channel CME-Co and Compass) were identified as the 
primary tools used to retrieve manuals, documentation and procedures. The IS Security 
functions used external evaluators for ongoing review processes requiring the 
documentation and adoption of lessons-learned, which was not reported in the literature. 
The CME-Co CBR tool facilitated external collaboration (Power-Link). To facilitate 
these processes the structure, management and the necessary ICT must support them. 
There are four modes of knowledge conversion required for knowledge creation: (1) 
socialisation, (2) externalisation, (3) conversion and (4) internalisation as identified by 
Nonaka et al., (1996) and replicated across the two organisations.  
1.	 Socialisation is the process by which tacit knowledge from one individual is 
converted into the tacit knowledge of another though observation and practice. 
CME-Co and TELE-Co both used: trial and error learning, on the job training, 
mentoring, direct or indirect communication.  
2.	 Externalisation is the process of changing tacit knowledge into explicit through 
dialogue and group reflection. The review process for audits forced both ISS 
functions to document the lessons learned for each review. 
3.	 Combination is a process of combining components of explicit knowledge to 
create and store in knowledge systems such as: KMS, databases and 
documentation, enabling additional members of the unit or organisation to 
access knowledge. CME-Co was an active advocate of combining explicit 
knowledge through Primus. TELE-Co was very much dependent on the skills of 
its Engineers to combine design knowledge.  
4.	 Internalisation is the process through which experts can personalise explicit 
knowledge and convert it into tacit knowledge. The two organisations were 
active in internalising knowledge. However while CME-Co was active in doing 
so both internally and externally. TELE-Co was domain specific 
Pools of IS Security and CS practitioners were used to collaborate, share and therefore 
use and reuse knowledge in problem-solving and decision-making. Knowledge sharing 
is the process through which explicit or tacit knowledge is communicated between 
individuals, groups, units or organisations. The IS Security and CS functions in TELE-
Co and CME-Co shared knowledge through the utilisation of tools such as email, 
teleconferences and collaborative platforms. However CME-Co utilised a CBR tool and 
TELE-Co utilised a central repository to share knowledge internally and symposiums to 
share knowledge publicly. Regulatory bodies were used to participate in the creation 
and sharing of standards and to drive the market, a fact not identified in the literature. 
However, as reported, the two organisations created informal (TELE-Co) and formal 
(CME-Co) communities where knowledge was shared and used by developing CoP 
(Pan & Leidner, 2003). 
Knowledge application involves the use of knowledge to guide decisions and actions. 
ISS knowledge was used and applied by the two case organisations which, as a result, 
facilitated organisational learning and therefore provided indirect and direct value to the 
organisations (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004; Jashapara, 2004). The organisations created, 
used, customised and stored knowledge in the form of solutions, standards, and best 
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practices. The IS Security functions utilised security technologies to build pictures of 
the CME-Co and TELE-Co security landscapes as identified as vital by Booz et al., 
(2005), Baskerville, (2004) and Dhillon (2006). Lessons-learned were documented 
through post-mortems and external measures or processes were used to improve internal 
activities. These processes were however not identified in the literature as value added 
activities. 
Finally, the two case organisations availed of IS Security strategies to protect their 
corporate boundaries. Groups targeted external environmental requirements to adhere to 
regulations and internally for controlling dispersed organisations. To protect 
information or knowledge assets, management allocated, as advocated in literature, 
appropriate IS Security and knowledge control measures to counter known threats 
(Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004; CSI, 2009). Security 
technologies were used to control and protect resources. Systems (assets) were 
prioritised according to their value and controls aligned were aligned as required 
(Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). Organisational resources such as repositories, product 
designs and Engineering labs were allocated controls in order to protect the innovative 
processes and the innovators themselves. Control is a managerial influence on KM to 
assure knowledge validity (accuracy and consistency) and knowledge utility (relevance 
and importance), (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Holsapple & Singh, 2004). The two 
organisations used formal, informal and technical controls to control the behaviour of 
unauthorised users. Knowledge control should be a priority as the value of knowledge 
and the returns achieved depend on the effectiveness of the controls (IT Governance 
Institute, 2001; Randeree, 2006). However, ISS viewed KM as a project and allocated 
controls as they would to any new system or process. 
Figure 7.4: IS Security Processes 
Figure 7.4 presents a synthesised representation of the different types of IS Security 
knowledge processed. A significant amount of knowledge was acquired externally by 
CME-Co. Collaborative software, regulatory guidelines, subscriptions, products and 
external evaluations were acquired by the functions to ensure that the two case 
organisations are compliant within their business environment and aware of any and all 
business opportunities such as market changes and competitor product advancements. 
Problem-solving was the principal approach used to create knowledge and applied 
through the reuse of the solutions created and stored. The CME-Co and TELE-Co IS 
Security functions purchased significantly more external knowledge than CS due to 
regulatory requirements. This environmental driver enabled the IS Security functions to 
exploit the auditing process and use reviews as benchmarking aids in applying lessons-
learned to internal and external IS Security activities. Problem-solving was identified in 
the two organisations as the principal approach used to create knowledge and applied 
through the reuse of the solutions created.  
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7.2.4 Interpreting the IS Security KM Mechanisms used in the Case Studies 
This section describes the mechanisms used in CME-Co and TELE-Co to promote the 
management of IS Security knowledge. Table 7.3 (adapted from Tables 5.11 and 6.11) 
outlines the mechanisms which are divided by type, and illustrates which are common 
or unique to the two case organisations (√√). 
Table 7.3 illustrates the high volume of KM mechanisms used in the two case 
organisations. It is evident that the IS Security functions utilised formalised mechanisms 
and external measures compared to the CS utilisation of ad hoc mechanisms utilised to 
drive KM within the two organisations. The support functions within TELE-Co and 
CME-Co utilised the different learning mechanisms. This varied according to budget or 
if specific training (SETA) was required.  Collaborative mechanisms such as: 
brainstorming, problem-solving and face-to-face meetings were used by the TELE-Co 
and CME-Co’s CS and IS Security functions. DMS were used unless a corporate 
specific procedure (POPI) was required. Formal groups or structures were used by the 
IS Security functions which were aligned to the CME-Co and TELE-Co strategies. The 
two organisations implemented KM as an ad hoc initiative. Internal collaborative tools 
were exploited by the two organisations across the IS Security and CS functions. Public 
forums were used by the two organisations but to varying degrees. The problem-solving 
tools identified were specific to the functions. Simulation software was used by the CS 
functions for decision-making and training. 
Finally, the monitoring and tracking tools were used by the IS Security functions.  The 
significant difference between the two organisations and functions was the utilisation of 
a case based reasoning tool. CME-Co positioned its CS knowledge management 
initiative around Primus. Due to the dedication of CS practitioners the role of the tool 
was gradually increased as its value to CME-Co was continuously demonstrated to the 
different levels of support and to senior management. Additionally, Primus was used to 
provide CS solutions to and as a self-service support environment for CME-Co 
customers and partners. CS utilised quality mechanisms for the solutions created, 
allowed knowledge filtering, advanced search criteria’s and pushed CS knowledge 
towards CME-Co customers. Therefore the IS Security functions were externally driven 
to comply with specific goals and measured due to regulatory requirements. CME-Co’s 
CS function was driven to develop skills and utilise practitioner knowledge more 
efficiently. TELE-Co positioned its KM initiative around M-Gates and PKM for 
specific design domains as opposed to the entire CS function. IS Security utilised KM 
mechanisms to support the organisational goal of protecting the corporate assets, 
adhering to regulatory constraints and sourcing environmental opportunities for 
exploiting potential markets.  
7.2.4.1 Functional IS Security KM Mechanisms 
In the literature mechanisms are categorised as either technological or non-
technological. However the mechanisms identified in the two organisations were further 
categorised according to their objectives to determine their use. They were supported by 
the KM organisational infrastructure and facilitated by KM systems (Becerra-Fernandez 
et al., 2004). KM mechanisms identified ranged from on-the-job training, learning by 
training, face-to-face meetings, mentoring, employee shadowing, employee rotation, 
brainstorming and analogies. While only on-the-job-training/learning and a face-to-face 
meetings were regarded as formal mechanisms in TELE-Co and CME-Co, mentoring, 
employee shadowing/rotation and brainstorming varied and were utilised on an informal 
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basis. Mechanisms which facilitated socialisation in the two case organisations 
included: cooperative projects across departments, repositories of best practices, and 
lessons-learned. However apprenticeships were not utilised due to, primarily, to budget 
constraints. Cooperative projects were utilised and formalised through methodologies 
and checklists Dhillon, 2006). 
KM MECHANISMS CME-Co TELE-Co 
ISS CS ISS CS 
N
on
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ec
hn
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ic
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Learning | Training KM Mechanisms: 
Induction Training: Specialised for the different functions √ √ √ √ 
Learning on the Job: Responsibilities are added gradually √ √ √ √ 
Analogies: Stories describing the competitive nature of Org. √ √ 
SETA: Penalties for Breaking Security Procedures √ √ 
Mentoring: Provide Access to Experts √ √ √ √ 
Lab Simulations Learning environment for problem-solving √ √ 
Job Rotation Learning  √ 
Reviews: 6 month Assessment of Employees √ √ 
Corp. University Up-skill to meet Specific Needs √ √ √ √ 
Collaborative Sessions: 
Teleconferences: Used for Global Communication √ √ √ 
Minutes of Meetings Recorded & Stored √ √ 
Meetings: Face-to-Face √ √ √ √ 
Brain Storming Audit Reviews √ √ √ √ 
Problem-solving Collaborative Process √ √ √ √ 
Documentation Quality Systems & Procedures: 
SRD: Aligning Security Requirements √ 
DMS: Doc. Templates & Quality Procedures √ √ √ √ 
Prj. Mgt. Method Phased approach to managing projects √ √ 
Business Case Project Resources & ID Roles Responsibilities √ √ √ √ 
Individual & Groups of Expertise: 
Expert Status: Expertise List √ √ √ 
Global ISS Group Global Security Group: Coordinate Teams √ √ 
Global IP Global Compliance Group √ √ 
KM Team Promote KM √ √ 
KM Roles KM Leadership √ √ 
Symposia Collaborate with Industry & Academia √ √ 
K
M
 T
oo
ls
 
Internal Collaborative Tools 
Intranet: Central Document Repository & Group Resource √ √ √ √ 
CMS: Stores Lessons-learned, Document Store √ √ √ √ 
Groupware: Collaborating & Sharing Solutions √ √ √ √ 
Hyperlinks Links to Internal & External Solutions √ √ √ √ 
Common Shares Groups, Regional Shares, Stores Procedures √ √ √ √ 
Public Forums 
Vendor Portals Procedures, Guidelines and Best Practices √ √ √ √ 
Forums Public Collaboration √ √ √ √ 
Problem-solving Tools 
CBR Case-based Reasoning Tools √ √ √ 
Simulation Models System & Paper-based for Product Components √ √ 
CAD Tools: Computer Aided Design for Product Simulations √ √ 
MS Excel: Risk Matrixes, to calculate the level of risk √ √ 
Monitoring & Tracking Tools 
ART: Automated Analysis, Reporting Tracking Tool √ √ 
Scanning SW: Monitors Rogues & Internal Employees √ √ 
VPN: Tunnelling to Protect Communication NWs √ √ 
Wireless Tech. 2-way Pagers from Systems or Call logging 
System 
√ √ √ √ 
*Organisational Level: √√ 
* Specific to One Function: √ 
Table 7.3: CME-Co and TELE-Co KM Mechanisms Used by the IS Security and CS 
Functions 
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The two organisations combined their knowledge through the collaboration of 
documentation (solution templates), databases (vendor), problem-solving 
methodologies and web-based access to data through Primus and Compass. However 
CEM-Co utilised external partner knowledge to a greater extent through PowerLink. 
Knowledge capture was facilitated by case-based reasoning tool –Primus in CME-Co. 
TELE-Co utilised Compass purely as a central repository as opposed to a true KMS 
(Butler & Murphy, 2007). Knowledge sharing was facilitated through corporate 
repositories, lessons-learned were documented by both case organisations but purely to 
adhere to compliance requirement. Expertise locators were not used by either 
organisation, contrary to the advantage reported in the literature (Eppler, 2004) personal 
contact lists were used instead. Support centres were used to facilitate direction, and 
policies and standards are used to support routines in CME-Co and TELE-Co as 
advocated by Becerra-Fernandez et al., (2004). 
Figure 7.5: IS Security Mechanisms 
Figure 7.5 presents a synthesised representation of the different types of IS Security KM 
mechanisms an organisation should utilise. The typical goal of a KM initiative is to 
capture knowledge in a documented form and store it into a repository where it can be 
easily stored and retrieved by knowledge workers (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). While 
TELE-Co attempted to do this through Compass. It was regarded by the interviewees as 
a DMS. However CME-Co pushed knowledge sharing and use internally and externally 
through its CBR tool. This enabled the combination and integration (Nonaka, 1994) of 
knowledge, along with the capability to combine an expert’s experience in the form of a 
system to provide a strategic tool (Alavi & Leidner, 2001) for the CS function in CME-
Co. However this advantage was very much function specific.  The technological 
mechanisms used by the case organisations were capable of combining explicit and tacit 
knowledge of workers to varying degrees (Butler & Murphy, 2007). These systems 
were used to acquire and manage knowledge and distribute it among the CS and ISS 
functional units as well as with any external collaborating functions in CME-Co to 
create new knowledge through the use of the different mechanisms (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001) and therefore improving the effectiveness of decisions (Peterson, 1996). 
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7.2.5 Interpreting IS Security KM Impacts in the Case Organisations 
This section describes the impact of managing IS Security knowledge within CEM-Co 
and TELE-Co. While the IS Security functions did not utilise a knowledge management 
strategy, the ISS functions within TELE-Co and CME-Co, as a result of regulatory 
requirements, managed their knowledge.  
The IS Security and CS practitioners within the two case organisations did learn new 
skills and attend collaborative conferences. TELE-Co ISS practitioners did have access 
to training, conferences, and were regularly reviewed. TELE-Co and CEM-Co provided 
the functions with the tools needed to tackle complex problems. ISS knowledge was 
shared across the different functions to ensure each organisation was secured. 
Therefore, compliance has positively impacted the individual ISS practitioner.  CME-
Co’s CBR tool - Primus had a very positive impact on CS practitioners. The CBR tool 
reduced the time needed for training, facilitated the creation of solutions for a complex 
product portfolio. Knowledge sharing has also been significantly increased with 
escalated levels of support for the two case organisations.    
The two IS Security functions are externally reviewed. Knowledge tools were used to 
centralise IS Security knowledge and problem-solving was coordinated. As a result, the 
ISS role became easier due to the utilisation of externally tested processes and practices. 
Specialised IS Security groups coordinated and shared knowledge across the two 
organisations. Audits provided measurements and facilitated learning through post­
mortems forcing a proactive stance against IS Security challenges.  CS practitioners 
utilised prototyping to facilitate learning in addition to corporate training. Symposiums 
allowed the CS function to collaborate with other organisations and academics.  KM 
tools (such as Compass) retained individual knowledge for reuse. Development 
standards and templates ensured easy collaboration across the functions and 
organisations. The IS Security and CS functions benefited from the individual impact of 
the management of IS Security and CS knowledge in CME-Co and TELE-Co. Best 
practices and standards for managing security were sourced and implemented to provide 
greater organisational security. Solutions created were stored and reused which reduced 
the amount of time needed to solve problems. Audits forced the recording of lessons-
learned and generated significant knowledge for future audits. CS utilised escalation 
processes and reverse-engineering skills to increase CS knowledge in the two 
organisations. This ultimately increased productivity and enabled product 
enhancements. CME-Co’s CBR tool reduced costs and enhanced the organisations 
relationship with its customers through the introduction of a (customer or partner) self-
service portal. 
External evaluators measured the IS Security functions activities and provided useful 
feedback for improvements. CME-Co’s CS function utilised a significant volume of 
external sources of knowledge in order to remain as industrial and environmentally 
aware as possible. Best IS Security practices and standards were sought. TELE-Co and 
CME-Co were evaluated to improve security internally. The auditing process also had 
positive impacts for the two IS Security functions. It forced the practitioners to 
undertake post-mortems at the end of a review which enhanced learning. Auditing has 
resulted in significant improvements in TELE-Co and CME-Co. Processes were 
documented and knowledge regarding the organisations security status was constantly 
pulled from internal and external knowledge reservoirs. The efficiency of the IS 
Security processes were measured by determining the number of calls from customers 
and the number of improvements made as a result of an audit. CS processes were 
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enhanced through employee rotation (on an ad hoc basis), brainstorming sessions and 
the recognition of practitioner contribution to the CBR tool. The number of solutions 
hits were measured and rated to create a competitive culture within CME-Co’s CS 
function. Processes were also evaluated through the improvements made. TELE-Co 
exploited standardised templates and procedures to alleviate IS Security workloads. 
Reviews were used to guide the next audit and are ongoing evaluations of the IS 
Security functions. Reverse-engineering and diagnostic skills provided valuable 
competitive knowledge for the two organisations. Escalation processes enabled 
improved services and products for customers and faster response time for fixes. 
However knowledge was domain specific in TELE-Co which provided an advantage to 
the design domains availing of the strategy. Solutions for problems or designs were not 
made available to Customers or to some domains as was reported in CME-Co.  
7.2.5.1 IS Security KM Impacts 
Malhorta (2003, p.3) contends that “…knowledge has no definitive value but can 
potentially be of use indefinitely.” Even though knowledge was difficult to quantify in 
the two case organisations it was a significant component of the decision-making 
processes illustrated and discussed in this chapter. It did have a clear impact on the 
business outcomes of the two case organisations (Soo et al., 2002). Intangible assets 
such as knowledge added services were difficult to appraise in TELE-Co and CME-Co 
but researchers have argued that they should not be ignored (Conway, 2004; Ulrich & 
Smallwood, 2004) as they provide numerous benefits (Tables 5.12 and 6.12). Brelade 
and Harman (2003) argued that the drivers for KM are much the same as drivers for 
change in any organisation; to obtain a competitive advantage. TELE-Co and CME-Co 
utilised knowledge management, in their CS functions, to achieve a competitive 
advantage. However, it was CME-Co which consistently pushed the use of the strategy 
to identify additional advantages in order to more effectively compete. TELE-Co’s use 
was very much domain (or CoP) specific despite obvious advantages. As the majority of 
organisations regard the knowledge possessed by the firm as an asset, particularly 
regarding expertise. Therefore, it was the management, creation and application of this 
knowledge in CME-Co that was a direct contributor in achieving and maintaining a 
sustainable competitive advantage as identified by Stewart (1997). The CS and 
Engineering practitioners through the implementation of the KM initiatives in TELE-Co 
and CME-Co made more effective decisions, improved their efficiency and in turn 
improved the profitability of the two case organisations through the effective 
management of knowledge (Coakes, 2004).  
CME-Co placed an emphasis on knowledge, skills and creativity and on the capturing 
and sharing of information through the creation of knowledge roles (knowledge 
champions): solution quality reviews (KCS), formalised communities of practice 
(KDG) and the use of a CBR tool. These are all issues that impact upon how people are 
managed (Brelade & Harman, 2003). Alternatively, TELE-Co did not support the 
initiative at a senior level and it was advocated at a domain level through an informal 
community of practice (PKM). However the two organisations showed evidence of 
knowledge hoarding between Engineering and the other corporate functions. Engineers 
hoarded their knowledge rather than share it. Unless knowledge sharing is rewarded 
more than knowledge hoarding (Davenport & Prusak 1998; Walsham 2001) 
practitioners will continue to hoard. The dilemma for knowledge workers is that there 
are potentially positive and negative consequences to both sharing and hoarding 
knowledge. The advantages of sharing knowledge maybe rewarding, with benefits at the 
group level (increased performance) which was evident in the ISS functions and at the 
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organisational level, and an individual’s status maybe enhanced as it was in the CME-
Co CS function. The negative implications vary from loss of power as indicated by the 
Engineering functions and time as reported by all of the interviewees in the two case 
organisations. Moreover, knowledge sharing is dependent on the motivational elements 
of the knowledge sharing process and the culture in which the process operates. 
However it is interesting that the ISS functions in the two case organisations were as 
positively impacted by managing knowledge as the CS functions which purposefully 
utilised a KM initiative. Therefore, as reported by Raghu and Vinze (2005), it is 
possible for knowledge sharing to be successful even without a set structure for 
knowledge sharing, as long as there is a context for knowledge initiative. In the context 
of this investigation compliance, unexpectedly, forced the ISS functions to manage ISS 
knowledge. 
A general weakness of KM initiatives is that the issues of conflict, power and politics 
are generally neglected (Hislop, 2005). CME-Co’s and TELE-Co’s management of ISS 
knowledge was facilitated through the requirements of regulatory adherence and the 
necessary approaches to managing ISS knowledge and structural changes (ISS senior 
role) were made. However the potential for conflict between workers and management 
can shape individuals willingness to participate in organisational knowledge processes. 
Engineering groups could bypass any initiative to access their knowledge even a 
managerial decision. Therefore inter-personal and inter-group conflict in the 
organisations can also affect KM processes (Hislop, 2003). This was, as explained in 
CME-Co, a direct result of a history of inter-functional conflict and competition 
between CS and Engineering. ISS regarded the power utilised by Engineering as 
disruptive yet unavoidable. TELE-Co management ignored the conflict so that the 
innovative creativity of Engineering would not be interfered with. Furthermore, 
knowledge and personal networks were used by many practitioners in CME-Co and 
TELE-Co as political tools in support of particular objectives (Hislop et al., 2000) in 
trying to access functional knowledge (Buchanan & Gibb, 2008). However the 
importance of conflict, power and politics in impacting workers willingness to share is 
profound. They are a common feature of organisational life and due to the inter­
relationship between power and knowledge, knowledge is a resource workers make use 
of in dealing with situations of conflict, as evident in the Engineering functions of the 
two case organisations. 
Figure 7.6 presents a synthesised representation of the different types of impacts an 
organisation should achieve through the utilisation of a KM initiative. Employee 
performance can be greatly impacted through KM or another initiative which facilitates 
knowledge sharing. In the case of this investigation compliance forced the management 
of ISS knowledge in the two case organisations. It facilitated ISS and CS individual 
learning and enhanced their exposure to the latest knowledge in their fields of expertise 
through for example access to experts and lessons-learned from one audit to another. 
Employees were also encouraged to learn from one another to adapt to inter-operability 
changes in their environments. These improvements also enhanced job satisfaction as 
skills were improved, as is the employee’s market value (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
Additionally KM facilitated improvements in organisational processes by improving the 
effectiveness, efficiency and innovativeness of the different processes to varying 
degrees across the two organisations. Specifically KM enables organisations and their 
functions to adapt quickly to changes in their environments, such as the IS Security 
landscape and technological advancements.  
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Figure 7.6: IS Security Impacts 
CME-Co was much more innovative in its approach to utilising internal and external 
knowledge than TELE-Co. Both companies did improve their corporate products and 
services through KM (Choi & Lee, 2002). Essentially existing products were improved 
to add value to the organisation, and the knowledge-intensive services: CS and ISS 
within CME-Co and TELE-Co were greatly improved (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
Conversely by overlooking the need to formulate a clear business case in TELE-Co, its 
KM implementations were not as successful as CME-Co’s (Coakes, 2004). This is even 
more evident in the improvements made in the ISS functions in adhering to regulatory 
requirements to manage ISS knowledge.  KM impacted the two organisations primarily 
indirectly in exploiting intangible assets which were difficult to measure (Smith & 
McKeen, 2004). Unfortunately, the organisations isolated their KM initiatives in CS 
(Hansen et al., 1999) focusing on the operational side of KM as opposed to an 
integrated approach. CME-Co did collaborate in the generation of solutions with 
partners through an extranet but not internally with other functions. The ISS functions 
did not use a KM initiative but their management of knowledge was function specific, 
collaborating only vendors, auditors, stakeholders and regulatory bodies. IS Security 
functions have significantly impacted the organisations. Figure 7.6 presents a 
synthesised representation of the different types of potential IS Security KM Impacts. 
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The IS Security strategies were aligned to the corporate strategy ensuring that IS 
Security was mapped to every organisational technology and process within CME-Co 
and TELE-Co. 
7.2.6 A Synthesised Perspective on Managing IS Security Knowledge 
IS Security was used by the two organisations to participate in regulatory bodies to steer 
the markets. An inefficient IS Security function would result in corporate breaches and 
loss of earnings. The CS knowledge management initiatives were not aligned to the 
business strategies and as a result were dependent on the CS practitioners who are 
driving the use of KM tools and processes. KM was also specific to Customer Support. 
CS costs were reduced and time saved. CME-Co identified the advantage in pushing 
more and more knowledge towards partners. Customer loyalty was increased when the 
organisation became more open and willing to share knowledge. Therefore the two 
organisations have benefited from managing knowledge. CS utilised a KM initiative to 
positively impact the CS function and IS Security managed knowledge due to 
environmental requirements. However CME-Co through its CS function also identified 
market niches to target and ultimately increased profits. The CME-Co functions have 
been positively impacted by managing knowledge. To benefit from the lessons-learned 
from this analysis the CS the IS Security functions in the two organisations could 
exploit case-based reasoning tools and devise incentives for IS Security practitioners to 
become problem-solving gurus.  
7.3 Aligning Information Systems Security to a KM Environment 
This section addresses the third research question. The purpose of which is to determine 
how firms align IS Security to a KM environment. This section is an extension of the 
preceding sections which discussed the organisational infrastructure necessary to 
facilitate IS Security knowledge management (section 7.1). The IS Security knowledge, 
reservoirs and processes used to facilitate and control the CME-Co and TELE-Co KM 
environments were also described, compared and contrasted to illustrate how IS 
Security is aligned to the CS functions operating within the two case organisations 
investigated. Additionally the mechanisms used and the impacts of KM were discussed 
not only as tools to promote IS Security KM but to again illustrate the relationship 
between IS Security and the two KM environments (section 7.2).  Therefore this section 
(7.3) extends sections 7.1 and 7.2 and explains how IS Security is aligned to a KM 
environment.  
7.3.1 Interpreting IS Security Control through Governance 
IS Security management and functions must understand the firms internal and external 
environments to build a suitable IS Security solution through effective ISS governance 
and quality control. This is achieved through the identification of IS Security 
responsibilities, practices, regulatory compliance, security policies, stakeholder 
relationships and IS Security activities to a KM. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of 
management to align IS security activities to a KM environment. IS Security must then 
be mapped to every business function, practitioner, process and technology (Patterson, 
2005). This section describes the IS Security infrastructure used to protect a KM 
environment (sub-section 7.3.1.1), the environment under analysis (sub-section 7.3.1.2), 
IS Security controls necessary (sub-section 7.3.1.3) and IS Security auditing process 
(section 7.3.2). This section concludes with a synthesised perspective of the controls 
necessary to protect a KM environment. 
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It is the IS Security infrastructure which secures the organisation and assures the value 
and utility of its knowledge stores (O’Dell et al., 2004). The type of infrastructure used 
determines the level of access employees have to the knowledge that resides within a 
firm.  Logical access rights were used to control access to CME-Co and TELE-Co 
knowledge stores. Best practice standards in the two organisations were crucial in 
establishing behavioural controls for decision-making. Corporate codes of ethics and 
ISS culture were introduced and delivered through security, education training and 
awareness (SETA) programmes. The two case organisations used M-Gates and Six 
Sigma (incorporating ISS gates and quality assurance steps) to ensure all employees 
utilised the same terminology in collaborating and managing projects across different 
business and support functions. 
It is the role of senior ISS management to guarantee that its structure is supportive of 
the exploitation of KM initiatives, without necessarily impeding business processes. 
The two case organisations identified the competitive advantage that can be gained from 
incorporating security enhancements into their products, steering standard making 
bodies and providing a one-stop-shop for customer compliancy requirements. As a 
result roles and official groups were established in the two cases raising the profile and 
political power of the IS Security functions. The two case organisations have 
established formal IS Security functions with political, structural, and budgetary 
independence. The cases were proactive in ensuring their compliance with the required 
regulations to operate across different geographies but also in identifying customer 
demand for security enhanced products and services. The Corporate Security group 
established in CME-Co represented corporate stakeholders (customers, shareholders, 
and partners) by identifying their product, service requirements and aligning security to 
the strategy of the organisation. The new reporting structures for the two case 
organisations required ISS to report to the Finance and legal departments. External 
reviews from auditors and consultants forced a significant change in the importance of 
the two IS Security functions.  TGS like the OISRM group analysed potential risks by 
improving IS Security processes to ensure a secure infrastructure for employees through 
proactive security strategies (policies, secure technologies and business assessment 
methodologies). TELE-Co also created a group responsible for developing global 
security procedures and policies which have disseminated to the various subsidiaries. 
Locally security is managed by Security Officers who are responsible for the security 
needs and audit reviews of individual sites. Securing a corporate network that has 
subsidiaries scattered around the world is a huge undertaking. In order to protect 
geographically dispersed subsidiaries the IS Security functions utilise Security Officers 
or Coordinators. These roles have the responsibility of rolling out the standards and 
controls selected by the corporate groups. They then collaborate using the different KM 
mechanisms used by TELE-Co and CME-Co. Senior management through, IS Security 
governance, are responsible for aligning the IS Security organisational infrastructure to 
a KM environment in order to support and protect it. 
7.3.1.1 IS Security Governance 
The relationship between governance and IS Security in CME-Co and TELE-Co exists 
in a number of different forms. The corporations are responsible to their creditors, 
stakeholders and for legal requirements (Dhillon, 2006). However ISS senior manager’s 
corporate officers are responsible for IS Security through the application of formal 
(policies, procedures and audits), technical (compliance, access lists and audits) and 
informal (ethics and behaviours) controls. Corporate officers within the two case 
organisations must and have demonstrated responsible behaviour and met compliant 
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requirements (Kaen, 2003) through corporate governance. Corporate governance is 
concerned with who has legal control (Kaen, 2003; Borodzicz, 2005) which did create 
challenges for CME-Co and TELE-Co management. The ISS functions were impacted 
by the Sarbanes-and-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 which required better business and IT 
controls in legislation (Chou, 2005). It was through the ISS functions that tighter access 
controls for the organisations and therefore the KM environments were assigned. The 
allocation of senior responsibility through corporate governance has increased corporate 
security awareness (Kaarst-Brown & Kelly, 2005; CSI/FBI, 2006). The creation of the 
TGS and OISRM groups within the two case organisations dramatically increased 
awareness and made huge impact on the coordinated effort to comply with regulations 
across the two multinational organisations. However CME-Co additionally created a 
global ISS director with the sole responsibility of sourcing best practices and standards 
for the organisation giving ISS significant political power within the organisation. An 
ISS stakeholder group was also created to identify ISS niche market and target 
compliance as a potential source of income. An initiative which has not been addressed 
in literature, other than warnings regarding vendor bias (Stewart, 2005) and market 
fragmentation. CME-Co and TELE-Co corporate governance defines the control 
structure and control of tangible and intangible information assets and corporate 
knowledge which emphasise accountability and methods of auditing and control as 
discussed by Sundt, 2006. 
Trompeter and Eloff (2001) argue that organisations should use confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (C.I.A) standards and security services to govern IS Security. However, 
while the two organisations regard these as implicit, both believed compliance and 
optimal balance as imperatives to ISS. Failure to comply with regulations would result 
in removal from the stock exchange and every organisation struggles to achieve optimal 
balance in assuring security without impeding productivity. Smith and Hasnas (1999) 
contend that the adoption of a code of ethics can have significant consequences 
(Reynolds, 2003). IS Security managers must therefore choose between competing 
ethical stances (Smith & Hasnas, 1999). However neither case organisation stressed the 
importance of the adoption of a code of ethics, as compliance, it was felt as enough. 
This contradicts the ISS literature as ethics is considered far more important (Whitman, 
2004; Sundt, 2006). 
Failures in governance have been due to a lack of awareness and conflicts of interest. As 
a result the case organisations stressed SETA and compliance as vital controls in any 
environment (CSI/FBI, 2006). There is a fundamental requirement for the governance 
of IS Security. Moulton and Coles (2003) refer to security governance in terms of: IS 
Security responsibility and practices, strategies and objectives for security, risk 
assessment and management, resource management for security, compliance with 
legislation, regulations, security policies and rules, investor relations and 
communication activities. CME-Co and TELE-Co have both made significant changes 
to ensure ISS governance which was relatively insignificant prior to 9/11 and SOX. 
Ultimately it is the responsibility of CME-Co and TELE-Co senior management to align 
security activities with the goals of the organisation (IT Governance Institute, 2001) and 
its KM environments. However, as CS and Engineering functions were prioritised other 
functions suffered from lazed security measures creating weak points in the corporate 
networks (Baskerville, 2004; Dhillon, 2006). Therefore IS Security was not mapped to 
every business function and process as advocated in literature (Patterson, 2005).  
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7.3.2  Interpreting the KM Environment in CME-Co and TELE-Co 
CME-Co and TELE-Co operate in a business environment that is influenced by rapid 
technological advancement, high demand and short product lifecycles and therefore a 
high level of uncertainty. Evolving with the market place is therefore an imperative. The 
KM environments identified in the CME-Co and TELE-Co was the Customer Support 
functions. Technological and non-technological KM mechanisms were used extensively 
in the two case organisations (sections 5.1.6 and 6.1.6). There are risks and 
consequences through the utilisation of KM mechanisms that if not correctly controlled 
and reviewed, may in fact breach the security concerns of an organisation as well as 
privacy and regulatory controls. This section addresses these issues and provides 
guidelines in aligning IS Security controls to a KM environment through an analysis of 
the two case organisations investigated in this study. In identifying the correct controls 
to allocate to a KM environment it is necessary to identify the different KM resources 
used and then to identify the risks associated with the resources.  Figure 7.7 (parts (a) 
and (b)) is used to diagrammatically illustrate the KM environments of the two case 
organisations investigated in this study. The illustration is based on the descriptions 
provided in Chapters 5 and 6. The KM resources used were numerous. However, they 
can be categorised into three: (1) individual and groups of experts, (2) paper-based 
document management systems and (3) KM technologies. 
(1.)  Individual and Groups of Experts 
The first category was the users of the systems (individuals), the functions, and partners 
(customers and vendors). Individuals file reports, minutes, presentations, fill-in solution 
templates and standard operating procedures such as the SRD (security requirements 
document) and ISO17799. These were either stored electronically or by paper. Primarily 
they were uploaded to Primus and Compass, the central repositories used by the 
Customer Support functions. CME-Co and TELE-Co employees were allocated 
resources based on their role and responsibilities within the case organisations. 
Therefore, access to knowledge resources is domain specific. As in the case of two 
domains interacting, an Engineer can bypass a domain control to physically or 
electronically (by email) provide a CS Technician with a sensitive solution. However, 
Engineering repositories and tracking systems were partitioned from other functions. 
Role-based allocation of access rights is a requirement of compliancy regulations and it 
was the IS Security functions role to enforce these controls. 
Figure 7.7(a) illustrates the access levels aligned to the different KM mechanisms in the 
TELE-Co and CME-Co KM environments. Access to the KM mechanisms, was 
administrated with four access levels to control its use. Level 1 was the most basic level. 
It was the Intranet entry point, providing company information, miscellaneous content, 
search functionality and hyperlinked documentation. Level 2 provided the user with 
content integration across projects and functions (standard function information), a 
more advanced search functionality, expert directories and users could personalise their 
views. Level 3 was categorised as a workplace integration level. It facilitated functions 
such as Customer Support in their operational activities, enabled collaboration, role-
based (personalised) workflows and ERP (enterprise resource planning) integration 
(access to the corporate inventory systems). Level 4 facilitated marketplace integration, 
procurement support, and supply chain management. However, CME-Co provided 
access to its external partners. TELE-Co, for specific projects, provided partners with 
access to the Extranet in order to enable collaboration. Primarily, TELE-Co Engineers 
used VPNs to link to customer environments and solve product errors. Access to Primus 
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was provided externally to CME-Co key partners to enable them to directly contribute 
to the CBR tool. Resellers, service enabled partners and third party maintenance 
providers all had the ability to view (controlled) solutions through Power-Link (the 
CEM-Co Extranet). Partners and customers could author solutions which allowed 
Customer Support to capture potential bugs/ issues that the partners identified. Partner 
solutions were captured so that TELE-Co and other partners could share solutions. 
Capturing solutions from CME-Co partners was a valuable process. However, the 
solutions had to be properly reviewed and validated before they could be shared with 
other partners. CME-Co would be held responsible for any errors or potentially 
dangerous commands. Reviewing was a significant element of the process so that 
solution quality could be monitored. Providing partners with access to the central 
repository helped to open-up solution knowledge into a single, shared resource enabling 
CME-Co to allow partners to solve their own problems through a web-based self-help 
service. 
The iView (interface) for Primus was optimised for partner or customer use. The system 
was used for searching, creating, using and managing solutions. Access was provided 
through a secure Extranet (Power-Link). Customers and partners, once registered to use 
the system, were automatically directed to iView instead of a generic Primus view. To 
provide the necessary control, partners cannot approve solutions. Only approved 
solutions could be viewed through Power-Link. All partners were associated with one of 
two groups aligned to the Primus application:  
•	 Partner-Reader: users accessed the Primus iView to search for solutions and log 
notes/ comments against an existing solution. They could not create new 
solutions or modify existing solutions. They could only view ‘status approved’ 
solutions.  
•	 Partner-Author: users, assigned to this group, had the rights of the Partner-
Reader group with the additional rights of being able to create and modify 
solutions identified by CS and Engineering.  
The users working in the two case organisations utilised the corporate Intranets to 
collaborate between communities of practice and the different functions across the 
geographically dispersed organisations. Leveraged content to improve products and 
services, from the two case organisations, integrated self-service offerings through 
Compass (provided by the TELE-Co University), Knowledge-link (provided by the 
CME-Co University), and access to online (public) help to reduce problem-solving 
time. The two case organisations used public forums and vendor repositories to pull 
external knowledge to solve problems. Encrypted virtual private networks were used to 
tunnel a secure connection between the two case organisations and external parties. 
However, TELE-Co utilised a human control mechanism in the form of site Export 
managers to verify and assure that any form of communication between TELE-Co and 
an external partner did not breach international or U.S laws regarding encryption. 
(2.)  Paper-based Document Management Systems (DMS) 
IS Security procedures and standards, such as the ISO17799, were purchased and 
customised by the two case organisations. These standards listed the steps the IS 
Security functions should follow to comply with regulations and to protect the case 
environments. The procedures chosen were used to support the different SOX 
requirements for TELE-Co and CME-Co. Solution templates were used to ensure 
solution writers adhered to the quality control measures determined by the CS functions 
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within the two case organisations. Templates were used to ensure that solutions could 
be tagged for searches.  The DMSs enforced by two case organisations specified the 
tagging of documents to determine their use and ownership. The DMS enabled users to 
convert the search functionality across to Compass and Primus. The documents stored 
were used to automatically and dynamically create solutions or bodies of knowledge. 
Documents describing similar problems and solutions were assigned to products or 
problems (accessing the different knowledge domains). CME-Co also used the tagging 
process to track solution usage through Primus. Call escalation procedures were used to 
allocate specific experts to particular problems. These procedures were also cost-saving 
measures as the higher the escalation - the higher the cost of the fix. The two cases also 
assigned author responsibility to solutions and procedures so that quality was ensured. 
CME-Co used a quality assurance team to assess solutions created internally by CME-
Co employees and externally by CME-Co partners. The KCS team (composed of CS 
Engineers) was assigned as reviewers to ensure that the solutions were accurate and of a 
high enough quality to be stored in the CBR tool. Additionally they determined the 
access rights of the solution so that the right user was connected to the right knowledge.  
(3.)  KM Technologies 
The KM technologies used in the two cases varied from repositories, databases, internal 
and external forums, common shares to tracking mechanisms. The mechanisms can, 
however, be categorised (Table 7.4) as collaborative mechanisms, public forums, 
problem-solving, monitoring, tracking mechanisms and KM repositories. There were 
several benefits to the utilisation of repositories (Compass) and case-based reasoning 
tools (Primus). New hires or employees with new job responsibilities could climb the 
learning curve more efficiently by learning from other employees. Automatic updates or 
alerts regarding internally published documents describing problems and solutions 
helped individuals reuse results and avoid reinventing the wheel. The KM mechanisms 
used by the individuals working within the IS Security and CS functions provided a 
number of advantages in enhancing problem-solving processes and innovation: 
(1.) A central resource: for documentation, corporate project descriptions, 
templates and presentations. 
(2.) Stored solutions: can be accessed through function portals.  
(3.) Advanced search capabilities: templates were used to enhance the search 
capabilities of the different repositories through Compass. 
(4.) Global distribution of documentation: reduced the level of duplication in 
procedures and solutions. 
(5.) Global / regional distribution of problems and solutions: central resource for 
trouble-shooting documentation.  
(6.) Ease of updates: individuals could easily update solutions and procedures, 
which were tracked through a quality review process to increase quality as 
ownership of documents and updates, were assigned.  
(7.) Ease of Access: resources were restricted by domains. 
In order to protect knowledge resources from the threats identified in the two case 
organisations. IS Security controls should be aligned to counter the threats. Figure 7.7 
(b) illustrates and Table 7.4 outlines the controls aligned to the KM mechanisms 
identified in the two case organisations. The controls were allocated to prioritised 
systems and repositories as identified by ISS management. The prioritisation of systems, 
databases and repositories was determined by the financial loss incurred if a critical 
system was down or loss of time to market. 
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Figure 7.7(a): KM Environment 
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Time to market is very valuable to Engineering organisations. The two organisations 
have experienced instances when products were reverse-engineered and released by a 
competitor. Therefore, allocating the right controls to design databases and simulation 
models is vital. Primus and Compass as knowledge assets were prioritised and allocated 
significant security resources to assure the availability of the tools. IS Security controls 
were incorporated during the development and implementations of the different KM 
mechanisms utilised.  Partitioning was used to control access of the different end-users 
to product solutions. This security measure was requested by Engineering to safeguard 
against inappropriate use of solutions. Engineering believed that some end-users lacked 
the technical knowledge necessary to understand the implications of specific commands 
and could potentially wipe-out a customer’s data. This, however, resulted in cross 
functional conflict in CME-Co. Access controls permit or deny the use of an object by a 
subject. Access control systems provide the essential services of identification and 
authentication, authorisation, and accountability where identification and authentication 
determines who can logon to a system, authorisation determines what an authenticated 
user can do, and accountability identified what a user did. Strong authentication is often 
coupled with high investments in the security infrastructure (increases were made due to 
compliance).  Virtual private networks (VPNs) utilised encryption when establishing 
connections over an existing shared infrastructure. Virus scanners functioned by 
constantly screening all inbound network traffic. Additionally product designs also 
needed to have allocated levels of access control. 
7.3.2.1 IS Security Control Infrastructure 
CME-Co and TELE-Co utilised a number of controls to protect their KM environments. 
The following types of controls or interventions were identified as countermeasures for 
the KM environments as illustrated in Figure 7.7 (b): KM hardware (sensitive 
knowledge access such as biometric access controls, regular audits of KM equipment, 
KM backups, physical security), KM software (automated procedures for KM access 
control, KM repository encryption), KMS development (KM system development 
methodologies such as the M-Gates were followed, validation and testing of KMS, 
quality assurance review), KM applications (systems access security, authentication, 
smart cards, encryption, backup and recovery), KM network controls (Internet, 
Extranet/Intranet access controls, virtual private networks, encryption, DMZ and 
firewalls) and KM human resources as identified by Jamieson (1991: 2004). Based on 
the requirements of the organisation and the type of KM initiative the appropriate 
controls should be selected by the IT/security groups and management as stated in 
literature (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Randeree, 2006). However, the CS functions in 
TELE-Co and CME-Co identified the necessary controls and ISS aligned them. ISS 
governance was not, as required by literature (IT Governance Institute, 2001), 
considered vital by the Engineering functions. Controls were therefore used as 
countermeasures to the perceived threat to the operations of the business, be it the 
management of knowledge, information or data. The process of ISS management 
involves identifying, assessing and evaluating the level of risk facing the two 
organisations (Borodzicz, 2006). It involves the identification of known threats 
(Williams et al., 1995) and the process of risk engineering (Lievesly, 1995) or adapting 
to changing business environments. 
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ISS CONTROLS  ALIGNED TO KM MECHANISMS CME-Co TELE-Co 
 ISS Controls 
N
on
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
Learning | Training KM Mechanisms: 
SETA: Penalties for Breaking Security Procedures √ Formal Control √ 
Reviews: 6 month Assessment of Employees √ Formal Control √ 
Corp. University Up-skill to meet Specific Needs √ ISS Training √ 
Collaborative Sessions: 
Teleconferences: Used for Global Communication √ NDA | External √ 
Minutes of Meetings Recorded & Stored √ Stored: ACL √ 
Meetings: Face-to-Face √ NDA | External √ 
Brain Storming Audit Reviews √ NDA | External √ 
Problem-solving Collaborative Process √ Stored: ACL √ 
Documentation Quality Systems & Procedures: 
SRD: Aligning Security Requirements to a Project √ Doc. Controls √ 
DMS: Doc. Templates & Quality Procedures √ Doc. Controls √ 
Prj Mgt. Method Phased approach to managing projects √ Doc. Controls √ 
Business Case Project Resources & ID Roles Responsibilities √ Doc. Controls √ 
Individual & Groups of Expertise: 
Expert Status: Expertise List √ NDA | External √ 
Global ISS Group Global Security Function: Coordinate Teams √ NDA | External √ 
Global IP Global Compliance Group √ NDA | External √ 
KM Team Promote KM √ NDA | External √ 
KM Roles KM Leadership √ NDA | External √ 
Symposia Collaborate with Industry & Academia √ NDA | External √ 
Business Functions Access depends on Roles & Responsibilities √ Roles √ 
K
M
 T
oo
ls
 
Collaborative Tools: 
Intranet: Central Document Repository & Group 
Resource 
√ Stored: ACL √ 
CMS: Stores Lessons-learned, Document Store √ Stored: ACL √ 
Groupware: Collaborating & Sharing Solutions √  Email Policies √ 
Hyperlinks Links to Internal & External Solutions √   Email Policies √ 
Common Shares Groups, Regional Shares, Stores Procedures √ Stored: ACL √ 
Public Forums: 
Vendor Portals Procedures, Guidelines and Best Practices √ VPN √ 
Extranet: External NW √ VPN √ 
Forums Public Collaboration √ VPN √ 
Problem-solving Tools: 
CBR Case-based Reasoning Tools √ ACL 
Simulation Models System & Paper-based for Components √ ACL 
CAD Tools: CAD for Product Simulations √ ACL 
MS Excel: Risk Matrixes, to calculate the level of risk √ Stored | ACL 
Monitoring & Tracking Tools: 
ART: Automated Analysis, Reporting Tracking Tool √ Monitoring SW √ 
Scanning SW: Monitors Rogues & Internal Employees √ Monitoring SW √ 
VPN: Tunnelling to Protect Communication NWs √ Encryption √ 
Wireless Tech. 2-way Pagers for Call logging System √ Notification √ 
KM Repositories: 
Repositories Legal liability regarding privacy etc √ ACL √ 
DB Domain access √ ACL √ 
HR DB Strict control √ ACL √ 
Table 7.4: IS Security Controls Aligned to KM Mechanisms 
The ISS functions must understand their internal and external environments and the 
company’s relationship (objective) with security before effective security solutions can 
be coined. The process involves implementing effective control measures (formal, 
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informal and technical) to maintain the optimum level of security (Marin, 1992; 
Dhillon, 2006). CME-Co and TELE-Co used a trial and error approach to targeting the 
optimal levels for their environments. In literature, this acceptable level is achieved 
through the introduction of a number of processes from risk, and feasibility analyses to 
the evaluation of IS security controls (Marin, 1992; Im & Baskerville, 2005). CME-Co 
and TELE-Co face enormous challenges in exposures to risks – be they security or 
otherwise. 
Knowledge and expertise in the technologies necessary to alleviate IS Security risks 
were seen as valuable by the two case organisations (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Belsis 
et al., 2005; Stewart, 2005). Technology was used by the organisations to gather and 
share information while simultaneously protecting it. Therefore the ISS senior managers 
were familiar with some of the critical components of security technologies (Dutta & 
McCrohan, 2002). Technological changes, in both secure hardware and software, are as 
constant as the increase in the number of threats to corporate IS Security. Secure 
protocols, standards and encryption were used to protect business environments 
(Stallings, 2001; Dhillon, 2006) and IS Security technologies such as firewalls, 
scanning tools and intrusion detection systems are used to filter out possible threats 
(Jamieson, 1991). Theoretically the data derived from these tools should, if utilised 
correctly, provide an integrated view or knowledge pertaining to the IS Security 
landscape of the organisation (Belsis et al., 2005; Booz et al., 2005). CME-Co and 
TELE-Co, as illustrated in Figure 7.7, utilise a number of ISS technologies to build a 
complete view of their security landscapes.  
As illustrated, a variety of controls were used to protect the data, information and 
knowledge stored by the two organisations. The most common counter measure is the 
firewall. Firewalls are regarded as the first line of defence of an IS Security strategy 
(Andress, 2004). Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor both inbound and outbound 
activities of the network and computer systems for signs of IS Security violations 
(Escamilla, 1998). Having detected such signs, the IDSs trigger alerts to categorise and 
report them. The report is downloaded by an analyst who evaluates and initiates an 
adequate response (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). However, information overload was 
reported by the two organisations. Access controls permit or deny the use of an object 
by a subject. Access control systems provide the essential services of identification and 
authentication (Andress, 2003; Cheswick, 2003; Dhillon, 2006). Cryptography was used 
to encrypt and decrypt data allowing employees and the organisations to store sensitive 
information or transmit it across insecure networks (Stallings, 2001; Sundt, 2006) to 
customers and partners. Virtual private networks (VPNs) utilised encryption when 
establishing connections over shared infrastructure to enable the two organisations to 
collaborate with their partners. These same technologies utilised by the two 
organisations have caused ISS challenges for the ISS functions.  Advanced firewalls and 
virtual private networks (VPN) have resulted in (unintentionally) fragmented Security 
compartments (Baskerville, 2004; Dhillon, 2006) making them difficult to monitor and 
control (Baskerville, 2004; Stewart, 2005).  
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Figure 7.7(b): Aligning IS Security Controls to a KM Environment 
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Finally, the two case organisations were dependent on external reservoirs of knowledge 
for ISS tools, standards and best practices. Unfortunately the IS Security market is 
essentially vendor driven. IS Security capabilities (products) are widely available for 
any business to purchase (CSI/FBI, 2007). It is common practice (for vendors) to 
manipulate internal taxonomies of vulnerabilities to make vendor figures look more 
impressive, creating a false perception of value as warned by Stewart (2005). Vendors 
in the IS Security space have a vested interest in playing up the perception that 
organisations face rapidly increasing threats/risks, and ISS management should 
approach their claims with appropriate scepticism (CSI/FBI, 2007). However, vendors 
were used as a source of external knowledge and ultimately manipulated by the two 
organisations to varying degrees. 
7.3.3. Interpreting IS Security Auditing Controls in the Case Studies  
An elementary part of the IS Security function’s responsibility is a careful examination 
of current regulations and common ethical expectations of national and international 
entities. Laws and regulations increasingly affect how IS Security is implemented 
(Sundt, 2006) in the two case organisations. Compliance has impacted KM processes as 
the documentation and application of access control rights to the different repositories, 
applications and databases used within the KM environments have increased. IS 
Security functions review the different KM mechanisms to determine the most effective 
security measures to allocate to the resources to prevent accidental or intentional 
damage, loss, modification, destruction or misuse of the mechanisms (Table 7.3). 
Unauthorised access, which is role-based, must be prevented and use histories (audit 
trails) were stored to ensure compliance. The KM mechanisms must be backed-up and 
network controls such as Extranets, access controls, VPNs, firewalls and dedicated 
connections were applied to the Primus CBR tools is available to customers. IS Security 
measures for protecting corporate knowledge, when shared internally were controlled 
through security policies, company ethics and enforced penalties. The IS Security 
functions therefore attempted to ensure that access is available to the correct users so 
that potential threats such as; loss of knowledge was eliminated.  
The IS Security functions utilised a number of procedures, standards, checklists and 
best practices to ensure CME-Co and TELE-Co’s compliance to different environmental 
regulations. TELE-Co enforced strict use of its DMS to control the quality of the 
solutions created. ISO17799 was identified by the two organisations as a vital IS 
Security guideline. While the two organisations purchased and customised externally 
produced standards, TELE-Co created in-house policies as behavioural controls in terms 
of protecting the organisations proprietary information (POPI). Engineers were 
reminded of penalties if they choose not to comply in TELE-Co. The case organisations 
have also hired compliance experts in order to try and understand the very complicated 
legal and compliance environment to adhere to regulations. However CME-Co extended 
the role of its compliance experts to identifying potential market requirements. Audit 
reviews were regarded as valuable sources of knowledge by the two organisations as 
externally sought evaluations of their IS Security functions. Review reports have been 
used as lessons-learned and checklists for the ongoing audit processes. M-Gates and Six 
Sigma were used by the two organisations as a common project management guidelines 
and (gate) vocabulary reference models to ensure organisational consistency across 
different projects. Usage varied within and across the organisations as CME-Co’s IS 
Security function and TELE-Co’s CS functions reported their use.  
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The corporate IS Security functions exploited IS Security repositories to automatically 
pull (multiple) firewall, scanning and IDS logs located throughout the corporate 
network in order to collate filtered knowledge into a prioritised list of issues for 
Security Officers and Coordinators. Subscriptions to technical repositories were used as 
a source of patch updates and procedures, and Q&A repositories. The IS Security 
functions exploited a number of security technologies to aid in monitoring and 
protecting their corporate boundaries. VPNs were used to encrypt lines of 
communication, SID for access-control and reporting, monitoring mechanisms to 
generate alert logs, firewalls for enforcing internal/external access rules and IDS to 
track internal and external network traffic. Additionally, TELE-Co utilised Excel to 
create checklists and to calculate risk levels. Scanning technologies, such as ART and 
Found-stone, were used to monitor the TELE-Co corporate network and track 
employees and rouges. While, scanners were used in CME-Co they were not reported to 
be as highly valued as they were in TELE-Co. However each technology generated 
streams of data which was pulled into monitoring databases in order to filter, query and 
generate a view of CME-Co and TELE-Co’s security landscapes. Vendors are used to 
provide guidelines, product and technological specifications. The inter-relationships 
were formed to exploit financial opportunities. CME-Co established and utilised a 
Corporate Security group to analyse the security industry and identify stakeholder 
requirements. TELE-Co hosted IS Security and CS symposiums to identify the direction 
of regulatory and market requirements.  The forums consisted of networks of IS 
Security practitioners collaborating and exchanging details regarding attacks, best 
practices and standards. Additionally the IS Security functions utilised external auditors 
as evaluators to adhere to regulatory requirements. The reports created were used as a 
form of measurement, a plan or checklist for future reviews and as a tool in post­
mortem brainstorming sessions. It is also evident that both organisations are dependent 
on inter-relationships with external evaluators for IS Security. IS Security can be 
primarily differentiated by structural position in the two organisations by reporting to 
the Finance departments.   
The auditing process forced the practitioners to undertake post-mortems at the end of a 
review which enhanced learning. Auditing has resulted in significant improvements in 
the two organisations. Processes are documented and knowledge regarding the 
organisations security status was constantly pulled from internal and external 
knowledge reservoirs. The efficiency of the IS Security processes were measured by 
determining the number of calls from customers and the number of improvements made 
as a result of an audit. CS processes were enhanced through employee rotation, 
brainstorming sessions and the recognition of practitioner contribution to the CBR tool. 
The number of solutions hits were measured and rated to create a competitive culture 
within CME-Co’s CS function. Processes were also evaluated through the 
improvements made. Auditing techniques can be used to monitor a broad range of user 
and server security activities. It was recommended that practitioners routinely audit 
server configurations to detect areas where resources may be susceptible to 
unauthorised access and tampering. Therefore, auditing is an important ingredient of a 
secure KM mechanism. Audit records can notify operations staff that unauthorised 
access is being attempted. They can help IS Security functions to diagnose security 
breaches after they have occurred and give important information that will allow a 
practitioner to rectify security vulnerabilities.  
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7.3.3.1 IS Security Auditing 
Environmental trends such as continued IT evolution and new business models coupled 
with strategies, such as knowledge management, have resulted in complex business 
environments on to which security must be mapped (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002). ISS 
governance is, as advocated by Ramos (2001), a key enabler in aligning the 
environment to the objectives of the organisations. Additionally, Jamieson & Handiz 
(2004) posited that IT governance should involve the governance of KM to ensure that 
it is aligned to the strategy of the organisation. Therefore, the ISS functions, as advised 
in literature, were consulted when considering security for the CME-Co and TELE-Co 
KM technologies, people and processes (Jamieson & Handiz, 2004). These personnel 
were responsible for identifying vulnerabilities and abuses associated with the systems 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2004) and implemented appropriate controls to alleviate 
identified threats. Management were also responsible for identifying and managing risks 
and the application of security controls to those risks. However, contrary to the 
literature KM governance committees were not created to identify knowledge assets 
within the two case organisations (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).  
Auditors and security officers should also have been involved in the process. The ISS 
auditors did assess the adherence of the organisations to industrial standards such as 
COBiT (Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies) and ultimately 
compliance to regulations such as the Sarbanes and Oxley Act of 2002. Risks identified 
by the ISS functions were prioritised according to the threat posed to the CS and 
(primarily) the Engineering functions but not to KM (Jamieson & Handiz, 2004). 
Considerable risk is posed in establishing a KM project within the organisations. 
Additionally KM processes, technologies and knowledge workers should also be framed 
to identify the risks, if any, in generating, codifying transferring and sharing knowledge. 
One of the critical first steps in KM is to conduct a knowledge audit. Liebowitz (1999) 
contends that the audit is akin to the business needs assessment, therefore an aspiring 
"knowledge organisation" should inventory its knowledge assets. Neither of the two 
case organisations audited the KM environments within CME-Co nor do TELE-Co. 
Jamieson (2001) contend that knowledge auditing involves monitoring the usage of 
knowledge. However if the KM technologies utilised by the organisation do not have 
monitoring and auditing tools incorporated, Jamieson and Handzic (2004) advise that 
they should be added in order to protect and track the knowledge stored. The two case 
organisations did use auditing to evaluate the ISS functions within CME-Co and TELE­
CO. Audits were effectively measures for the two ISS functions (Sundt, 2006). The 
process forced ISS to undertake post-mortems which unintentionally enhanced ISS 
learning. Auditing resulted in significant improvements. Processes were documented 
and knowledge regarding the ISS infrastructure was created and utilised. Auditing 
techniques were used to monitor a broad range of user and server security activities. 
These audits helped the IS Security functions to diagnose security breaches after they 
have occurred and give important information that will allow a practitioner to rectify 
security vulnerabilities. 
7.3.4 A Synthesised Perspective on Aligning IS Security to a KM Environment 
The relationships between IS Security and the KM environments in the two case 
organisations were very similar. The majority of the KM IS Security requirements were 
automatically aligned by the IS Security function. The goal of the IS Security functions 
was to ensure that the technical controls used are transparent to alleviate potential 
interference with internal processes. Security controls are incorporated during the 
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development of internal systems, particularly in partitioning systems. Partitioning was 
used to control the access of the different end-users to product solutions. This security 
measure is utilised by Engineering to safeguard against inappropriate access to product 
designs. KM does not affect the IS Security functions any differently than the steps 
needed to protect information systems. However it does experience difficulty 
controlling Engineering groups who ultimately “circumvent security controls in the 
pursuit of innovation”. Engineers require and have full control over boxes (servers) and 
remove and add them to and from the corporate network as desired. IS Security officers 
are constantly battling with Engineering to adhere to the standards or guidelines and 
have implemented internal DMZs (demilitarised zones) as a separate control 
environment for developers. Full control of the network has caused serious network 
breaches and as result the unavailability, at times, of parts or the entire network. 
Failures, such as these, were considered by IS Security to be a barrier to the innovative 
process and a significant waste of resources in fixing the fault and loss of productivity 
due the unavailability of knowledge resources to other groups. However, Engineering 
has far more political support in the organisations and security is often sacrificed for the 
business case. 
7.4 IS Security Leveraging KM 
This section merges the findings identified in sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 to describe and 
illustrate how IS Security can leverage the concept of KM. Each section addressed a 
component of the research framework (Figure 7.1) identified from the synthesised IS 
Security and KM literatures discussed in Chapter two (Figure 2.5) and set out in 
Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1). The framework was used as a lens to analyse the different 
factors and outcomes identified and to differentiate between them, based on their 
applications within CME-Co (Chapter five) and TELE-Co (Chapter six). The factors 
and outcomes acted as a basis for grounding the investigation of the approaches used to 
manage knowledge in two specialised support (IS Security and CS) functions. Sections 
7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 addressed each of the research questions formulated in Chapter three. 
The organisational infrastructure necessary to support the management of ISS 
knowledge, how ISS knowledge should be managed and the alignment of IS Security to 
a KM environment are each described and compared to literature. This section describes 
and illustrates an IS Security KM model (Figure 7.8), derived from this investigation, as 
a guide for ISS practitioners in managing ISS knowledge. 
7.4.1 The IS Security Model 
To make effective decisions regarding IS Security, management must know about the 
various threats facing the organisation, its employees, data, information, knowledge and 
systems (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). ISS management and IT executives lack sufficient 
knowledge about their own vulnerabilities (Im & Baskerville, 2005) and the potential 
cost of failure (CIO, 2003) due to an inability to manage knowledge pertaining to IS 
Security (Belsis et al., 2005; Willison & Backhouse, 2006). IS Security function’s and 
practitioner’s knowledge of local threats, which form part of such risks, is often 
fragmented. The effectiveness of current approaches to managing IS Security 
knowledge has been questioned given the volume of security breaches. Management 
must not only minimise risks through the operationalisation of security activities but 
also effectively communicate vision, rules and guidelines to employees. Large volumes 
of data must be processed from a plethora of security technologies to provide 
information regarding the security landscape of the organisation (Stewart, 2005). As a 
result, management required the development of an integrated approach to the 
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management of IS Security knowledge. Combining security activities, experts and tools 
could resolve these problems. The application of a KM approach to the management of 
IS Security knowledge would enable a more holistic approach to the management of IS 
Security across an enterprise. Figure 7.8 is derived from the findings of sections 7.1, 7.2 
and 7.3. The model illustrates the different components identified. Each variable is 
tagged with its corresponding sub-section to illustrate the flow of the ISS model. The 
remaining sub-sections outline the different components of the ISS model (Figure 7.8). 
The first three describe the types (sub-section 7.4.1.1), reservoirs (sub-section 7.4.1.2) 
and approaches (sub-section 7.4.1.3) used to manage knowledge, each of which is inter­
dependent on the other. Sub-section 7.4.1.4 describes the KM mechanisms needed to 
promote KM in organisations. Sub-section 7.4.1.5 describes the expected levelled 
(individual, functional and organisational) impact of the approach. Sub-section 7.4.1.6 
describes the infrastructure needed to support the management of ISS knowledge. Sub­
section 7.4.1.7 outlines the controls necessary to protect a KM environment and finally 
sub-section 7.4.1.8 highlights the impact of the business environment the organisation is 
operating in. 
7.4.1.1 Types of ISS Knowledge  
The ability to problem-solve is vital and knowledge intensive. ISS functional general 
knowledge is primarily: operational, technical knowledge: tactical and contextual 
knowledge: strategic. Figure 7.8 (sub-section 7.4.1.1) presents a synthesised 
representation of the different types of IS Security knowledge an organisation should 
utilise. The practices of an ISS practitioner have changed due to technological 
advancements (Jashapara, 2004) and when individuals work in ISS functions to perform 
tasks, practitioners should create and apply ISS knowledge (Polanyi, 1966). The arrows 
represent the categorisation of IS Security knowledge as it is reused. Therefore, 
eventually contextually and technically specific knowledge will become IS Security 
general knowledge. As a result knowledge use and development is therefore regarded as 
a fundamental aspect of ISS activities (Gherardi, 2000; Hislop, 2005), making ISS 
knowledge inseparable from the actions of the ISS practitioner (Orlikowski, 2002). 
Equally, all knowledge work, whether using knowledge, sharing knowledge, developing 
knowledge or creating knowledge will involve an element of activity. ISS knowledge is 
pulled from corporate reservoirs of knowledge. The next section describes the different 
reservoirs from which ISS knowledge is pulled/ captured from. 
7.4.1.2 Reservoirs of ISS Knowledge  
The different levels of ISS expertise is a significant source of knowledge (Figure 7.8, 
sub-section 7.4.1.2). A considerable amount of knowledge resides in individual ISS 
practitioners (Argote & Ingram, 2000) and extensive knowledge resides within 
functions. Formal and informal knowledge development groups (Pan & Leidner, 2003) 
and coordinators can develop skill-sets and ensure solution standards.  Procedures such 
as solution templates and management techniques are viewed as important sources of 
knowledge. Internal and external documentation can be sourced to comply with 
corporate requirements, such as lessons-learned and case solutions. Knowledge tools, 
repositories and email can be used to store knowledge. Inter-relationships with external 
evaluators for IS Security is an important source of measurement and best practices. 
Additionally, the utilisation of a stakeholder group to analyse the business environment 
can be a vital source of knowledge. Figure 7.8 provides a synthesised representation of 
the different reservoirs of IS Security knowledge an organisation should utilise. This 
knowledge, when processed, should be constantly changing and reused.  
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Figure 7.8: IS Security Leveraging the Concept of KM 
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7.4.1.3 ISS Knowledge Approaches 
Figure 7.8 (sub-section 7.4.1.3) presents a synthesised representation of the different 
types of IS Security knowledge processes. ISS knowledge is captured from the different 
knowledge reservoirs (ISS technologies and pools of expertise) (Davenport & Prusak, 
1998; Coakes, 2004). A significant amount of ISS knowledge is acquired. Collaborative 
software, regulatory guidelines, subscriptions, products and external evaluations are 
acquired by ISS functions to ensure that an organisation is compliant within their 
business environment and aware of any and all business opportunities (Holsapple & 
Singh, 2004; Baskerville, 2004). Problem-solving is the principal approach used to 
create ISS knowledge and applied through the reuse of the solutions created and stored. 
Collaborative software and trouble-shooting techniques can be used to share IS 
knowledge. The process of knowledge application relies on available ISS knowledge 
(Holsapple & Joshi, 2004). The auditing process can be manipulated to use reviews as 
benchmarking aids in applying lessons-learned to internal and external IS Security 
activities. Knowledge control is necessary to protect the ISS knowledge stored and used 
in an organisation. This is achieved through the allocation of controls such as tunnelling 
and quality control mechanisms (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004; Becerra-Fernandez et al., 
2004; CSI, 2009). Controls are therefore used as ISS countermeasures to perceived 
threats to the operations of an organisation such as the management of knowledge. The 
processes identified should be used as an ongoing life-cycle of creating and using ISS 
knowledge. The next section describes the different mechanisms used to promote the 
management of ISS knowledge within an organisation.  
7.4.1.4 ISS Knowledge Mechanisms 
Use of KM mechanisms, in the context of this research, is measured in terms of the 
change which occurred as a result of managing knowledge either unintentionally or 
purposefully and the motivation to implement a KM initiative (O’Dell et al., 2004). The 
use of KM in either a general or specific context will affect its success (Gartner, 2000). 
If the level of use increases then KM will have a greater impact on the users (ISS 
practitioners and functions) and therefore the organisation (DeLone & McLean, 1992). 
The technological mechanisms, illustrated in Figure 7.8 (sub-section 7.4.1.4), are 
capable of combining explicit and tacit knowledge of ISS practitioners to varying 
degrees (Butler & Murphy, 2007). These technological and non technological 
mechanisms are categorised as collaborative, learning, problem-solving and monitoring 
tools. They can be used to acquire and manage knowledge and distribute it among the 
ISS functional groups as well as with any external collaborating partners (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001) and therefore improving the effectiveness of decision-making (Peterson, 
1996). The next section discusses the potential impact of managing ISS knowledge. 
7.4.1.5 ISS Knowledge Impacts 
ISS practitioner performance can be greatly impacted through the use of KM. It can 
facilitate individual learning and enhance exposure to the latest ISS knowledge through, 
for example, access to experts and lessons-learned from audit to audit. Employees can 
also be encouraged to learn from one another to adapt to inter-operability changes in 
their environments. Therefore, KM can facilitate employee learning and enhance their 
exposure to the latest knowledge in their fields of expertise. KM enables organisations 
and their functions to adapt quickly to changes in their environments, such as the IS 
Security landscape and technological advancements. These improvements can enhance 
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job satisfaction as skills were improved, as is the ISS practitioner’s market value 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991). Knowledge mechanisms can be used to centralise IS Security 
knowledge and coordinate problem-solving. Therefore the IS Security practitioner role 
will become easier due to the utilisation of externally tested processes and practices. 
Specialised IS Security groups, if used, can coordinate and share knowledge across the 
organisation. KM can also facilitate improvements in organisational processes by 
improving the effectiveness, efficiency and innovativeness of the different processes to 
varying degrees. Specifically KM enables organisations and their functions to adapt 
quickly to changes in their environments, such as the IS Security landscape and 
technological advancements. The ISS functions can collaborate with vendors, auditors, 
stakeholders and regulatory bodies. Audits provide a measurement and facilitate 
learning through post-mortems forcing a proactive stance against IS Security 
challenges. Symposiums allow practitioners to collaborate with other organisations and 
academia.  An organisation can use KM to improve their corporate products and 
services (Choi & Lee, 2002). Collaboration with partners can increase the number of 
ISS solutions and generate best practices. Solutions created and stored are reused which 
reduces the amount of time needed to solve problems. Audits force the recording of 
lessons-learned and therefore generate significant knowledge for future audits. The 
auditing process will have positive impacts for IS Security functions. It can force ISS 
practitioners to undertake post-mortems at the end of a review to enhance learning. To 
achieve these direct and indirect impacts IS Security strategies must be aligned to the 
corporate business strategy, thus ensuring that IS Security is mapped to every 
organisational technology and process within the organisation. Additionally, the flow of 
the arrows illustrate: the knock-on benefits to the organisation as individuals and 
functions are positively impacted by the approach. Finally, the cycle back illustrates 
that, as an organisation benefits from the approach more and more, resources will be 
allocated, thus improving its value.  
7.4.1.6 ISS Organisational Infrastructure 
In the preceding sub-sections the types, reservoirs and approaches used to manage ISS 
knowledge, through the ISS model were discussed. Organisational infrastructure is the 
foundation on which KM resides. It is composed of organisational: structure, culture, IT 
infrastructures, common knowledge and the physical environment (Standards Australia, 
2001; Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). The structural component of the organisational 
infrastructure is vital in supporting the management of ISS knowledge. A separate ISS 
function will provide the specialised unit with political status, resources and budgets 
separate to IT (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Dhillon, 2006). Environmental drivers, 
specifically compliance, has both raised the status of the function and forced the 
documentation of processes and collection of knowledge regarding the security 
landscape of an organisation for external evaluations. Common organisational language 
and a culture of sharing need to be promoted in an organisation. Communities of 
practice should be created for internal and external collaboration. The co-ordination of 
KM requires the leadership of senior management if an organisation is to benefit from 
its utilisation (Hansen et al., 1999; Choi & Lee, 2002; Malhotra, 2000; Coakes, 2004). 
Additionally, the ISS function needs to participate in regulatory bodies to steer the ISS 
markets. The next section describes the controls necessary to protect a KM 
environment. 
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7.4.1.7 Aligning ISS Controls 
The goal of the IS Security function is to ensure that the formal, technical and informal 
controls used are transparent to employees and to alleviate potential interference with 
internal processes. Controlling IS Security knowledge is a necessary aspect of the model 
(Figure 7.8, sub-section 7.4.1.7). Security technologies are used to control and protect 
IS Security knowledge resources. Systems (resources) were prioritised according to 
their value and controls aligned in order to protect IS Security knowledge pertaining to 
the organisation. Controls are allocated to IS Security documents to ensure quality, 
utility, consistency and ownership. Formal, informal and technical controls are used to 
control the behaviour of unauthorised users and knowledge pulled from the controls 
must be protected, restricted and monitored as its misuse could have serious 
consequences for the organisation. The next section describes the impact of the business 
environment. 
7.4.1.8 ISS Business Environment 
One of the fundamental problems regarding IS Security is for an organisation to choose 
the right kind of environment to function in. Strategic IS Security issues relate to where 
the firm chooses to operate and the scope of the organisation’s relationship with other 
organisations. For example if an organisation chooses to work with a U.S. based firm. 
The organisation will have to ensure compliance with corporate governance as 
mandated by the Sarbanes-and-Oxley Act of 2002 (section 2.3.1). Moreover, any 
change to an existing business process will have implications for business partners.  
Deficiencies in IS Security can cause direct negative consequences for business 
processes due to errors, delays and information leakage (Jamieson & Handzic, 2004). 
To make effective decisions regarding IS Security, management must know about the 
various threats facing an organisation, their employees, data, information, knowledge 
and systems when allocating resources, formulating security policies and performing 
risk assessments (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). The changes made to comply with 
regulatory requirements force ISS functions to acquire ISS knowledge externally from 
vendors, retrieve ISS knowledge from ISS technologies, create filtered reports 
highlighting internal and external threats, share this knowledge across the dispersed ISS 
functions and apply this knowledge for reviews and to ISS strategies. Therefore, in 
identifying the opportunity of utilising its external partnerships, such as vendors, to 
create additional knowledge and reduce support operational costs, is also vital 
(Borodzicz, 2005; Gal-or & Ghose, 2005; Booz et al., 2005; Dhillon, 2006). 
7.4.2 Existing ISS Models 
The IS research community has embraced many technologies as the “silver bullet 
solution” to corporate information needs (Webster & Watson, 2002). Previous IS 
Security research has been technical as criticised by leading IS researchers (Straub et 
al., 2008; Siponen & Willison, 2007; Dhillon, 2006). Similarly methods for the 
development of secure systems have been investigated (Baskerville, 1992; Siponen, 
2005; Villarroel et al., 2005) while an integrated approach to managing IS Security has 
been ignored. Comparatively little work has taken a managerial point of view, covering 
broad organisational and social issues (Dhillon & Backhouse 2001; Straub et al., 2008). 
There are several frameworks which have been used to analyse Secure Information 
Systems (SIS) methods and approaches (Baskerville, 2004). Each study investigated 
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methods for secure IS, not the people, processes and technologies which embody IS 
Security functions (Siponen & Willison, 2007; Siponen et al., 2008).  
Manunta (2000) contends that security is just a function of three components: an asset 
(A), a protector (P) and a threat (T). Security can therefore be expressed in any situation 
(Si) mathematically as: S = f (A, P, T) Si. However, this approach eliminates the 
complexity of understanding the concept of IS Security but the problem is compounded 
when applied in different environments (Baskerville, 1993; Wood, 1999; Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002). Technical approaches to IS Security have limited effectiveness as 
security is primarily a people issue. IS Security requires the development of an 
integrated approach to the management of IS Security knowledge.  
Another model used as a guide for the creation of knowledge is the ‘spiral model’ 
(Nonaka, 1991) of the different modes of knowledge creation or SECI. Nonaka’s model 
has been hugely influential in demonstrating how knowledge is created and therefore 
how organisations should incorporate the management of tacit knowledge as a strategic 
objective. The leveraging of tacit knowledge is a difficult process and central to its 
achievement is the collaboration of the actors so that both tacit and explicit knowledge 
can be transferred to stimulate the creation of new knowledge. There are four modes of 
knowledge conversion involved in the process that leads to knowledge creation and the 
knowledge spiral which are socialization (is the process by which tacit knowledge from 
one individual is converted into the tacit knowledge of another), externalization (is the 
process of changing tacit knowledge into explicit), conversion (is a process of 
combining components of explicit knowledge) and internalization (is the process 
through which actors can personalise explicit knowledge and convert it into tacit 
knowledge ) (Nonaka et al., 1996). Therefore, knowledge creation occurs when there is 
continuous interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge and produces a spiral 
effect; starting with one process and moving onto the new mode and so on. While the 
SECI model illustrates the importance of both knowledge types and the effect they have 
on each other and the way in which employees generate new knowledge from them. The 
model does not, however, address the goal of IS Security in minimising information 
systems operational risks. This involves several activities, such as planning, designing, 
implementing, monitoring, reviewing, and improving (BSI, 2002). These activities 
require specialised IS Security knowledge and one of the challenges faced by modern 
organisations is to acquire and manage expert knowledge in the area of IS Security 
(Belsis et al., 2005). 
Existing IS Security models and procedures do not exhibit a high degree of flexibility, 
and as a result managers and IS Security practitioners make IS Security decisions in a 
knowledge vacuum. Risk can be managed or reduced when IS Security managers, 
practitioners and functions are aware of the full range of controls 
(formal/informal/technical), environmental threats, regulations, standards, technologies 
and practices available and implement the most effective solution. Threats should be 
met when organisations avoid reactive solutions and instead adopt proactive practices. 
To tackle threats or risks IS Security functions need to keep their skills and knowledge 
current. The effectiveness of current IS Security solutions and best practice standards 
have been seriously questioned (Baskerville, 2005). IS Security challenges increase the 
importance of managing IS Security knowledge in the context of protecting the 
organisation. Therefore, a customised model for managing ISS knowledge is required. 
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7.5 Summary 
Combining IS Security knowledge, activities, experts and tools could resolve the 
different IS Security challenges encountered by organisations (Sundt, 2006; Randeree, 
2006; Huo et al., 2008). This could be achieved through the utilisation of an effective 
KM approach. The application of the strategy to the management of IS Security 
knowledge would enable a more holistic approach to the management of IS Security 
across the enterprise. This chapter discusses how the different components of the 
organisational infrastructure can support the management of IS Security knowledge. It 
delves into the concept of managing IS Security knowledge to understand how 
organisations manage this knowledge. How firms align IS Security to a KM 
environment is discussed and a model is derived from this cross-case analysis. 
Ultimately, the researcher applied a KM approach to the management of IS Security 
knowledge to alleviate the challenges facing IS Security managers and functions. 
Approaches incorporating people and processes as well as technologies have never been 
contextually investigated. The administration and management of IS Security is a 
knowledge-intensive activity and to be effective must be managed.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 

CONCLUSION 

8.0 Introduction 
This Chapter takes the analysis of the findings and links these back to the research 
proposition and questions raised in response to the literature review, bringing a 
conclusion to the process, making a contribution to the gaps in the literature (Figure 
1.1). This thesis aimed at exploring how Information Systems Security (ISS) could 
leverage the concept of Knowledge Management (KM) through qualitative research. 
This objective was divided into three questions that are recapitulated in section 8.1. 
8.1 Findings 
8.1.1 RQ.1: How can the organisational infrastructure support the 
management of IS Security knowledge? 
A review of the literature revealed the importance of the organisational infrastructure in 
providing the foundation on which the functional units within reside and operate. The 
review revealed five main components (culture, structure, common knowledge, IT 
infrastructure and physical environment) that are traditionally depicted as 
interconnecting parts of an organisational infrastructure. Research has yet to explore 
their application in supporting the management of IS Security knowledge. The purpose 
of this research question was to use this theory as a lens to examine how the 
organisational infrastructure supported the management of IS Security knowledge in the 
two organisations participating in this study.  
An analysis of the findings revealed the importance of the organisational infrastructure 
in supporting the needs of KM. The organisational infrastructure necessary to support 
the management of IS Security knowledge is evident in the two case organisations. 
However this is primarily due to the structural component of the organisational 
infrastructure. The two IS Security functions are formal departments in the 
organisations providing the IS Security functions with political status, resources and 
budgets separate to IT. Environmental drivers, specifically compliance, has both raised 
the status of the function and forced the documentation of processes and collection of 
knowledge regarding the security landscape of the organisations for external 
evaluations. Common organisational language and a culture of sharing are promoted in 
the cases. Additionally KM mechanisms are used throughout the two case organisations 
to facilitate knowledge sharing. However barriers to sharing appear to be more historic 
than environmental. The Engineering units in CME-Co and TELE-Co are reluctant to 
share knowledge due to the perceived risk of (design) knowledge becoming public or 
used incorrectly (high risk commands initiated in a customer environment). Knowledge 
sharing in the cases was function or team specific. The Customer Support function in 
CME-Co battles senior management, and particularly Engineering, to share internal 
knowledge. Changes in the business environment created a culture of security 
awareness for the two case organisations. The circumvention of (security) controls by 
Engineering created a culture of resentment from a security perspective as it weakens 
the control environment used to protect organisational assets. Therefore from a IS 
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Security and CS (front-line support) perspective a culture of entitlement and 
circumvention of rules created knowledge sharing issues for both functions despite the 
fact that security was aligned strategically to the goals of both organisations. 
Consequently, managing IS Security knowledge was vital in order for IS Security 
professionals to be proactive regarding security - particularly in sharing (SETA) threat 
and risk knowledge with the general employee population. Additionally external 
collaboration with CME-Co partners is proving effective in cutting costs in allowing 
customers and partners to “self-service” and even creates and shares their own solutions 
through the corporate Extranet. However TELE-Co uses a domain specific approach to 
KM. A community of practice (PKM) was created for collaboration across design 
domains not to collaborate across units or through inter-relationships. Therefore 
knowledge is pushed around the Engineering design domains and not to CS or the 
corporate customer base. Table 7.2 presents a synthesised representation of the 
organisational infrastructure components.  
In the literature the importance of organisational infrastructure in supporting KM is 
high. Nevertheless, by overlooking the need to formulate a clear business case, many 
KM implementations fail (Coakes, 2004). Neither of the two case organisations support 
KM at a senior level beyond the creation of a corporate central repository. The co­
ordination of KM requires the leadership of senior management if an organisation is to 
benefit from its utilisation. Even though many researchers highlight the importance of 
an overall KM strategy (Hansen et al., 1999; Choi & Lee, 2002; Malhotra, 2000; 
Coakes, 2004), it was not implemented in CME-Co or TELE-Co. KM has impacted 
CME-Co and TELE-Co directly and indirectly but only at functional levels. The 
literature has warned against companies isolating KM in functional departments such as 
CS (Hansen et al., 1999). The majority of organisations focus on the operational side of 
KM as opposed to an integrated approach. However the ISS functions did effectively 
(albeit indirectly) manage, due to the impact of compliance, their knowledge and 
benefited from structural, political and budgetary independence. 
8.1.2 	 RQ.2: How do the two functional areas IS Security (ISS) and Customer 
Support (CS) manage knowledge? 
The focus of research has been the technical side of security even though it has long 
been recognised that it is as important to understand the social elements of the area. 
Comparatively little work has taken a managerial point of view, covering broad 
organisational and social issues (Dhillon & Backhouse 2001; Straub et al., 2008). Scant 
work exists examining the management of security knowledge or secure knowledge 
management. Furthermore traditionally IS Security approaches have been grounded in 
positivism (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Siponen & Willison, 2007). Previous studies 
have been neglectful in investigating IS Security as few if any studies utilised a 
qualitative approach, eliminating holistic, in depth rich descriptions of core issues  
within the field to facilitate the development of rigorous IS research and theory 
development. The literature suggests that the management of knowledge can directly 
impact the organisation at several levels: (ISS) individuals, the functions within, and the 
overall organisational performance. Impacts can come about directly from KM 
approaches or from the knowledge created, shared and applied through the approach. 
Therefore it is important to investigate how an organisation manages knowledge to 
determine the contribution of KM efforts.  
The importance of IS Security knowledge can be attributed to the structures of the two 
organisations and their competitive business environments. IS Security is a futile 
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function if it is absent from the organisational structure. The ability to identify and react 
to rogues (hackers) is also viewed as strategic, emphasising TELE-Co’s recognition of 
its expertise in rectifying security incidents. However proactive strategies were not 
identified by either organisation as an important skill indicating an inability to be 
proactive in tackling security challenges. CME-Co has identified compliance as a niche 
market and as a result formed a group to target customer regulatory requirements and 
generate additional income. The steps in applying standards for regulatory requirements 
are vital to the function. IS Security practitioners utilised regulatory and control 
knowledge to ensure compliance and follow external advice regarding audits. Different 
levels of expertise are viewed as a significant source of IS Security knowledge within 
the two organisations. CME-Co created ad hoc knowledge development groups and 
coordinators to develop lower level support skill-sets and ensure solution standards. 
Procedures such as solution templates and management techniques are viewed as 
important sources of knowledge. Knowledge tools, repositories and email were used to 
store knowledge. It is also evident that both organisations are dependent on inter­
relationships with external evaluators for IS Security. A significant amount of 
knowledge was acquired externally. Collaborative software, regulatory guidelines, 
subscriptions, products and external evaluations were acquired by the functions to 
ensure that the organisations are compliant within their business environment and aware 
of any and all business opportunities such as market changes and competitor product 
advancements. Problem-solving was the principal approach used to create knowledge 
and applied through the reuse of the solutions created and stored. The IS Security 
functions purchased significantly more external knowledge than CS due to regulatory 
requirements However, this environmental driver enabled the IS Security functions to 
exploit the auditing process and use reviews as benchmarking aids in applying lessons-
learned to internal and external IS Security activities.  
CME-Co positioned its CS knowledge management initiative around a CRB tool. Due 
to the dedication of CS practitioners the role the tool was gradually increased as its 
value to CME-Co was continuously demonstrated. Additionally, Primus was used to 
provide CS solutions to and as a self-service support environment for CME-Co 
customers and partners. CS utilised quality mechanisms for the solutions created, 
allowed knowledge filtering, advanced search criteria’s and pushed CS knowledge 
towards CME-Co customers. Therefore the IS Security functions were externally driven 
to comply with specific goals and measured due to regulatory requirements.   
The IS Security functions have significantly impacted the organisations. The IS Security 
strategies were aligned to the corporate strategy ensuring that IS Security was mapped 
to every organisational technology and process within CME-Co and TELE-Co. IS 
Security was used by the two organisations to participate in regulatory bodies to steer 
the markets. An inefficient IS Security function would result in corporate breaches and 
loss of earnings. The CS knowledge management initiatives were not aligned to the 
business strategies and as a result were dependent on the CS practitioners who are 
driving the use of KM tools and processes. KM was also specific to Customer Support. 
However CS costs were reduced and time saved. However CME-Co identified the 
advantage in pushing more and more knowledge towards partners. Customer loyalty 
was increased when the organisation became more open and willing to share 
knowledge. Therefore the two organisations have benefited from managing knowledge. 
CS utilised a KM initiative to positively impact the CS function and IS Security 
managed knowledge due to environmental requirements 
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The effective management of IS Security is a knowledge-intensive activity that depends 
on the experience of security experts. Furthermore management must not only minimise 
risks through the operationalisation of security activities but also effectively 
communicate vision, rules and guidelines to employees. Large volumes of data must 
also be processed from a plethora of security technologies to provide information 
regarding the security landscape of the organisation. As a result management requires 
the development of an integrated approach to the management security knowledge. 
Combining the security activities, experts and mechanisms could resolve these 
problems. This was achieved through the utilisation of an effective KM approach, a 
solution which has been ignored by academia and industry. The application of the 
strategy to the management of security knowledge would enable a more holistic 
approach to the management of information security across the enterprise. 
8.1.3 	 RQ.3: How can firms align Information Systems Security (ISS) to a 
Knowledge Management (KM) environment? 
A review of the literature revealed that there is little if any accord regarding the 
relationship between IS Security and the management of knowledge other than the 
application of IS Security controls in the technological application of KM and vice 
versa. It is however agreed that both KM and IS Security involve people and processes 
as opposed to just technology. Therefore an organisation, through its IS Security 
function, must align IS Security to every facet of a KM environment to ensure that 
needed knowledge resources and processors are available in sufficient quantity and 
quality subject to the corporate IS Security measures and constraints. An organisation 
that intends to stay in business must have the necessary IS Security controls in place to 
prevent and certainly to decrease the frequency of loss. The purpose of the third 
research questions was to determine how firms align IS Security to a KM environment.  
The corporate IS Security functions exploited IS Security repositories to automatically 
pull (multiple) firewall, scanning and IDS logs located throughout the corporate 
network in order to collate filtered knowledge into a prioritised list of issues for 
Security Officers and Coordinators. Subscriptions to technical repositories were used as 
a source of patch updates and procedures, and Q&A repositories. The IS Security 
functions exploited a number of security technologies to aid in monitoring and 
protecting their corporate boundaries. VPNs were used to encrypt lines of 
communication, SID for access-control and reporting, monitoring mechanisms to 
generate alert logs, firewalls for enforcing internal/external access rules and IDS to 
track internal and external network traffic. Each technology generated streams of data 
which was pulled into monitoring databases in order to filter, query and generate a view 
of an organisations security landscape. 
Vendors are used to provide guidelines, product and technological specifications. The 
inter-relationships were formed to exploit financial opportunities. The forums consisted 
of networks of IS Security practitioners collaborating and exchanging details regarding 
attacks, best practices and standards. Additionally the IS Security functions utilised 
external auditors as evaluators to adhere to regulatory requirements. The reports created 
were used as a form of measurement, a plan or checklist for future reviews and as a tool 
in post-mortem brainstorming sessions. The auditing process forced the practitioners to 
undertake post-mortems at the end of a review which enhanced learning. Auditing has 
resulted in significant improvements in the two organisations. Processes are 
documented and knowledge regarding the organisations security status was constantly 
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pulled from internal and external knowledge reservoirs. Therefore IS Security is aligned 
to KM through IS governance, controls, and compliance. 
ISS governance is, as advocated by Ramos (2001), a key enabler in aligning the 
environment to the objectives of the organisations. However, contrary to the literature 
KM governance committees were not created to identify knowledge assets within the 
two case organisations (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Auditors and security officers 
should also have been involved in the process. Risks identified by the ISS functions 
were prioritised according to the threat posed to the CS and (primarily) the Engineering 
functions but not to KM (Jamieson & Handiz, 2004). Considerable risk is posed in 
establishing a KM project within the organisations. Additionally KM processes, 
technologies and knowledge workers should also be framed to identify the risks, if any, 
in generating, codifying, transferring and sharing knowledge. One of the critical first 
steps in KM is to conduct a knowledge audit. Liebowitz (1999) contends that the audit 
is akin to the business needs assessment, therefore an aspiring "knowledge organisation" 
should inventory its knowledge assets. Neither of the two case organisations audited the 
KM environments within CME-Co nor do TELE-Co. Jamieson (2001) contend that 
knowledge auditing involves monitoring the usage of knowledge. However if the KM 
technologies utilised by the organisation do not have monitoring and auditing tools 
incorporated, Jamieson and Handzic (2004) advise that they should be added in order to 
protect and track the knowledge stored. Auditing techniques were used to monitor a 
broad range of user and server security activities.  
8.2 Conclusions, Contributions and Further Study 
IS Security is vital for the protection of the organisation but also in assuring activities 
such as knowledge management. Therefore IS Security has become a strategic enabler 
for business and can itself provide competitive advantage through the creation of value 
added services and products and the protection of assets from known threats through the 
allocation of (formal, technical and informal) controls. Thus, organisations seek 
practical approaches to protect the business.  
Unfortunately, the IS Security community is bogged down in small-scale technical 
queries as the social aspects of IS Security are ignored resulting in fragmented research 
across the IS field. While models and standards are scattered through the literature they 
focus on the secure development of information systems and standards. These standards 
are inflexible and ignore the fact that organisations are different. As a result managers 
make IS Security decisions in a knowledge vacuum and their subsequent actions to cope 
with threats are less effective. Research to date has failed to provide an integrated 
approach to the management of IS Security knowledge. KM has not, to the knowledge 
of the researcher, been used as a possible solution even though it is concerned with 
ensuring that knowledge is available in the right form to the right processors (IS 
Security: technologies, practitioners and processors) whenever required.  
Thus, this study explored how IS Security could leverage the concept of KM through 
qualitative research. In order to accomplish this, the importance of organisational 
infrastructure in supporting the management of IS Security knowledge in each 
organisation participating in this study was determined as it provides the foundation on 
which functions operate and reside. In order to determine how to leverage KM it was 
necessary to investigate how the organisations manage knowledge. It was impossible to 
properly investigate this at organisational level – given the size, uncertain business 
environments and structural complexity. However, examining how one function 
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 (Customer Support), using a KM approach, can help establish a baseline for 
implementing the KM approach in another function (IS Security). By comparing the 
KM approach used in a Customer Support function with the IS Security function 
operating within the same organisation, the researcher was able to determine how IS 
Security functions manage knowledge. Additionally, in leveraging the concept of KM 
for IS Security is was important to determine how IS Security functions support and 
manage knowledge to effectively align IS Security to KM environments. In the case 
organisations investigated this was achieved through governance, countermeasures 
(controls) and compliance.  
The main contributions of this research are as follows: 
First, this study answers calls from researchers and practitioners in the IS Security 
community and industry as it addresses the need for an integrated approach to managing 
IS Security knowledge. This study addresses the need for holism, rigour, and empirical 
fidelity in IS research by positing an integrative conceptual model that can be employed 
to help explain and understand the interplay between the IS Security and Customer 
Support functions (specialised units) at a local level and across the two case 
organisations. The IS Security research community is restrained by small-scale 
technical questions as the social aspects of IS Security are ignored resulting in 
fragmented research across the IS field. There has been a consensus in IS Security 
research that IS Security can be more effectively managed if the emphasis goes beyond 
the technical bastion used for protecting intangible resources (Baskerville, 1993; Straub 
& Welke, 1998; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). This study 
provides a theoretical perspective on managing IS Security and knowledge to addresses 
the weaknesses in the phenomenon. 
The second contribution relates to the application of KM to an IS Security challenge. 
Gaps exist in both the KM and IS Security literatures where a relationship between both 
fields has rarely if ever been identified. Albeit security is put forward as a necessary 
consideration in the design and implementation of Knowledge Management Systems 
(KMS) like any other development project but not as a consideration or aid in the 
management of knowledge as in simply providing the right knowledge to the right 
finger tips (logical control). The IS Security literature advocates access control, security 
policies, the integrity of information and environmental threats yet KM has been 
ignored as a solution when in the case of this research it enabled the construction of an 
integrated model for managing IS Security knowledge. 
The third major contribution is this study’s utilisation of an interpretivist approach to IS 
Security to provide rich contextual findings. Traditionally approaches applied have been 
grounded in positivism (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001) and technocratic in nature 
(Willson & Backhouse, 2006). Predictable threats seem apt for being investigated 
through positivist approaches, whereas unpredictable threats lend themselves to an 
interpretive approach (Spagnoletti & Resa, 2007) and require investigation in a social 
setting. Descriptive understanding is one of the main contributions of this research. This 
study presents systematically, using the research lens derived from an analysis of the 
literature reviews in Chapter two, descriptions of IS Security and CS knowledge, 
reservoirs, processes, mechanisms and the organisational infrastructure necessary to 
support KM. This is a critical form of knowledge; essential for theory building in the 
field of IS Security. Research has focussed on the analysis, design and the technical 
development of secure systems. The contribution of this thesis, beyond the previous 
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studies, is to bring together research in IS Security and KM and introduce an 
interpretive approach to the management of IS Security knowledge.   
The fourth major contribution of this study is its practical implication for management 
as practitioner’s knowledge of local threats is often fragmented (Willison & Backhouse, 
2006) which can result in security breaches. As circumstances change, senior managers 
and IS Security functions must have the ability to take more or less risk based on 
judgement, understanding and knowledge. As IS Security breaks become a ubiquitous 
reality for all users of information, there is a pressing need for a theoretical framework 
against which practitioners may diagnose problems, plan action and implement 
solutions. IS Security models and standards today do not exhibit much flexibility, 
therefore managers make IS Security decisions in a vacuum. IS Security problems can 
be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the full range of controls 
(formal/informal/ technical) available and implement those which are most effective. 
Unfortunately, they often lack this knowledge and their subsequent actions to cope with 
systems risk are less effective. To complement and augment existing research, this 
study addresses the need for an IS Security model to manage IS Security knowledge.  
Based on the findings of the two case organisations, this research has established a 
model for the management of IS Security knowledge. The model is organised by type of 
knowledge, reservoirs of IS Security knowledge, processes, mechanisms to promote IS 
Security KM, impacts and the organisational infrastructure supporting the management 
of IS Security (Figure 7.8). The fifth contribution relates to the study’s findings. These 
act to confirm and extend existing theory and exploratory research and provide unique 
insights into the complex nature of the phenomenon of managing IS Security 
knowledge. This study provides a timely answer to calls in the IS field for in-depth 
empirical research of a qualitative nature on the management of IS Security. This 
research has also argued that to solve the problem of managing IS Security and ISS 
knowledge; practitioners and researchers need to understand the deep seated practical 
aspects of an organisation. This research has questioned the support provided by the 
organisational infrastructure in managing IS Security knowledge. In addition to being of 
academic interest, the findings from this research are intended to be useful for IS 
Security and Engineering practitioners engaged in the management of knowledge. This 
research provides some useful insight into the issues and concerns for the management 
of IS Security and ISS knowledge. 
8.2.1 Further Research 
The possible approach used by IS Security to leverage the concept of  KM put forward 
in this research study will need to be tested in a number of organisations, and it is likely 
that more concepts will arise from such empirical work. However the concepts put 
forward in this research are sufficient to provide a robust foundation to develop an 
integrated model for the purposes of undertaking applied research of practical 
significance for organisations considering managing IS Security knowledge more 
efficiently.  Ultimately, referring back to the arguments presented in Chapters one and 
two regarding the significance of IS Security research and desire of researchers to focus 
on the technical side of ISS as opposed to the social elements of the ISS field, there is 
an urgent need to understand the processes and behavioural components of IS Security 
to improve the management of ISS in organisations and reduce the number of ISS 
incidents. Future research should expand the number of case organisations used, but in 
different sectors. An analysis of the application of the model in an organisational setting 
would generate interesting findings particularly in determining the impact of the model. 
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Further research could also include a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
organisations, operating in the Irish manufacturing sector, which need to leverage the 
management of tacit knowledge. A study could galvanise existing knowledge research 
areas such as training and learning models, KM, KMS and LMS, identify a critical path 
for future research, provide a substantial portfolio of rich case studies, create and 
validate a model for enhancing employee skill-sets through an effective (life-long) 
learning model and ultimately to manage tacit knowledge based on the exploitation of 
knowledge management and learning/knowledge management systems. 
8.3 Discussion 
This section reflects on the research design, case selection, and the limitations of this 
investigation. It then discusses the findings, implications for practice and research, and 
opportunities for further research. The thesis ends with a reflection on the PhD process. 
8.3.1 The Research Design 
The main elements of the research design were:  interpretive; two case-studies; semi-
structured interviews using a questionnaire to help guide interviewees. The data was 
analysed using manual transcription of the interviews, and coding by hand was used in 
qualitative data analysis. In retrospect, while much of the research process was 
successful, there were problems which might have been solved by adopting different 
approaches. The reminder of this section deals with each aspect of this investigation. 
Interpretive methods, unlike experimental methods, allow the researcher little control. 
Access to the case organisations and to interviewees was varied, with some case 
organisations being very open with several willing interviewees, and some interviewees 
easy to reach and arrange to interview, others were more difficult to schedule. Research 
themes had been identified during the analysis of the literature, but others occurred 
during the pilot case study (step 4 of the CSP). When carrying out the research some 
things did not go according to plan, and because there is little control and it was 
necessary to re-visit cases to delve further into the phenomenon. However, this did 
require far greater access to interviewees and more time. Unlike a longitudinal case-
study, two case organisations provides only a snapshot of the situation in time, which 
means that the change process is not observed, and that reports of events from the past 
may be unreliable. Due to the fact that the utilisation of two case organisations, 
incorporating a pilot case, is less in-depth than a longitudinal case-study a less rich 
analysis of the organisations is achieved. Difficulties with access with some 
organisations providing many interviewees, and others only a few can also affect the 
richness of the case descriptions. In retrospect it may have been more advantageous to 
use a single longitudinal case-study design, in an organisation where there was 
extensive access, although there would have been other limitations. The utilisation of 
semi-structured interviews allowed the participants to bring up topics they believed to 
be important, which added to the richness of the data, but it also means that not all of 
the interviewees addressed the same issues. Interviewees may raise issues or make 
statements for ulterior motives, and say things that are biased. If a more structured 
interview approach had been used, more consistent results from the case organisations 
might have been achieved. However, a more structured interview approach could also 
have produced less rich results and proved weak in terms of reliability and validity of 
data. 
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The data that was gathered through semi-structured interviewees was analysed utilising 
a manual process. Automated software such as NVivo was not used as it was deemed 
unnecessary. While transcription was a slow process it proved valuable in allowing the 
researcher to fully appreciate the richness of the data and enable effective data reduction 
while working through the interviews compared to the utilisation of a transcribers. 
However there were still errors. These errors were often caught by the researcher. In 
some instances there was noise or interference making the words hard to hear. In this 
instance the researcher made use of the field notes taken during and immediately after 
the interviews. NVivo could have been used as an alternative to manual typing and 
analyses. The main benefit from using software is convenience of storage and running 
queries. Therefore the use of software instead of the manual process used offered little if 
any difference. 
8.3.1.1 Case Selection Methodology 
The study of organisations is complex, as their processes are made up of many activities 
(Stamper, 1973; Nutt, 1984; Baskerville, 2004). Traditionally organisations have been 
viewed as formal systems concerned with inter-organisational (between the 
organisations and its environment) and intra-organisational (internal departments) 
information. Since computer-based systems have been used to automate the activities of 
these formal systems this view has evolved. The emergent belief of a number of studies 
is to view the organisation as an evolving or emerging social form (Baskerville, 2004; 
Dhillon, 2006). Consequently, the organisation allows different groups to interact with 
each other and the environment (Walsham, 1993). Emergent organisations endure 
continuous change which is beyond simple environmental adaptiveness, allowing them 
to operate effectively in highly competitive markets by maintaining continual agility 
(Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Vulnerabilities and threats emerge as these organisations and 
their information systems are remade (Baskerville, 2004). As a result the context of IS 
Security is changing. Consequently, emergent IS Security must cope with rapid changes 
in the organisation, shifting information systems and changing vulnerabilities and 
threats through the development of an integrated and agile approach to managing IS 
Security. Agile IS Security management is required to anticipate threats and rapid 
responses. Traditional IS Security management principles and approaches will endure in 
organisations which are static and non-competitive, protecting traditional systems from 
traditional threats.  
8.3.1.2 Limitations 
The purpose of this section is to identify the limitations of this study. Limitations of the 
research strategy refer to the shortcomings at any stage of the research. These stages 
include: the conceptual framework and research questions; the development of a 
research approach, data collection techniques, data analysis and the reporting of the 
findings. While many of the potential limitations were discussed in Chapter three and 
tested in Chapter four, this section recapitulates the key weaknesses of the research 
strategy in addition to highlighting specific limitations that were encountered. The 
methodological approach for this research has been interpretive and one of the 
limitations of interpretive research is its reflexive nature. Researchers must therefore 
recognise that they are part of the social world they study. We then tend to rely on 
common-sense knowledge to make judgements about the social phenomena under 
investigation. While conducting this research many such judgements were made. 
Positivists consider this aspect of interpretive as a limitation. However the experiences 
and findings gained from this research gave the researcher little justification for 
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rejecting common-sense knowledge while conducting the research. Another limitation 
identified pertained to some of the literature read. IS Security is at an early stage of 
development, few studies have been carried out to date in the area, particularly of a 
qualitative nature (Siponen & Willison, 2007; Siponen et al., 2008). Therefore some of 
the relevant literature found is not in academic journals, but in industrial journals 
(CSI/FBI). The latter, it may be argued, are produced for a different audience and with a 
different focus. Such journals rely to a large extent on the support of vendors but to 
protect against mistaking promotion for research, the researcher focused primarily on 
(when referenced) journal articles written by independent industry analysts which have 
been referenced by the IS community.   
This investigation adopted an interpretive stance, and the research design used a 
selection of two case organisations, interviewing a limited number of interviewees in 
each of the case organisations (Table 3.3). The approach and design leads to the 
following limitations: in generalisability, reliability, and validity. First, although 
statistical generalisability was not the intent, it is important to note that because the 
number of cases is so small compared to the population of engineering organisations, it 
is not possible to demonstrate that any findings are statistically representative of the 
whole population of engineering organisations. Second, due to the interpretive stance 
taken the reliability of any findings could be brought into question, the findings and 
conclusions are a result of an interpretation of the data by the researcher. The researcher 
maybe also be bias in analysing the data and ignore contradicting evidence regarding 
preconceived theories. Third, because the findings are based on interview data it was 
also possible to question the validity of the findings because interview bias is almost 
impossible to eliminate (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Interviewees may recount events 
from a personal perspective which is at odds with the views of other participants.  
8.4 PhD Process 
The PhD process commences with a PhD candidate who may or may not have prior 
research experience. The initial MPhil phase is seen in the United Kingdom as a 
programme of research preparation. At the end of the MPhil phase, PhD candidates 
must transfer from MPhil to PhD by producing a transfer report and defending it in a 
viva. The transfer report consists of a literature review, statement of research objective, 
questions and research methodology. Candidates are also required to investigate the 
identified research objective and questions in two case organisations. The MPhil is 
largely a minor thesis to be conducted for the PhD. The transfer viva is a validation of 
the research undertaken, and evidence of the PhD candidate’s capability to plan and 
carry out a research programme.  
As the PhD progresses the author changes. Writing style is perhaps the least important 
but most noticeable aspect that is changed. Familiarity with the subject is another 
obvious change as the author becomes immersed in the study, but confidence in 
conducting research and the acquisition of research skills are also developed. The whole 
process might be summarised as a process of learning how to theorise, gather relevant 
data, analyse that data, use the analysis to reach an informed decision about the 
hypotheses and theory, and then communicate that decision, in hopefully an interesting 
way. The PhD process should be viewed as a collaborative effort between the PhD 
candidate, supervisors, colleagues and the wider community of IS researchers who are 
present at conferences and other events, authors of previous works upon which the 
research builds, and the internal and external examiners. The end result is research that 
is informative and public. 
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Appendix A: Sphere of Security 
Figure 1: Sphere of Security (Source: Whitman & Mattord, 2005, p.198).  
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Figure 2.2: Proposed Countermeasures for data, information and knowledge (Adapted 
by the Researcher from Whitman & Mattord, 2005, p.198, Appendix A). 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
1. Determine the type of Organisational infrastructure used in the case study 
Identify the type(s) of Culture, common knowledge, Structure and communities of practice 
used in IIS or CS 
Identify any barriers that may exist in terms of the above 
Identify the type of physical environment the functions operate in and the restrictions caused 
How is it arranged from and across the different sites? 
Identify the IT infrastructure used to support the needs of the functions 
2. Determine the type and role of the ISS or CS knowledge used: 
General Knowledge |Technical Knowledge| Contextual Knowledge 
-Display matrices were used to verify the types and roles of knowledge in supplementary 
interviews. 
3. Determine where ISS or CS knowledge is located 
Identify the knowledge stores or reservoirs used by the ISS or CS functions 
Individuals, Groups, Procedures, Repositories, Technologies, Organisation, Units, Inter­
organisational Relationships 
-Display matrices were used to verify the knowledge reservoirs identified in supplementary 
interviews. 
4. Determine the types of processes used by ISS and CS 
Identify how the functions acquire, capture, create, Share, apply and control their knowledge 
-Display matrices were used to verify the knowledge processes identified in supplementary 
interviews. 
5. Determine the impact of managing ISS or CS knowledge 
Identify the impacts on Individual employees, the function, the organisation 
-Display matrices were used to verify the impacts identified in supplementary interviews. 
6. Determine how the organisation aligns Knowledge Management with security and 
how is the impact of one on the other assessed. 
Identify the main business functions of the business 
Identify the value chain processes of the organisation? 
What are the main cross-functional business processes of the organisation? 
Identify the inter & intra-organisational alliances and contributions? 
How is quality measured? 
The main information systems supporting individual / group/  business needs 
Culture of the organisation in promoting: 
Knowledge Management/ Security |Inter / intra collaboration | Continuous Improvement 
(TQM) Innovative | Evaluate the value of the information / knowledge for Org & Group 
Outline a map of knowledge and security within the organisation: 
Teams, Systems, Repositories | Knowledge Resources (Experts) 
Knowledge Assets – Org, Dept & Individual Level 
Knowledge Structures – Knowledge Domain 
Knowledge Applications – Problem-solving (People, Docs, DB) 
Knowledge Developments – progression (Learning Org.) 
7. Determine how the organisation strikes a delicate balance between a secure and a 
productive (Knowledge Sharing) environment. 
Employees responsible for Knowledge in the organisation 
Roles in the department: Knowledge Manager, Knowledge group 
How many employees are in the knowledge group? 
What is the staff turnover? 
Experts – How can you ensure that their expertise is retained? 
How is knowledge shared between experts? 
Mentoring | On the job experience | Training 
Email – Problem & Solution, minutes of meetings, lessons-learned 
Knowledge Managers | Investment in KM / Security over the last: 1yr, 2yrs, 5yrs, 10yrs 
Establish the assessment of the contribution of KM / Security to the organisation 
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Roles in the IS department: IT Manager; Security Officer; Security Group; 
Outline the map of security within the organisation 
Experts – How can you ensure that their expertise is retained? 
How is knowledge shared between experts? 
Email – Problem & Solution, minutes of meetings, lessons-learned 
Intranet – Knowledge web 
Do you agree that the same knowledge tools that make security workers more productive and 
additionally make attackers more powerful? 
Tools used to share knowledge: Extranets, Access control mgt, Knowledge Portals 
1yr, 2yrs, 5yrs, 10yrs 
How do you assess the contribution of security to the organisation? 
What is your company’s biggest security threat? 
What is your biggest IT security concern? 
8. Establish end-users impact on knowledge sharing and how can these impacts be 
minimised through appropriate security administration. 
Employee motivation to share and protect knowledge 
Knowledge Management Issues-customer: 
Who can access what? 
What information / knowledge do users need to do their work? 
Can groups of users be defined, who accesses the same information? 
What do users want information / knowledge for? 
How is information / knowledge shared between groups of users? 
How is information / knowledge input, stored, accessed and transmitted between users? 
Is data stored or transmitted in a form accessible by non-authorised users? 
Where are the “nodes” that data passes consistently? 
How can the different forms of data be made compatible? 
Supply/Security Issues: 
Is the information / knowledge supplier trustworthy? 
Can external as well as internal information / knowledge be collected 
9. Determine the key threats and defences against both internal and external security 
abuse. 
Determine the company’s biggest threat to KM 
Types of breaches of security faced and the consequences to KM 
Does your company have an incident response plan? 
How do you perform security checks on your partners? 
What level of control do you give your partners? 
What technologies are used for access control? 
How do you ensure that they can only access the information that they should have access to? 
How is Access Control controlled? 
Do you have centralised access control? 
Is it at your ideal level? 
How many applications are integrated? 
10. Determine the impact of changing organisational structures on Knowledge 
Management / IS Security, (for e.g.: in supporting geographically dispersed offices). 
Determine if the contribution of collaboration to the organisation is assessed. 
Experienced/ suspected a security threat (and loss of Knowledge) due to a competitor. 
Measure the level of risk against the benefit of openness (for customers and trading partners 
Tracking users and what they are permitted to do 
11. Determine the impact of changing organisational structures on Knowledge 
Management / Security, (for e.g.: in supporting geographically dispersed offices). 
Identify problems in managing knowledge across the different subsidiaries 
Identify the difficulty in securing a multinational organisation 
The Interview Guide, shown above, was altered for each of the three groups of 
interviewees outlined in Chapter 3, Table 3.3 
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Appendix C: CME-Co ISS Knowledge & TELE-Co ISS Knowledge 
CME-Co AND TELE-Co IS SECURITY FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
D:E/T |P:E/T CME-Co: IS SECURITY KNOWLEDGE Role TELE-Co: IS SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
K
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
D:E Org. Doc.| Vendor /Internal Warnings| Threats. O D:E Org. Documentation| Charts| Contacts 
D:E HW/SW Specifications: Firewalls| Servers. O D:E Security HW Lists| Template 
D:T Regulations| Impact of Threats| Roles: Escalations O D:T Regulations| Technology| System| Threats| Roles 
D:T D:T Networks| Domains| Procedures 
P:E Procedures| White Papers – Projects ISS Issues. O P:E Checklists| Policies 
P:T Steps to Align IT & Access Control Lists (ACL) O P:T ID Assets| Assessment Criteria 
O T S 
11 0 0 
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D:E IS Security Policy| Strategy| Regulations S D:E ISS Policy| Strategy| Regulations 
D:E ACL & Alert Reports from Security Technologies. O D:E Audit|  Alert & Evaluation Report 
D:T Domain Access Rights: Segregation of Duties. O D:T Domain Access Rights 
D:T Implement Regulations| Systems| Risk Knowledge. T D:T Controls| Scanning| Forums 
D:T Advising Customers: ISS Issues & Tools S D:T Evaluation of Technologies 
P:E Standards & Procedures. T P:E ISO17799 | Trouble-shooting 
P:T Developing Plan & Strategy| Security Methods. S P:T Audit Reviews| Best Practices 
P:T P:T Prioritise Vulnerabilities 
O T S 
Totals: 4 6 5 Totals: 
C
o
n
t
e
x
t
u
a
l
l
y
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D:E SOX Requirements| Risk Criteria| Manuals O D:E Regulations| Standards| Practices| Alerts 
D:E Audit Reports: Evaluation Feedback| NW Testing T D:E IS Security Audit Reviews 
D:T ISS Specialists Knowledge of: SOX| Risks| Audits T D:T SOX| Impact of Technologies 
D:T D:T Regulations| Practices| Risks| Controls 
P:E ISS Teams: Steps for Standards| Review T P:E Steps: Lessons-learned| Audits 
P:T ISS Officers: Steps for: Incidents| Audits T P:T Steps: Identify & React to Rogues 
O T S 
Totals: 5 9 0 Totals: 
ISS Knowledge Totals 28 20 15 ISS Knowledge Totals 
*Declarative (D)/ Procedural (P), Explicit (E)/ Tacit (T). | *Roles: Operational (O), Tactical (T) Strategic (S). 
*Totals are calculated from Tables: CME-Co ISS Knowledge & TELE-Co ISS Knowledge (Source: Adapted from Tables 5.4 & 6.4) 
Role 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O T S 
15 0 0 
S 
O 
O 
T 
S 
O 
T 
O 
O T S 
7 5 3 
O 
T 
O 
T 
T 
T 
O T S 
5 9 0 
27 14 3 
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Appendix D: CME-Co IS Security and Customer Support Reservoirs 
Knowledge 
Stores 
ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE RESERVOIRS IS SECURITY RESERVOIRS CUSTOMER SUPPORT RESERVOIRS 
(1.) 
Individuals 
¾ ISS Specialists: Engaged in Problem-solving 
¾ Engineers: Creating Security enhancements 
 GIS Director: Purchasing & Customising Best Practices 
 Site Security Officer: Implementing Controls 
 Corp. Sec. Officer: Identifies Stakeholder requirements 
 Auditor: Evaluates the ISS Controls used 
 OISRM Coordinator: Source Regulatory Guidelines 
¾ CS Specialists: Engaged in Problem-solving 
¾ Engineers: Creating Product Designs| Fixes  
CS Manager: Coordinating CS 
Knowledge Consultant: Centralising Knowledge 
KDG Officer: Develops & Coordinates Training 
Knowledge Champion: Promotes KM Practices 
Level (1|2) Technicians: Provide 1st & 2nd Support 
Escalated levels of Expertise 
Solution / Product Innovators 
Senior Role: steering (ISS) practices 
Global Coordinators: implementing 
controls 
Stakeholder Analyst: identifying 
requirements 
In/External Evaluator: assessing ISS 
KM Champion: promoting training| 
consolidation of (ISS) knowledge Differences 
o Engineers enhance existing products with Security tools 
o Formal Senior GIS Security Role to promote ISS 
o Site Coordinators oversee global rollouts (e.g. patches) 
o Stakeholder (Customer) identifies market requirements 
o Auditor performs an external review |measure 
o CS Manager controls international operations 
o Knowledge Consultant consolidates CS 
knowledge 
o KDG Officer provides Technician training 
o Knowledge Champion promotes KM within CS 
o Technicians provide front-line Customer support 
(2.) 
Groups 
¾ Management: Enforces Standards & Procedures 
¾ Security Officers: Utilise Domain & Control Knowledge 
¾ GIS|IT Departments: Provide IT Services & Guidelines 
 OISRM: Provide a Pool of Regulatory Experts 
 Corporate Security: Strategies & Development 
 Internal Audit Committee: Compliance issues| reviews 
 Remote Services: External Access Requirements 
¾ Managerial Forum: Define Policies 
¾ CS Engineers: Support Product Portfolio| 
Diagnose 
¾ Engineering: Develop Products & Provide 
Support 
KDG CS Group: KM Strategy for CS 
KCS (Centred Support) CoP: Review Solutions 
Managerial Responsibility: policies| 
standards 
Specialised (ISS) Support Teams: 
diagnosing problems| applying controls 
Corp. (ISS) Group: providing specialised 
knowledge on regulations| strategies| audits| 
domain knowledge 
Quality Assessors: solutions| reviews| 
standards| post-mortems| training needs 
Centralised IT | ISS Services: rollouts of 
technical controls & patches 
Evaluation Group: measuring value 
Communication Group: establishing secure 
in/external connections 
Differences 
o Two (Official) Security Groups: 
 Regulatory Standards & Stakeholder Groups 
o Compliance is assured & product enhancements made 
o Evaluation Group provide a form of measurement 
o Secure external (Partner) connections are monitored 
o Ad hoc groups are used to support & promote KM 
o Levels of escalation are defined & use measured 
(costing) 
o Group created to develop CS skills 
o Collaborate with & support Sales | EBC 
o Quality review process used to assess solutions by 
a CoP 
(3.) 
Procedures 
 Compliance Procedures: Customised to U.S| 
International  
 M-Gates Method: Used to Manage Projects 
 Checklists: Outline ISS Activities to be completed 
 Six Sigma: Case Template for Resource Allocation 
Templates: Used for Creating Solutions & CBR 
Searches 
Call Escalation Procedures: Used to Control the 
Problem-solving Process to Measure Costs. 
Templates: quality solutions| tagged for 
CBR searches 
Procedures: in/external control| 
environmental standards| problem-solving 
escalations 
Checklists: prioritise activities 
Project Management Methodology: 
collaboration across teams 
Resource Allocation Method: budgetary 
restriction 
Differences 
o  Procedures are externally sourced  
o  Project management methodology is used 
o  ISS activities are listed & completed (e.g. for a review) 
o  Resources allocation procedures for shared resources 
o Templates for solution are used to ensure quality & 
reuse 
o Levels of expertise are identified, formally 
documented & assigned to: problems| products| code 
¾ Document Mgt. System: Stores Solutions & Guides ¾ Document Mgt. System: Stores Solutions & Documentation Management System: 
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(4.) 
Repositories 
¾ Intranet: Centralises Common & Group Knowledge 
¾ Vendor Repositories: Used to Source Manuals, Guides 
¾ Knowledge-Link (University): Provides Online Training 
¾ Desktops: Store Individual Doc., Solutions & Guides 
¾ Portals (E-Room| Power-Link): Used for Collaboration 
¾ Email Alerts: Notification of for e.g. New Threats 
 Global Tech Web: Accessed for Patches & Solutions 
 Q &A Repositories| Forums: Query Ex/Internal Experts 
 Shared Drives: Store Solutions & Procedures 
Guides 
¾ Intranet: Corp. Info. & Group websites 
¾ Vendor Repositories: Used to Source Manuals, 
Guides Re: Competitor| Vendor Products 
¾ Knowledge-Link (University): Provides Online 
Training  
¾ Portals (E-Room| Power-Link): Used for 
Collaboration 
¾ Email Alerts: Notification of for e.g. Hot Issues 
Managers Forum: Collaborate Across CS Sites 
Engineering Bug Tacking System: Monitors 
Errors but Accessed only by Engineering 
solutions| trouble-shooting guides 
Central (ISS) Repository: source material 
Vendor repositories: interoperability 
documentation & updates  
Shared Drives | Discussion Forums 
Extranet |Intranet | 
Portals | Group Websites 
E-learning Platforms 
Warning Alerts & Linked solutions 
Differences 
o Desktops used as stores 
o External Repositories & Forums for ISS Expertise 
o Managers Forums to collaborate at a senior level 
o Bug Tracking System with controlled access 
(5.) 
Technologies 
¾ Primus: CBR Tool for Problem-solving 
¾ MS Outlook: Used for Collaboration| Problem-solving   
VPN (Virtual Private Networks): to Secure Connections 
SID (Secure ID): Track Employee  Accessing Resources 
Monitoring Tools: Used to Alert Security Re: Rogues 
Firewalls: Enforce Security Policy Re: In/External Access 
 IDS (Intrusion Detection SW): Track In/External Traffic 
¾ Primus: CBR Tool for Problem-solving 
¾ MS Outlook: Used for Collaboration| Problem-
solving 
Case-based Reasoning Tools: build 
collaborative solutions 
Monitoring | Tracking Technologies: build 
view of the Corporate security landscape| 
filtered data 
Groupware: collaborative problem-solving 
Differences o Technologies to track traffic: VPN| SID| IDS, Firewalls 
(6.) 
Units 
Joint Projects: Require Security Controls 
Business Functions: Roles & Responsibilities Identified 
Finance & Legal: Assign Regulatory Requirements 
PPMG: Identify Function Requirements 
Engineering: Allocate Controls for their own Systems 
CS: Require Security Controls 
Engineering: Create & Support CME-Co Products 
Research & Development: Create New Products 
Sales & Executive Briefing Centre: Sell Products 
GIS|IT Departments: Provide IT Services & 
Guidelines 
Security Officers: Provide Security Controls 
Collaborative Function Mechanism: to 
identify (ISS) function requirements| 
Roles & Responsibilities: defined for 
controlled access| segregation of duties 
Reporting Structure: dictates goals 
R&D: innovative products| solutions 
Engineering: circumvent (ISS) controls| 
priority users 
Differences 
o Support Cross Functional Projects 
o Provide Access based on Roles & Responsibilities 
o R&D Group to innovate 
o Sales to sell products & provide feedback 
(7.) 
Networks 
¾ Customers (stakeholders): Identify ISS Requirements 
¾ Partners (vendors): Collaborate in Problem-solving 
Competitors: Collaborate Re: Standards & Interoperability 
Joint Collaboration| Reg. Bodies: Drive the Market 
Auditors: Review & Evaluate ISS  
¾ Customers (stakeholders): Feedback is Collected 
& Used 
¾ Partners (vendors): Create & Share Solutions 
Stakeholder Feedback: evaluate service| 
generate market needs 
Partner Collaboration: problems  
Industrial Groups: driving the market 
External Evaluation: Measure | Benchmark 
from previous review 
Differences 
o Reg. Bodies: Driving market| External Evaluation function o Feedback is used for evaluation 
Specific to Customer Support 
 Specific to IS Security 
¾ Common to IS Security & Customer Support Functions  
Characteristics of CME-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge 
Appendix D: CME-Co IS Security and Customer Support Reservoirs (Adapted from Tables: 5.5 and 5.8). 
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Appendix E: CME-Co IS Security and Customer Support Processes 
Knowledge 
Processes 
ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE PROCESSES CHARACTERISTICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE PROCESSES IS SECURITY PROCESSES CUSTOMER SUPPORT PROCESSES 
(1.) 
Acquisition 
¾ E-Room: Collaborative SW for Partners |Customers 
¾ Subscription: to Technical CoP |Vendor Repositories 
¾ Online Tutorials: Purchased & Customised 
¾ Security SW|HW: Reverse-engineered & Customised 
¾ Competitor Products: Tested for Interoperability Issues 
 Membership of Regulatory Bodies: Drive Market 
 Regulation Guidelines: Selected & Customised 
 ISO17799 Guidelines: Purchased & Customised 
 External Consultants: Audit Reviews & NW Testing 
 Security Specialists: Utilised for Specific Projects 
¾  E-Room: Collaborate SW for Partners| Customers. 
¾ Subscription: to Technical CoP |Vendor Repositories 
¾ Online Tutorials: Purchased & Customised 
¾ Competitor Products: Reverse-engineered & Tested 
Competitor| CME-Co Products: Used for Training in 
Lab Simulations 
Collaborative SW: Problem-solving 
Subscription to Forums | Repositories: external 
expertise & market changes 
Customised Reg. Guidelines | Standards 
Reverse-engineer Technologies| (ISS) 
standards| products 
Training Simulations & Content: Up-skill 
External Evaluation: measure activities 
External (Security) Experts: provide specific 
knowledge| guidance 
Membership of Regulatory Bodies: to 
participate in driving the market 
Procedures| Standards| Best Practices to 
comply with regulations 
Technologies: to reverse-engineer & 
repackage for use  
Differences o Procedures are sourced externally 
o Interoperability Knowledge: for Product Support 
o Security SW|HW is sourced, customised & resold 
o External reviewers are used as a evaluation method 
o Security Experts are hired for specific projects 
o Limited acquisition of knowledge 
o Lab simulations are used to train CS Technicians 
(2.) 
Capture 
¾ Pool of Experts: Used for Q & A| Problem-solving 
¾ Roles & Responsibilities: Identifies Expertise 
¾ MS Outlook | Portals: In/External Problem-solving 
¾ Knowledge Reservoirs (Appendix D): Stores Accessed 
 External Experts: Used for Activities (e.g. Audit & 
NW Testing) 
¾ Pool of Experts: Used for Q&A| Problem-solving 
¾ Roles & Responsibilities: Identifies Expertise 
¾ MS Outlook | Portals: In/External Problem-solving 
¾ Knowledge Reservoirs (Appendix D): Stores 
Accessed 
CBR: Creation| Capture| Sharing| Application| 
Control of Solutions 
Power-Link: Used to Capture & Share Partner 
Solutions 
Pool of Experts: Problem-solving 
Collaborative SW: retrieve| share in/external 
knowledge 
CBR Tool: centralise| store| share & pull 
controlled knowledge 
External Evaluators: external view of the 
organisation | environmental benchmarking 
Differences o External Experts are used to evaluate the ISS function o CBR Tool used extensively to create  
o Partner knowledge is captured, reviewed & shared 
(3.) 
Creation 
¾ Solutions: Created through Problem-solving 
¾ Lessons-learned: Doc. During Projects (M-Gates) 
 Audit Reviews| Reports: Documented During Audits 
 Post-mortems: Doc. in Brainstorming Sessions  
 Function Requirements: Identified Using the PPMG   
 Gate| Stage Outputs: Identified at Each (M) Gate 
 Compliance Deliverables: Identified through Auditing 
 Best Practices: Customise & Shared by OISRM Group 
 Discussions (Audit): Enabled through Calls| Forums 
¾ Solutions: Created through Problem-solving 
¾ Lessons-learned: Doc. During Projects 
Solutions: Created through the Escalation Process 
Solutions: Created & Shared  by Vendors| Partners  
Solutions: through in/external problem-solving 
Lessons-learned: through post-mortems 
Business Requirements: identified & 
prioritised 
Project Goals: listed & managed 
Reviews: documented & reused 
Special Deliverables: identified externally 
Trial & Error Approach: tests & redefines 
(ISS) measures 
Customised Best Practices| Standards 
Brainstorming: through collaborative SW 
Differences o External Evaluation to measure the function 
o Use of mechanisms (M-Gates) to coordinate & create 
o Escalation process is used to create of a solution 
o Vendors & Partners are used to create solution 
knowledge 
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(4.) 
Sharing 
¾ Problem-solving Process: Create & Store Solutions 
¾ Email, E-Room, Primus, Intranet: Enable Sharing 
¾ Knowledge Trading: Builds Escalation Relationships 
 Coordination| Sharing: Enabled by PPMG Managers 
 PPMG Mechanism: ID Business Requirements 
 Participation in Regulatory Bodies: Practices Shared 
¾ Problem-solving Process: Create & Store Solutions 
¾ Email, E-Room, Primus, Intranet: Enable Sharing 
¾ Knowledge Trading: Builds Escalation Relationships 
Escalation Process: Builds Solutions 
Partner Collaboration: Creates & Shares Solutions 
Solutions: though problem-solving process 
PPMG Mechanism: coordination of members 
& groups 
Knowledge Tools: enable sharing 
Knowledge Trading: solutions & best practices 
Participation in Industrial Forums: external 
collaboration Differences o Participation in Regulatory Bodies o External Collaboration to create solutions & cut costs 
(5.) 
Application 
¾ Standards| Practices: Customised, Stored & Reused 
¾ Experts: Collaborating to Create & Reuse Solutions  
 Audit Reviews: Doc. Lessons-learned Created| Reused 
¾ Solutions: Customised, Stored & Reused 
¾ Experts: Collaborating to Create| Reuse Solutions 
Escalation Process: Reuse of Solutions 
Primus: Enables Solution Reuse 
Primus: Pushes Solutions towards Customers| 
Partners 
Reuse of customised practices| standards 
Documentation of Lessons-learned 
Reused & Reworked Solutions: through the 
escalation process 
CBR: solution storage & reuse |in/external 
collaboration 
Audits: application of lessons-learned Differences o Auditing: forces documentation & lessons-learned o Primus enables the reuse of solutions & external 
sharing 
o  Utilises an escalation process to build solutions 
(6.) 
Control 
 Tracking: Employee & Rogue NW Behaviour 
 Monitoring: Corporate Traffic & Use of Stores 
 Informal Controls: Policies Used to Control Behaviour 
 Formal Controls: Define Access to Knowledge Stores 
 Technical controls: VPN, IDS Assure Connections 
 Controls: Applied to Assure the Quality of Solutions 
¾ Controls: Applied to Partition Knowledge Repositories 
Tracking: External Solutions to Validate Use 
Mechanisms (Reviewers): Utilised for Solution 
Quality  
Domain Specific Controls: Aligned to Expert Groups 
¾ Access Levels: Aligned to CBR Solutions| 
Commands 
Tracking: In/external traffic & solutions 
monitored 
Controlling Access: through formal, informal 
& technical controls 
Quality Mechanism: to assure standards 
Restricted Access: Intellectual Property 
Mgt Review: ID requirements & allocate 
resourcesDifferences o Control allocation to monitor| track| secure knowledge 
stocks 
o External collaboration tracked & reviewed 
o Domain Access to Knowledge Stocks 
Specific to Customer Support 
 Specific to IS Security 
¾ Common to IS Security & Customer Support Functions  
Characteristics of CME-Co Knowledge Processes 
Appendix E: CME-Co IS Security and Customer Support Processes (Adapted from Tables: 5.6 and 5.9). 
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Appendix F: TELE-Co IS Security and Customer Support Reservoirs 
Knowledge 
Stores 
ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL RESERVOIRS OF KNOWLEDGE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE RESERVOIRS IS SECURITY RESERVOIRS CUSTOMER SUPPORT RESERVOIRS 
(1.) 
Individuals 
¾ ISS Specialists: Engaged in Problem-solving 
¾ IT Manager: Provides Services & Coordinates Sites 
 TGS Coordinator: ID Security Org. Requirements 
 Security Officer (Site): Rolls-out Site Controls 
 Security Officer (Networks): Rolls-out NW Controls 
 Security Coordinator: Coordinated Org. ISS Controls 
 TIP Auditor: Reviews & Create| Store Lessons-learned 
 TIP Coordinator: Conducts| Controls Reviews 
 Compliance Coordinator: Identifies Practices| Standards 
 Export Manager: Ensures Site Encryption| SW Licences 
¾ CS Specialists: Engaged in Problem-solving 
¾ CS Manager: Provides Support & Coordinates Site 
Teams 
CS Engineers: Creating Product Designs| Diagnose 
Fixes 
Level (1|2) Technicians: Provide 1st & 2nd Support 
Technicians: Code Faults| Trouble-shoot Problems 
 PKM Coordinator: Promotes the Use of KM & 
Prototyping 
Escalated levels of Expertise 
Trouble-shooting |Diagnosing Specialist 
Global Coordinator: ID ISS requirement 
Solution / Product Innovators 
Compliance Coordinator: Identifies 
Practices| Standards 
Site (ISS) Manager: IT & Control Rollouts 
KM Champion: promoting training| 
consolidation of (ISS) knowledge| lessons-
learned 
Differences o Formal Global (Corporate) Security Coordinator to 
enforce consistent ISS controls 
o Security type| site Officers for different ISS requirement 
o Corporate Coordinators for: Controls| Compliance| 
Reviews & Encryption (level varies for each country) 
o Lessons-learned from reviews are recorded to be reused 
o CS Manager controls international operations 
o Knowledge Champion promotes KM within  
Engineering 
o Technicians provide front-line Customer support 
(2.) 
Groups 
 TGS: Formulate & Develop Security Strategies 
 Security Officers: Roll-out Controls |Prepare Site Audits  
 Corporate Security Group: Coordinates ISS Operations 
 TIP: Select & Customise Standards & Practices 
  Networks: Provide NW Services & Allocates Controls 
 IT Department: Provide & Roll-out IT Services 
WEC: Coordinate Eng. Design| Product Divisions 
 GTSS Engineers: Cell Phone Division 
 CS Engineers: Support Product Portfolio| 
Diagnose 
 Regional Teams: Support EMEA & APAC 
Customers  
 Engineering: Develop Products & Provide Support 
 Product Domain Engineers: Build Components| 
Diagnose 
 PKM (Ad hoc) CoP: Promotes Use of PKM | M-
Gates 
Umbrella Group: Strategy & Development 
Group 
Specialised (ISS) Support Teams: 
diagnosing problems| applying controls 
Corp. (ISS) Function: providing specialised 
knowledge on regulations| strategies| 
audits| domain knowledge 
Quality Assessors: solutions| reviews| 
standards| post-mortems| training needs 
CoP: promoting KM 
Centralised IT | ISS Services: rollouts of 
technical controls & patches 
Pool of Experts: Select & Customise 
Standards 
Differences o Three (Official) ISS Groups:  
  TGS| TIP for Audits| Corporate Security Groups 
o Standards are purchased & customised 
o Community of Practice promote the use of KM 
across Design Engineering 
(3.) 
Procedures 
 Compliance Procedures: Customised ISO17799 
 POPI: Control Employee Behaviour 
(P rotect our Proprietary Information)  Checklists: Outline ISS Activities to be completed 
 Audit Review Templates: Used to Build Reports 
 Continuity Plans: Guide (Safe) Shut Downs| Backups  Best Practices: Used to Guide Audits 
¾ Doc. Mgt System (Paper): Template Specifications 
Problem-solving: to Diagnose Problems 
Templates: to Record Solutions 
Trouble-shooting Doc.: Divide & Conquer 
Problems 
Coding Process: Divide & Conquer Coding 
Process 
Corporate Policies: Documenting processes 
M-Gates: Method to Manage Projects Across 
Templates: quality solutions| tagged for 
CBR searches 
Procedures: in/external control| 
environmental standards| problem-solving 
escalations 
Checklists: Outline ISS Activities to be 
completed 
Audit Review Templates: Used to Build 
Page 318 
Groups 
Prototyping: Method for Testing Prototypes 
¾ Doc. Mgt System (Paper): Template Specifications 
Reports 
Doc. Mgt. System (paper-based): Template 
specifications 
Project Management Guidelines Differences o Procedures are externally sourced & customised 
o   ISS activities are listed & completed (e.g. for a review) 
o   Behaviour Control used to protect information 
o Project management methodology is used 
o Divide & Conquer approach used for problem-
solving 
o Prototyping is used as a development approach 
(4.) 
Repositories 
¾ Document Mgt. System: Stores Solutions & Guide 
¾ Portals: Customised for Individuals| Groups 
¾ Intranet: Centralises Common| Group Knowledge 
¾ Vendor Repositories: Used to Source Manuals, Guides 
¾ Shared Drives: Store Solutions & Procedures 
 Database: Pulls & Stores Log files| Scanning reports 
 Vulnerability Repository: Provides Lists| Priorities 
¾ Document Mgt. System: Stores Solutions & Guide 
¾ Portals: Customised for Individuals| Groups 
¾ Intranet (Compass): Centralises Common| Group 
Docs 
¾ Vendor: Source Manuals| Guides| Specifications 
¾ Shared Drives: Store Solutions & Procedures
 CS Repository: Records Calls & Solutions
 Government Sponsored: Provide  
Recommendations  
Online (Public) Forums: Share Coding & Solutions 
Documentation Management Systems: 
solutions| trouble-shooting guides 
Portals: Individual/Group 
Central Repository: source material 
Vendor repositories: interoperability 
documentation & updates  
DB: Extract Data from Security Tech. 
Vulnerability Data Repository 
Intranet/ Share Drives 
Environmental Requirements 
Divide & Conquer approach used for 
problem-solving 
Prototyping is used as a development 
approach 
Differences o Repositories are used to pull information from different 
security technologies 
o Repositories used to record| track calls 
o Collaboration with external programmers 
o External advice sourced for product development 
(5.) 
Technologies 
¾ MS Outlook: Used for Collaboration| Problem-solving 
 MS Excel: Calculates Levels of Risk 
 ART & NW Scanning: Track Employees| Rogues 
¾  MS Outlook: Used for Collaboration| Problem-
solving 
Simulations: Used to Model Designs  
CAD Tools: Develop & Store CAD Designs 
Simulation SW: to build design solutions 
Case-based Reasoning Tools: build 
collaborative solutions 
Monitoring | Tracking Technologies: build 
view of the Corporate security landscape| 
filtered data 
Groupware: collaborative problem-solving 
Excel Matrices: ID risks  
Differences o Technologies: VPN| SID| IDS| Firewalls tracking 
o MS Excel used to analyse risk 
o Simulation used to create & store designs 
(6.) 
Units 
 Joint Projects: Require Security Controls 
 Business Functions: Roles & Responsibilities Identified 
 HR: Enforce Corporate Security policies 
Marketing: Collects Customer Feedback 
Technical Advisors: Used as Backups for Sales 
Pitches 
IT Organisation: Provide IT Support & Services 
Security & Compliance: Secure, Compliant  
Connections 
CMPR Team: M-Gates Expertise 
U.S. Engineering: Provide Call Support  
Roles & Responsibilities: defined for 
controlled access| segregation of duties 
Collaborative Function Mechanism: to 
identify (ISS) function requirements 
Customer Feedback: analysed 
Technical Advisors: Specialist Knowledge 
Governance Group: Enforce Policies 
Secure Connections: for communication 
Escalation Group: problem-solving Differences o Support Cross Functional Projects 
o Provide Access based on Roles & Responsibilities 
o Marketing sell products & provide feedback 
o Act as Technical Advisors for Marketing 
o Dependent on IT, Security, CMPR, U.S Eng. for 
support 
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(7.) 
Networks 
¾ Partners (vendors): Collaborate in Problem-solving 
 Regulatory Bodies: Sourced for Best practices 
 Auditors: Review & Evaluate ISS  
 ISS Forums: Collaboration with External ISS Groups 
¾ Vendors: Share Product Specifications| Standards 
Feedback re: Trade-offs & Debug Customer Errors 
TELE-Co Symposia: Collaborate with Industry 
Government: Extract Environmental Requirements  
Public Forum: Collaborate in Problem-solving 
Stakeholder Feedback: evaluate service| 
generate market needs 
Partner Collaboration: solving problems  
Industrial Groups: driving the market 
External Evaluation: Measure | Benchmark 
from previous review 
Public Forums: Specialist & Public 
Government: environmental requirements 
Differences o External Evaluators are used 
o Regulatory Bodies provide standards 
o Collaboration with other companies for ISS practices 
o Customer feedback is used to improve products 
o Symposia is used to collaborate with other 
companies 
o Environmental requirements are sourced 
o Public collaboration is sought 
Specific to Customer Support 
 Specific to IS Security 
¾ Common to IS Security & Customer Support Functions  
Characteristics of TELE-Co Reservoirs of Knowledge 
Appendix F: TELE-Co IS Security and Customer Support Reservoirs (Adapted from Tables: 6.5 and 6.8). 
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Appendix G: TELE-Co IS Security and Customer Support Processes 
Knowledge 
Processes 
ISS AND CS FUNCTIONAL KNOWLEDGE PROCESSES CHARACTERISTICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE PROCESSES IS SECURITY PROCESSES CUSTOMER SUPPORT PROCESSES 
(1.) 
Acquisition 
Regulation Guidelines: Selected & Customised 
ISO17799 Guidelines: Purchased & Customised 
Systems Dev. Life-Cycle: Researched & Customised 
External Consultants: Audit Reviews & NW Testing 
Symposia: Industrial| Academic Collaboration-Simulations 
Reverse-engineer: Competitor Design| Products for 
Interoperability Knowledge & Diagnose Problems 
Customised Guidelines/Standards 
ISO17799 | Sec/SDLC 
Industry Collaboration (Conferences) 
Reverse-engineer | Diagnosing 
External Evaluation 
Differences 
o Procedures are sourced externally 
o External reviewers are used as a evaluation method 
o Symposia used to collaborate with academia & industry 
o Modelling is used to create & test ideas 
o Competitor knowledge for problem-solving| designs 
(2.) 
Capture 
¾ Pool of Experts: Used for Q&A| Problem-solving| 
Technologies 
¾ MS Outlook: In/External Problem-solving 
¾ Corporate Repository: Store| Collaborate Re: 
Specifications| Manuals 
¾ Knowledge Reservoirs (Appendix F): Stores Accessed 
¾ Pool of Experts: Used for Q&A| Problem-solving| 
Technologies 
¾ MS Outlook: In/External Problem-solving 
¾ Corporate Repository: Store| Collaborate Re: Manuals 
¾ Knowledge Reservoirs (Appendix F): Stores Accessed 
Simulation Models: Used to Design| Test Data 
Roles & Responsibilities: Locates Expertise 
Escalation Process: Pulls Expertise from Different Levels 
Security Technologies 
Simulation Models: Design/ Test Data 
Roles & Responsibilities 
Escalation Process 
Email - Comm./Filtering 
Doc. Repository 
Differences o Modelling SW is used to build| create 
o Expert locator & Escalation process are used for calls 
(3.) 
Creation 
¾ Solutions: Created through Problem-solving 
¾ Lessons-learned: Doc. During Projects 
Trial & Error Process: Used for Allocating Controls 
Lessons-learned: Created after Audit Reviews 
Audit Reviews| Reports: Documented During Audits 
¾ Solutions: Created through Problem-solving 
¾ Lessons-learned: Doc. During Projects (M-Gates) 
Divide & Conquer Method: Solutions are Created 
Trouble-shooting Guides: to Solve Problems 
Gate| Stage Outputs: Identified at Each (M) Gate 
Product Development: Components are built 
Security Considerations: Identified for each M-Gate 
Product Plans: Created through M-Gates 
Risk Assessment: Risks Identified (e.g. Late to Market) 
First to Market Product: Competitive Advantage Gained 
Approval Process: Goals are Achieved 
Security Evaluation: Identifies Products Security needs  
Problem-solving : Solution 
Trouble-shooting Guides 
M-Gates Process : Product realisation 
Product Development Mile-stones  
Auditing /Escalation Process 
Trial & Error 
Lessons-learned : Reviews 
Planning Process : Plan 
Security/Business Req. 
Divide & Conquer  
Risk Assessment : Risks 
First to Market  : End result 
Function Approval 
Evaluation 
Differences o External Evaluation to measure the function 
o Level of Security determined through trial & error 
o Problems broken down into manageable pieces 
o Step by step methods to solve problems are created| shared 
o Project management approach used to set targets 
o Identification of Risks  
o Security is built into the development process of products 
o Use of mechanisms (M-Gates) to coordinate & create 
o Measures| goals are used throughout CS 
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(4.) 
Sharing 
¾ Problem-solving Process: Creates & Store Solutions 
 Incident Response: React to Incidents (e.g. Hacker) 
 Coordination: Used to Roll-out Controls| Instructions  
 Email, Compass, Teleconferences: Enable Sharing 
 Security Symposia:  Coordinated to Drive Market 
 Participation in Regulatory Bodies: Practices Shared 
 Collaborating Forum: Share Practices with Industry 
¾ Problem-solving Process: Creates & Store Solutions 
Escalation Process: Builds & Shares Solutions 
Product Creation Process: Ideas | Designs are Shared 
Email, Compass, Teleconferences, CAD: Enable Sharing 
Product Designs: Generated through Prototyping | PKM 
Code & (known) Bugs: Shared through Problem-solving 
Trouble-shooting: Used to Solve Problems  
Creation Process – Outputs 
Email, Compass, Teleconferencing 
Product Designs – Support 
Code & (known) Bugs 
Trouble-shooting 
Collaborative Forum/Symposia 
Problem-solving 
Incident Response 
Coordination 
Participation of Reg. Bodies 
Differences o External collaboration to create solutions| drive market 
o Reactive approach to environment (threats) 
o Coordination of security activities across the org. 
o Problem-solving approach to builds & solutions 
o Steps in solving problems provided to groups 
(5.) 
Application 
 Technologies: Used to Build a Picture of Corp. NW 
 Expert Locator: to Solve Problems 
 Standards| Best Practices: Customised & Reused 
 Auditing: Doc. of Lessons 
 Solutions: Pulled from Reservoirs & Reused 
 Experts: Trade Knowledge in Problem-solving 
 Use of Audits: Increase Org. Profile 
 Email Warnings: Used to Pre-empt Problems 
M-Gates: Requires the Application of Knowledge 
Holistic Approach to Design: Domain Knowledge is Pulled 
to Integrate Product Components by Engineers 
Evaluation Phase: Measures Goals 
Simulation Modelling Design: Reused | Tested 
Solve Customer Calls: through Trouble-shooting 
Diagnose Problems: Create Solutions 
Reverse-engineer: Competitor Knowledge is Assessed  
Escalation Process: Combines Expert Knowledge 
Teleconferences| Compass| Email|: Enable Use 
Face-to-face Collaboration: Problem-solving 
Integrated View of Org. 
Reuse of Standards/Practices 
Stored Solutions – for reuse. 
Auditing – Doc. of Lessons 
Experts – trading Knowledge 
Use of Audits – Profile of Org. 
Project. Mgt Method 
Holistic Approach: Decisions 
Diagnose Problems 
Escalation Process 
Teleconferences/Compass/Email 
Face-to-face Collaboration. Differences o External knowledge is sourced, customised & reused 
o Lessons-learned are used as post-mortems 
o External evaluation raised the profile of the function 
o Method used to ensure use & reuse of knowledge 
o Experts are used to pull knowledge from different design 
domains in order to innovate (without SW) 
o Modelling is used to create 
o Utilises an escalation process to build solutions 
(6.) 
Control 
 3 Pronged Control approach: Alignment of Controls| 
Automatic virus updates| Testing of controls 
 NW security: Allocates Controls to Eng. Systems 
 Scanning of NW: to Monitor Employees | Rogues 
 Tunnelling: Builds Secure Encrypted Tunnels 
 Author Ownership: Assigned to Doc. Solutions 
 Priority Systems: Identified & Protected 
  HR Repositories: Experts Profiles 
 Eng. Labs: No Control which Creates Weak link 
Access Control Lists: Determine Access to Systems 
VPN: External Communication is Encrypted 
Legal Documents: (NDAs) Controls Expert Risks 
Security Environment Documents: ID Security Req. 
Engineering: Specify Access to Eng. Repositories 
Control Method 
Alignment of Controls 
Centralised Control 
Testing of controls  
Monitoring 
Ownership /Decision-maker 
Priority Systems 
ACL /VPN/ Tunnelling 
Legal & Control Documents 
Differences o Engineering Rights Exposes the Entire Corp NW o Eng. Innovative Process is not limited by Controls 
Specific to Customer Support 
 Specific to IS Security 
¾ Common to IS Security & Customer Support Functions  
Characteristics of TELE-Co Knowledge Processes 
Appendix G: TELE-Co IS Security and Customer Support Processes (Adapted from Tables: 6.6 and 6.9) 
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